Worst Case Scenario for the USSR in the Polish-Soviet War?

[CaekDaemon]

So, in a war that's rather forgotten due to the much larger conflicts both before and after it, Poland and the newborn Soviet Union went to war in 1919, the Polish-Soviet War. The reasons for the war are complex, being a combination of a desire amongst the Polish to regain the eastern territories that were lost in the various partitions and to liberate the Ukraine, whilst the Soviets generally viewed the conflict as the first step of exporting communism to central Europe and beyond, though that's a bit of a simplification

Anyway, things went well for the Polish at first, taking Minsk on the 8th of August and later Kiev on the 7th of May 1920, only to be driven out again on the 13th of June that year after which things started to take a turn for the worst...only to culminate with the Battle of Warsaw where the Polish took a hundred thousand Soviet troops off the board in a battle so great as to be called the Miracle of Vistula thanks to the breaking of Soviet ciphers, entire divisions just falling apart as the Polish launched a counter attack leading to battles like the Battle of Komarów where Polish cavalry killed nearly ten times their own losses, then the Battle of the Niemen River, another major Polish victory followed by a continued advance on all fronts, after which the exhausted Soviets sued for peace.

That would become the Peace of Riga, which put the borders of Eastern Europe like this:

But just how bad could the war have gone for the Soviets in the worst case scenario? I'll admit I've got little more knowledge about the topic than what the Wikipedia page can give me, so its a mile wide and an inch deep and meaning that this thread is as much a chance for me to learn as it is a question, but there seems to be a number of avenues for things to get much worse.

According to the Wiki, the British were starting to get involved...

Britain's Prime Minister, David Lloyd George pressed Poland to make peace on Soviet terms and refused any assistance to Poland that would alienate the Whites in the Russian Civil War. In July 1920, Britain announced it would send huge quantities of World War I surplus military supplies to Poland, but a threatened general strike by the Trades Union Congress, who objected to British support of "White Poland", ensured that none of the weapons destined for Poland left British ports. David Lloyd George had never been enthusiastic about supporting the Poles, and had been pressured by his more right-wing Cabinet members such as Lord Curzon and Winston Churchill into offering the supplies.

On 11 July 1920, the government of Great Britain sent a telegram to the Soviets, signed by Curzon, which has been described as a de facto ultimatum. It requested that the Soviets halt their offensive at the Curzon line and accept it as a temporary border with Poland, until a permanent border could be established in negotiations. In case of Soviet refusal, the British threatened to assist Poland with all the means available, which, in reality, were limited by the internal political situation in the United Kingdom. On 17 July, the Bolsheviks refused and made a counter-offer to negotiate a peace treaty directly with Poland. The British responded by threatening to cut off the ongoing trade negotiations if the Soviets conducted further offensives against Poland. These threats were ignored.

...alongside France and other powers.

France, continuing its policy of countering Bolshevism now that the Whites in Russia proper had been almost completely defeated, sent a 400-strong advisory group to Poland's aid in 1919. It consisted mostly of French officers, although it also included a few British advisers led by Lieutenant General Sir Adrian Carton De Wiart. The French officers included a future President of France, Charles de Gaulle; during the war he won Poland's highest military decoration, the Virtuti Militari. In addition to the Allied advisors, France also facilitated the transit to Poland from France of the "Blue Army" in 1919: troops mostly of Polish origin, plus some international volunteers, formerly under French command in World War I. The army was commanded by the Polish general, Józef Haller. Hungary offered to send a 30,000 cavalry corps to Poland's aid, but the Czechoslovakian government refused to allow them through, as there was a demilitarized zone on the borders after the Czechoslovak-Hungarian war that had ended only a few months before. Some trains with weapon supplies from Hungary did, however, arrive in Poland.

Could Poland have done even better - or the USSR done even worse - if such supplies and troops were allowed through? And what might the aftermath of a better performing Poland be? According to the Wiki (a questionable source at best, I know, but the best one I've got right now ) one of the Polish plans was to create an Intermarium Federation led by Poland that would comprise "Poland, Lithuania, Ukraine, and other Central and East European countries emerging out of crumbling empires after the First World War" in order to serve as a counterweight against Germany and Russia, but could this actually be created even in a timeline where Poland performs at its best and the USSR at its worst?

All info is welcome!

 

[fasquardon]

The main issue here is that the Poles don't want to do too well. As such, even with a miraculous performance by the Poles, I have a hard time seeing them driving further East than Smolensk on the Belarus front or much further East than Kiev on the Ukrainian front.

If Poland did manage to win hard enough to get the Soviets to disgorge Belarus, it's possible we'd see the area being integrated directly into Poland. If they did very well in the Ukraine area, likely it would mean that the Polish border in the South is a little further East (or maybe a little to the West of the OTL border, if the Poles have integrated Belarus - the NDs didn't want Poland to have a majority of non-Poles), instead the main upshot of doing well in this area would be that Petliura would get his independent Ukraine - a small rump Ukraine, to be sure, and likely with extensive Polish influence, but still better than what he got for his efforts in OTL.

Poland taking and holding Cherson would be very interesting. It's plausible that the Poles might integrate that region directly into Poland, giving them a major port on the Black Sea.

And Poland doing better in the Polish-Soviet war could notably mean less damage to the Polish heartlands (which were ravaged again when the Soviets pushed to the Vistula) and much more stable politics in the post-war period. The two of those, added to less economic disruption in Belarus and Ukraine, added to the effect of Poland controlling the key rail and river shipping routes in the region, could also snowball together to result in a much stronger economy in this larger Poland.

fasquardon

 

[CaliGuy]

The main issue here is that the Poles don't want to do too well. As such, even with a miraculous performance by the Poles, I have a hard time seeing them driving further East than Smolensk on the Belarus front or much further East than Kiev on the Ukrainian front.

If Poland did manage to win hard enough to get the Soviets to disgorge Belarus, it's possible we'd see the area being integrated directly into Poland. If they did very well in the Ukraine area, likely it would mean that the Polish border in the South is a little further East (or maybe a little to the West of the OTL border, if the Poles have integrated Belarus - the NDs didn't want Poland to have a majority of non-Poles), instead the main upshot of doing well in this area would be that Petliura would get his independent Ukraine - a small rump Ukraine, to be sure, and likely with extensive Polish influence, but still better than what he got for his efforts in OTL.

Poland taking and holding Cherson would be very interesting. It's plausible that the Poles might integrate that region directly into Poland, giving them a major port on the Black Sea.

And Poland doing better in the Polish-Soviet war could notably mean less damage to the Polish heartlands (which were ravaged again when the Soviets pushed to the Vistula) and much more stable politics in the post-war period. The two of those, added to less economic disruption in Belarus and Ukraine, added to the effect of Poland controlling the key rail and river shipping routes in the region, could also snowball together to result in a much stronger economy in this larger Poland.

fasquardon

Agreed with all of your points here. However, could Poland want to create an independent, puppet Belarus to avoid stuffing Poland with too many non-Poles?

Also, how would a strong Poland affect German-Polish and Soviet-Polish relations over the next 20 years?

 

[thaddeus]

the worst case is loss of half Ukraine?



and Romania was around periphery of conflict and could have become involved (on Polish side of course)

in the aftermath of huge Polish victory, wonder if Little Entente might be Poland-Romania-Yugoslavia with Poland instead of Czechoslovakia (poor relations between Czechoslovakia-Poland)



would think it leads to better German-Soviet relations? would Nazi regime still pursue better relations with Poland when/if they come to power?

 

[fasquardon]

in the aftermath of huge Polish victory, wonder if Little Entente might be Poland-Romania-Yugoslavia with Poland instead of Czechoslovakia (poor relations between Czechoslovakia-Poland)

Given that the Little Entente was an anti-Hungarian alliance, and Poland had pretty decent relations with Hungary and didn't share a border, I find it unlikely that Poland would be a member of such an alliance.

We might see a closer Polish-Romanian alliance if Romania feels less threatened by Russia though, or a weaker one for the same reason.

We might actually see better Czechoslovak-Polish relations in TTL as the bigger Soviet loss means the Czechoslovaks have less reason to dream of a quick Soviet thrust through South-East Poland to link up with the Czechoslovaks in the event they are at war. As such, there would be more of an incentive for the Czechoslovaks to seek compromise with the Poles.

Agreed with all of your points here. However, could Poland want to create an independent, puppet Belarus to avoid stuffing Poland with too many non-Poles?

Belarusian national consciousness was pretty close to zero, so there was still a chance to turn the people there into a part of Poland (probably the Lithuanian part of their identity and history would be emphasized), so I suspect the balance of political forces inside Poland would push for a Belarus that was in a close union with, but recognized as distinct from, Poland. (Maybe a bit closer than the constitutional relationship between England and Scotland at the time - I don't imagine anyone would be particularly interested in having a different system of law between Poland and "real Lithuania" the way England and Scotland have different laws.)

Also, how would a strong Poland affect German-Polish and Soviet-Polish relations over the next 20 years?

Basically unchanged IMO. Both see Poland as a troublesome aberration that will soon be removed when the wheel of history turns against them.

fasquardon

 

[KACKO]

Given that the Little Entente was an anti-Hungarian alliance, and Poland had pretty decent relations with Hungary and didn't share a border, I find it unlikely that Poland would be a member of such an alliance.

We might see a closer Polish-Romanian alliance if Romania feels less threatened by Russia though, or a weaker one for the same reason.

We might actually see better Czechoslovak-Polish relations in TTL as the bigger Soviet loss means the Czechoslovaks have less reason to dream of a quick Soviet thrust through South-East Poland to link up with the Czechoslovaks in the event they are at war. As such, there would be more of an incentive for the Czechoslovaks to seek compromise with the Poles.



Belarusian national consciousness was pretty close to zero, so there was still a chance to turn the people there into a part of Poland (probably the Lithuanian part of their identity and history would be emphasized), so I suspect the balance of political forces inside Poland would push for a Belarus that was in a close union with, but recognized as distinct from, Poland. (Maybe a bit closer than the constitutional relationship between England and Scotland at the time - I don't imagine anyone would be particularly interested in having a different system of law between Poland and "real Lithuania" the way England and Scotland have different laws.)



Basically unchanged IMO. Both see Poland as a troublesome aberration that will soon be removed when the wheel of history turns against them.

fasquardon

Czechoslovakia recognized Soviet Union only in 1934. Until then relation were bad. After all Czechoslovak legions did put the wrench into Soviet takover of Sineria for a while. And treaty with Soviets was signed only in 1935 pnly after France signed such alliance with Soviets. Czechoslovak Soviet treaty fully depended on Frence participation.

Much stronger Poland however could lead to push for improving relations. Czechoslovak generality was requsting this from political leadership anyway.

 

[Mackus]

Worst case scenario for the Soviet Russia? (It wasn't USSR yet!)
Kornilov, who unlike most Whites, was willing to negotiate independence of Finland and Poland in exchange for their support against Reds, takes over White Movement.
Coordinated attacks with Finns in the North, and Poles in the South, allow Whites to win civil war. No USSR.

 

[David T]

The Poles go all the way to Moscow, as in 1610!

 

[ATP45]

The Poles go all the way to Moscow, as in 1610!

They could ,but could not.Army was capable,but all major political factions did not want - becouse they belived,than new white russia would attack Poland with West Powers blessing,when reds never could do that.Fools,they forget that Brits and USA could sold their allies to everybody.Which they did in 1944 selling Poland to soviets.

 

[marcinL]

Worst case would be periphery lost - independent Ukraine and Caucasus states, Belarus incorporated into Poland, far east grabbed by Japan, and ongoing civil war, with Russia divided between warlords of all colors

 

[CaliGuy]

Belarusian national consciousness was pretty close to zero, so there was still a chance to turn the people there into a part of Poland (probably the Lithuanian part of their identity and history would be emphasized), so I suspect the balance of political forces inside Poland would push for a Belarus that was in a close union with, but recognized as distinct from, Poland. (Maybe a bit closer than the constitutional relationship between England and Scotland at the time - I don't imagine anyone would be particularly interested in having a different system of law between Poland and "real Lithuania" the way England and Scotland have different laws.)

OK. However, for what it's worth, Poland would need to move quickly in regards to establishing loyalty among the Belarusians; after all, a large part of the Belarusians was already literate by this time (literacy helps with establishing a national consciousness and loyalty).

Basically unchanged IMO. Both see Poland as a troublesome aberration that will soon be removed when the wheel of history turns against them.

fasquardon

OK. However, does this mean that the partition lines of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact will be different in this TL?

Also, if France still falls in 1940 in this TL, does this mean that there would be even more Jews killed in the Holocaust in this TL (in our TL, the Jews who were a part of Poland up to 1939 and then became a part of the Soviet Union were less likely to be evacuated to the interior of the Soviet Union than the Jews who were a part of the Soviet Union even before 1939)?

 

[fasquardon]

OK. However, for what it's worth, Poland would need to move quickly in regards to establishing loyalty among the Belarusians; after all, a large part of the Belarusians was already literate by this time (literacy helps with establishing a national consciousness and loyalty).

For sure, and if the NDs become powerful in this Poland, things could go badly.

OK. However, does this mean that the partition lines of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact will be different in this TL?

I doubt it. The German and Russian claims would be no different and Germany would need Soviet intervention even more.

Germany barely subdued Poland in OTL. A bigger Poland could very well mean the Germans lose. Not only would Poland have more strength to turn against the Germans, but the Poles have more depth to wear the Germans down with.

Also, if France still falls in 1940 in this TL, does this mean that there would be even more Jews killed in the Holocaust in this TL (in our TL, the Jews who were a part of Poland up to 1939 and then became a part of the Soviet Union were less likely to be evacuated to the interior of the Soviet Union than the Jews who were a part of the Soviet Union even before 1939)?

"If" France falls. However, German victory in the East is far from pre-determined.

fasquardon

 

[James Ricker]

Well Stalin was in charge of the red army at Warsaw,that explains why they lost.Put Somebody halfway military confident in you get a Soviet victory.But you also antagonize Western Europe. You could get the Treaty of Versailles amended to allow Germany to rearm as a buffer against the red horde.When war comes France, England and Germany will be against the Soviet Union along with anyone else the Communists have managed to piss off.Picture Barbarossa x 4.

 

[Polish Eagle]

Lenin was prepared to restore essentially the 1772 frontier of the Commonwealth, according to Davies--Poland from the Baltic to the Dnieper. This could plausibly get Endek support--Dmowski proposed the same eastern frontier in Paris a few years earlier. I don't think it's possible to get more than that, because the Transdnieper has a much greater Russian ethnic component than the regions west of the Dnieper. Kiev will be the sticking point--Pilsudski will want it as a core for Ukraine, but giving up a city in Russian hands since the seventeenth century would require continued Polish triumphs over the Red Army.

But a worst-case scenario...I don't see a plausible scenario for a Polish push to the Caucasus, which is what would be needed to realize Pilsudski's wildest dreams. Turkey, I don't think is in any real shape to conquer the Caucasus. That leaves only Japan, Finland, and the possibility of continued Siberian resistance by Kolchak (who, for the sake of argument, lives and wins battles), at which point we're talking about the utter dismemberment of Russia.

So the worst-case scenario with Poland alone is the restoration of the frontiers of the PLC in 1772, possibly with Kiev too (minus the core of Lithuanian-speakers around Kaunas). With Japan, Finland, Siberian Whites, and Turkey, it's the end of 'Russia' and a reversion to 'Muscovy.'

 

[marcinL]

Well Stalin was in charge of the red army at Warsaw,that explains why they lost.Put Somebody halfway military confident in you get a Soviet victory.But you also antagonize Western Europe. You could get the Treaty of Versailles amended to allow Germany to rearm as a buffer against the red horde.When war comes France, England and Germany will be against the Soviet Union along with anyone else the Communists have managed to piss off.Picture Barbarossa x 4.

Stalin was political comissar in southern part of Soviet advance and he blocked sending help to Tuchaczewski

 

[fasquardon]

Lenin was prepared to restore essentially the 1772 frontier of the Commonwealth, according to Davies--Poland from the Baltic to the Dnieper.

The 1772 border before or after the first partition?

And what happened to stop this from becoming the agreed border? Arguments over Kiev? Or something else?

EDIT: Actually, wasn't this the offer the Polish knew wasn't serious, since their code breakers were able to tell them that Lenin's secret messages boiled down to "don't worry about giving them all of this, once we win the civil war we're taking it all back anyway".

fasquardon

 

[Polish Eagle]

The 1772 border before or after the first partition?

And what happened to stop this from becoming the agreed border? Arguments over Kiev? Or something else?

EDIT: Actually, wasn't this the offer the Polish knew wasn't serious, since their code breakers were able to tell them that Lenin's secret messages boiled down to "don't worry about giving them all of this, once we win the civil war we're taking it all back anyway".

fasquardon

I understood the reference in "God's Playground" to refer to the pre-partition border. I'm not sure if the Soviets were serious about it or not, but Davies credits the offer's rejection to a National Democrat member of the Polish Delegation preferring a line "more conducive to good neighborly relations," in the man's (Grabski's) own words, which can either be a reference to the vast numbers of Ukrainians and Belarussians in the territory or to your note about secret messages.