Alternate Wikipedia Infoboxes VI (Do Not Post Current Politics or Political Figures Here)
- Status
The 1867 Confederate States presidential election in South Carolina in Harry Turtledove's The Guns of the South
The 1867 Confederate States presidential election in South Carolina took place on November 5, 1867, as part of the 1867 Confederate States presidential election. The state legislature chose eight representatives, or electors to the Electoral College, who voted for president and vice president. South Carolina was the only state in the Confederacy that used this procedure in a presidential election.
South Carolina would cast its eight electoral votes for the Patriot candidate Nathan Bedford Forrest. These electors were chosen by the South Carolina General Assembly, the state legislature, rather than by popular vote. However, Confederate Party candidate Robert E. Lee would narrowly win the election.
Both of the running mates of the election were born in South Carolina. Lee's running mate Albert Gallatin Brown was born in Chester County while Forrest's running mate Louis Wigfall was born in the town of Edgefield.
Note: I plan on making presidential election infoboxes for all the US and Confederate States that participated in the 1864 and 1867 presidential elections. I decided to do South Carolina first since that one would be the easiest to make since the state doesn't even have a popular vote.
Page 38: The 1867 Confederate States presidential election
* Page 307: The 1867 Confederate States presidential election in South Carolina (you are here)
Page 39: The 1864 United States presidential election
* Page 307: The 1867 Confederate States presidential election in South Carolina (you are here)
Page 39: The 1864 United States presidential election
The 1867 Confederate States presidential election in South Carolina took place on November 5, 1867, as part of the 1867 Confederate States presidential election. The state legislature chose eight representatives, or electors to the Electoral College, who voted for president and vice president. South Carolina was the only state in the Confederacy that used this procedure in a presidential election.
South Carolina would cast its eight electoral votes for the Patriot candidate Nathan Bedford Forrest. These electors were chosen by the South Carolina General Assembly, the state legislature, rather than by popular vote. However, Confederate Party candidate Robert E. Lee would narrowly win the election.
Both of the running mates of the election were born in South Carolina. Lee's running mate Albert Gallatin Brown was born in Chester County while Forrest's running mate Louis Wigfall was born in the town of Edgefield.
Note: I plan on making presidential election infoboxes for all the US and Confederate States that participated in the 1864 and 1867 presidential elections. I decided to do South Carolina first since that one would be the easiest to make since the state doesn't even have a popular vote.
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The person pictured as the nominee is Nathan Bedford Forrest, but the person stated in the text as the nominee is Louis Wigfall
Last edited:
I just noticed the problem and corrected it. Thanks for letting me know, @viewcode .
Resigned after falling out with Dole, later ran as an independent candidate in 1996.
List of US Presidents from my recent wikiboxes
Rockefeller never appointed a new VP?
A result of my recent interest in Serbia...
From: The Serbian 20. century, chapter 5, the May coup and its immediate consequences
“… in the end it would be a great amount of luck that saved the royal couple. While the plotters originally planned to seize the royal palace thanks to the members of the royal guard they have managed to gain to their side, many of those would be revealed by a last minute confession of one Captain Jovan Miljkovi. An officer aware of the conspiracy, but previously unwilling to either reveal it or join it, the reason for his change of heart remains a mystery, likely to never be solved. However his actions would prove decisive for the fate of both House of Obrenović and Serbia.
A series of arrests of the disloyal guards, among them Lieutenant Colonel Mihailo Naumović who was at the moment preparing to assume command of the royal guard. The king then ordered for several government members, including the Prime minister Marković and minister of defence Pavlović, as well as the brothers of his wife, to be summoned so that further course could be decided.
The coup was however already beginning. Only Pavlović and minister of justice Todorović managed to reach the palace early enough. Prime minister Marković was stopped by the coup aligned units and promptly executed. The queens brothers were both arrested and shot the following day. At that time, it was becoming evident that loyalist elements had little to no chance of holding onto Belgrade, with only the loyalty of the remaining royal guardsman certain. While the king and his ministers were uncertain of what to do, it would be the kings firs aide-de-camp, Lazar Petrovič, who offered a solution. The royal couple, along with the ministers and a few loyal guards would flee, preferably to the East of Serbia where army units were hoped to be loyal. Petrovič would meanwhile take the command of the palace, and hold it with the remaining members of the guard for as long as possible.
While the king was reluctant to abandon the capital and his men to their fate, he was convinced that his survival was utterly necessary if an effective opposition to the coup was to be rallied. The royal pair and their group left only half an hour before the plotters arrived. General Petrovič announced to the men that they would defend the royal family for as long as possible, hopefully until loyal units would relieve them. It seems that he did not wish to undermine the morale of the troops, and might have suspected that plotters still had men inside. Indeed, a certain Lieutenant Petar Živković was not revealed as a plot member, and quickly managed to inform the rest of the conspirators of the situation at the palace.
Originally expected the palace to be seized from the inside, the plotters had to quickly organize the 11. and 12. Infantry regiments, that have already rallied to the coup, for a march at the palace. What ensued was a desperate defence by the Royal guard, betrayed once again by Živković, who would help the forces of the plotters in entering the palace itself. His treachery would not be rewarded though, as he was shot and killed during following firefights inside the palace. In the end, the plotters reached the royal bedchambers, only to find them lacking their targets.
Many uncertainties surround the battle of the palace. It is unclear whether the royal Guard truly fought to the last men, or if they attempted to surrender only to be treacherously slain. The fate of general Petrovič too is unclear. Where he was killed, as well as if it was in fight or after surrendering remain sources of debate. What is known for certain is that his body was later thrown from a window of the palace to the courtyard below and later buried in a mass grave with his men (all of them would receive a proper burial in November).
When the plotters realized that the royal family has fled, it caused much panic among them, as instead of a fait accompli to present to the nation, they instead faced deep uncertainty of what to do. While some like general Atanacković hoped that the king would flee to Austria, where he would present only a distant issue, others were not so sure. Lieutenant Dragutin Dimitrijević Apis, one of the original plotters and one of the current leaders would correctly guess that the king would attempt to get to loyalist forces, which likely meant going to the south.
In a few days after the coup, a new government was quickly gathered in Belgrade under the liberal prime minister Avakumović. Almost immediately, the government faced a large amount of problems, chief among them being the new found hesitancy of the political parties. With the king still very much alive, even if his location was unknown, many were no longer willing to join a revolt that might not succeed. It would be at the suggestion of Apis that a group of officers and politicians, under the newly made Minister of construction and army colonel Aleksandar Mašin (who lead the attack at the palace) and Lieutenant Vojislav Tankosić (who previously executed the brothers of Queen Draga), be sent to Niš, to rally the local troops to the coup and hopefully catch the Royal couple and in his words, “rid us of these troublesome individuals”.
Of course, this would prove a rather unsuccessful tactic as we will see in chapter six….”
The Serbian civil war was a four month long armed struggle from June to October 1903, between the loyalists of the ruling Obrenoić dynasty and the coalition of opposition groups with differing goals, including republicans, supporters of house Karadordevic and socialists, united by their anti-Obrenović and mostly anti-Austrian and pro-Russian position. The conflict begun with the May coup that seized Belgrade and forced the royal family to flee to Niš and ended with the siege of Belgrade by a combined force of royalists and Austrian intervention corps.
The flight to Niš was a risky task for the royal party and would take several days of road and river travel to accomplish. Indeed, they arrived only a day before the group sent by the plotters arrived to the city. This would prove crucial, as the king managed to meet the local commanders, thankfully for him not associated with the coup, and rally them to his side. The same would hold true to the low ranks, who even seized a group of coup associated junior officers who attempted a take-over.
By the time the emissaries of the coup arrived, they were promptly arrested. Their fate was not even discussed, both Mašin and Tankosić were promptly hanged. The plotters had shown in Belgrade that mercy was not in their minds, and king Alexander was ready to respond in kind.
Meanwhile, the world was beginning to react. While the plotters have made sure to not target foreign embassies, especially hoping for a quick Russian recognition, they were quickly disappointed. The condemnation was rather universal among the powers, and the loudest one was coming from Vienna and St. Petersburg. While Austria-Hungary had clear reasons to support increasingly aligned Obrenović, the response from Russia was much more surprising. For Tsar Nicholas II., supporting a group of traitors against a legitimate monarch proved an unimaginable proposition. While the radical pan-slavists at the court attempted to convince the Tsar that supporting the coup would be in Russia’s best interest, he would refuse and further entrusted foreign minister Lamsdorf, a supporter of detente with Vienna and policy of stable state of affairs in the Balkans, to give official support to the house of Obrenović. While no Russian troops would take part in the civil war, its refusal to recognize the plotters would prove crucial.
In Vienna meanwhile, a debate was raging. Many called for a direct and immediate military intervention to support the Obrenović and turn Serbia into an effective puppet state. Others, lead by Minister of Foreign Affairs Goluchowski and the heir to the throne Archduke Franz Ferdinand, instead wished to coordinate any action with the Russians, so as not to liquidate the recent diplomatic improvements between the two powers. Meanwhile, the XIV. Army corps under Archduke Eugen was re-deployed close to the Serbian borders and reinforced by additional troops, so that it could intervene if decided so.
While St. Petersburg and Vienna were quickly trying to reach a diplomatic deal on Serbia, the military conflict in the country itself had openly begun. While most of central and southern Serbia remained loyal to king Alexander, much of the north and north-east was either seized or joined with the government in Belgrade. Both sides were well aware that the war had to be decided quickly, but the plotters in Belgrade were the ones in greater hurry, thanks to the threat of foreign intervention hanging over them like the sword of Damocles. This would be the reason for the launching of the Great southwards offensive, with the ultimate goal being the seizure of Niš. Due to the hilly terrain of Serbia, the fighting would mostly take place close to the main rivers. Under the command of the coup-aligned general Stepanović, the Southwards offensive would last for a month, pitting him against generals Bojović and Mišić and the hastily assembled royalist forces under their command. While at first quite successful, the offensive would bog-down in the city of Aleskinac. The heavy street fighting would lead to two weeks of struggle, while increasing amounts of pro-Obrenović units arrived. By the 30. of July, the royalists launched their own offensive, almost encircling the pro-coup troops in Aleskinac. While the rebels managed to escape in time, they would loose much of the artillery they possessed. The royalist advance northwards would be bitterly opposed, turning into a two month hard march towards Belgrade under the newly promoted general Misić, while a secondary force under general Bojović prepared to strike against several pro-plot strongholds in the west of the country.
By the beginning of August, the so-called Krakow negotiations between Austria-Hungary and Russia finally came to a mostly successful end. At first between the foreign ministers, later including personal meeting of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and Tsar Nicholas II., the negotiations finally yielded the desired outcome. In the end the provisions were such:
The Austrian intervention would begin on the 15. August. While the main bulk of the forces under Archduke Eugen was to advance towards Belgrade, a single division under general Conrad von Hötzendorf was to link up with the Obrenović forces under general Bojović. Here, Hötzendorf’s troops would have to fight in a hilly, almost mountainous, terrain, an experience that would have a profound effect on the general in later years. In the end, the southern front was of lesser import and both the royalist and Austrian forces would link up in Užice on 3. October, a day after the civil war ended in the North.
The Austrian intervention forced the Belgrade government to split its remaining forces to handle two fronts. While necessary, the move would prove fatal for the forces under Stepanović in the east, whose force was cut off at the city of Požarevac by the advancing royalists, where he would surrender on the 25. of September. General Mišić would not wait for the surrender, taking a large part of his forces directly towards Belgrade to prevent the plotters from escaping. In this, he would prove quite successful, as by the time he encircled Belgrade on the 28. September, only a few of the main coup backers managed to escape, with the big fish caught. On the 30. September, he was joined by the forces of Archduke Eugen, who managed a somewhat swift offensive through northern Serbia. Now outnumbering the rebels 8 to 1, the two day long battle of Belgrade would take place, ending with the surrender of remaining pro-coup forces on the 2. October. While a few members of the Belgrade government like general Atanacković would die fighting, others would surrender, hoping to keep their necks.
This would prove a fools hope, especially after a plot sympathetic soldier assassinated queen Draga a week after the capitals fall. The vengeance of king Alexander was brutal, with every caught officer of the original Black hand as well as the officers that took part in the coup itself or any of the murders of royalists being given the noose, including Apis himself. The same would prove true for the Belgrade government ministers, including Avakumović. Some mercy was given to the surrendered Stepanović and his officers for their early surrender, receiving life sentences instead (Stepanović would die in prison in 1925). Main Serbian parties were effectively banned, with a government appointed and responsible only to the king taking power under the former Minister of Justice Todorović formed. While parliamentary elections would again start taking place in 1905, Serbia was effectively turned into a royal dictatorship for the rest of king Alexander’s long reign.
A self-proclaimed government in exile under Đorđe Genčić would be formed in Switzerland, it quickly lost support of most exiled groups, and would disband after the massive swelling of popular support for the Obrenović dynasty after the Balkan war and the Four months war.
While some of the rebel troops escaped or took to banditry, their numbers were rather small. Indeed, the amount of troops the coupists managed to rally was quite limited by the loyality of large parts of the population to the king and the believe that the revolt was doomed from the start. While enjoying a temporary advantage in numbers during their offensive, by the beginning of September, the numbers had fully turned against the rebels.
From: Liberator and Autocrat, the long reign of Alexander I. of Serbia
“...by the time the civil war ended, the king has undergone a true change into an autocrat. Especially after the murder of his wife, he would take severe actions upon the plotters and all who he saw as a threat. The period of Complete autocracy would last for two years, with king Alexander and an advisory cabinet overseeing the function of Serbia without any control by a legislative body. In the meantime, the king was also facing the succession question. He refused to consider his illegitimate half-brother outright, and any talk of union with Montenegro was dashed by the latter’s safeguarding of several coup plotters.
While originally refusing to re-marry, the king was convinced by the end of 1904 that unless he remarried, the throne would likely be offered to the rival Karađorđević family after his death. Unwilling to accept his family’s rivals as the next kings of Serbia, the king would begin to look for a royal match that would ensure him succession. In this he was helped by the increasingly good relations with Vienna and Berlin. There was even some talk of the kings marriage to a member of the Habsburg family, though such an idea was refused by emperor Frnaz Joseph. In the end, it would be the daughter of king Ludwig III. of Bavaria, the 23 year old princess Hildegard. An artistically minded woman, it took much convincing for both her and her father to agree to the match, especially with Alexander’s previous foolishness when it came to German nobility and marriage.
The marriage that took place in 1905 would certainly not be a loving one. In time, a sense of respect did develop between the two, and Hildegard would become truly enamoured with Serbia. The people too would come to like the artistic and charitable queen, who would quickly prove much more popular then Draga ever was. The marriage was also used by the king to announce that new elections would be held. While well received by the public, they would prove of little import. Candidates had to receive a royal approval, with the members of the senate directly appointed. Political parties remained prohibited, and the candidates could only stand as independents. While the system would somewhat liberalize in the following decades, a true return to democracy would only occur after Alexander’s death.
Truly happy news would come in 1908, when the queen was confirmed as pregnant. In the end, a healthy boy named Milan would be born, the only one the royal couple would have. The securing of the royal dynasty in the boy that would one day become Milan II. and I., would be widely celebrated in Serbia, with congratulations coming from all over Europe. This would prove the first of the four high points of the kings reign, with the second one to come in, but 3 years...”
Used the map of Serbia in 1900 for the base of the map in the second wikibox
From: The Serbian 20. century, chapter 5, the May coup and its immediate consequences
“… in the end it would be a great amount of luck that saved the royal couple. While the plotters originally planned to seize the royal palace thanks to the members of the royal guard they have managed to gain to their side, many of those would be revealed by a last minute confession of one Captain Jovan Miljkovi. An officer aware of the conspiracy, but previously unwilling to either reveal it or join it, the reason for his change of heart remains a mystery, likely to never be solved. However his actions would prove decisive for the fate of both House of Obrenović and Serbia.
A series of arrests of the disloyal guards, among them Lieutenant Colonel Mihailo Naumović who was at the moment preparing to assume command of the royal guard. The king then ordered for several government members, including the Prime minister Marković and minister of defence Pavlović, as well as the brothers of his wife, to be summoned so that further course could be decided.
The coup was however already beginning. Only Pavlović and minister of justice Todorović managed to reach the palace early enough. Prime minister Marković was stopped by the coup aligned units and promptly executed. The queens brothers were both arrested and shot the following day. At that time, it was becoming evident that loyalist elements had little to no chance of holding onto Belgrade, with only the loyalty of the remaining royal guardsman certain. While the king and his ministers were uncertain of what to do, it would be the kings firs aide-de-camp, Lazar Petrovič, who offered a solution. The royal couple, along with the ministers and a few loyal guards would flee, preferably to the East of Serbia where army units were hoped to be loyal. Petrovič would meanwhile take the command of the palace, and hold it with the remaining members of the guard for as long as possible.
While the king was reluctant to abandon the capital and his men to their fate, he was convinced that his survival was utterly necessary if an effective opposition to the coup was to be rallied. The royal pair and their group left only half an hour before the plotters arrived. General Petrovič announced to the men that they would defend the royal family for as long as possible, hopefully until loyal units would relieve them. It seems that he did not wish to undermine the morale of the troops, and might have suspected that plotters still had men inside. Indeed, a certain Lieutenant Petar Živković was not revealed as a plot member, and quickly managed to inform the rest of the conspirators of the situation at the palace.
Originally expected the palace to be seized from the inside, the plotters had to quickly organize the 11. and 12. Infantry regiments, that have already rallied to the coup, for a march at the palace. What ensued was a desperate defence by the Royal guard, betrayed once again by Živković, who would help the forces of the plotters in entering the palace itself. His treachery would not be rewarded though, as he was shot and killed during following firefights inside the palace. In the end, the plotters reached the royal bedchambers, only to find them lacking their targets.
Many uncertainties surround the battle of the palace. It is unclear whether the royal Guard truly fought to the last men, or if they attempted to surrender only to be treacherously slain. The fate of general Petrovič too is unclear. Where he was killed, as well as if it was in fight or after surrendering remain sources of debate. What is known for certain is that his body was later thrown from a window of the palace to the courtyard below and later buried in a mass grave with his men (all of them would receive a proper burial in November).
When the plotters realized that the royal family has fled, it caused much panic among them, as instead of a fait accompli to present to the nation, they instead faced deep uncertainty of what to do. While some like general Atanacković hoped that the king would flee to Austria, where he would present only a distant issue, others were not so sure. Lieutenant Dragutin Dimitrijević Apis, one of the original plotters and one of the current leaders would correctly guess that the king would attempt to get to loyalist forces, which likely meant going to the south.
In a few days after the coup, a new government was quickly gathered in Belgrade under the liberal prime minister Avakumović. Almost immediately, the government faced a large amount of problems, chief among them being the new found hesitancy of the political parties. With the king still very much alive, even if his location was unknown, many were no longer willing to join a revolt that might not succeed. It would be at the suggestion of Apis that a group of officers and politicians, under the newly made Minister of construction and army colonel Aleksandar Mašin (who lead the attack at the palace) and Lieutenant Vojislav Tankosić (who previously executed the brothers of Queen Draga), be sent to Niš, to rally the local troops to the coup and hopefully catch the Royal couple and in his words, “rid us of these troublesome individuals”.
Of course, this would prove a rather unsuccessful tactic as we will see in chapter six….”
The Serbian civil war was a four month long armed struggle from June to October 1903, between the loyalists of the ruling Obrenoić dynasty and the coalition of opposition groups with differing goals, including republicans, supporters of house Karadordevic and socialists, united by their anti-Obrenović and mostly anti-Austrian and pro-Russian position. The conflict begun with the May coup that seized Belgrade and forced the royal family to flee to Niš and ended with the siege of Belgrade by a combined force of royalists and Austrian intervention corps.
The flight to Niš was a risky task for the royal party and would take several days of road and river travel to accomplish. Indeed, they arrived only a day before the group sent by the plotters arrived to the city. This would prove crucial, as the king managed to meet the local commanders, thankfully for him not associated with the coup, and rally them to his side. The same would hold true to the low ranks, who even seized a group of coup associated junior officers who attempted a take-over.
By the time the emissaries of the coup arrived, they were promptly arrested. Their fate was not even discussed, both Mašin and Tankosić were promptly hanged. The plotters had shown in Belgrade that mercy was not in their minds, and king Alexander was ready to respond in kind.
Meanwhile, the world was beginning to react. While the plotters have made sure to not target foreign embassies, especially hoping for a quick Russian recognition, they were quickly disappointed. The condemnation was rather universal among the powers, and the loudest one was coming from Vienna and St. Petersburg. While Austria-Hungary had clear reasons to support increasingly aligned Obrenović, the response from Russia was much more surprising. For Tsar Nicholas II., supporting a group of traitors against a legitimate monarch proved an unimaginable proposition. While the radical pan-slavists at the court attempted to convince the Tsar that supporting the coup would be in Russia’s best interest, he would refuse and further entrusted foreign minister Lamsdorf, a supporter of detente with Vienna and policy of stable state of affairs in the Balkans, to give official support to the house of Obrenović. While no Russian troops would take part in the civil war, its refusal to recognize the plotters would prove crucial.
In Vienna meanwhile, a debate was raging. Many called for a direct and immediate military intervention to support the Obrenović and turn Serbia into an effective puppet state. Others, lead by Minister of Foreign Affairs Goluchowski and the heir to the throne Archduke Franz Ferdinand, instead wished to coordinate any action with the Russians, so as not to liquidate the recent diplomatic improvements between the two powers. Meanwhile, the XIV. Army corps under Archduke Eugen was re-deployed close to the Serbian borders and reinforced by additional troops, so that it could intervene if decided so.
While St. Petersburg and Vienna were quickly trying to reach a diplomatic deal on Serbia, the military conflict in the country itself had openly begun. While most of central and southern Serbia remained loyal to king Alexander, much of the north and north-east was either seized or joined with the government in Belgrade. Both sides were well aware that the war had to be decided quickly, but the plotters in Belgrade were the ones in greater hurry, thanks to the threat of foreign intervention hanging over them like the sword of Damocles. This would be the reason for the launching of the Great southwards offensive, with the ultimate goal being the seizure of Niš. Due to the hilly terrain of Serbia, the fighting would mostly take place close to the main rivers. Under the command of the coup-aligned general Stepanović, the Southwards offensive would last for a month, pitting him against generals Bojović and Mišić and the hastily assembled royalist forces under their command. While at first quite successful, the offensive would bog-down in the city of Aleskinac. The heavy street fighting would lead to two weeks of struggle, while increasing amounts of pro-Obrenović units arrived. By the 30. of July, the royalists launched their own offensive, almost encircling the pro-coup troops in Aleskinac. While the rebels managed to escape in time, they would loose much of the artillery they possessed. The royalist advance northwards would be bitterly opposed, turning into a two month hard march towards Belgrade under the newly promoted general Misić, while a secondary force under general Bojović prepared to strike against several pro-plot strongholds in the west of the country.
By the beginning of August, the so-called Krakow negotiations between Austria-Hungary and Russia finally came to a mostly successful end. At first between the foreign ministers, later including personal meeting of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and Tsar Nicholas II., the negotiations finally yielded the desired outcome. In the end the provisions were such:
- Austria-Hungary would send an army corps of no less then 40 000 men to support the rightful Serbian government.
- Both empires would continue their support for the rightful royal government and would not in any way aid or shelter the coup participants.
- Austria-Hungary would pledge that no annexation of Serbian territory would take place, and that all troops would be withdrawn latest a month after the liberation of Belgrade.
The Austrian intervention would begin on the 15. August. While the main bulk of the forces under Archduke Eugen was to advance towards Belgrade, a single division under general Conrad von Hötzendorf was to link up with the Obrenović forces under general Bojović. Here, Hötzendorf’s troops would have to fight in a hilly, almost mountainous, terrain, an experience that would have a profound effect on the general in later years. In the end, the southern front was of lesser import and both the royalist and Austrian forces would link up in Užice on 3. October, a day after the civil war ended in the North.
The Austrian intervention forced the Belgrade government to split its remaining forces to handle two fronts. While necessary, the move would prove fatal for the forces under Stepanović in the east, whose force was cut off at the city of Požarevac by the advancing royalists, where he would surrender on the 25. of September. General Mišić would not wait for the surrender, taking a large part of his forces directly towards Belgrade to prevent the plotters from escaping. In this, he would prove quite successful, as by the time he encircled Belgrade on the 28. September, only a few of the main coup backers managed to escape, with the big fish caught. On the 30. September, he was joined by the forces of Archduke Eugen, who managed a somewhat swift offensive through northern Serbia. Now outnumbering the rebels 8 to 1, the two day long battle of Belgrade would take place, ending with the surrender of remaining pro-coup forces on the 2. October. While a few members of the Belgrade government like general Atanacković would die fighting, others would surrender, hoping to keep their necks.
This would prove a fools hope, especially after a plot sympathetic soldier assassinated queen Draga a week after the capitals fall. The vengeance of king Alexander was brutal, with every caught officer of the original Black hand as well as the officers that took part in the coup itself or any of the murders of royalists being given the noose, including Apis himself. The same would prove true for the Belgrade government ministers, including Avakumović. Some mercy was given to the surrendered Stepanović and his officers for their early surrender, receiving life sentences instead (Stepanović would die in prison in 1925). Main Serbian parties were effectively banned, with a government appointed and responsible only to the king taking power under the former Minister of Justice Todorović formed. While parliamentary elections would again start taking place in 1905, Serbia was effectively turned into a royal dictatorship for the rest of king Alexander’s long reign.
A self-proclaimed government in exile under Đorđe Genčić would be formed in Switzerland, it quickly lost support of most exiled groups, and would disband after the massive swelling of popular support for the Obrenović dynasty after the Balkan war and the Four months war.
While some of the rebel troops escaped or took to banditry, their numbers were rather small. Indeed, the amount of troops the coupists managed to rally was quite limited by the loyality of large parts of the population to the king and the believe that the revolt was doomed from the start. While enjoying a temporary advantage in numbers during their offensive, by the beginning of September, the numbers had fully turned against the rebels.
From: Liberator and Autocrat, the long reign of Alexander I. of Serbia
“...by the time the civil war ended, the king has undergone a true change into an autocrat. Especially after the murder of his wife, he would take severe actions upon the plotters and all who he saw as a threat. The period of Complete autocracy would last for two years, with king Alexander and an advisory cabinet overseeing the function of Serbia without any control by a legislative body. In the meantime, the king was also facing the succession question. He refused to consider his illegitimate half-brother outright, and any talk of union with Montenegro was dashed by the latter’s safeguarding of several coup plotters.
While originally refusing to re-marry, the king was convinced by the end of 1904 that unless he remarried, the throne would likely be offered to the rival Karađorđević family after his death. Unwilling to accept his family’s rivals as the next kings of Serbia, the king would begin to look for a royal match that would ensure him succession. In this he was helped by the increasingly good relations with Vienna and Berlin. There was even some talk of the kings marriage to a member of the Habsburg family, though such an idea was refused by emperor Frnaz Joseph. In the end, it would be the daughter of king Ludwig III. of Bavaria, the 23 year old princess Hildegard. An artistically minded woman, it took much convincing for both her and her father to agree to the match, especially with Alexander’s previous foolishness when it came to German nobility and marriage.
The marriage that took place in 1905 would certainly not be a loving one. In time, a sense of respect did develop between the two, and Hildegard would become truly enamoured with Serbia. The people too would come to like the artistic and charitable queen, who would quickly prove much more popular then Draga ever was. The marriage was also used by the king to announce that new elections would be held. While well received by the public, they would prove of little import. Candidates had to receive a royal approval, with the members of the senate directly appointed. Political parties remained prohibited, and the candidates could only stand as independents. While the system would somewhat liberalize in the following decades, a true return to democracy would only occur after Alexander’s death.
Truly happy news would come in 1908, when the queen was confirmed as pregnant. In the end, a healthy boy named Milan would be born, the only one the royal couple would have. The securing of the royal dynasty in the boy that would one day become Milan II. and I., would be widely celebrated in Serbia, with congratulations coming from all over Europe. This would prove the first of the four high points of the kings reign, with the second one to come in, but 3 years...”
Used the map of Serbia in 1900 for the base of the map in the second wikibox
-1964 Elections
-1966 Elections
-1968 Elections
-1972 Presidential Election
-the Supreme Court
-Hubert Humphrey
-Impeachment, 1976, and 1980
The Republicans were expected to have a good shot at retaking the Presidency, after 12 years out of power. George McGovern had beat strong conservative Ronald Reagan solidly in 1980, and then beat the far right Jesse Helms in 1984 in a landslide, while McGovern's former VP (after Hubert Humphrey died) Shirley Chisholm had beat the more mainstream conservative Bob Dole with rather smaller margins - many in the Republican party had, reluctantly, at least, accepted the necessity of nominating a moderate in order to have a shot at returning to power. And the Chisholm administration was not hugely unpopular, but tended to have mediocre approval ratings, lower than the McGovern administration at the height of the 80s economic boom. Liberal criminal justice reforms had led to a decent decline in crime rates, but crime was still pretty high, and the liberal reforms had simply never been that popular among some middle of the road voters, giving Republicans a potential issue to attack on with a more tough-on-crime alternative. And while the McGovern and Chisholm economic reforms were pretty popular as a whole, with marked improvements in national conditions even in the poorest of areas, there was a growing sentiment in at least halting new expansions of government for the time being, if not necessarily making more than superficial cutbacks. And the Chisholm carbon tax had caused a sizable amount of backlash, even with the partial rebate it included
The 1970s and 1980s had led to a shift in the American public, with ideological liberalism with influences from the so-called New Left becoming pretty popular, and with conservatism having become somewhat unpopular among the general public. But at the very least, with national conditions as they were, and with "Democrat fatigue" after 12 years of that party holding the Presidency, the idea of electing some sort of Republican from the moderate-to-liberal Rockefeller wing of the party was often positively received by the public, with many polls supporting that idea
But there were a few factors that could, and would, complicate things
First, the campaign of businessman Ross Perot, as an independent. Perot focused his campaign on matters of trade protectionism and reducing the national debt (the debt-to-GDP ratio had risen from a post WWII low of around 20% at one point in the 70s to a whopping 40% during the early 90s recession, though some of that jump was due to temporary stabilizing measures to deal with the early 90s recession and the debt-to-GDP ratio was again on the decline in 1992), as well as other ideas like expanding the war on drugs and implementing electronic direct democracy. Perot's stances and general rhetoric tended to take a moderate lean, and he was on one hand seen as having the potential to turn the 1992 election into a three way race but on the other hand seen as having the potential to siphon moderate-to-liberal Republican votes from the GOP, potentially splitting the party
Second, there was the Republican base. The rise of the religious right left the Republican party in a tricky situation. After an initial surge in the late 70s, the religious right had somewhat stagnated in growth during the early 1980s as it met a ceiling for potential growth due to general contentedness with liberalism among the general public. But despite a lack of mainstream popularity, the religious right had still managed to make up a large chunk of the Republican voter base, and was an influential minority block in the primaries. Bob Dole had to fight to beat the further right of the party in order to win in 1988, and in 1992, party establishment (and a sizable portion of the party) hoped to nominate a Rockefeller Republican, someone even less conservative than Dole, so they certainly had their work cut out for them in regards to preventing an unelectably conservative Republican from getting the nomination and dashing their hopes
It might have all been possible, if a different Rockefeller Republican had initially gained traction and cleared the field from that faction. But instead, Bob Packwood, the moderate Republican Senator from Oregon was the one to gain traction. And by the time that his sexual misconduct scandal went public, and made his campaign completely collapse, Packwood had already consolidated the liberal and mainstream wings of the party (with others having largely dropped out of the primaries by then), and conversely, staunch conservative and representative of the religious right Pat Robertson had already consolidated the right wing of the party. With the outbreak of the scandal, establishment Republicans scrambled to arrange for alternate candidates to enter the race, but the field on that side of the party was now divided, as well as damaged by association with Packwood. Robertson was able to win the nomination with relative ease due to the divided opposition despite winning slightly under 40% of the popular vote in the primaries, and Republicans consigned themselves to another 1984 style landslide loss
What they instead got was far worse than a 1984 style loss
From the sidelines (having since dropped out of the race due to a series of gaffes and scandals), Ross Perot saw an opening. He'd originally planned to re-enter the race, hoping that a couple months out of the race would draw the heat away from him and give him something of a reset, and the imploding of the Republicans had given him hope that he could potentially take the lead, but hypothetical polling still showed him trailing the President. Some other hypothetical polling had caught his attention, however. Former general Colin Powell, a moderate independent who had served across the aisle in the Reagan, McGovern, and Chisholm administrations and who had gained some public acclaim during the intervention against the Apartheid regime in the South African Civil War, had polled very competitively with Chisholm, even more competitively than Perot himself did. One of Perot's advisors suggested a joint ticket, with Powell taking the top of the ticket in return for policy concessions to Perot, perhaps involving a secret agreement for Powell to only run for one term and then switch places. Perot vacillated, unwilling to play second fiddle but also seeing it as his best shot at all - and Vice President was more than what most people ended up achieving, right? Powell, for his part, was very reluctant to run for office at all, but saw some appeal, both for the office itself and for the possibility to present a moderate alternative to a Republican Party that he saw as increasingly shifting towards a disturbing radicalism and embrace of unsavory dog-whistle politics, and he both saw Perot's stances as broadly tolerable and saw the pragmatic political use of allying with the fairly popular and very rich Perot. Even after coming to an agreement, both Perot and Powell had second thoughts, and until (and after) the public announcement of the joint ticket, both candidates considered pulling out, but the public announcement of the Powell-Perot ticket was met with positive acclaim, as well as endorsement by a number of moderate Republicans as well as a handful of moderate Democrats
The Powell-Perot ticket was soon boosted by another factor - the Symms affair. For his running-mate, Pat Robertson chose strongly conservative Governor of Idaho, Steve Symms. This choice further cemented the Republican ticket as overly conservative in the first place, doing nothing to help Robertson's poor and declining polling numbers. Then things got worse. Stories hit the public regarding allegations of Symms' infidelity - he'd potentially engaged in numerous affairs. He strongly denied these claims, but still, the whole thing left the Republican ticket looking very hypocritical, with their calls for strong conservative moral purity contrasted to the alleged infidelity of Symms. Robertson's response didn't help, either. He apparently held high trust in his partner, and refused to believe the media reports on the issue, decrying them as nothing but lies and conspiracy by a lying communist media that was out for the destruction of the American family and country
The affair and Robertson's response severely hurt the Republican ticket. It retained support from the hardcore religious right, which largely managed to rationalize or deny the issue, but the Powell-Perot ticket was able to gain support from Republicans who leaned conservative but were put off by the denialism or hypocrisy from the Republican ticket, and who saw the Powell-Perot ticket as better than a second term for Chisholm. The Powell-Perot ticket also managed to see some additional growth in support from moderate Republicans who initially shifted to Chisholm in repulsion to Robertson but who now increasingly saw the independent ticket as being genuinely competitive rather than just a potential to split the vote
The battle between Chisholm and Powell itself was rather more calm, compared to the tempest from the Republican Party. Chisholm preferred to focus on touting the successes of her own administration and that of the McGovern administration, and Powell preferred to present a positive message rather than focusing on the heavily negative campaigning that doomed the Helms campaign in 1988 and appeared to be hurting the Robertson campaign (even more than it had already been hurt, that is). As the campaign went on, polling showed the two candidates usually virtually tied, and some advisors on both sides suggested their campaign take things more negative in order to try and gain some slight advantage, but neither candidate was particularly willing to do so, with some polling and surveys suggesting the public was not in the mood for a negative campaign, and with Chisholm in particular also seeing some strategic value in letting Republican support shift to the Powell-Perot ticket in the hopes for potentially politically isolating the right wing in the longer term even if it made her own reelection less certain
In the end, Chisholm did manage to win a second term, potentially in no small part due to some new data being published showing that the crime rate had declined somewhat more than initially expected. But Powell made a very strong showing, coming within a couple percentage points of winning and having the strongest independent performance in a federal election since Washington himself. For his part, Robertson had taken the Republican party to never-before-seen depths, even somewhat underperforming his already dismal polling. He'd retained a majority of support from the religious right and self described born agains, according to exit polling, but a large chunk of the Republican Party had instead voted for the Powell-Perot ticket
The 1992 election was seen as the death of the Republican Party's relevance. In the 32 years from 1960 to 1992, Republicans had won just two of the last nine elections, and had taken some severe damage from the eight years combined of the Agnew and Reagan administrations. The Democrats had gone through periods of more or less popularity, and some of their victories (1968, and 1980) were won with just slight majorities of the popular vote, or just a plurality (1960 and 1992), but the public had increasingly come around to accepting the general idea of Democratic liberalism, and had come to be very skeptical of Republican movement conservatism, especially after the prosperity of the 1980s and the quick recovery after the early 1990s recession. Despite losing, Powell and Perot had shown themselves to be the most capable opposition to the Democrats in the past four elections, and had shown themselves able to attain endorsements and support from a range of people and politicians ranging the spectrum from moderate Democrats, independents, Rockefeller Republicans, and even some more conservative leaning Republicans. Perot and Powell would go on to form the "Reform Party", as a big tent coalition to the right of the Democratic Party mainstream but without the radicalism of the GOP and maintaining far more of a moderate orientation
As soon as it was established, the Reform Party saw a number of defections from the Republican Party as well as some from the Democrats, and while the Democrats maintained a majority in both chambers of Congress through the 1993-1994 session, the Reform Party managed to gain a plurality in the House in the 1994 midterms, and took the speakership in a power-sharing agreement with the Democrats (being unwilling to negotiate with the remnant of the Republican Party). In the 1996 elections, Colin Powell won the nomination for the Reform Party, again with Perot as his running-mate, and won a respectable victory over Jim McDermott and his Republicans, while the Republicans cemented their place as a third party that retained a loyal support from staunchly conservative religious right voters and very few else. With the Reform Party having taken its place on the mainstream right of the political spectrum, such as it existed, the Republican Party in future decades was never again able to retain competitiveness, and its continued existence and mid to high single digit support ensured that the Reform Party would need to cling pretty close to the center, generally, in order to be competitive in the generally liberal-leaning USA
-1966 Elections
-1968 Elections
-1972 Presidential Election
-the Supreme Court
-Hubert Humphrey
-Impeachment, 1976, and 1980
-1992-
The Republicans were expected to have a good shot at retaking the Presidency, after 12 years out of power. George McGovern had beat strong conservative Ronald Reagan solidly in 1980, and then beat the far right Jesse Helms in 1984 in a landslide, while McGovern's former VP (after Hubert Humphrey died) Shirley Chisholm had beat the more mainstream conservative Bob Dole with rather smaller margins - many in the Republican party had, reluctantly, at least, accepted the necessity of nominating a moderate in order to have a shot at returning to power. And the Chisholm administration was not hugely unpopular, but tended to have mediocre approval ratings, lower than the McGovern administration at the height of the 80s economic boom. Liberal criminal justice reforms had led to a decent decline in crime rates, but crime was still pretty high, and the liberal reforms had simply never been that popular among some middle of the road voters, giving Republicans a potential issue to attack on with a more tough-on-crime alternative. And while the McGovern and Chisholm economic reforms were pretty popular as a whole, with marked improvements in national conditions even in the poorest of areas, there was a growing sentiment in at least halting new expansions of government for the time being, if not necessarily making more than superficial cutbacks. And the Chisholm carbon tax had caused a sizable amount of backlash, even with the partial rebate it included
The 1970s and 1980s had led to a shift in the American public, with ideological liberalism with influences from the so-called New Left becoming pretty popular, and with conservatism having become somewhat unpopular among the general public. But at the very least, with national conditions as they were, and with "Democrat fatigue" after 12 years of that party holding the Presidency, the idea of electing some sort of Republican from the moderate-to-liberal Rockefeller wing of the party was often positively received by the public, with many polls supporting that idea
But there were a few factors that could, and would, complicate things
First, the campaign of businessman Ross Perot, as an independent. Perot focused his campaign on matters of trade protectionism and reducing the national debt (the debt-to-GDP ratio had risen from a post WWII low of around 20% at one point in the 70s to a whopping 40% during the early 90s recession, though some of that jump was due to temporary stabilizing measures to deal with the early 90s recession and the debt-to-GDP ratio was again on the decline in 1992), as well as other ideas like expanding the war on drugs and implementing electronic direct democracy. Perot's stances and general rhetoric tended to take a moderate lean, and he was on one hand seen as having the potential to turn the 1992 election into a three way race but on the other hand seen as having the potential to siphon moderate-to-liberal Republican votes from the GOP, potentially splitting the party
Second, there was the Republican base. The rise of the religious right left the Republican party in a tricky situation. After an initial surge in the late 70s, the religious right had somewhat stagnated in growth during the early 1980s as it met a ceiling for potential growth due to general contentedness with liberalism among the general public. But despite a lack of mainstream popularity, the religious right had still managed to make up a large chunk of the Republican voter base, and was an influential minority block in the primaries. Bob Dole had to fight to beat the further right of the party in order to win in 1988, and in 1992, party establishment (and a sizable portion of the party) hoped to nominate a Rockefeller Republican, someone even less conservative than Dole, so they certainly had their work cut out for them in regards to preventing an unelectably conservative Republican from getting the nomination and dashing their hopes
It might have all been possible, if a different Rockefeller Republican had initially gained traction and cleared the field from that faction. But instead, Bob Packwood, the moderate Republican Senator from Oregon was the one to gain traction. And by the time that his sexual misconduct scandal went public, and made his campaign completely collapse, Packwood had already consolidated the liberal and mainstream wings of the party (with others having largely dropped out of the primaries by then), and conversely, staunch conservative and representative of the religious right Pat Robertson had already consolidated the right wing of the party. With the outbreak of the scandal, establishment Republicans scrambled to arrange for alternate candidates to enter the race, but the field on that side of the party was now divided, as well as damaged by association with Packwood. Robertson was able to win the nomination with relative ease due to the divided opposition despite winning slightly under 40% of the popular vote in the primaries, and Republicans consigned themselves to another 1984 style landslide loss
What they instead got was far worse than a 1984 style loss
From the sidelines (having since dropped out of the race due to a series of gaffes and scandals), Ross Perot saw an opening. He'd originally planned to re-enter the race, hoping that a couple months out of the race would draw the heat away from him and give him something of a reset, and the imploding of the Republicans had given him hope that he could potentially take the lead, but hypothetical polling still showed him trailing the President. Some other hypothetical polling had caught his attention, however. Former general Colin Powell, a moderate independent who had served across the aisle in the Reagan, McGovern, and Chisholm administrations and who had gained some public acclaim during the intervention against the Apartheid regime in the South African Civil War, had polled very competitively with Chisholm, even more competitively than Perot himself did. One of Perot's advisors suggested a joint ticket, with Powell taking the top of the ticket in return for policy concessions to Perot, perhaps involving a secret agreement for Powell to only run for one term and then switch places. Perot vacillated, unwilling to play second fiddle but also seeing it as his best shot at all - and Vice President was more than what most people ended up achieving, right? Powell, for his part, was very reluctant to run for office at all, but saw some appeal, both for the office itself and for the possibility to present a moderate alternative to a Republican Party that he saw as increasingly shifting towards a disturbing radicalism and embrace of unsavory dog-whistle politics, and he both saw Perot's stances as broadly tolerable and saw the pragmatic political use of allying with the fairly popular and very rich Perot. Even after coming to an agreement, both Perot and Powell had second thoughts, and until (and after) the public announcement of the joint ticket, both candidates considered pulling out, but the public announcement of the Powell-Perot ticket was met with positive acclaim, as well as endorsement by a number of moderate Republicans as well as a handful of moderate Democrats
The Powell-Perot ticket was soon boosted by another factor - the Symms affair. For his running-mate, Pat Robertson chose strongly conservative Governor of Idaho, Steve Symms. This choice further cemented the Republican ticket as overly conservative in the first place, doing nothing to help Robertson's poor and declining polling numbers. Then things got worse. Stories hit the public regarding allegations of Symms' infidelity - he'd potentially engaged in numerous affairs. He strongly denied these claims, but still, the whole thing left the Republican ticket looking very hypocritical, with their calls for strong conservative moral purity contrasted to the alleged infidelity of Symms. Robertson's response didn't help, either. He apparently held high trust in his partner, and refused to believe the media reports on the issue, decrying them as nothing but lies and conspiracy by a lying communist media that was out for the destruction of the American family and country
The affair and Robertson's response severely hurt the Republican ticket. It retained support from the hardcore religious right, which largely managed to rationalize or deny the issue, but the Powell-Perot ticket was able to gain support from Republicans who leaned conservative but were put off by the denialism or hypocrisy from the Republican ticket, and who saw the Powell-Perot ticket as better than a second term for Chisholm. The Powell-Perot ticket also managed to see some additional growth in support from moderate Republicans who initially shifted to Chisholm in repulsion to Robertson but who now increasingly saw the independent ticket as being genuinely competitive rather than just a potential to split the vote
The battle between Chisholm and Powell itself was rather more calm, compared to the tempest from the Republican Party. Chisholm preferred to focus on touting the successes of her own administration and that of the McGovern administration, and Powell preferred to present a positive message rather than focusing on the heavily negative campaigning that doomed the Helms campaign in 1988 and appeared to be hurting the Robertson campaign (even more than it had already been hurt, that is). As the campaign went on, polling showed the two candidates usually virtually tied, and some advisors on both sides suggested their campaign take things more negative in order to try and gain some slight advantage, but neither candidate was particularly willing to do so, with some polling and surveys suggesting the public was not in the mood for a negative campaign, and with Chisholm in particular also seeing some strategic value in letting Republican support shift to the Powell-Perot ticket in the hopes for potentially politically isolating the right wing in the longer term even if it made her own reelection less certain
In the end, Chisholm did manage to win a second term, potentially in no small part due to some new data being published showing that the crime rate had declined somewhat more than initially expected. But Powell made a very strong showing, coming within a couple percentage points of winning and having the strongest independent performance in a federal election since Washington himself. For his part, Robertson had taken the Republican party to never-before-seen depths, even somewhat underperforming his already dismal polling. He'd retained a majority of support from the religious right and self described born agains, according to exit polling, but a large chunk of the Republican Party had instead voted for the Powell-Perot ticket
The 1992 election was seen as the death of the Republican Party's relevance. In the 32 years from 1960 to 1992, Republicans had won just two of the last nine elections, and had taken some severe damage from the eight years combined of the Agnew and Reagan administrations. The Democrats had gone through periods of more or less popularity, and some of their victories (1968, and 1980) were won with just slight majorities of the popular vote, or just a plurality (1960 and 1992), but the public had increasingly come around to accepting the general idea of Democratic liberalism, and had come to be very skeptical of Republican movement conservatism, especially after the prosperity of the 1980s and the quick recovery after the early 1990s recession. Despite losing, Powell and Perot had shown themselves to be the most capable opposition to the Democrats in the past four elections, and had shown themselves able to attain endorsements and support from a range of people and politicians ranging the spectrum from moderate Democrats, independents, Rockefeller Republicans, and even some more conservative leaning Republicans. Perot and Powell would go on to form the "Reform Party", as a big tent coalition to the right of the Democratic Party mainstream but without the radicalism of the GOP and maintaining far more of a moderate orientation
As soon as it was established, the Reform Party saw a number of defections from the Republican Party as well as some from the Democrats, and while the Democrats maintained a majority in both chambers of Congress through the 1993-1994 session, the Reform Party managed to gain a plurality in the House in the 1994 midterms, and took the speakership in a power-sharing agreement with the Democrats (being unwilling to negotiate with the remnant of the Republican Party). In the 1996 elections, Colin Powell won the nomination for the Reform Party, again with Perot as his running-mate, and won a respectable victory over Jim McDermott and his Republicans, while the Republicans cemented their place as a third party that retained a loyal support from staunchly conservative religious right voters and very few else. With the Reform Party having taken its place on the mainstream right of the political spectrum, such as it existed, the Republican Party in future decades was never again able to retain competitiveness, and its continued existence and mid to high single digit support ensured that the Reform Party would need to cling pretty close to the center, generally, in order to be competitive in the generally liberal-leaning USA
Ok, I know I already said I was through with this scenario two or three times before, but now it is REALLY through, done, and finished
I'd initially had some thoughts of continuing my earlier "liberal 1980s with Kennedy and Glenn scenario", continuing the idea of "1980s but liberal rather than conservative" with a "turn to the center and the Democrats lose" sort of thing, but with Ross Perot managing to beat Glenn in 1992, so the turn to the center still didn't actually involve a Republican win, and maybe it would weaken the Republican Party and conservatism a bit more. But I never got around to doing it
I kind of returned to that idea for this "1964 and onward" scenario too, especially with my last post with it, kind of connecting it to a modified version of my first liberal 1980s scenario in order to cement a longer term win for liberalism over conservatism in the US. This is some modification of that idea, with the GOP imploding due to scandals, unfortunate primary wins, and the less conservative parts of the party just losing hope in the GOP after so many losses and shifting to a more centrist/center-right/christian democracy/big tent alternative in order to present an alternative to the Democrats that could house those with some degree of right-leaning political lean (among other sorts of leanings) while remaining competitive in the liberal-leaning America of the TL
I'd initially had some thoughts of continuing my earlier "liberal 1980s with Kennedy and Glenn scenario", continuing the idea of "1980s but liberal rather than conservative" with a "turn to the center and the Democrats lose" sort of thing, but with Ross Perot managing to beat Glenn in 1992, so the turn to the center still didn't actually involve a Republican win, and maybe it would weaken the Republican Party and conservatism a bit more. But I never got around to doing it
I kind of returned to that idea for this "1964 and onward" scenario too, especially with my last post with it, kind of connecting it to a modified version of my first liberal 1980s scenario in order to cement a longer term win for liberalism over conservatism in the US. This is some modification of that idea, with the GOP imploding due to scandals, unfortunate primary wins, and the less conservative parts of the party just losing hope in the GOP after so many losses and shifting to a more centrist/center-right/christian democracy/big tent alternative in order to present an alternative to the Democrats that could house those with some degree of right-leaning political lean (among other sorts of leanings) while remaining competitive in the liberal-leaning America of the TL
Techno Angel
Banned
Maybe you wanna do an alternative version of this where Powell wins sometime? I get that the 3td party candidate winning in the US is virtually impossible but in this situation in particular it may be possible, and would've been far more interesting &unexplored
Maybe you didn't read the whole post (I can get a bit long-winded, I know), but in the last paragraph in a sort of conclusion to the thing, I did mention that Powell and Perot, along with a number of Republican and some Democratic defectors, go on to form the Reform Party. That party goes on to replace the Republicans as the main right-leaning party, and the Powell-Perot ticket goes for a rematch in 1996 and does win then (which, along with their gains in the 1994 midterms, which lead to them sort of taking control of the House) help cement the Reform Party as one of the big two while consigning the Republican Party to political irrelevancy
Actually maybe I will make an infobox for 1996 too. I half considered doing it but have had less free time lately and was feeling lazy so I just left it at 1992, but who knows
The 2019 Czechoslovak parliamentary election was held on the 27th January 2019 to elect 300 members to the National Assembly, the unicameral legislature of Czechoslovakia. It was called after a motion of no confidence in the government of Andrej Babiš passed in November 2018 and President Miloš Zeman chose to dissolve the Assembly after four weeks in which negotiations to form a new government failed.
The Babiš government had implemented several substantial reforms including pension increases and child tax credits, tax cuts and slashing of Czechoslovak migrant acceptance rates; initially these made Babiš popular, but he remained deeply distrusted by the left for the corruption allegations against his companies Agrofert and Stork’s Nest, and these allegations persisted until eventually he was stripped of his parliamentary immunity in 2017, which damaged his reputation.
After its severe defeat in the 2016 election, the ČSSD elected Peter Pellegrini, a protégé of Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico, as its leader. Pellegrini initially managed to gain popularity both due to his associations with Fico, who was fairly popular among Slovaks, and because of the decline in support for Babiš; however, after the murder of investigative journalist Ján Kuciak in February 2018 drew attention to corruption by Fico’s government and in Slovakia generally, Pellegrini was tarnished by association (though he was able to avoid having to resign as Fico did) and the poll leads the ČSSD had enjoyed until then evaporated.
With support for the mainstream parties continuing to decline, the centrist to centre-left ZaP alliance and far-right ČSS started to further increase in popularity, and the ČSSD’s standing as the main centre-left party was damaged by President Zeman starting to voice extremely socially conservative attitudes and take vocally pro-Israeli, Russian and Chinese government stances while advocating for Euroscepticism. Pellegrini angered many left-wing voters by refusing to vocally condemn these stances, giving the impression of division within the ČSSD.
The event which ultimately brought down the Babiš government was a scandal that broke in early November, when two Seznam News journalists found Babiš’s son Andrej Babiš Jr. in Switzerland and interviewed him, with Babiš Jr. claiming that his father’s employees kidnapped and threatened him to prevent him giving testimony to the European Anti-Fraud Office against Stork’s Nest. The’Stork’s Nest crisis’, as it became known, led to large-scale protests from the public, the largest of which was the Demisi protest in Prague and the Odstúpiť protest in Bratislava, the latter of which was attended by Pellegrini, which helped bolster his popularity again in advance of the election.
A vote of no confidence in Babiš was held on the 23rd November, and it passed with 196 votes to 104, forcing Babiš to resign. While President Zeman tried to encourage Pellegrini to form a government, negotiations between the ČSSD and the other parties proved inconclusive and the public continued to lobby for a new election. On the 21st December, Zeman announced an election would be held in the new year.
While Pellegrini had been negotiating to form a new government, Babiš had stood down as PDS leader and the party had held a short leadership election, which was won by Alena Schillerová, an ally of Babiš’s but also more of a moderate than the outgoing Prime Minister. She made overtures towards forming a new PDS coalition that she pledged would be ‘more receptive to our partners’, and having been frustrated by the negotiations with Pellegrini, both ZaP leader Ivan Bartoš and ČSS leader Tomio Okamura suggested they would back a government led by Schillerová if she excluded the other party.
During the campaign in January, ZaP made significant progress both at the expense of the ČSSD due to Pellegrini’s perceived flip-flopping and the ČSS since Okamura had backed Babiš in the no confidence vote, as well as playing up his and his alliance’s social liberalism in contrast to the moderate stance the ČSSD was taking and recruiting several prominent politicians into the alliance, most notably Mayor of Bratislava Matúš Vallo, with whom he campaigned throughout Slovakia.
The election saw a further decline in votes and seats for both the PDS and ČSSD, though significantly less than expected due to Schillerová softening the backlash to the PDS and a strong campaign from Pellegrini in his native Slovakia. ZaP increased its seat count to 63 and effectively made itself the kingmaker of the new Assembly, particularly as the ČSS secured fewer gains than expected, while all the minor parties from 2016 returned but only Coexistence and the OLS gained seats.
In the weeks following the election, Bartoš started negotiations with both Schillerová and Pellegrini as well as with the minor parties, and in late February he and Schillerová agreed to form a coalition with the support of Coexistence, though for certain issues it has sought the support of the ČSSD.
Since this election, the Schillerová government has introduced several policies designed to reduce emissions and pollution in Czechoslovakia, legalized gay marriage and organized several plebiscites over further policies like the legalization of marijuana and increases to the minimum wage. These were planned to be held during the summer of 2020, but were postponed to that October to coincide with the presidential election as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic.
That election proved a contentious one, as Zeman’s ordained successor, former artist turned populist politician František Ringo Čech, was opposed by Zuzana Čaputová of ZaP, the favoured candidate of the PDS-ZaP government; Čech won the first round, but the runoff eventually saw Čaputová narrowly win.
As a result of Čech’s defeat, the Zeman wing of the ČSSD has been somewhat marginalized, and in a surprise move, when its leader Jan Hamáček retired in mid-2021 due to continually poor polling, former Prime Minister Vladimír Špidla came out of retirement, winning a by-election in South Bohemia and being elected leader. Špidla has managed to gain some degree of popularity among the Czechoslovak left, making light of his perceived dullness- his leadership campaign used the slogan ‘Boredom over Chaos’- and avoiding the kind of social conservatism that allowed ZaP to rise in popularity in favour of left-wing economic populism combined with pro-European internationalism.
With about a year until the next election is scheduled to be held, Czechoslovakia’s future looks uncertain, but is sure to be interesting.
(And so ends my Czechoslovak TL! I might make some presidential election wikiboxes sometime if people are interested in that, but since we’re up to the present day this will be the last parliamentary one for a while.)
Techno Angel
Banned
No I meant like an alternative version of 1992
Also if you just don't like the word "Republican" for how it sounds or whatever then it's OK but if you don't like the Religious Right or whatever sort of people someone like Pat Robertson would come to represent just wrecking the Republican Party simply means that another party with a different name will take it's place with exactly the same platform - because the demand for such a representation will not be gone, for those views to be less prominent you need to have some MAJOR changes in the world and not just different names in the White House - for example if the enemies of America in the Cold War are not God hating communists but maybe victorious Third Reich or even a surviving Russian Empire than the alliance between conservative Christians and political right may not be made in the US and the majority of the population can be more left wing, maybe even with some socialist Presidents for real
Otherwise most of the changes would realistically be just names
I hope I don't sound incoherent
The idea isn't that the Republican party just disappears. Of course there's going to be some sort of demand for representation for the religious right. It's just that, well, even in OTL, in 1992, self described "Born Again, religious right* made up 17% if the electorate according to exit polls, a sizable chunk but not enough to win elections all by itself
Another part of it is that a more successful Democratic party (not just with Presidents but in Congress) can get done more liberal stuff that ends up working decently at reducing poverty, sticking up for the working class, and making people's lives better, helping with Democratic popularity outside of just the liberal base. Combined with certain aspects where things would go similarly to OTL, but voters may just have this thing where they blame or praise the president for national conditions even if they are outside the control of US politics in general, so there's some benefits or losses to be potentially made from the simple economic hot potato aspect of things
But even with that, it's not like the population all becomes liberal or willing to elect "some socialist presidents for real", it's just a shift somewhat in favor of liberal capitalism vs conservative capitalism vs OTL. And, like, in OTL, even in the conservative 1980s, self described moderates were the largest voter bloc in exit polls, they just tended to lean to the right. Here, instead there's somewhat more liberals and fewer conservatives vs OTL, but still self described moderates being a large voter bloc, just one that is also more willing to give liberal reforms a chance, after seeing the benefits from (or directly benefiting from) more positive reforms, and being more willing to enable such reforms by sometimes electing more liberal congresses
So, back to the religious right. They are still there doing their thing, and the establishment right still forms a political alliance with them. That alliance just doesn't work out all that well for Republicans, with more middle of the road voters leaning more towards the Democrats and having some dislike towards the religious right. The GOP just doesn't manage to pull off the sort of coalition that Reagan in the 80s did, that combined the religious right, the establishment right, and moderates
So there's the same demand for representation by the religious right, but on the other hand, the Republicans have less in the way of moderates to provide a counterweight to them, and balance things out. So, even before its collapse, it's not just that the party happens to nominate different people, that's more of a symptom of a broader issue where the party has actually already taken on a *more* conservative platform vs OTL
Then Perot and Powell come along, with a more moderate message compared to what the GOP was giving out, and it doesn't outright win but comes very close. And so there's a religious right that, being less checked by more centrist elements and suffering from being out of power, starts to purity-spiral, but on the other hand there's a center right and mainstream/establishment right that starts to consider that they may not be best served by allying with the religious right. So the Reform Party is able to become the main right leaning party, but it doesn't just become the Republican Party with a different name but same platform, because the Reform Partiers are focused on pursuing electability and moderation in a somewhat more liberal electorate (not socialist, not even hugely more liberal, just with swing voters more open to liberal politicians and such), while at the same time a large chunk of the religious right has already started purity-spiraling and takes the Reform Party's rise as an excuse to do even more purity spiraling. There's something like 10% of the electorate, once a particularly active part of the GOP base, that sees the Reform splitters leaving the party as giving them a chance to reform the Republican Party in an even more godly direction, either with the hope that this would somehow lead to electoral success, or with the hope that it would at least lead to a better situation in the afterlife. By that point, they aren't particularly in the mood to compromise with the Reform Party or try and reform it from the inside or something like that, so they don't end up with much influence over it
Idk if any of that clarifies anything. Maybe it still seems too unrealistic to imagine. If so, eh. I gave it a try, but I'm no expert and my scenarios aren't always the most plausible, so that's fair
Bonjour.
French politics is dominated by Four major parties. These are the Popular Reaction, Sanitation, Christian-Democratic and Enrage. On the right side of the political spectrum, there is the Popular Reaction (RP). Moving even further to the right, you have the slavery endorsing Christian-Democrats, who have the effect of making the segregationist PR look reasonable by comparison. Taking a gander at the left side of French politics, you are greeted with the options of either the party that your elderly grandfather supported in the 50's or the party for people not born in the 19th century, also known as the Enrages.
Currently, the executive National Sanitation Committee has been under the control of the Sanitation Party with a 15/25 majority on the executive board. The head of state is the Chairman of the NSC Jean-Louis Tourenne, who himself was a former member of the Enrage before joining the party in 2012. The NSC currently acts as the main advisor to the legislative body, though in practice it often exercises this power to veto legislation passed by the National Constituent Assembly. Should there be any disputes between the executive and the lower house, then a mediating offer is proposed by the Estates General.
Along-with mediating disputes between different branches of government, the Estates General can give recommendations of pardons, which must then be approved by the NSC. The upper house is also the sole legislative portion to approve justices to the Committee of Public Safety. The Committee of Public Safety, in turn, is the only branch to officiate executions and is in charge of foreign affairs for France. In contrast to the NCA, 1,194 members of the Estates General are democratically elected in batches of 199 members every 4 years. In each of the 49 Departmental Administrations, three members are elected in Multiple-member constituencies via a top-three method of voting. The fifty-two remaining members are elected via a random lottery drawn throughout the country in 52 randomized towns, cities and communes of France. The winners of the lottery are then approved of by their respective constituents in a referendum. Should the constituents within Paris reject the three chosen by sortition, then more members are chosen by the lottery until approval is reached by the constituents.
The Lower National Constituent Assembly can propose and draft legislation, which is passed on to the National Sanitation Committee. It is also the only house of government which can approve new military commanders to the French Joint-Chiefs. It is the only house that has every member democratically elected by a plurality or majority of the popular vote. Elections are held with two main classes. 217 members of Class 1 serve three year terms, while 378 members of Class 2 serves four year terms of office. Elections are staggered in between Estates General terms, and are held earlier in July in contrast to the Estates' voting days of December.
French politics is dominated by Four major parties. These are the Popular Reaction, Sanitation, Christian-Democratic and Enrage. On the right side of the political spectrum, there is the Popular Reaction (RP). Moving even further to the right, you have the slavery endorsing Christian-Democrats, who have the effect of making the segregationist PR look reasonable by comparison. Taking a gander at the left side of French politics, you are greeted with the options of either the party that your elderly grandfather supported in the 50's or the party for people not born in the 19th century, also known as the Enrages.
Currently, the executive National Sanitation Committee has been under the control of the Sanitation Party with a 15/25 majority on the executive board. The head of state is the Chairman of the NSC Jean-Louis Tourenne, who himself was a former member of the Enrage before joining the party in 2012. The NSC currently acts as the main advisor to the legislative body, though in practice it often exercises this power to veto legislation passed by the National Constituent Assembly. Should there be any disputes between the executive and the lower house, then a mediating offer is proposed by the Estates General.
Along-with mediating disputes between different branches of government, the Estates General can give recommendations of pardons, which must then be approved by the NSC. The upper house is also the sole legislative portion to approve justices to the Committee of Public Safety. The Committee of Public Safety, in turn, is the only branch to officiate executions and is in charge of foreign affairs for France. In contrast to the NCA, 1,194 members of the Estates General are democratically elected in batches of 199 members every 4 years. In each of the 49 Departmental Administrations, three members are elected in Multiple-member constituencies via a top-three method of voting. The fifty-two remaining members are elected via a random lottery drawn throughout the country in 52 randomized towns, cities and communes of France. The winners of the lottery are then approved of by their respective constituents in a referendum. Should the constituents within Paris reject the three chosen by sortition, then more members are chosen by the lottery until approval is reached by the constituents.
The Lower National Constituent Assembly can propose and draft legislation, which is passed on to the National Sanitation Committee. It is also the only house of government which can approve new military commanders to the French Joint-Chiefs. It is the only house that has every member democratically elected by a plurality or majority of the popular vote. Elections are held with two main classes. 217 members of Class 1 serve three year terms, while 378 members of Class 2 serves four year terms of office. Elections are staggered in between Estates General terms, and are held earlier in July in contrast to the Estates' voting days of December.
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Techno Angel
Banned
If the Dems are staying as a party representing the blue color workers then I really doubt they'd be putting a black woman on the top of their ticket, would they? Especially when you consider that they still don't have balls for that now not that's not to be discussed here
I think that it's easier to just see Powell/Parrot running as Republican ticket in the next four years than wrecking the entire established system
Also what I think would help to not have the Religious Right ascendant is to butterfly away the AIDS epidemic, this probably leads to LGBTQ people being more accepted by society in general
Actually I think Chisholm's focus on kitchen table issues over identity ones helps in this regard.
I feel there's something distasteful about making a contemporary political figure like Fillon the head of a 'pro-slavery' party, I also feel like you're going to need a lot more explanation about how that potion can be reconciled with Christian Democracy.
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