Wrapped in Flames: The Great American War and Beyond

[EnglishCanuck]

but yet, 150 years later, I still can't get my inlaws (who aren't even from the South) to see that major point

sigh

Have never been able to fathom this idea myself. If the war were not about slavery, and slavery were not so directly tied to the whole ideological conflict, why on earth would Lincoln have bothered making it a war goal in the first place, or why would the South have bothered to secede over the issue of slavery?

Seems glaringly obvious.

although a lot of Northerners wanted to execute Jeff Davis for treason postwar, I think Lincoln had the right idea when he hoped Davis would just flee the country

The way I've always seen it was that Jeff Davis alive was just a down on his luck former rebel who had a mixed reputation amongst his former constituents at best, Davis dead was a potential rallying symbol for the South and diehards who would not accept Reconstruction. In hindsight, the letting the South up easy policy may not have been the best in terms of enforcing the enfranchisement of the freedmen, but in terms of reunifying the nation, it was far more foresighted.

Executing the South's leaders would have been problematic on many levels.

 

[EnglishCanuck]

So, did Davis really start his speech by heaping praises upon George Washington and then proceed to refer to the Union government as "the tyrants in Washington"? I know that the context makes it clear that he`s referring to the city, but it does makes the speech seem a bit internally inconsistent.

He did indeed. Though I'm pretty sure there was enough distinction at this point between Washington City (the cockpit of ambition) and Washington the Founder at this point. Mind you extolling the virtues of the man who founded the nation then crushed a rebellion against taxes while trying to divide that nation during a rebellion over the right to hold people in bondage seems mildly inconsistent.

Of course, another example of truth being stranger than fiction really...

Man, Davis is probably on cloud 9 giving that speech. British intervention is almost as good as good as the second coming.

He's quite overjoyed. The next time we see him you can bet there will be comments on his unusually sunny disposition. He still wishes he had a different job however

Of course, what the South think British intervention means, and what the British think their intervention means are likely two horses of a different color...

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Of course, that ignores the fact that it comes with.... conditions.

The issue of intervention is interesting to say the least. One might say the for the South, Britain is a very fair weather friend as far as engaging in the war is concerned

 

[Saphroneth]

Have never been able to fathom this idea myself. If the war were not about slavery, and slavery were not so directly tied to the whole ideological conflict, why on earth would Lincoln have bothered making it a war goal in the first place, or why would the South have bothered to secede over the issue of slavery?

Well, in fairness, the original war goal was (and the Union government was very clear it was) to bring a rebellious area back under the control of the central government.

...Seward was pretty emphatic about not bringing the slavery thing up. He instructed the ambassador in London that "you will not consent to draw into debate before the British government any opposing moral principles, which may be supposed to lie at the foundation of the controversy between those (the Confederate) States and the Federal Union" (Seward to Adams, 10 April 1861). The ambassador in Paris got even more explicit instructions- "refrain from any observation whatever concerning the morality or immorality, the economy or the waste, the social or the unsocial aspects of slavery... the condition of slavery in the United States will remain the same whether [the revolution] shall succeed or fail" (Seward to Dayton, 22 April 1861). Seward only removes the ban on 28 May 1862, but unfortunately only to warn the British that any attempt to mediate or intervene would result in the slaves massacring their owners and their owners families, and sparking a series of bloody reprisals.

Such a civil war between two parties of the white race... could not be expected to continue long before the negro race would begin to manifest some sensibility and some excitement... if the war continues indefinitely, a servile war is only a question of time... The government... adopts a policy designed at once to save the Union and rescue society from that fearful catastrophe... Let us now suppose that any one or more European states should think it right or expedient to intervene by force to oblige the United States to accept a compromise of their sovereignty. What other effect could it produce than to render inevitable, and even hurry on, that servile war? (Seward to Adams, 28 May 1862)

It would probably be fair to say that the Confederacy started the war over slavery and came to want independence for its own sake later on, while the Union started the war over rebellion and came to desire the destruction of slavery as the war went on. So at any one time one party felt the war was mostly about slavery, but which one changed...

 

[galveston bay]

It would probably be fair to say that the Confederacy started the war over slavery and came to want independence for its own sake later on, while the Union started the war over rebellion and came to desire the destruction of slavery as the war went on. So at any one time one party felt the war was mostly about slavery, but which one changed...

the South made it very clear from the beginning that they sought independence to protect their 'institution'. No slavery, no Civil War. But then you could also argue that without slavery the Jamestown Colony (and thus Virginia) probably wouldn't have been economically viable enough and whether the Carolinas would have been settled by the English gets questionable too. Slaves were needed for the tobacco crop, which was the economic mainstay of the Southern colonies. Picking it, to be blunt, sucks, and so does picking cotton. The first slaves were Indians, who died off because of European diseases, while indentured Whites (and initially Blacks too) left as soon as they could get away with it. So it was slavery or no plantation economy.

Frankly, other than timber, there wasn't much else to export from the Southern Colonies during the Colonial period

Slavery then colored every aspect of the South from them on, and almost entirely negatively (except for some of the people who got rich from it)

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Chapter 14: All Wet out West​

“The Mississippi is well worth reading about. It is not a commonplace river, but on the contrary is in all ways remarkable. Considering the Missouri its main branch, it is the longest river in the world — four thousand three hundred miles. It seems safe to say that it is also the crookedest river in the world, since in one part of its journey it uses up one thousand three hundred miles to cover the same ground that the crow would fly over in six hundred and seventy-five.” – Mark Twain

“The Western Theater of the war was in some ways, one of the most crucial to the North and South. While great armies clashed mere miles from their respective capitals in the East one of the true strategic goals of the war was fought over, eight hundred miles to the West. There the mighty waters of the Mississippi flowed from the north to the south, leaving a fertile land in her wake. Once the furthest extent of the American frontier, it had finally been crossed opening up vast new territories in the West and leading to an expansion of the American republic. The Mississippi was the natural highway of the American continent. It allowed easy travel and communication and facilitated the flow of goods from the South to be brought North and to flow back South again, leading to a mutually beneficial partnership. The most powerful city was where this mighty river met her end at New Orleans, and that city lay in Confederate hands.

To that end both sides had maneuvered for control of the states of Kentucky and Missouri. In the summer of 1861 Kentucky fell into Union hands when Confederate General Leonidas Polk occupied the city of Columbus, violating that states self-proclaimed neutrality. That allowed Union forces under Brigadier General Ulysses S. Grant to seize Paducah on the Ohio River in order to contest the interior of Kentucky. Other than a number of skirmishes on the banks of the Mississippi and fighting in the Cumberland Gap there had been few serious battles in early 61 and much of the action was relegated to raiding. Missouri was still contested, but Confederate forces were on the retreat after Booneville and regrouping across the border in Arkansas.

On the Confederate side, command of all the area between the barrens of Kentucky and across the Mississippi extending to Indian Territory lay in the hands of the 59 year old Albert Sidney Johnston. Johnston, with his tough reputation and immense stature radiated command. A Kentucky born soldier he had graduated West Point in 1826 and served against the Black Hawk in 1832, then moved to his adoptive home of Texas where he resigned his US commission to serve as a private in the Texan army and fought against the forces of Santa Anna in the Texan Revolution, and would rise rapidly through the ranks briefly serving as Secretary of War in the First Texan Republic. He would return to service in the United States Army during the Mexican War where he had organized volunteers and fought bravely at Monterry and Buena Vista. He had then led the column in the so-called Utah War of 1857-58 before being sent to command the Department of the Pacific in 1860. Upon the secession of his adoptive home state of Texas he had resigned his commission in the United States Army and travelled West to join the Confederate states, whereupon he was granted the rank of general and given command of the whole of the Western Department by his old friend and fellow West Pointer, Jefferson Davis.

General Albert Sidney Johnston​

Great things were expected from Johnston, and indeed the praise heaped upon him saw that it was expected he would be able to move mountains in defense of the Western Confederate states. Davis himself proclaimed “I hoped and expected that I had others who would prove generals, but I knew I had one, and that was Sidney Johnston.” The task facing Johnston though was a daunting one. His command was an area nearly the size of Western Europe, and at the outset he found himself outgunned and outnumbered. His critical position lay in the border state of Kentucky where he faced down a much larger Union force. He had barely 50,000 men opposing 90,000 Union troops.

On the Union side though, there was a distinct lack of unity in command. Union forces were split into three departments under different commanders, the Department of Kansas, under Maj. Gen. David Hunter, the Department of Missouri, under Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck, and the Department of the Ohio, under Brig. Gen. Don Carlos Buell. Each commander cooperated little with his fellows, and by February there had been no grand strategy formulated for the war in the West. Buell demonstrated towards the Cumberland Gap with indecisive battles at Middle Creel and Mill Springs, while Halleck allowed little more than a short diversionary attack on the Confederate camp at Belmont in Missouri. Despite mounting political pressure, none of the department commanders appeared eager to make any sudden movements towards the Confederate armies.

As the situation stood in January 1862 the forces were positioned as such; west across the Mississippi some 20,000 volunteers, Indian braves, and militia were under Major General Earl Van Dorn’s overall command facing 30,000 Union soldiers and militia nominally under Hunter’s command. East of the Mississippi at the strategic points in the Western Theater were 17,000 Confederates at Columbus under Maj. Gen. Leonidas Polk facing 25,000 Union soldiers under Brig Gen. Ulysses S. Grant. Maj. Gen. William Hardee was at Bowling Green with 25,000 men facing 60,000 Union men under Brig. Gen. Don Carlos Buell. At the Cumberland Gap Brig. Gen Felix Zollicoffer had 4,000 men facing 8,000 men under Brig. Gen. George H. Thomas, and finally 4,500 Confederates defended the important military posts at Fort Henry and Fort Donelson on the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers under Brig. Gen Lloyd Tilghman.

However, at the end of January, the equation changed. With the evacuation of the British legation on the 28th there was a sudden serious rupture in the confidence of the Union commanders. This had not been helped by Johnston’s continuous stream of psychological warfare leading the different Union commands to expect a different attack along the frontier at various points (the stress of this had been so severe that Brig. Gen. William T. Sherman had suffered a nervous breakdown and been forced to resign his command in favor of Buell). Now each commander was looking both north and south, and sought out directives from Washington on how best to proceed. Halleck for his part, agitated for a command of all the forces in the West, saying it would be wiser to have all the disparate forces under one commander than spread out across three departments. This was achieved on February 6th 1862 when Halleck was appointed commander of the Department of the Mississippi encompassing all the previous three commands from the Missouri River to Knoxville Tennessee, and putting them under one department chief. Halleck, 47, son of 1812 veteran Joseph Halleck, was an 1839 West Point graduate who had distinguished himself as a military theorist, having written Elements of Military Art and Science and translated Jomini’s Vie politique et militaire de Napoleon, as well as authoring many treatise on military and international law. Balding with gray mutton-chop side whiskers he looked considerably older in his years than he was, and had earned the nickname “Old Brains” amongst his fellow officers. He had served in the Mexican War in California, and served in the capture of Mazatlán and was breveted to captain for his meritorious service. He had then served with distinction as a military governor and politician in California, before re-enlisting in the Army in August of 1861 as the civil war began.

Henry Halleck​

His first act was to finally approve the plans of Brig. Gen. Grant on the 7th to attack the Confederate positions at forts Henry and Donelson. Grant had been agitating for such a move since January, but the cautious Halleck had been less than eager to approve it, but then in conjunction with his promotion, and stern orders from Washington for offensive action, he authorized Grant to move, and move Grant did.

Grant took his forces from Paducah swiftly and in cooperation with Western Rivers Flotilla under Flag Officer Andrew H. Foot moved against Fort Henry. However, he was in for a pleasant surprise upon his arrival.

Fort Henry was poorly situated that much was clear. Located on a flood plain and dominated by heights across the river it was an untenable military position. Tilghman would write that it was a "wretched military position. ... The history of military engineering records no parallel to this case." By the beginning of February the rains had come and the waters were rising, come the 7th they were lapping at the magazine of the fort and rising further still, leaving only nine of fifteen guns capable of firing. By the 8th the whole position was untenable with the main batteries all under water, and Tilghman reluctantly ordered the fort to be abandoned and retreated in the direction of Fort Donelson.

On the 11th the first probing efforts of Grant’s force would arrive in the form of his flotilla. Foote’s gunboats cautiously scouted ahead, and to their surprise discovered the fortifications abandoned. Grant moved quickly to seize the empty fortifications, and rather than rest wired Halleck stating “Fort Henry is ours. The enemy has abandoned the works in the face of a mighty deluge which revealed the weakness of their position. I intend to make camp here to supply my soldiers and advance. I shall rest my men for a day and then seize and destroy Fort Donelson and then return to Fort Henry. The flag is reestablished on the soil of Tennessee. It will never be removed.”

At Fort Donelson upriver, Tilghman was now faced with a significant challenge. He had reported the abandonment of Fort Henry to Johnston by telegraph the previous day, he had no promise of reinforcement, or even word of a relieving army. Instead Johnston had ordered him to “hold as long as practicable” with no word on his own strategy. Now with a mere 4,400 men Tighlman would make his stand…

…Johnston had for his part been under significant stress since mid-January. The indecisive battles of earlier in the month had not been crushing, but the defeat at Mill Springs had dislocated his eastern flank and forced his withdrawal from Bowling Green towards Nashville earlier in the month. He had established his headquarters there intending to hold the city against an advance by Buell, but the news of the abandonment of Fort Henry, and what seemed like the imminent fall of Fort Donelson forced him to reconsider his plans. Though Buell showed no signs of moving towards Nashville, or even advancing further on the Cumberland Gap, Johnston realized that the abandonment of Nashville was a foregone conclusion should the entry to the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers fall as he had no river fleet to oppose the approaching Federals, and it would leave him open to encirclement on his rear.

So it was with the news of the fall of Fort Donelson and the loss of 4,400 men on February 15th that Johnston ordered the evacuation of Nashville, bringing his forces towards Tullahoma behind Duck River to establish a better defensive position south of Murfreesboro. Taking all the supplies he could not destroy he withdrew to loud exclamations of grief by the populace and an outpouring of anger in the papers.

However, just as the tide seemed to turn against the Confederates in the West, the strategic situation changed yet again. On the 20th news of the entrance of Great Britain into the war arrived to Johnston in the field. The news immediately propped up flagging Confederate morale and reinvigorated the men and changed Johnston’s strategy from one of defence, to one of attack. He set up his headquarters at Tullahoma and began a reorganization of his forces.

Polk had been forced to withdraw from Columbus and withdraw to the defences at Memphis and Island Number. 10 while the bulk of Johnston’s men were now positioned in Tullahoma, and were shortly reinforced by 12,000 men freed from coastal duties under Braxton Bragg. The news of the defeat at Elkhorn Tavern in early March had prompted Johnston to recall the bulk of Van Dorn’s Army of the West back east across the Mississippi to link up with him there bringing a further 15,000 men to the newly constituted Army Tennessee. In total, between Memphis and Tullahoma 72,000 men had been organized for operations in theater.

Come April 1st the Confederate forces around Tullahoma and Murfreesboro were organized with 49,000 men as such:

Army of Tennessee (Gen. Albert S. Johnston)

1st Corps (Maj. Gen. Leonidas Polk)

1st Division: Brig. Gen. Charles Clark

2nd Division: Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Cheatham

2nd Corps (Maj. Gen. Braxton Bragg)

1st Division: Brig. Gen. Daniel Ruggles

2nd Division: Brig. Gen. Sterling Wood

3rd Corps (Maj. Gen William Hardee)

1st Division: Brig. Gen. Thomas C. Hindman

2nd Division: Brig. Gen. John C. Breckinridge

The defences of Memphis and Island No. 10 were supported by the newly created Confederate Army of the Mississippi under command of the recently transferred General Pierre Beauregard, victor of the Battle of Bull Run. He was charged with maintaining the Confederate position at Memphis and ensuring the remainder of the river remained in Confederate hands. To do this he had 23,000 men in 3 brigades under his command:

Army of the Mississippi (Gen. P.G.T. Beauregard)

1st Brigade Maj. Gen. Stirling Price

2nd Brigade Brig. Gen. Johnson K. Duncan

3rd Brigade Brig. Gen. John P. McCown

Johnston’s plan in the opening stages of the campaign was simple. He would oppose any Union thrust out of either Nashville, or up the Mississippi against Memphis, and then march north to turn the flank of any Union force and drive it back to Nashville and then invest the city. That he was allowed to build up his forces with so little opposition was thanks to a number of factors, largely though was the necessary pause as Union forces were reorganized and shifted north towards the border with the Province of Canada.

It remained to be seen whether the reorganized Union forces could match the vigor with which they had driven south in late January and early February…” On the Shores of the Mississippi: The Western Theater of the Great American War, Francis McKean, University of Boston, 1996

 

[sarahz]

Man, Davis is probably on cloud 9 giving that speech. British intervention is almost as good as good as the second coming.

rather better for the confederacy Christ would probably not have kept the "peculiar institution"

 

[Saphroneth]

rather better for the confederacy Christ would probably not have kept the "peculiar institution"

It's an odd thing, proof-texting - you can find conclusive evidence that slavery is not godly, and conclusive evidence it is.

http://rationalwiki.org/wiki/RationalWiki:Annotated_Bible/1_Timothy#1_Timothy_6:1
1 Timothy 6:1-2 (NASB): 1All who are under the yoke as slaves are to regard their own masters as worthy of all honor so that the name of God and our doctrine will not be spoken against. 2Those who have believers as their masters must not be disrespectful to them because they are brethren, but must serve them all the more, because those who partake of the benefit are believers and beloved. Teach and preach these principles.
(i.e. if you're a slave of a Christian, obey them unquestioningly.)

Deuteronomy 23:15-16 (NASB): 15You shall not hand over to his master a slave who has escaped from his master to you. 16He shall live with you in your midst, in the place which he shall choose in one of your towns where it pleases him; you shall not mistreat him.
(i.e. the Fugutive Slave Law is ungodly.)

This has been Proof-Texting And Why It Can Get Ridiculous.

 

[Raunchel]

It's simple right? A slave has to obey their master, and not run away. But, that is the moral rule for them to follow. If you encounter someone without the moral fortitude to serve and obey, you should not make them an outcast, and instead, should welcome them, just like other sinners. There is nothing saying that you can't say that they were morally wrong in running away of course.

So, with that piece of justification for crap outof the way, and having washed my hands after typing it to get rid of the filthy feeling, I have to say that that indeed is the greatest power of scripture, you can always read what you want.

 

[DAv]

So the Confederacy position gets a huge reprieve that helps the vital link to New Orleans. This will certainly grant them time needed to make their defences, so long as they don't get gung-ho and think that Britain's going to send an army up the east coast to help them strike at the US.

 

[EnglishCanuck]

So the Confederacy position gets a huge reprieve that helps the vital link to New Orleans. This will certainly grant them time needed to make their defences, so long as they don't get gung-ho and think that Britain's going to send an army up the east coast to help them strike at the US.

The lack of punishing blows in the West is a big reprieve. For instance OTL at Fort Henry and Donelson the CSA lost 13,000 men, while almost simultaneously losing both their largest city and the southern port of New Orleans and terminus of the Mississippi. That was a blow from which the South was unlikely to recover. Here though, the lack of extra men at Forts Donelson and Henry means that there are more troops on hand for Johnston to organize into a fighting force, and of course the Union offensives of spring 1862 OTL are stalled as the new departments are organized.

As to what help the British can offer, well I believe I'll borrow a phrase from that famous Confederate commerce raider: Aide-toi et Dieu t'aidera, or perhaps more accurately in this case Aidez-vous et Britannia vous aidera!

 

[galveston bay]

The lack of punishing blows in the West is a big reprieve. For instance OTL at Fort Henry and Donelson the CSA lost 13,000 men, while almost simultaneously losing both their largest city and the southern port of New Orleans and terminus of the Mississippi. That was a blow from which the South was unlikely to recover. Here though, the lack of extra men at Forts Donelson and Henry means that there are more troops on hand for Johnston to organize into a fighting force, and of course the Union offensives of spring 1862 OTL are stalled as the new departments are organized.

As to what help the British can offer, well I believe I'll borrow a phrase from that famous Confederate commerce raider: Aide-toi et Dieu t'aidera, or perhaps more accurately in this case Aidez-vous et Britannia vous aidera!

I noticed the change in forces lost... losing a division is bad, but it is far better than losing basically a corps! A corps Johnson would have found handy at Shiloh.

 

[EnglishCanuck]

I noticed the change in forces lost... losing a division is bad, but it is far better than losing basically a corps! A corps Johnson would have found handy at Shiloh.

Yes, one of the decisions that always baffled me was why those 13,000 men were sent to reinforce the forts in the first place. Johnston even thought they were not defensible, but agreed to send them on. It's one change that can have big ripples. Or it very well might not. The jury will be forever out on whether or not Johnston could have learned from his mistakes at Shiloh.

 

[RodentRevolution]

Yes, one of the decisions that always baffled me was why those 13,000 men were sent to reinforce the forts in the first place. Johnston even thought they were not defensible, but agreed to send them on.

May I suggest politics? More generals throughout history have been sacked for not doing something even when waiting was the right action than doing the wrong thing.

 

[EnglishCanuck]

May I suggest politics? More generals throughout history have been sacked for not doing something even when waiting was the right action than doing the wrong thing.

True, political considerations are what lead to such spectacular events like the Battle of Stones River and the Red River (Louisiana) Campaign. Politics and war are intertwined, but don't mix well on the battlefield.

 

[galveston bay]

True, political considerations are what lead to such spectacular events like the Battle of Stones River and the Red River (Louisiana) Campaign. Politics and war are intertwined, but don't mix well on the battlefield.

the Red River campaign was a fiasco that could have been a disaster in the first order. At least Stones River was merely unnecessary

 

[EnglishCanuck]

the Red River campaign was a fiasco that could have been a disaster in the first order. At least Stones River was merely unnecessary

As far as blunders in that was go Red River probably falls higher on that list more than most. That it didn't end in complete disaster was almost a miracle. I suppose Stones River doesn't rate as highly, but I still put it up there myself.

Though on another tangent, one could say that Lee's invasions of the North were dictated as much by political necessity as military necessity.

 

[galveston bay]

As far as blunders in that was go Red River probably falls higher on that list more than most. That it didn't end in complete disaster was almost a miracle. I suppose Stones River doesn't rate as highly, but I still put it up there myself.

Though on another tangent, one could say that Lee's invasions of the North were dictated as much by political necessity as military necessity.

both them most definitely... although having a fresh place to forage factored into the equation too. Poor northern Virginia was getting pretty used up even by 1862

There were several campaigns dictated by politics over sense.... the invasion of Missouri in 1864 by Price was a desperate effort to take the state capital and install a Confederate government (it didn't go well), while several stabs at Texas were just plain foolish (Sabine Pass being the biggest embarrassment) while the nasty little partisan wars in Missouri, Kansas and the Indian Territory were less about strategy and more about getting even (personal politics I suppose), like the raid on Lawrence and General Order 11
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_Order_No._11_(1863)

 

[EnglishCanuck]

both them most definitely... although having a fresh place to forage factored into the equation too. Poor northern Virginia was getting pretty used up even by 1862

There were several campaigns dictated by politics over sense.... the invasion of Missouri in 1864 by Price was a desperate effort to take the state capital and install a Confederate government (it didn't go well), while several stabs at Texas were just plain foolish (Sabine Pass being the biggest embarrassment) while the nasty little partisan wars in Missouri, Kansas and the Indian Territory were less about strategy and more about getting even (personal politics I suppose), like the raid on Lawrence and General Order 11
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_Order_No._11_(1863)

Yes that was a practical consideration indeed. Price's invasion of Missouri was a poorly thought out decision to be sure, and really couldn't have gone anywhere. I suppose most of the early stabs at Texas were ill conceived, but with the situation in Mexico and the need to cut off the illicit trade coming across the border it was something that needed to be attempted at least.

The nasty little partisan wars were less driven from the top down than the bottom up though, so I suppose they don't really count as politically motivated blunders. At least in my opinion anyways, they were bleeding sores left over from years of sectional violence and I wouldn't really say they were driven by the war versus being blown into the open and the chance to settle old scores brought up under the shady legitimacy of fighting for one side or the other.

 

[galveston bay]

Yes that was a practical consideration indeed. Price's invasion of Missouri was a poorly thought out decision to be sure, and really couldn't have gone anywhere. I suppose most of the early stabs at Texas were ill conceived, but with the situation in Mexico and the need to cut off the illicit trade coming across the border it was something that needed to be attempted at least.

The nasty little partisan wars were less driven from the top down than the bottom up though, so I suppose they don't really count as politically motivated blunders. At least in my opinion anyways, they were bleeding sores left over from years of sectional violence and I wouldn't really say they were driven by the war versus being blown into the open and the chance to settle old scores brought up under the shady legitimacy of fighting for one side or the other.

the part of Missouri I live in is just in the "Pro-Southern" zone, and you would be amazed at some of the monuments. Jesse James is a folk hero in this part of the country still. Price's invasion was pushed by the Confederate government at the urging of the exiled governor so I consider it politically motivated.