The Balkan war, part 1
From: The Balkan war, chapter 3- Formation of the league
“...in the end though, it would be the Ottomans themselves who removed the last obstacle in the formation of the Balkan league. The 4. of March speech would enter all the textbooks of Balkans, even though initially its importance was realized by very few, mostly due to the fact that it was a completely normal report on the status of Ottoman Balkan holdings. Its significance was due to two things. One, the speaker. Ahmed Niyazi Bey, one of the younger leaders of the Young Turk Revolution of 1908. A man of Albanian origin, as well as great personal skill and charisma, he was a raising star of the Ottoman empire, having done much to try and improve the standing of the state in Macedonia. While he retired from the army in 1909 due to disagreements with more senior commanders, he was still respected by many, and in the preparations for the 1911 royal tour of sultan Mehmed V. to Kosovo and Macedonia, Niyazi was called to provide assistance. A part of the preparations, an offer of a speech to the Ottoman house of deputies was made by several members of the ruling CUP. The speech was mostly in support of reforms in Albania and Macedonia, to prevent another revolt like the one in 1910. However, the ending of the speech would touch on another issue and should be fully shown:
And while the present issues are indeed daunting, we should rejoice for improvements are quickly forthcoming, as this grand tour shows. Indeed, our sights should be set further still, to a time where the Caliph’s authority is fully restored, from Sarajevo to Epir!
The speech went around quite well in the chamber, and most foreign observers noted it with little interest. However, in one city the reaction was much, much more furious.
In Vienna, the speech was seen as a direct challenge to the existing status quo in the Balkans. Having been under Austrian occupation since the Congress of Berlin, the mention of Sarajevo and by extension Bosnia was seen as a direct threat. The Austrians had held suspicion of the Young Turk regime since its creation, with the memoirs of the Chief of staff, Archduke Eugene, mentioning serious discussions of annexation of Bosnia right after the revolution, only stopped due to the recent treaty in Russia, and the insistence of the pro-Serbian faction at court.
Now, the Bey’s speech seemed to attack even the current settlement. In addition, the Austro-Hungarian Evidenzbureau intelligence service provided information of increasing Ottoman troop movements near Bosnia, and new plans in the Ottoman high command, including plans to invade Bosnia. While these would be proven to be fabrications, gained due to high treason in the Evidenzbureau, they only strengthened the increasing anti-Ottoman feeling in Vienna. While before this, Vienna was the main supporter of keeping Ottomans as the power in the Balkans, the March speech would prove to be the tipping point.
By June 1911, the Warsaw talks between Austro-Hungarian Foreign minister Alois Lexa von Aehrenthal and Russian foreign minister Alexander Izvolsky reaffirmed the previous positions of both powers on the division of Balkan spheres of influence. More importantly, both empires agreed to support a new division of the Balkans, including the partition of most of the Ottoman Balkan territories. Russia mostly wished to secure favourable position in Macedonia and Thrace for Bulgaria (though with the caveat of keeping Constantinople out of Bulgarian hands, and open for later Russian annexation). Austria meanwhile had to balance the interests of Serbia, with its own desire of not creating a strong Balkan power, capable of rivalling it. In the end, Aehrenthal agreed that favourable arrangement in Macedonia would be made for Bulgaria, while Izvolsky assured his counterpart that Austria would be free to decide the exact boundaries in its own sphere of influence. Crucially, the question of Greek claims was rather overlooked, including its territories in the Balkans.
The agreement was well timed indeed. Bulgaria was already busy negotiating a possible alliance with Greece and Montenegro, while diplomatic connections with Belgrade faced Austrian disagreement, previous disputes and the fact that several exiled Serbian politicians resided in Sofia. Both states did desire some sort of agreement. For Bulgaria, the need of another powerful land force to tie the Ottoman forces in the Balkans was of primary importance, as they did not consider Greece an adequate land ally (somewhat understandable given its poor performance in 1897), desiring Greek assistance against Ottoman navy. For Serbia, the issue was of legitimacy. The Serbian civil war might have ended almost a decade ago, however the support of Obrenović dynasty was far from assured. Many nationalists desired liberation of their fellow Serbs, and the lack of actions by king Alexander on this issue angered them to no end. King Alexander himself wished to gain a major foreign victory, to both ensure his family’s position and the continuation of his royal autocracy.
The Warsaw agreement finally allowed both states to sit down and hammer out an agreement. Macedonia was to be split into three zones, the Western and Northern one going to Serbia, the Eastern and Southern one to Bulgaria and the Central ones fate was to be decided later on, with a joint military occupation being employed there for some time. However, the unclear definition of new borders, and a provision to alter the borders with subsequent deals ensured that the issue of Macedonia was far from solved. Both Austria-Hungary and Russia provided assistance with the creation of the treaty, which was to be specifically anti-Ottoman in nature, and was signed on 11. January 1912 by prime minister Ivan Geshov of Bulgaria and the Serbian foreign minister Kosta Hristić (with the increasingly sick prime minister Todorović unable to attend, resigning a month later, replaced by Hristić).
With Montenegro and Greece also signing treaties with Bulgaria (though they were quite unclear on territories) and a formal assistance treaty between Greece and Serbia in September, the Balkan league came to existence. A somewhat unstable group of countries, bound by several treaties and shared animosity towards the Ottomans, the league would soon have its wish of a Balkan war, especially in the light of clear Italian success during its invasion of Libya. A small shooting incident at the beginning of September 1912 would lead to the Bulgarian declaration of war on the 20. September, followed by Montenegro, Serbia and finally Greece...”
From: The memoirs of the Southern liberation, by Dušan Simović
“...We managed to defend from the Ottoman assault near Kumanovo with surprising ease, the combined might of our three armies and the volunteers withstanding the Turks attacking in several waves on the 23. By the night, the volunteer scouts had brought in information and high ranking prisoners, revealing the attacking force was not merely the Ottoman forward force as previously thought, but almost the entire Vardar army. All honour has to go to the troops that took part in this scouting and their shrewd officers, for without their actions that would have to be considered legends if not for clear evidence, the Turks might have well withdrawn in good order to fight us another day. Instead, their leadership was decapitated, their organization thrown in disarray and way was open for our triumph.
The second day be the decisive one indeed, for the encircling manoeuvres by both our flanks caught much of the Ottoman army between them, converging ever southwards. Serving as an officer in the centre, under general Mišić was an experience I would not trade, yet it somewhat saddens me, that I was not there in the thick of the fighting, where great names such as Bojović, Šturm or Hötzendorf carved out glory and victory. Still, my men showed their bravery pinning down the Ottoman center troops with great resolve. By the noon, almost the entirety of the Ottoman army wasencircled. Indeed, the sheer fact of the amount of troops we had at our mercy was staggering. 60 000 men, many of whom decided to use the opportunity to promptly surrender or even try and join us! Their liberation from the Mohammedan tyrants had come, and they knew it!
Formerly, the Turks gave up on the 1. of November, mostly to save face. His royal highness, king Alexander himself, had arrived by that point to personally accept the surrender of the army of Vardar. Only a few thousand Ottoman troops escaped, most of them running home to their families, while the remnants would surrender in the following two weeks, as our armies seized Macedonia. While we could have easily marched all the way to Thessaloniki, the king and the generals (soon to receive new promotion to vojvodas for their performance) decided otherwise. The news coming were that of tense atmosphere between the Bulgarians who freed the city and the late arriving Greeks, so it was decided to concentrate on liberating Macedonia and deal with the remaining Turkish garrisons. While this would be role of the majority of our army, a part under newly promoted vojvoda Bojović, was to march to aid the Montenegrin force that besieged Scutari, one of the main remaining Ottoman holdouts in Northern Balkans. With Greeks dealing with Epirus and the lands of Albanian tribes in a state approaching anarchy, we believed the worst to be beyond us. Scutari would prove how naive we all were.
Everyone has their own version of the events that lead to the massacre of brothers. The Montenegrin’s damns us to the deepest pit of hell, and will likely continue to do so long after all of us that were present are naught, but bones. My tale of the events is different of course and I freely admit to the limits of my knowledge, but I also believe my story to be the truthful one. Having asked to be place in the force, I was there with vojvoda Bojović and the other officers upon our arrival on 2. of December. At first, the relations between us and the Montenegrin troops was quite good, even brotherly. Strange, to claim a Montenegrin as a brother today will only get you scoffs and insults in the homeland, but back then it seemed an indisputable fact. Then their damned reinforcements arrived.
To this day, the amount of support that Montenegro gave to the traitors who rebelled in 1903 is quite uncertain, especially as many responsible are either dead or hiding. However, it is a well known fact that there was much sadness at the coups failure. King Nikola hoped that the traitors would invite him to seize the Serbian crown, and unify the two states. Their failure and the strengthening of good king Alexander’s reign was a great disappointment to him. He hoped to improve his position by seizing as much of the Balkans as possible from the faltering Turks, but was faced with the mighty fortress of Scutari, where the Muslims gave one of the fiercest resistance efforts of that war. He called upon our army for aid, but also decided to make use off those that took fled justice to his country almost a decade before.
Almost two thousands former members of the traitors army, having fought only so long until flight was possible. Hoping for vengeance against our graceful king and his loyal subjects, they first hoped to strengthen their position in Montenegro, even gaining the ears of the then Crown prince Danilo. Their arrival to the siege in mid-February was perhaps the gravest insult Nikola could have hurled against us, and our vojvoda immediately asked for their disarming and surrender for trial. The pompous king refused, claiming them his own subjects, and challenging the vojvoda to make due on his demands, if he dared. Vojvoda Bojović decided to send messages for instructions from our king, not wishing to make a hasty action that might damage Serbia’s position in the world.
His highness was quite busy with the upcoming peace talks and the situation in Thessaloniki, and did not wish for unnecessary conflict. He ordered the vojvoda to negotiate merely the traitors return to Montenegro, even if it meant them escaping a well deserved punishment. In his wisdom, the king did all he could to save the cooperation between us and our allies. King Nikola had other ideas.
On 3. March, the vojvoda was off for another round of negotiations. On his way to the meeting, he was meat with a group of our allies cavalrymen, to provide honour guard. Considering that this happened during the previous negotiations as well, he had no reason to be suspicious. Yet only a few moments later, the riders took out their weapons and assaulted both him and his assistance. Six brave men died, and only quick thinking and great skill with horse saved the life of vojvoda Bojović. He was chased by the enemy riders all the way to our camp, where our sentries drove them off. At that moment, news were arriving that several of our units were attacked by our supposed allies. Our leader ordered our artillery pieces to be turned against the backstabbers, and for our reserve units, including my own, to aid our beleaguered troops.
The bombing proved quite effective, with many Montenegrin troops and officers being killed, including crown prince Danilo. Our following counter-assault forced the Montenegrin forces into full retreat, and allowed us to dispense justice onto many of our treacherous countryman, though unfortunately many escaped our grasp. Indeed, while our former allies would call for blood due to the death of their crown prince, the great powers found us in the right, both when they rejected the ridiculous Montenegrin demand for reparations, and when they decided that Scutari would become a part of our kingdom.
Indeed, though our forces were only half their previous numbers, the Turks were incapable of launching another counter-assault, and by the end of April had to surrender the fort to our glorious army, shortly before a force of Great powers arrived. With them, we jointly occupied the city, making sure to give good treatment to the locals and the captives, up until peace was signed. Next the final efforts of the army in Macedonia should also be mentioned….”
(Translators note: The truth behind the events of Scutari remain a mystery to this day. Whether it was a Montenegrin or Serbian provocation that begun the fighting has never been conclusively proven, though the international commission of Great powers ruled in Serbian favour)
From: Against all of Austria’s enemies, the biography of Conrad von Hötzendorf, chapter 12: In the Balkan war
“… while his removal from active service was a harsh blow to the feldmarshall’s pride, he remained certain that he would soon gain an opportunity to regain the Imperial favour, with his former superior Archduke Eugene serving as the chief of staff, and his good relations with the Imperial heir. The opportunity would come sooner then even Conrad expected, with the Balkan war erupting south of the empire’s borders. Conrad himself has gained some appreciation for the Serbs, regarding them as “almost Germanic” in their attention to warfare, and as an “excellent ally against any Magyar foolishness”. He especially took liking to king Alexander I., both for his iron-fisted rule and his good ties to Austria, and the good regard given to the Austrian intervention force during the civil war, of which von Hötzendorf himself was a member.
While the government in Vienna did not wish to directly send its troops to the Balkans, there was a clear desire to use the war to observe the development of warfare, and to support their Serbian allies. Meanwhile, there were many, especially among the Slavic nationalities in the Empire, that wished to aid their brethren in the Balkans in driving out the Turks. In the end, this would result in the formation of the United Volunteer Force, containing 12 156 men from all around the empire, later reinforced by several other volunteer contingents from other countries (especially Romania), though a few, most well known being the Italian one, refused to join the force that was regarded, (quite correctly), as an extended hand of Vienna.
Predominantly made out of Bohemians and Croatians (with the Hungarian government being much more weary of allowing for men to join), Hötzendorf was somewhat apprehensive of commanding a mostly Slavic force, writing to his wife that “I will only have few true soldiers from Styria and Tyrol to rely upon”. His worries would prove unfounded though, with his later remarks giving much more positive image of his troops, though not without much self praise. Among the soldiers themselves, Hötzendorf was regarded as something of a rash leader, and quite demanding. However, his ability to gain triumph in battles, and to make sure his troops were always well supplied generally won him good image and memories among his troops. In his 1970 memoirs of these days, the then retired feldmarshall Ludvík Krejčí would praise Hötzendorf as “the finest commander I had the pleasure to serve under”. Indeed, many of the volunteers would go on to gain high ranks in later years, so much that many would grumble on the preferences shown to “Conrad’s lads”.
The greatest showing of the volunteer force would of course be at the battle of Kumanovo. Placed at the somewhat weak Serbian left wing, the foggy day of 23. allowed for little visibility. This allowed the Ottomans to deal the first blow on the Serbian army, concentrating their numerically inferior forces against the left wing. The artillery bombardment made their intentions quite clear, and the attack was met with and repulsed by the combined Serb-Volunteer forces. Despite the prevailing fog, von Hötzendorf ordered for large reconnaissance operation to make the true state of the enemy clear, while the majority of his forces would commence a counter-assault. This would throw the Ottomans back to their original lines, and gave the aggressive Hötzendorf the idea for a continued assault. However, the army command had little to no idea of what amount of the Ottoman forces they were facing, and general Mišić was loath to attack a force that might well outnumber him. It was in the evening that Hötzendorf’s scouts returned, with shocking news, prisoners of highest importance and an unbelievable tale.
The 300 strong reconnaissance unit had managed to avoid engaging the Ottoman forces for the entirety of their march, eventually slipping behind the main Ottoman force, and managing to approach the main Ottoman encampment. There their luck seemingly ran out, as they were spotted by the Ottoman guards. However, most Ottoman troops had no idea that there even was such a thing as an United Volunteer Army, and the unfamiliar grey uniforms the volunteers wore confused them severely. This confusion was quickly used by one of the volunteers, a man from a mixed Czech-Montenegrin marriage, with good knowledge of several local languages. Introducing himself and his fellow soldiers as German military advisors, sent to aid the Sultans army, he quickly excused their late arrival and requested to be taken to the centre of the camp. The audacious idea would be one of the many that the then-lieutenant Radola Gajda would later become famous for. The sleep-wary guards were utterly confused by such a turn of events (as were many of the volunteers themselves), and send for an officer. A certain yüzbaşı (captain) in the Ottoman army, he actually had met several German attaches in the past, and had at least some idea of their language and mannerism. While confused that no such arrival was announced beforehand, the performance of Gajda and several of his fellow volunteers in fluent German (though at least one of them would later say to have been angrily screaming out a repeat of a children story), would convince him that he had genuine German soldiers before him. The man would interestingly enough escape the catastrophe of the following hours and days, and would later be judged and acquainted by a military tribunal (though dismissed from holding any army post in the future).
What followed seemed to be something out of a bad comedy as the officer lead Gajda and the other volunteers directly to the centre of the camp, to the main tent that housed the staff and commanders of the Vardar army. Realizing that the deception would not hold for long here, the volunteers sprung into action upon reaching the tent, disarming the nearby Ottoman guards, and capturing nearly the entire command of the Ottoman forces including its leader, general Zeki Pasha. The following escape was more of a mad dash towards the battle lines, through utterly confused Ottoman troops. In this, young Croatian officers Mihajlo Lukić and Eduard de Bona would take the main part, leading the spearhead of the assault that cut through the Ottoman positions. By the time they got to the actual battle lines, the Ottoman troops managed to put together a defensive position facing them. Only for it to be overrun by a mad charge of over a hundred, predominantly Croatian, volunteers. Though they were short 60 men by the time they returned to the main army, the volunteer scouts succeeded beyond the wildest expectations anyone had of them. While not exactly pleased by the subterfuge that was used, Hötzendorf was much more interested in the fact that he now had an excellent idea of the opposing forces. That it was the entire Ottoman army in Macedonia, they now lacked their leadership and that it was only half as strong as the Serbian army in the area, not even counting the volunteers.
The Serbian army command was at first unwilling to believe that these informations could be true, especially from such fantastically sounding source, but when Zeki Pasha himself was delivered to general Misić, he realized that the mad tale was actually true. He now had an excellent idea of what he was facing, and he was going to use it.
The offensive that erupted the following day was commanded on the right flank by general Bojović, while on the left, general Šturm and Hötzendorf were the main officers in charge, while Misić organized the action, using the troops of the centre to pin down the Ottoman forces. Using the paths previously exploited by the volunteers, the left flank was able to get behind, and cut off any escape the Ottomans had, while the right flank launched an unexpected assault upon the Ottoman positions and camp. To the credit of the Ottoman army, once their remaining officers realised their predicament, they attempted several well coordinated assaults upon the Serbian left flank, hoping to carve a path out of the encirclement. However, the Serbian-volunteer force held out, and by the end of the day, the Ottomans were forced to cease their assaults, too tired and running dangerously low on ammunition. Only a small portion of the Ottoman army managed to escape southwards, before the right and left Serbian flanks connected. The encircled troops would formerly surrender on 1. of November, with Zeki Pasha being allowed to temporarily return to his troops, only to convince them that further resistance had no meaning. He would surrender both himself and his army to king Alexander.
For von Hötzendorf, the battle was a glorious example of the truth of his war theories, and especially the need for quick and decisive offensives. He however faced a problem with his troops. When the news of the impersonation that the volunteers committed reached the German embassy in Constantinople and through it Berlin, several harsh protests were levelled upon the volunteers for such an act of dishonesty, and the shame it brought to Germany, and Conrad himself for allowing his troops to commit such acts. This was not helped when von Hötzendorf refused to punish the main instigators, aside from an order to not repeat such actions in the future. When the Germans turned upon Vienna, the Austrian government promptly declared that they had no jurisdiction over the volunteers and their acts, a blatant falsehood considering the amount of the volunteers that were part of the Kuk army itself. In the end, the brief worsening of relations was mostly solved after a meeting between Kaiser Wilhelm II. and Archduke Franz Ferdinand, with the latter convincing the former that such a thing was a mere one-time mistake that would not repeat itself, and that it would be beneath the German dignity to overly bother such a great empire. Wilhelm, in a surprisingly good mood that day, agreed though he warned Franz Ferdinand to make sure, “his barbaric Slavs knew not to repeat such an insult again”. The incident would be one of the first signs of a slow worsening in Austro-German relations, that would culminate in the famous events of 1914 and 1915.
Meanwhile, the volunteers and Hötzendorf himself were regarded as heroes in Serbia and their homeland, with many of the volunteers going on to achieve high ranks and positions in both Austria-Hungary and elsewhere. While Hötzendorf’s greatest glory was yet to come, he was now regarded as a reliable friend of Serbia (even developing good relations with several of the Serbian generals), while his friends in Vienna signalled to him that his previous mistakes were fully forgotten, and that his star was on the rise in Vienna. The volunteer force would take limited part in the rest of the Balkan war, avoiding the dramatic events of Thessaloniki, Thrace and Scutari, mostly concentrating on taking part in the liberation of Macedonia. Upon his return home after the end of the fighting, von Hötzendorf would soon find himself in command of the newly created army of the Balkans, where a surprising amount of former volunteers also soon found their place. In leading it, Hötzendorf would soon build upon reputation from Kumanovo, though that part will be covered in the chapters dedicated to the Four months war...”
A follow-up on my Serbia piece.
