27 November 1941. Rome, Italy.
The last message from General Nasi was passed on to Benito Mussolini. The commander of the last Italian garrison in Africa Orientale Italiana (AOI Italian East Africa) reported that his last reserves had been unable to stop the enemy, and that armoured vehicles had entered the town. Coupled with the latest messages from Tripoli of British breakthroughs in the last defensive positions protecting the capital of Africa Settentrionale Italiana (ASI Italian North Africa) brought the reality of the loss of the Italian empire home to the Italian dictator.
While he would claim some credit for the defeat of Greece, in reality, without German help, he could have ended up losing Albania. His outrage at the inability to defeat the British by land, sea or air had left him at odds with his military command. The reminder that they had been planning for war beginning in 1942, not early 1940, was an affront to his judgement. He was terribly aware that there were plenty of people whose husbands and sons, brothers and uncles now were sitting in camps around the British empire. At least they knew they were safe, there were far too many grieving parents, widows and children. Resentment against the war, with only defeat after defeat, was also, to Mussolini’s mind, resentment towards himself. The support of the Blackshirts was assured, but the armed forces were a different kettle of fish. He would need to look after his own position now: he’d lost an empire, it wouldn’t take too much for him to lose power altogether.
Mussolini’s relationship with Adolf Hitler had also cooled dramatically. Despite sending an Infantry and Panzer Division to stiffen Italian resolve, the Italian army had failed completely, costing Germany those two Divisions. The fact that most of the defeats inflicted on the Italian forces of AOI had come from Indians and Africans, not Europeans, just confirmed Hitler’s disdain for his ally’s ability.
Berlin was now having to look at contingencies for the possibilities of various actions by the British. If they take on the remaining French possessions in Africa, especially on the Mediterranean coast, that would have consequences for the Petain regime in Vichy. Worse, would be if Weygand went over to the ‘Free French’. There were plans in place to occupy the rest of France, but that would involve using forces that might overwise finish off the Soviets. The OKW now had to consider the potential of an invasion of Greece or even Italy itself. Intelligence told them that a new British army was being formed in Iran, and once the British 8th Army had finished with the Italians, these might be available to counter moves towards the Soviet oil supplies.
The onset of the terrible winter weather in Russia had stalled the German advance at the gates of Moscow. What was even more galling was that these ‘impenetrable’ British tanks were appearing there too. The German organization in charge of tank development (Wa. Prüf. 6) was commanded by Oberst Sebastian Fichtner. General Guderian had invited Fichtner to examine the Russian and British tanks captured by his panzer army. Having returned from the Eastern Front with his Special Armour Investigation Committee, he had reported his findings, and General Guderian’s requests.
They identified three advantages the T-34 had over the Panzer III. The first was the sloped armour, which afforded greater protection than flat armour of the same thickness. The second was the suspension; the T-34 used a Christie type suspension which along with its wide tracks gave excellent mobility, even over mud and snow. The third thing was that unlike German tank design which avoided the gun overhanging the front of the tank, the T-34’s longer barrel resulted in better muzzle velocity and thus better armour penetration.
The evaluation of a captured Valiant tank in Russia was relatively dismissive. It was certainly well armoured, but the 40mm gun was obsolescent, the suspension was an old style, without much room for improvement. The diesel engine was considered quite good, but otherwise the tank wasn’t any better than the Panzer III or IV. It was certainly a more impressive tank than the British Matilda Infantry tanks left behind in France, and the ‘cruiser’ style tanks. The new 50mm anti-tank gun was proving effective against the British armour, but only at a closer range than was comfortable for the gunners. The 7.5cm anti-tank gun, expected to begin production in February 1942 would be more than capable, as should the turret mounted version.
As well as these observations, Fichtner included General Guderian’s requests in his report. Firstly, all current tanks should have the minimum of the 5cm gun. New tanks must be made with wider tracks and lower ground pressure to deal with the mud and snow. He emphasised the need for all his panzer to be able to drive cross-country in all weathers. Thinking about the next generation of tanks, he wanted it to have a heavier armament, at least 7.5cm, the armour protection needed improved, the 7.6cm gun on the Soviet tank had to be countered. Finally, the importance of tactical mobility had to be learned. The new tank needed a high power-to-weight ratio, and so a more powerful engine would be essential.
The debate that Fichtner’s report began was between his own preference, to continue with the development of the VK20 project, the design of which was nearly complete. This project had been devised to replace the Panzer III and IV, and adapting it to Guderian’s recommendations would be easier, and faster, than starting from scratch.
On the other hand, the Reich Minister for Armaments and Ammunition, Fritz Todt, wanted to go-ahead and start work on designing a completely new tank. The shock of the T34/KV1, on top of the British Matilda/Valiant success over the panzer arm, asked too many questions of the current thinking. The VK20 project was still limited to 20 to 25 tonnes, what was needed was something that would start at 30 tonnes. The powerplant and suspension of the VK20 project, was in Todt’s opinion, not strong enough to really take the changes that would be needed.
Ultimately the political decision was made to begin work with a design competition between Daimler-Benz and M.A.N. They were requested to develop a tank between 30-35 tonnes, with sloped armour, designed to take Rheinmetall’s 7.5cm cannon, and with an engine providing between 650-700 horsepower, providing a top speed of 55kph. The design was to be ready by the spring of 1942, with prototypes and production models to follow as soon as possible. In the meantime, work on the Panzer III and IV to have additional armour added and the improved cannon fitted would keep these tanks capable of dealing with the enemy.
Progress on the heavier Panzer VI prototypes were being rushed to be ready for the Fuhrer’s birthday in April 1942. This at least would have the armour protection needed to deal with current and projected enemy anti-tank guns, and with the 88mm cannon, it would deal easily with just about anything thrown against it. It was hoped that it would be ready for production in the summer of 1942. Fichtner’s experience of tank development left him worried that such a rush would lead to problems with reliability when it entered service, which the new designation for the 30 tonne tank would likely suffer from too.