28 May 1942. Muar, Malaya.
A selection of men of the Australian 8 and 9 Divisions and British 18th Division had been gathered to discuss the problems they’d had countering the Japanese bunkers at Ipoh. Between the strength of these defensive positions and their ability to support one another, the Australians had struggled to overcome the Japanese defenders. Most of the men at the meeting had been mentioned in dispatches for the way in which they had dealt with the Japanese bunkers. The men knew that there were plenty of others who hadn’t survived, who had tried various methods to deal with the bunkers.
A few things were taken for granted. When the infantry had tank support, they would be able to make progress. When the infantry were trying to deal with the bunkers without tank support they generally didn’t do so well. One of the problems that hadn’t been considered was that the camouflage of the bunkers was such that they weren’t always seen until too late. By which time the infantry were too close to the target for artillery support, and generally the bunkers were hardened enough to withstand mortar fire, even in some cases direct hits from 25-pdr shells.
It was clear that the infantry sections needed a weapon capable of engaging the bunkers that was man-portable, accurate and powerful. The Japanese Type 100 flamethrowers that had been examined were one solution that was being examined. One of the common responses to the discovery of Japanese bunkers was to mark them by firing a flare at them. On a couple of occasions, the flame of the flare spread, making life for the Japanese machine gunners more difficult, and therefore desirable for the British and Australian troops.
One enterprising Australian Company had persuaded a battery of 25-pdrs to lend them one gun and crew, which the Australians brought up during the cover of darkness and then used it to put direct fire into a bunker that had resisted everything else. The officers of the Royal Australian Artillery made it clear that they did not want a repeat of this, under any circumstances. What made the episode worse, was that the Forward Observer had remained with the gun’s crew who used it almost like a sniper. A Japanese NCO had been spotted giving orders, and the since he was in a position that had already been surveyed, the Forward Observer ‘nominated’ him, and the Japanese soldier was vapourised by a 25-lber shell.
The troops that had been supported by Matilda II infantry tanks, primarily from 18th Division, all seemed to have an easier time than those supported by Stuart Light tanks. The 2-pdr on the Matilda and the 37mm on the Stuart tanks weren’t a great deal of use, and in both cases, it was the machine guns on the tank that provided the cover for the infantry to close with the bunkers and destroy them. The exception was those sections supported by the Matilda II CS tanks with the 3-inch howitzer. These were far more effective providing direct fire HE rounds, and on many occasions providing smoke cover as well. The news that V Corps’ Tank Brigade was made up of Infantry Tanks, all equipped with the 3-inch howitzer and two machine guns, was a real sign that someone back in Blighty had listened to the previous reports.