With the Crescent Above Us 2.0: An Ottoman Timeline

[haider najib]

Just realised russia didn't meme with their navy in this tl. The russian Baltic fleet never did the meme journey to fight japan legit is a terrible loss in this tl. But that means these fleets still exist. So will the russian black sea fleet go through turkish straights to help Austria? Don't the russians already have a treaty from previous wars beating down the ottomans allowing them access for their fleet to go through.

 

[Nassirisimo]

Fadıl Necmi; The Sublime Ottoman State: A History of the Ottoman Empire: Istanbul University Press

Ottoman Policy at the beginning of the Great War​

Perhaps the most surprising thing about the Great War for the political classes of the Ottoman Empire, was that it had broken out under circumstances different to those commonly imagined. Following the near destruction of the empire after the Great Balkan War in 1896, a foreboding feeling had become prevalent. Sultan Abdülhamid himself, though prone to gloomy thoughts even at the best of times, expressed the belief that the empire was in its death throes. He had privately predicted that the next international crisis would see the final partition of the empire between the European powers, and the extinguishing of any remnants of political independence in the Islamic world. Many other prominent figures within the empire saw the future prospects of the empire in a similarly bleak fashion. Paraphrasing Louis XV, Rashid Ridha, a prominent Islamist thinker, simply put it “after the Caliphate, the deluge”. Once the traditional political structures of the empire were completely dismantled, as he saw it, there would be nothing to stop the final triumph of European states and, more insidiously, cultural values. Even to those who were more progressive than the likes of the Sultan and men such as Ridha, the empire appeared to be on the brink which left the many patriots amongst them aghast.

Thus, when the crisis in the Balkans broke out following the assassination of Stambolov, the Ottomans may have been the only power in Europe with reason to breathe easier than had been the case previously. Early on in the crisis, the Bulgarians had sent feelers to the Ottomans to try and gain some assurances that the non-aggression pact that they had signed in 1909 would not be reneged upon. Sultan Abdülhamid, especially loath in his old age to engage in adventurism, happily agreed to this and promised Bulgaria Ottoman neutrality in any Balkan conflict. At this point both the Bulgarians and Ottomans anticipated that the conflict would remain a short and localized one, though they were quickly disavowed of their expectations. As the conflict grew into one of continental, and then global proportions in the space of weeks, fears in Constantinople and the rest of the empire grew once again that the Ottoman Empire would find itself embroiled in war. The Sultan ordered a partial mobilization on the 20th of September, announcing that the Ottoman Empire would maintain a position of “armed neutrality”, keeping the straits open and defending itself from any violations of its sovereignty.

Sultan Abdülhamid's cautious policy earned him the scorn of ambitious army officers​

This was an insufficiently muscular policy for some members of the army, many of whom sympathized not only with those parties in parliament who were considered to be unfriendly to the Sultan but also with opposition groups which had been exiled on account of their supposedly extreme nature. In particular, a clique of Turkish Nationalists surrounding Ahmed Zeki Bey had published a letter which claimed that successful participation in the war, preferably on the side of the Entente, would be the jolt of energy the empire needed to overcome its current moribund status and forge a new path as a Great Power encompassing all the Turkic peoples of the world.[1] Ideas such as these found little currency outside the army, however, as it was within the living memory of most adults of the empire just how devastating the Great Balkan War had been. The Sultan too did little to entertain these ideas, conscious as he was of the empire’s weakened status.

The largely passive policy was one based on the empire’s capabilities, but as the true scope of the conflict became apparent, a growing number of statesmen now became aware that the war could bring opportunity, as well as danger. Though dreams of territorial conquest remained limited to fringe groups, many more mainstream parties had long since identified a number of now-vulnerable institutions that they hoped the Ottoman State could topple. The most hated of these were the capitulations. The Order and Progress Party, which had for the first time won a majority of the seats in the Ottoman Parliament following elections in 1911, had blamed the capitulations for a host of different economic, political, and social ills afflicting the empire. A bill was introduced in the Ottoman Parliament as soon as September 1912 to unilaterally abolish the capitulations, though this faced severe opposition within parliament as well as from the Sultan himself, who was petrified that this would trigger an attack by several European empires upon the empire.[2] The bill spent weeks in parliament, but when it was passed the Sultan refused his assent and would refuse this assent for almost a year. It was not until late 1913, when the situation in Europe had become even graver, that the Sultan finally gave his assent, and the “Abolition of Foreign Capitulations Act” was finally passed.

At a stroke, the Ottomans had fundamentally changed the nature of their relations with foreign powers and had changed much within their own country. The Great Powers of Europe, who had been following the course of the bill’s passage through the Ottoman political system with varying levels of interest, by now had far greater concerns than their extraterritorial privileges in the Near East. Only Britain launched a formal complaint through their ambassador in Constantinople, but by this point, the Ottomans understood there would be no real challenge to the abolition of the capitulations. Whilst locked in a life-or-death struggle, the Great Powers of Europe had been met with a fait accompli. With the abolition of the capitulations came a great amount of celebration, particularly amongst the Muslims of the empire, though the reaction from Christians was far more muted. Many of them had benefited directly from the capitulations and feared what their abolition meant for the future position of Christian peoples within the empire.

With the long-hated capitulations now abolished, the Ottomans began to look at those other hated manifestations of Ottoman weakness, the autonomous regions. The Ottoman Empire possessed two autonomous regions which had been guaranteed by the Great Powers, Mount Lebanon and Armenia. Whilst Mount Lebanon was judged to be vulnerable, the same could not be said of Armenia. The Autonomous Armenian Vilayets consisted of five vilayets of the Ottoman Empire, all of which had Armenian governors, and were protected by “Fedayi”, Armenian militias who were the semi-official security forces of the autonomous Vilayets. Altogether around 60,000 men served in these militias, though there was precious little artillery or heavier weaponry available to the Armenians.[3] Since 1907 the Armenian Fedayi had become more centralized, as the ambitions of the Armenian Revolutionary Groups started to move away from preserving their autonomy and more toward creating an independent Armenian nation-state, a move which had garnered opposition both within the Ottoman Empire and Russia. Much of the centralization was aimed at better protecting Armenians within the Vilayets from the depredations of nomadic peoples, who represented a persistent challenge to security, but from 1909 an Armenian General Staff had been created.

Armenian Fedayi posing for a photograph​

The Armenians became evermore concerned that the Ottoman army would one day march into Armenia and revoke their autonomous status. To this end, they not only slowly built up their armed strength and attempted to pull the Vilayets closer together administratively, but they also employed a number of methods to secure the Armenian hold on the land. Most importantly, Armenian immigration from other Vilayets of the Ottoman Empire was encouraged. Whilst a number of Armenians emigrated from Western Anatolia and Vilayets such as Adana, it proved to be significantly more difficult to encourage the Armenian population of Constantinople to move to what was seen as the backwater areas of Eastern Anatolia.[4] From 1896 to 1912, around 200,000 Armenians immigrated to the five autonomous Vilayets.

Despite this migration, the Armenian population of the Five Autonomous Vilayets may have remained less than that of the Muslim population. Although the figures of the Armenian Patriarchy suggested that the previous Ottoman census had undercounted Armenians in the area while over-counting the Muslims, this remains a controversial topic at best. It is important to consider that even if Armenians made up a slight majority in the Vilayets overall, the proportion of the population that was Armenian was significantly smaller than what had been the case for the various Christian populations in the Balkans before the Great Balkan War. The Armenians demonstrated an awareness that the large proportions of Muslim people in their Vilayets could have ill effects on their long-term hold on the provinces. Although Armenian leaders agreed that Muslims should be discouraged from settling within the provinces, there remained no agreed-upon policy for how to affect this. The number of Muslims who emigrated from the Autonomous Vilayets was negligible.

By 1914, the position of the Armenian Autonomous Vilayets had become near-untenable. Voices within the Ottoman Parliament had become more extreme on what had come to be known as “The Armenian Question”. Whilst the Sultan was still loath to undertake action that he saw as potentially jeopardizing the relations of the Ottoman Empire with the warring Great Powers of Europe, his partisans within Parliament could do little to present the growing pressure to end the autonomous status of the vilayets. Delegates from the Order and Progress party now introduced a bill to revoke the autonomous statuses of the vilayets and to rule them once again from Constantinople. This bill found widespread support within Parliament, and it was signed into law on the 21st of May 1914. The legality was challenged by Armenian delegates within Parliament, but this appeal was quashed and Ottoman forces surrounding the vilayets now took a more offensive posture.

The Armenian leadership of the provinces panicked. Appeals to both Russia and the United Kingdom were met with sympathy, but with nothing beyond that. With both powers locked in what seemed to be an existential struggle, the chances that either power would jeopardize the neutrality of the Ottoman Empire seemed nigh impossible. Finally, the Armenians tried to make a personal appeal to Sultan Abdülhamid, long known as the “Red Sultan” by Armenians, to preserve their autonomy. If there was one thing that Abdülhamid was more reluctant to do than to follow the will of his parliament, however, it was to make concessions to the non-Muslims of the empire. The Order and Progress party got its way, and the Ottoman Army moved into the Armenian Vilayets on the 14th of June, 1914. The experiment of Armenian autonomy within Ottoman territory ultimately lasted less than twenty years, though they did not capitulate easily. The Ottoman army experienced two defeats in open battle during what they called the “Pacification of Eastern Anatolia”, and even after the Vilayets had been occupied by Ottoman forces, Armenian Fedayi continued a guerilla resistance for years afterwards.

Kurdish regiments proved to be crucial in the "Pacification of Eastern Anatolia", and many were driven by an ethnic hatred of Armenians​

The occupation of the Armenian Vilayets marked the end point of Christian autonomy within the empire. Mount Lebanon had been occupied the previous year, and the Ottoman Government now formally announced that each territory of the empire would be directly administered from Constantinople. The 14th of June remains a day of mourning for Armenian communities around the world, as the occupation of the Armenian Vilayets was followed by what can only be characterized as policies of ethnic cleansing. Ottoman officials would often turn a blind eye when local Muslims took revenge for abuses and slights by their Armenian neighbours during the years of autonomy. Some Ottoman officers even engaged in atrocities themselves, something which raised protests in Western nations including America when the testimony of Armenian survivors appeared in newspapers. Ottoman authorities admitted to a few thousand Armenians, “mostly Fedayi”, dying during the course of the occupation, but independent studies by scholars suggest that the death toll for the Armenians and other Christian peoples of the region may have been in the hundreds of thousands.[5] Hundreds of thousands of more became refugees, though exact numbers are difficult to establish.

[1] – It’s worth keeping in mind that the ideological landscape of the empire will be changed as Sultan Abdülhamid remains in power and figures such as Enver Paşa are butterflied. Ahmed Zeki Bey, we might see more of in the future.
[2] – The abolition of the capitulations in OTL was met with protests from all the European Great Powers, though the difference in TTL is that this doesn’t come a few weeks into the war, but rather after a year of extremely destructive fighting. Abdülhamid’s course is far more cautious than that of the CUP and the Three Paşa’s.
[3] – The number is broadly similar to the number of Ottoman Armenians who fought the empire before and during the Armenian Genocide of OTL.
[4] – The Armenian population was surprisingly widely distributed throughout the empire. Whether or not the figures of the Ottoman census were accurate is a matter of debate, though to pretend that the evidence is conclusive one way or the other seems questionable to me.
[5] – This of course is horrific and is rightly seen as a national tragedy for the Armenians of TTL. Compared to the almost complete destruction that the Ottoman Armenians experienced in OTL… I don’t want to suggest this is positive in any way. Atrocities are hard to write about.

* * * * * *

Author's notes - This isn't the definitive update on the Ottoman Empire during the Great War, and there are quite a number of aspects such as volunteers, and economics, that remain to be covered. This of course is discounting any future possible intervention on the part of the empire, which depends on how long the Sultan can last. There are those in the empire who would like to join the war.

The question of course is whether this would be a good idea. In OTL, the Three Pashas had hijacked the Ottoman State and with the help of the Germans, more or less forced the ill-prepared Ottoman Empire into the war. The impressive Ottoman victories of the first years of the war at Gallipoli, Gaza and Kut often overshadow just how much of a disaster this conflict was for the Ottoman Empire/Turkey. Millions of people died, notwithstanding the Christian populations of the empire who suffered disproportionately, with the Armenians being more or less annihilated across much of their homelands. Avoiding this would be a great thing, but the way I see it, ethnic conflict was more or less a guarantee at this point. When two or more people claim the same land, especially in modern times this often leads to conflict, and "Western Armenia" was a land which at this point was most probably majority Muslim, though breaking down the Muslim category means that many of these lands had Armenian pluralities.

It seems to me as though a popular solution in AH circles to solve the "Armenian Question" is to give what is sometimes termed as Western Armenia to the Armenians, though considering the little-known fate that Muslim populations suffered in modern-day Armenia, I think that this would result in a repeat of OTL's events with some of the roles changed. I think that it's worth explaining that while TTL's events are a better fate than what the Armenians suffered in OTL, they are by no means desirable. The Armenians are still doomed to be de-facto second-class citizens across much of their homeland, perhaps in a similar fashion to the Palestinians of OTL. Perhaps this will change in the future, but I will try to keep things within plausibility, which sometimes results in some horrific things.

 

[LostInNewDelhi]

When two or more people claim the same land, especially in modern times this often leads to conflict, and "Western Armenia" was a land which at this point was most probably majority Muslim, though breaking down the Muslim category means that many of these lands had Armenian pluralities.

The Muslim category will break itself down-- the Kurds don't believe in "all people under their vilayet, all vilayets under Constantinople" either. And God help the construction crew of any infrastructure projects out here that don't give the aghas their cut.

The tide of opinion is against the Armenians now but I'm willing to bet that from Constantinople to Adana to Kars they pay more in tax revenue and have closer connections to the imperial elite than the Kurds; meanwhile the Kurdish program at this point in time is not a "Kurdish state" but "no state".

I'm not going to sit here and talk about "sustainable" levels of hatred, violence is violence and unchecked escalation right into genocide is only made easier by technology. But the Ottomans are presiding over a war of "second class peoples" out in the east, it's harder to single any one of them out if they don't have a big blinking "autonomy" sign over their heads. (In fact with the sign gone from Armenia, it now hovers over the Kurdish principalities).

It could certainly be easier to single out the Armenians if the Fedayi go Ustashe, getting training in terrorism abroad (the Bulgarians have experience but not the will; somewhere else in Europe may oblige, Greece or Serbia?) and returning home with a plan to focus all of the Hamidians' ecumenical yokel-hatred back onto them specifically once more. But this could be stopped cold by Armenian counterinsurgents** in Ottoman employ. They'll be hated as much as the Palestinian Authority or Akhmat Kadyrov for doing what they do, but as long as they can keep the cynicism from lapsing into full blown despair they'll know why they're doing it.

**Are there any OTL Armenians who would be willing to front such an initiative, to fight for funding and access to Ottoman decision making? Maybe do a little "police work" themselves? Maybe an OTL Soviet apparatchik-- and I don't mean a potentially principled person. I mean the people who put others on purge lists in order to take their place. From Wiki it seems like a lot of Beria's bastards were Eastern Armenians and Bolshevik veterans, supposedly on the lookout for "Dashnak Trotskyists"; in fact the first major purge victim was Western Armenian. Could the Ottomans literally hire Bolshevik boeviki (if they exist, which they might not, as discussed here) for this, if they're not getting anything done in Russia? That would be twisted. But Lenin needs the money-- and even if the German SPD voted against war credits, can or will their members (individually or as a body) supply him, against the wishes of their own government? No 1905 means neither Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, nor SRs have any experience with confronting the full force of the government, they're probably just hanging onto the liberals and hoping to succeed through them-- Lenin's group may be people who grumble about this but don't do anything either. In the meantime they need to eat, even if it means robbing banks or scamming rich ladies they had affairs with. A job in the Ottoman Empire's gotta be better than that. Lenin's German connection seems to have also done business in the Ottoman Empire, and met the Young Turks. Looking into it further-- during the Civil War Beria was for some reason or other working with Musavat. Of course in 1912 the Bolsheviks have more experience getting jailed than doing the jailing, but maybe they're two sides of the same coin? If you know how to escape, you also know how to capture. And some Bolsheviks were Okhrana double agents, they learn how important informers are to the police by, well, being informers themselves. Mr. NKVD himself (Lavrent Pasha? Oh, that's so cursed) could already be capable of getting the ball rolling on... well, I suppose they are Armenian Kadyrovtsy, but they don't have to be such blatant thugs, at least not all of the time. Okay it doesn't make that much sense when I think about it, it's not that the Bolsheviks were always great cops or investigators, even if they use infiltration to gather information or track people down, they also just pinned blame willy nilly and killed until things went quiet. And at this stage a lot of them aren't so mercenary as to take the lead in Ottoman policing or anything, some of them still think being a revolutionary is about creating a freer society. But maybe a few personnel could be loaned and make their way around.

Agents of this force might even spread outside the former Autonomous Vilayets and attach onto the regular police in Armenian neighborhoods of other cities, or even start infiltrating Russia and the diaspora. Once the ball is rolling Beria is no longer necessary and I hope someone shoots him right away. A similar model may be seeded in the Kurdish lands to police them, and eventually come west to haunt policing practices used on Turks. All over the Empire but especially in minority regions the local police might try to take society wholly under its wing, upper ranks making donations to schools and churches and lower ranks getting preference in university admissions for their children. The Ottomans might even be able to infiltrate the Jewish Agency, maybe get the Histadrut abolished for being "too socialist" or whatever-- that would kneecap the Zionists' ability to actually integrate new migrants, a lot of them will move elsewhere if they don't find work. The Revisionists can do terrorism but their own community may cast them out-- they say the right words but they don't create jobs, they mess up alliances with locals, and they draw too much attention generally. It's not like the Armenian situation where the community is large and knows the terrain-- here these people are not leaders but liabilities.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deportation_of_Armenian_intellectuals_on_24_April_1915 Here's a list of some notable people who might still be alive TTL.

 

[haider najib]

Damn why did ottomans assure the Bulgarians of no threat. This will be a interesting crisis of refugees, coming south. Also suprised Land bridge, and Thessaloniki wasn't a popular thing, major ottoman city, and Albanian cut off and at the mercy of everyone.

Whats the status of the ottoman navy?

 

[Berat2beti]

Damn why did ottomans assure the Bulgarians of no threat. This will be a interesting crisis of refugees, coming south. Also suprised Land bridge, and Thessaloniki wasn't a popular thing, major ottoman city, and Albanian cut off and at the mercy of everyone.

Whats the status of the ottoman navy?

I imagine it’s going to be a case of either one of the kindest acts of compassion seen in the war, or one of the most vengeful and spiteful acts. Cause once Bulgaria falls and the Serbian, Greek, Romanian and Austro-Hungarian death squads come around to ethnically cleanse their slices and occupy the rest a lot of people are going to run for the hills and go Guerrilla or run for safety which is basically Albania and Thrace. And it’s going to be interesting to know what the call is going to be, whether it’s peacefully but forcefully disperse, and send them away or keep firing their guns until they all die or fuck off.

if Russia was feeling so inclined to help a brother Slav nation out I imagine they could try and evacuate as many Bulgarians as they can from Burgas and Varna. And if there was for some reason effort, I’m sure the Russians could hell even pay the Ottomans to ferry Bulgarians to Sevastopol. It’s not like the Ottoman Navy’s doing much, but that requires cooperation and some modicum of trust I imagine no one on either side wants to give.

 

[haider najib]

d occupy the rest a lot of people are going to run for the hills and go Guerrilla or run for safety which is basically Albania and Thrace. And it’s going to be interesting to know what the call is going to be, whether it’s peacefully but forcefully disperse, and send them away or keep firing their guns until they all die or fuck off.

Last war that already happened Albanian militias had to stop Bulgaria itself, Albania still hasn't been addressed. If ottomans don't stop the Bulgarians i can see Albania breaking away fully now as they don't have any faith in the ottoman state. It was their militias that saved them not the ottoman army. I don't think ottomans have the diplomatic capital to take Bulgarians in they destroyed empires european land only to know run back into the empire, is going to piss alot of people off. Albania itself already had to do it. Also everyone knows Bulgaria sees Albania and Thrace as their claims.

 

[SealTheRealDeal]

Also everyone knows Bulgaria sees Albania and Thrace as their claims.

I wonder if a certain Albanian nationalist has volunteered for service in the Austro-Hungarian Army ittl.

 

[haider najib]

I wonder if a certain Albanian nationalist has volunteered for service in the Austro-Hungarian Army ittl.

so a little bit of albanian trolling going on.

 

[LostInNewDelhi]

And if there was for some reason effort, I’m sure the Russians could hell even pay the Ottomans to ferry Bulgarians to Sevastopol. It’s not like the Ottoman Navy’s doing much, but that requires cooperation and some modicum of trust I imagine no one on either side wants to give.

There's also America. Coverage of the Armenian autonomy revocation could be diluted with news about the Thracian authorities' orderly transshipment of Balkan Slavs. The missionary societies and sympathizers in the American government will see what's happening, but they're out to help refugees, that includes Slavs and Armenians.

Austria also has Sandzak, and Sandzak on the 1896 map seems to extend into western Kosovo-- which also makes it contiguous with Albania. The greatest remaining threat to this connection is Serbia, which TTL may not have the Yugoslav idea to give it cover, I don't know if Croat and Slovene intellectuals have been eagerly watching Serbia's progress in getting its lunch money taken by Bulgaria. It's possible that Bulgaria has become the model for conservative Austrian Slav nationalists-- a "regency" praetorian republic, militaristic and nationalist but progressive in its own way. Croatians probably believe they can do it too, or even do better than the Bulgarians-- and Serbia's disappointing 19th century doesn't inspire belief that it would be an asset.

Without the Yugoslav idea, all Serbia has is Serb irredentism, which Austria won't support if it involves their territory, Bulgaria might support if it means they can keep Nis, and Russia might support but is too far away to affect. Italy might have delusions of allying with the Serbs in a Balkan Crusade, but might also be content with influence over Croatia and Montenegro. Meanwhile the Ottomans have access through Albania and Sandzak to Bosnia, and if they're only fighting Serbia... basically if Austria falls apart and an assembly of Bosnians requests protection, I think the Ottomans could argue they are well within their rights to oblige.

A (Zagreb?)-Sarajevo-Novi Pazar-Durres-Salonica/Skopje-Edirne railway sounds like a pipe dream but Bulgaria could be persuaded to allow it by the income from the train stations on their territory-- or, they could be forced to accept an extraterritorial zone cutting through Macedonia, modeled on the Russian and Japanese railways in Manchuria. The easy way or the hard way-- they can't do this with Egypt and Libya because the Entente actually cares about Egypt, much more than they do about Bulgaria. And if the South Manchurian Railway Company is any indication, this approach works. What if this Turkish company becomes the richest entity in Bulgaria's borders, offering security and employment to the remaining Muslims and to Christians, even building whole new neighborhoods for them within the railway zone? What's to stop them from influencing Bulgaria in other ways, now that everyone is used to their existence? The SMRC was built on Manchurian soybean exports-- maybe here it can be Bulgarian tobacco, I'm sure the empire's citizens would like a cheap and plentiful source of tobacco, and through Durres they can export to Italy and abroad. The Ottomans have an opportunity to reshape Bulgaria to their own specifications-- as a pliant country that produces valuable agricultural exports in abundance, one that would rather buy tractors than tanks. That may prove to be a mistake in a Second World War but we'll cross that bridge when we come to it.

And what, are a few Macedonian agitators supposed to be a threat to this? What will they do when their own government sells them out?

Modern Japan's first great foreign policy achievement was forcing an unequal treaty onto Korea. If the Ottomans learn to speak the evolving language of domination instead of just demanding "land bridges" outright, they might actually find their actions being perceived as more "natural" and coming under less criticism. Small nations think in terms of border expansion. Big nations let others expand their borders, then dominate the expanded country. This whole "we need to govern the entire territory in order to dominate it, even all the millions who don't like us"... well, the day Japan started thinking like that is the day they started digging their Empire's grave.

 

[LostInNewDelhi]

A note about cars. Although someone might be dreaming of building "the Umma's Car", that will probably remain a dream for the next generation. Nowhere outside western Europe and North America do you have the road density or disposable income for mass car ownership to be possible or practical, and America absolutely dominated world car production through Fordism and its derivatives. Before the war Japanese mostly drove cars assembled in local Ford plants from kits shipped from Detroit, which contained all the necessary parts. Toyota in this era was never profitable, really more of a research lab than a real car company, whose only concrete achievements were motorcycle engines and trucks for the army-- but no "people's car".

Iraq looks like a miserable place to do factory work but the western Levant has much lower mean temperatures, so an industrial buildup around Damascus could be possible before better HVAC can extend that to Iraq. Or the area from Adana to Aleppo.

An Ottoman company would probably start out a lot like Toyota, trying to reverse engineer Ford cars by buying kits and scale models. But maybe they could stand a chance of breaking into the luxury car market. The competition is stiff (Rolls Royce, the Daimler company's Mercedes), the engineering has to be world class. But that very big hurdle aside, this is actually a bit more reasonable than a consumer car, the upper crust of Ottoman society has an interest in cars and the ability to actually buy them (and a place to drive them), unlike most of the people. If France starts bringing in guestworkers, and plenty more than OTL, we may see Ottoman citizens brought close to the process of automobile and even tank production.

Of course workmanship isn't synonymous with engineering, so a lot of people are going to have to go to school and learn the more theoretical side of things. But the best thing to do might be entering some kind of joint venture with a German or British (even if the Germans lose the war they could be a valuable partner) car company and trying to become "their man in Turkey", the contractor they trust to handle local production and sales. That can at least bring in revenue and grow a trained workforce, while the original designs are perfected and made ready for release. Some problem they may tackle early on and with more energy than Europeans could be dust/sand filters and cooling.

Tamghas could make pretty cool car logos. So could Ottoman signatures and Nastaliq calligraphy, the kind of calligraphy that fits into neat shapes like coin inscriptions. "Tamgha" itself sounds like a pretty cool name, but I guess it all depends what sounds both "Turkish" and "modern" to the likely buyers' ears. "Zaman(i)"? Sounds kinda Italian, I like it. Oh and for individual car names, Persian words make for awesome regnal titles. "Jahandar" could be a big off-roader, utility vehicle type. Or a pickup truck, the kind that gets driven into a warzone with a machine gun mounted on it

 

[LostInNewDelhi]

Energy Boon Leads Norway to Sell Krone for First Time Since 2013

The Norwegian central bank will sell krone next month for the first time in nine years after the value of its electricity and petroleum exports was boosted by an energy crisis and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

www.bloomberg.com

"The Norwegian central bank will sell krone next month for the first time in nine years after the value of its electricity and petroleum exports was boosted by an energy crisis and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The move would counteract higher krone purchases by oil and gas companies that need to pay taxes in the currency. The krone has been the third-biggest gainer this year among the G-10 group of the world’s largest currencies as the impact of the war in Ukraine compounded the surge in energy prices in Europe."

This article gets at something interesting-- the relationship between the Ottomans' oil and the money they earn from it. This is not "infinite money". The Ottomans don't want to put all the oil they have out into the world, that's just going to drive down the price, too low and oil may fail to earn enough to pay for the cost of its production. In wartime they could lay a devastating embargo on a country, but their "control" over oil on a peacetime, day to day basis is really just the ability to set the world price through their production, or rapidly shift it in one direction or the other. And not just for foreign policy reasons but for internal development reasons, they may not want a high price all the time.

If you haven't yet heard of "petrodollars", it simply refers to the fact that when OPEC countries and Qatar and Norway (formerly Russia as well) sell oil, they accept payment in US dollars. This "keeps the dollar strong" (creates demand for the dollar) because any country, not just the US, has to have dollars on hand to buy oil, and that demand means they'll give up more of their own currency (or other currencies) to acquire a dollar. The oil vendor which pockets the dollars, and the state that draws money from the vendor through taxes (a state owned oil company with insufficient protections from political pressure may be turned into a second state treasury), then have to spend this money. If investment within their country won't offer spectacular returns, they'll spend that money outside. And if they already have dollars, they'll probably buy things with dollars, which means buying American goods, services, and financial securities. (They could also spend on other countries-- this is part of why the Gulf states have so much money available for building mosques, media operations, and religious outreach. The Ottoman Shaykh al-Islam's capacity for this, acting on behalf of the sultan as Caliph, could be tremendous. Even Muslim governments independent from the Ottomans may find it very difficult to defy Constantinople on anything.) Anyways, this is "petrodollar recycling"-- the US not only gets a stronger dollar but also receives back what it has already put out into the world.

Now say that the Ottoman Empire, which includes Iraq and Saudi Arabia but not any of the other Gulf states, states that all payments for its oil should be made in the Ottoman lira. That should be a good thing-- the lira will be in demand, and the Ottomans will get back the lira they put out in the world (the money they give away paying for imports). However, if the lira is too much in demand, what if it starts being hoarded? People who want to buy, for example, an Ottoman car find it's almost impossible to acquire enough lira through currency exchanges-- meanwhile, the people who are able to access lira are holding onto it pretty much only to 1) buy oil in lira 2) pay taxes to the Porte in lira. That seems good, except for the fact that no one is able to buy Ottoman cars. An overly strong currency will weaken all exports, not just industrial ones.

In order to lessen some of this demand, the Ottomans could instead just accept payment in a foreign currency for its oil-- the dollar, pound, or mark. This might even be a sound industrial strategy-- strengthening a great power's currency may make their exports harder to buy, leading Ottoman citizens to buy local and other foreigners to import from the Ottomans as well. "Petromark recycling" will ensure that marks are used to buy German exports in the end, but this is an inevitability (some of their products are world-class, you might never find something at this quality or price anywhere else), and at least the Ottomans have all the marks they need when the time comes. As the profile of Ottoman exports increases, and Ottoman financial instruments become a more attractive investment, the Ottomans could switch to selling their oil for lira. Against the malign effects of the lira becoming too strong and eventually too scarce, the Ottomans could do what Norway is doing and print more currency. They may not even have to consciously do that-- borrowing is after all a form of "printing money" due to how central banks rate the value of debt purchased from treasuries. And the Ottomans may be doing a lot of borrowing.

Oil and industrial policy are therefore closely related and whether the Sultans remain executives or step back and let a Prime Minister take charge, the oil and industry ministers will have to coordinate closely in order to both accomplish their missions, they really are running a three-legged race. In addition to my prior posts about the security services, it seems the Ottomans will have to be a very top heavy, centralized, and activist state in this century. An executive who cannot balance all of these very important concerns may be a disaster for the nation, and the bureaucracies that manage oil, industry, finance, and security may consider their institutional expertise (which they will build up over the coming decades) too important for any minister to ignore. The system seems primed to produce a "deep state" of unelected bureaucrats and supportive think tanks demanding they be heard, while having a very low tolerance for executives that prioritize political theater or pyromancy, or see themselves as having been put into office to push a single perspective or force a single issue, instead of recognizing their job is actually about juggling several competing interests at once. They're supposed to be a force for balance, but balance is restricting-- just ask all the US presidents between Polk and Lincoln.

It's possible that leadership will consist of rapid turnover of short lived executives (during which the bureaucracies are running on autopilot, one can only hope they coordinate with each other) interspersed with era-defining executives who have a long tenure and are able to alter the state's "mission statement", changing what the "autopilot" approach looks like even after they are gone. This executive doesn't necessarily have to be Prime Minister. They could just occupy a very powerful Parliamentary position, or be a recurring member of cabinets. It could even be a Sultan who stands back and issues carefully curated statements, as well as a Sultan who overtly exercises executive power. The overall appearance may not seem perfectly democratic, as predictability is considered a greater virtue than following along perfectly with the people's shifting opinions-- you may see one party conquer the Majlis and turn into a bazaar for horse trading between different internal factions, or so many parties that every single government is a coalition of some kind. There are reasons to favor a strong as well as weak lira, manufacturing as well as oil, so attitudes related to these not-really-opposites may become hallmarks of two dominant parties. Maybe the sheer volume of Ottoman production means their oil industry can get by charging lower prices in a weaker currency, so they're actually pretty willing to make concessions if needed.

But if an incompetent executive is one kind of danger, a malevolent executive could be far worse. Remember that "unchecked strong lira" scenario of people only wanting the lira so they can pay the oil companies or the state, possibly having none left over for other Ottoman products? This would mean only the oil companies and the state actually ever make any money (and they'll want the oil price to be as high as possible, which hurts all oil consumers-- even gas station owners in the Empire may try to smuggle their subsidized product abroad, leaving less for Ottoman motorists). And if the oil company is state owned, and there's no barriers to political influence so the company openly functions as a political slush fund, this means that all the money is going right to the state and everyone else is left dependent on handouts. And if the executive should cover his tracks with the significant powers that previous executives have left him? And if he should purchase the loyalty of the security services to prevent himself from being overthrown? And then become deluded into thinking he is a great strategist who can use his strength "for the glory of the Empire?" Whether all this made you think of Erdogan or Putin or someone else entirely (there are many like them), someone like that could be a genuine disaster-- especially if the "deep state bureaucrats" can no longer restore the balance.

Understanding Between Correlation of Oil and Currency

Crude oil remains in a tight correlation with many currency pairs.

www.investopedia.com

How Petrodollars Affect the U.S. Dollar

We examine the rise of petrodollars and their influence on the USD as a global reserve currency.

www.investopedia.com

Strong Dollar: Advantages and Disadvantages

While a strong U.S. dollar benefits some, it negatively impacts others. These are the advantages and disadvantages of a strong U.S. dollar, and who gains and loses.

www.investopedia.com

 

[Beatriz]

It's possible that leadership will consist of rapid turnover of short lived executives (during which the bureaucracies are running on autopilot, one can only hope they coordinate with each other) interspersed with era-defining executives who have a long tenure and are able to alter the state's "mission statement", changing what the "autopilot" approach looks like even after they are gone.

This reminds me of the Japanese Federation from the EEUSG series, which is in practice run by the local bureaucracies with elections as kabuki theater

 

[LostInNewDelhi]

This reminds me of the Japanese Federation from the EEUSG series, which is in practice run by the local bureaucracies with elections as kabuki theater

Well, it doesn't have to be that bad. As long as the elected figures are in touch with reality, or in touch with parts of reality but willing to work together, things could be fine. It's not like bureaucrats are perfectly good at picking successors anyways, their first instinct is probably just to reward whoever stood by them in factional disputes.

It's just that oil might offer more money, especially in the short term, that can be lavishly spent on social services and new construction to say "look, the government is helping you"; while industry may be slower to take off and require a lot of nurturing, but long term will have the best effects for public employment, education, and general outlook on life, as long as sufficient attention is paid to externalities like pollution. These things are both good but what's good for one may not be great for the other-- and the opposition plays out in the currency itself, because the profits produced by oil may drive up its value. The thing is that currency is supposed to be a matter for the treasury and central bank, so they are forced to invite representatives of these other two interests to their meetings in order to actually get a handle on what's affecting the currency and what the currency affects.

The fact that half the cabinet's most important people are conducting their own meetings is where you might get the "shadow government" from, if there isn't sufficient space for and resolution of these discussions "aboveground", in meetings with elected figures.

And it could get even more complicated, drawing in even more cabinet portfolios-- say that the British protectorates in the Gulf (all the Gulf states except Saudi Arabia) remain independent from the Ottomans, even if it means a continuing British protectorate. Even if they want a lifestyle of total austerity, they will inevitably earn more money than the total population could ever need or want. So first you tackle the needs, bringing in the Levantine and Iraqi doctors with pay scales far better than they'll see at home. And then the wants, now it's the South and Southeast Asian construction workers. It's only a skip and a hop to the World Cup from there.

Meanwhile the Ottoman interior of the Peninsula may seem a bit more drab in comparison, if the oil income is purposely limited and is being "responsibly" spent where it can "do more good". Industrial growth will benefit Anatolia and the Levant but it won't show its face here. Can the Ottomans really leave the area like that, and tell them to get jobs in the Levant or Anatolia if they don't want to be poor, when the bar is set so much higher by Gulf state governments giving their citizens everything they could want? Is al-Hasa or Najd a higher priority for subsidies (and within Hejaz, just Jeddah and the Haramayn or the rest of it too)-- who is less likely to send militants to Mecca? Even if Ibn Saud is gone his people may remain, the 1979 Mecca takeover was led by descendants of Ikhwan rebels against Ibn Saud. And the enemy always gets a vote-- what if the Gulf states fluctuate their production to deny the Ottomans profits, flooding the market with oil to drive down the price (and still probably making more money than they could ever need or want)? How is a confrontation between the Ottomans and the (probably still British?) Gulf states supposed to go and how will the world respond? Will the rest of the Ottoman economy and society appreciate being dragged along for the ride, or would you see more Levantines preferring that the Turks call them "Shami" instead of *scoffs* "Arab"?

The equivalent of the 1980s might introduce even more changes. Public health crises, industrial stagnation and outsourcing, and the suggestion that gains force through repetition-- "couldn't oil solve all our problems"? And maybe it could, if instead of drawing on the oil income directly the government covers its deficits by withdrawing from a sovereign wealth fund that all past income goes into. Then they wouldn't need to keep such an iron grip on the exact amount of oil production and price.

 

[LostInNewDelhi]

Will the Philippines try to join the Entente? They need military experience (the revolution was over a decade ago), none of the Kaisers can really threaten them, and they need Europeans to know them as something other than "rabid anticolonialists"-- they need to network, not stay in Japan's kangaroo pouch.

With the Philippines' more radical republicanism (could there be influence from American Populism and Progressivism, or the thinking of the Bellamys, maybe from Americans and left wing Europeans who have decided to move to Manila to see things for themselves, or to work as foreign "o-yatoi" experts hired to modernize agriculture, following recommendations from the Japanese?) maybe an alliance with the same countries holding SEA down could be criticized. But it could also be phrased as paying back Japan for their earlier help, and as long as the Philippines don't do stuff like extraditing Chinese/SEA dissidents they shouldn't get too much bad press for it.

They might not have the best time fighting alongside the Japanese but if things get really bad, like they're just used as cannon fodder or it's perceived that way, that could cleanly set the stage for a postwar rupture between them. The legacy of the Restoration's "shishi" is after all a complicated one-- the Meiji government defeated the Satsuma Rebellion and the Popular Rights Movement. These critics might been portrayed as backward, rootless, and disloyal to nation and Emperor-- but what if the supposedly backward, despite some archaisms, were actually more forward thinking than their opponents and more focused on the people's welfare, with prescience and lessons about the current world and national crises? Depending on how successful (in creating a just and/or strong country-- perhaps not industrialism, but a seemingly better agrarianism) the Filipinos' marriage of the shishi legacy to a very different social outlook from the Meiji government, they could even argue they have inherited something from the Restoration that Japan itself hasn't. It probably won't be allowed to go so far that Japan withdraws its business/arms sales or support the opposition, but there's potential for natural disagreement-- not a chasm or a hairline fracture, something in between that could move in either direction. The Philippines may bristle at the idea that "fraternity" with other Asian governments should compel them to extradite people from China or from Japanese Taiwan, even if those people are working on a "Second Formosa Republic" or something-- after all, what about open republicanism (with land reforms and universal suffrage?) should scare these Asian monarchies so? But maybe that's just the Bonifacist, Rizalist thinking, and the partisans of the executed Aguinaldo are now running an opposition party calling for pro-growth policies at home and not unnecessarily antagonizing neighbors.

 

[Ursogulos]

Ah the Armenian question is finally answered, in a swift and Brutal manner.

A bit delve into Balkans, would a super weak and chastised Bulgaria after territorial losses propose a dual monarchy under Ottoman sultan as per a proposal OTL? I can see this happening if a lot of Bulgarian refugees are gonna end up in Ottoman territories. Prominent Policy makers might say,"better to have an turk on your belly than an Austrian or Russian over your head"

 

[akramos2012]

Ah the Armenian question is finally answered, in a swift and Brutal manner.

A bit delve into Balkans, would a super weak and chastised Bulgaria after territorial losses propose a dual monarchy under Ottoman sultan as per a proposal OTL? I can see this happening if a lot of Bulgarian refugees are gonna end up in Ottoman territories. Prominent Policy makers might say,"better to have an turk on your belly than an Austrian or Russian over your head"

Or reduce Bulgaria to its otl borders and make it a neutral country and give Macedonia eather to the OE or give them undependans?

 

[LostInNewDelhi]

a dual monarchy under Ottoman sultan as per a proposal OTL?

I was going to say "what about a Greek" but a Turk might even be an easier sell, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church is one half of the nationalist state there and it rebelled against the Patriarch of Constantinople as well as the Sultan. But maybe that could be used to argue it's become too politicized, and shouldn't stand in the way of "harmony, justice, and compensation for past mistakes" in Bulgaria's relations with neighbors.

If the Kaisers lose, Bulgaria won't accept a German as king like OTL. France doesn't have any nobles, pretenders have no diplomatic value. Britain and Italy do, but pro-Ottoman Greek and Albanian nobles (the Phanariotes and similar) might have a decent shot. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ghica_family

 

[the_Atom]

This is part of an overall question of how technology will develop differently in TTL though, and so far most of the changes have been "under the hood". Hopefully as the war progresses and even ends we will begin to see how technology has developed differently though.

Speaking of technology, is there anything resembling an air war happening right now, or is aircraft use restricted entirely to scouting roles?

 

[Nassirisimo]

Okay, so long time no reply. This time my excuse is an impromptu trip to Bahrain (nothing bad happened, I just had the opportunity thanks to China finally opening up its borders), as well as my luggage (which included my laptop charger) being stuck in Bangkok for almost two weeks (thank you Gulf Air) (wow, there sure are a lot of parentheses in here). So progress has been minimal.

The future of the Balkans is going to be really tricky to decide. Bulgaria did well in 1912 but between shell shortages that make other combatants look well-supplied and increased numbers of Austro-Hungarian soldiers on the battlefield, it is likely that they will be crushed in 1913. What happens after this is up in the air. It is possible the British will leverage their naval power to save as much of the Bulgarian army as possible, as it is unlikely that the Entente has the troops to spare to stabilize the Bulgarian front. Another possibility as some of you guys have noted is that the Bulgarian army may try to move into Ottoman territory in Thrace and Albania. Moving into Albania all guns blazing will be very bad from the perspective of the Entente, as it may force the Ottomans into the war on the side of the TEA, which will tip the scales even more decisively in their favour. The Ottomans may well inter Bulgarian forces that arrive in Ottoman territory as well, though this will likely be a huge drain on Ottoman resources. A more likely eventuality is the Bulgarians agree upon a separate peace, which will see their territory handed to other Balkan powers such as Greece, Serbia, Romania and very possibly the Ottoman Empire.

This would ensure that the Austro-Hungarians will be the primary power in the Balkans at least for the duration of the war, but I could see tensions between Austria-Hungary and Russia arise once again following the victory of the TEA. The Austro-Hungarians may also be tempted to take Salonika for themselves, something that some advocated in the late 19th-early 20th century of OTL.

The Kurds in Eastern Anatolia, now that the Armenians have been rendered largely powerless, are likely to see the Ottoman Government less as a partner against the Armenians, and the same is true in reverse. I think for the rest of the 1910s and 1920s tensions will grow as Kurdish Nationalism becomes increasingly important, something that will only grow stronger as more Kurds settle down, become sedentary and even worse, become educated.

Oil and the shape of the future Ottoman economy are interesting topics, to say the least. I think there's a medium between "The Dutch Disease will hollow out the economy" and "fully automated luxury Ottomanism". It is highly unlikely that the Ottomans would be able to control the whole Gulf, barring some disastrous decline in British power and a subsequent Anglo-Ottoman War, which in all fairness happened in the last timeline. That the Gulf states would be separate from the Ottoman Empire and potentially as prosperous as in OTL would have its own implications for the Ottoman Gulf and Iraq. I think part of this depends on how centralised the Ottoman government is by the time that oil starts to become a serious factor within the Gulf, which likely isn't until the 1950s/1960s, though I suppose it could happen earlier. At this point, there are a lot of possibilities.

 

[haider najib]

Moving into Albania all guns blazing will be very bad from the perspective of the Entente

I think the opposite. Italy is on the entente side they can support Bulgaria threw the straights and boot of italy. Italy can send troops as much closer to home they also have interest in said territory. It also allows the Mediterranean navies to do something. Remember Egypt was fully usurped. I don't think they care much about ottoman land power. Ottoman army didn't save albania, it was the Albanian militias. Also lets be real as long as Bulgarians and italians die in the south keeping russia away from the true western front its a win. After all whats italy contributing? Fighting in literal mountains won't knock out austria so they may as well be useful being a distraction down there.