@M79 It's closer to your first one. I have him annexing Saxony and the 'New Silesia' of North Bohemia
WI: WW1 happened in the 1860s/1870s over German unification?
- Thread starter Disraeli2004
- Start date
Hi guys! I'm so sorry for failing to keep up with this. The pressure of impending exams meant I couldn't do this for a while.
But I'd still like to keep up with this. In the interim, I have been doing some reading on Disraeli/Gladstone's foreign policy. I'm going to write this up now!
But again, I do apologise.
In terms of interim notices, I'm going to try and make this more nice in terms of maps and graphics. If anyone would be keen to help on this front I'd be extremely grateful.
But I'd still like to keep up with this. In the interim, I have been doing some reading on Disraeli/Gladstone's foreign policy. I'm going to write this up now!
But again, I do apologise.
In terms of interim notices, I'm going to try and make this more nice in terms of maps and graphics. If anyone would be keen to help on this front I'd be extremely grateful.
Part 5- The Russian Question
"I cannot allow that Bonaparte to dominate Germany again, and to do otherwise would be a betrayal of the Russian Empire"- Tsar Alexander II
1872. The frontlines have remained broadly static. France remains encroaching on the Rhineland, but has failed to secure a decisive victory. The Prussian lines still broadly hold. The Prussians had also been baulked in their attempt to knock Austria out of the war after the decisive failure of the Vienna campaign in 1870, but the failure of the counteroffensive meant that Prussia remains in control of Prague and still threatens Berlin. The necessity of moving troops to defend against the French encroachment has meant the possibilities of an offensive against Austria had all but evaporated by the spring of 1872..
Prussia is now feeling the weight of an apparently failed gamble closing in on the nation. Without outside intervention, it looked unlikely that they would be able to strike an offensive blow to knock either of the combatants out of the war. Morale at home is also fast disappearing. The war has lost much of its patriotic fervour- the King's failure to endorse the GroBdeutschland solution, a solution advocated by the German National Convention, set up on the outbreak of the war, has meant the war has increasingly felt less like a struggle for German independence and more a petty imperial squabble. What's worse is the rapid increase in military organisation and equipment- the Prussians had enjoyed a large advantage against the disorganised French and Austrian troops, but as the war progressed rapid military reform was undertaken in both countries. The Prussians looked set to lose this conflict.
The first time that became immediately apparent was in the Battle of Linz, which was fought between the Prussian and Austrian forces in early March. The attempt by the Prussian forces was to break through the Austrian defences that surrounded Linz, which was broadly successful, but on a battle on March 14th the Prussian contingent was defeated, and outnumbered, by Austrian forces descending the city. Military analysts suggested that this was the last time the Prussians could have hoped to unilaterally break through the Austrian defences. The defeat was followed by a resumption of the offense in the West by French forces, which was broadly held off- but the French were now advancing in sight of Trier, allowing them access to a much broader part of the Rhineland.
This prompted a much more serious discussion of the war amongst the Russian high command. It looked increasingly likely that the Prussian army would be unable to maintain a defensive posture for a significant period of time without defeat, although the army was still very much still in tact. And what would a Franco-Austrian victory look like? Here opinion was divided at court between the aggressively anti-German camp and the so called "pragmatists". The pragmatists very much fretted about a Franco-Austrian victory. It would cement Napoleon III's status as hegemon of the continent, after successful interventions in European affairs in Crimea, Northern Italy and now Germany, and re-introduce French influence to the Rhineland and Germany. This expansion in French influence not only re-awakened the Napoleonic demons of the earlier 19th century, but also presented a real, tangible threat- Napoleon III had ripped away the title of "defender of the Christians" in the Balkans from the Tsar only 20 years before, and Crimea was for from forgiven. The expansion in Austrian influence was also not welcome- relationships had been tense ever since the "Crimean betrayal" in which Austria had abandoned their commitment to Russia, despite Russia playing a decisive role in keeping the Austrian Empire together in 1848-49, and still would frustrate Russian ambitions in the Balkans, where the two powers were at loggerheads. A drastic expansion in French and Austria influence would, therefore, significantly weaken the Russian position. The Pragmatists therefore favoured a swift and decisive intervention to protect the Russian standing, on the Prussian side. This wasn't outlandish. After the collapse of the "Holy Alliance" with Austria, Russia and Prussia had remained on distinctly good terms. Prussia had even provided diplomatic support for Russia when they crushed the January Uprising of 1863 in Poland, despite international condemnation. Bismarck, the former chancellor, had made particular efforts on this front and had served as ambassador to Russia. At this point, the war was still a close run thing, although France and Austria would gain the upper hand soon if no action was taken. Given Prussia needed the intervention, they could negotiate a very favourable settlement with the Prussians- and thus greatly expand their power whilst keeping a lid on Prussian power. By intervening decisively on the side of the Prussians, the Russian Empire could also bolster her prestige after the continued humilliation after Crimea and restore her degraded international standing- something that would help in terms of projecting power in the Balkans and advancing their mission. Victory would mean a significantly more free hand in the Balkans, a humbling of Napoleon III, who would n longer be able to frustrate Russian ambitions, and perhaps even a slice of Galicia. And given the close nature of the war, that victory looked very attainable if they intervened.
They were opposed by a significant peace and anti-Prussian lobby within the Russian government. It was argued at the time that helping Prussian attain German unity would inevitably create a large and hostile state that would oppose the pan-Slavist objectives. The slogan often used was "Fighting Prussia's war is a betrayal of the Slavic Peoples!'. This, alongside concerns about the military readiness of the Russian government, pushed the Tsar in the neutrality directions- it would be a relief to see the humbling of Prussian influence. But the events of March began to change the calculations in Petreograd. With Prussia significantly humbled, Russia could attain a signficantly higher price for entry into the war- specifically in terms of the Balkans and spheres of influence in a humbled Austria. It was also clear that not taking action at this point would result in a signifcant Franco-Austrian victory. The French Foreign Minister, Émile Ollivier, wrote a letter to Napoleon III warning of the danger of Russian intervention, suggesting 'It seems evident to me that unless we can give Russia significant and sizeable guarantees over her security, they will lose patience with us entirely'. Napoleon III ignored this, clinging to his personal hatred and distrust of the Tsar.
The eventual pact between Prussia and Russia was formalised between March and April. The Russian party was particularly keen that Austria was not dismembered in the aftermath of the war to serve as a bulwark against Prussian influence. Bismarck was removed from retirement and took up his post as special envoy to Russia to negotiate the settlement. The Secret Protocol of the Konigsberg was signed on May 9th 1872 between the Prussian and Russian governments. The secret terms agreed on the framework of the peace. I have condensed them as follows:
a. Prussia's annexation of Bohemia is confirmed, as well as the proclamation of the German Empire over the remaining German states, not including Austria. The annexation of Strasbourg by Prussia was also anticipated. In return, Russia will receive Galicia.
b. The Austrian Empire shall remain in tact. However, areas of political and economic spheres of influence would be set up. Areas lying within the Hungarian sector would fall within the Russian sphere of influence, and states lying within the Austrian sector will lie within Prussia's sphere of influence.
c. Prussia will formally declare that it will not intervene in any further conflicts in the Balkan region, and provide diplomatic support for special Russian rights in Ottoman Europe and the straights.
d. France will renounce titles of protector of the faith in the Balkans and formally hand them over to the Tsar.
e. Russia would occupy Hungary for 10 years, and Prussia would occupy Austria for 10 years.
f. A mutual defence pact against the British would be signed and announced after the conclusion of the war.
The significant climbdown for the Prussians was the renouncing of the GroBdeutschland solution- something with an immense weight of public support behind it- but Wilhelm considered the secret treaty a success. And thus, the stage was set for Russian interference in the war.
1872. The frontlines have remained broadly static. France remains encroaching on the Rhineland, but has failed to secure a decisive victory. The Prussian lines still broadly hold. The Prussians had also been baulked in their attempt to knock Austria out of the war after the decisive failure of the Vienna campaign in 1870, but the failure of the counteroffensive meant that Prussia remains in control of Prague and still threatens Berlin. The necessity of moving troops to defend against the French encroachment has meant the possibilities of an offensive against Austria had all but evaporated by the spring of 1872..
Prussia is now feeling the weight of an apparently failed gamble closing in on the nation. Without outside intervention, it looked unlikely that they would be able to strike an offensive blow to knock either of the combatants out of the war. Morale at home is also fast disappearing. The war has lost much of its patriotic fervour- the King's failure to endorse the GroBdeutschland solution, a solution advocated by the German National Convention, set up on the outbreak of the war, has meant the war has increasingly felt less like a struggle for German independence and more a petty imperial squabble. What's worse is the rapid increase in military organisation and equipment- the Prussians had enjoyed a large advantage against the disorganised French and Austrian troops, but as the war progressed rapid military reform was undertaken in both countries. The Prussians looked set to lose this conflict.
The first time that became immediately apparent was in the Battle of Linz, which was fought between the Prussian and Austrian forces in early March. The attempt by the Prussian forces was to break through the Austrian defences that surrounded Linz, which was broadly successful, but on a battle on March 14th the Prussian contingent was defeated, and outnumbered, by Austrian forces descending the city. Military analysts suggested that this was the last time the Prussians could have hoped to unilaterally break through the Austrian defences. The defeat was followed by a resumption of the offense in the West by French forces, which was broadly held off- but the French were now advancing in sight of Trier, allowing them access to a much broader part of the Rhineland.
This prompted a much more serious discussion of the war amongst the Russian high command. It looked increasingly likely that the Prussian army would be unable to maintain a defensive posture for a significant period of time without defeat, although the army was still very much still in tact. And what would a Franco-Austrian victory look like? Here opinion was divided at court between the aggressively anti-German camp and the so called "pragmatists". The pragmatists very much fretted about a Franco-Austrian victory. It would cement Napoleon III's status as hegemon of the continent, after successful interventions in European affairs in Crimea, Northern Italy and now Germany, and re-introduce French influence to the Rhineland and Germany. This expansion in French influence not only re-awakened the Napoleonic demons of the earlier 19th century, but also presented a real, tangible threat- Napoleon III had ripped away the title of "defender of the Christians" in the Balkans from the Tsar only 20 years before, and Crimea was for from forgiven. The expansion in Austrian influence was also not welcome- relationships had been tense ever since the "Crimean betrayal" in which Austria had abandoned their commitment to Russia, despite Russia playing a decisive role in keeping the Austrian Empire together in 1848-49, and still would frustrate Russian ambitions in the Balkans, where the two powers were at loggerheads. A drastic expansion in French and Austria influence would, therefore, significantly weaken the Russian position. The Pragmatists therefore favoured a swift and decisive intervention to protect the Russian standing, on the Prussian side. This wasn't outlandish. After the collapse of the "Holy Alliance" with Austria, Russia and Prussia had remained on distinctly good terms. Prussia had even provided diplomatic support for Russia when they crushed the January Uprising of 1863 in Poland, despite international condemnation. Bismarck, the former chancellor, had made particular efforts on this front and had served as ambassador to Russia. At this point, the war was still a close run thing, although France and Austria would gain the upper hand soon if no action was taken. Given Prussia needed the intervention, they could negotiate a very favourable settlement with the Prussians- and thus greatly expand their power whilst keeping a lid on Prussian power. By intervening decisively on the side of the Prussians, the Russian Empire could also bolster her prestige after the continued humilliation after Crimea and restore her degraded international standing- something that would help in terms of projecting power in the Balkans and advancing their mission. Victory would mean a significantly more free hand in the Balkans, a humbling of Napoleon III, who would n longer be able to frustrate Russian ambitions, and perhaps even a slice of Galicia. And given the close nature of the war, that victory looked very attainable if they intervened.
They were opposed by a significant peace and anti-Prussian lobby within the Russian government. It was argued at the time that helping Prussian attain German unity would inevitably create a large and hostile state that would oppose the pan-Slavist objectives. The slogan often used was "Fighting Prussia's war is a betrayal of the Slavic Peoples!'. This, alongside concerns about the military readiness of the Russian government, pushed the Tsar in the neutrality directions- it would be a relief to see the humbling of Prussian influence. But the events of March began to change the calculations in Petreograd. With Prussia significantly humbled, Russia could attain a signficantly higher price for entry into the war- specifically in terms of the Balkans and spheres of influence in a humbled Austria. It was also clear that not taking action at this point would result in a signifcant Franco-Austrian victory. The French Foreign Minister, Émile Ollivier, wrote a letter to Napoleon III warning of the danger of Russian intervention, suggesting 'It seems evident to me that unless we can give Russia significant and sizeable guarantees over her security, they will lose patience with us entirely'. Napoleon III ignored this, clinging to his personal hatred and distrust of the Tsar.
The eventual pact between Prussia and Russia was formalised between March and April. The Russian party was particularly keen that Austria was not dismembered in the aftermath of the war to serve as a bulwark against Prussian influence. Bismarck was removed from retirement and took up his post as special envoy to Russia to negotiate the settlement. The Secret Protocol of the Konigsberg was signed on May 9th 1872 between the Prussian and Russian governments. The secret terms agreed on the framework of the peace. I have condensed them as follows:
a. Prussia's annexation of Bohemia is confirmed, as well as the proclamation of the German Empire over the remaining German states, not including Austria. The annexation of Strasbourg by Prussia was also anticipated. In return, Russia will receive Galicia.
b. The Austrian Empire shall remain in tact. However, areas of political and economic spheres of influence would be set up. Areas lying within the Hungarian sector would fall within the Russian sphere of influence, and states lying within the Austrian sector will lie within Prussia's sphere of influence.
c. Prussia will formally declare that it will not intervene in any further conflicts in the Balkan region, and provide diplomatic support for special Russian rights in Ottoman Europe and the straights.
d. France will renounce titles of protector of the faith in the Balkans and formally hand them over to the Tsar.
e. Russia would occupy Hungary for 10 years, and Prussia would occupy Austria for 10 years.
f. A mutual defence pact against the British would be signed and announced after the conclusion of the war.
The significant climbdown for the Prussians was the renouncing of the GroBdeutschland solution- something with an immense weight of public support behind it- but Wilhelm considered the secret treaty a success. And thus, the stage was set for Russian interference in the war.
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That one is quite wordy, I'll be working on some images to liven it up. It's basically my rationale for having Russia interevene
Feel free, by the way, to criticise any part of this, or point out any historical inaccuracies- I will revise as necessary. I am not the oldest here (I'm 15 years old) and thus my historical knowledge is comparatively shallow, so I wouldn't be offended with any criticisms- in fact, I'd love to hear any of your thoughts!
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I assume this is supposed to be Prussia and Russia?
The Ottoman Empire is going to have some reaction to this, right?
Same but for England. Or are these all private?
Britain is already somewhat hostile to Prussian expansionism and jingoism, and Russia and Britain are currently rivals and enemies in the Balkans, Middle East and Central Asia. So Russia joining Prussia might push Britain to join France and Austria. Especially as Napoleon III's France had semi-friendly relations with Britain, and they had fought together in Crimea. Or at least, Britain might providing lend-lease to Austria and France, and putting Russia and Prussia under embargo.
1. Yep- Will correct, thanks for pointing that out.
2. Yes they will- the treaty is secret for now, but a Prussian-Russian alliance would already scare the Ottomans (or just any extension of power)
3. They are currently private, but the formulation of the Prussian-Russian alliance will scare Britain. Currently I plan for Gladstone to take no action, to much uproar and condemnation at home.
I initially shared your position almost exactly. The problem is who is in power in Britain- which is William Gladstone. Gladstone, throughout his tenure from 1868 to 1874, was very much against the grand realpolitik that Disraeli liked to practice, and a strong opponent of intervention more generally in most circumstances- his governance style was far more influenced by his high anglican mindset. We see this in response to the Eastern Crisis, where Gladstone emerges from retirement to oppose Disraeli's refusal to condone the Russian intervention (the Midlothian campaign etc). Gladstone was far less hard-nosed about pursuing British interests, but sought to preserve the moral good or protect smaller nations from encroachment by larger European powers. Gladstone also saw the Ottoman regime as corrupt and inhumane, and would be very unlikely to go to war to protect the Ottoman influences he so despised. He condemned Disraeli's more pragmatic approach as threatening 'all the most fundamental interests of Christianity'. Gladstone also prefered multilateralism and broader agreement. In this conflict, as in the one in our timeline, there isn't really a clear moral good. France was undoubtedly itching for war, and there's nothing that is going to convince a reluctant Gladstone to swallow his moral principles and intervene. So although we may see pleas for international arbitration, it's very difficult to foresee Britain involving herself, even if that is in her foreign policy interests. Disraeli would likely use this failure to intervene to attack Gladstone, and will probably win 1874 in this OTL- so the Eastern Crisis is going to be very interesting when I get to it.
Part 6: Gladstone's Crisis
"If that Mr Disraeli had his way, shamefully followed by members of my own party, I would be sending a generation of British servicemen to be slaughtered. And for what? To prop up the inhumanity of the Ottoman governments and save the ramshackle Habsburg empire. How that man can advocate for something like that and keep his conscience clear must remain a mystery to me"- Expert from Gladstone's Diaries, July 3rd 1872
By May 1872, all necessary preparations and been made for the Russian Empire to enter the war. There had been a certain amount of scrambling in Moscow in order to find a pretext to justify a war for honour and conquest that would, to a certain extent, satisfy international opinion. They found this in the form of what is to be known as Stuttgart rising, which was a military confrontation between the occupying French forces and a new force, the so-called Unified German Resistance (Einheitlicher deutscher Widerstand, more commonly known as the EDW in Germany)- this paramilitary organisation had close affiliations and links to the Prussian governments and had become operational in January, and had carried out small raids and attacks to cut off supplies to the invading French army in the Rhineland. French forces clashed with the EDW around Stuttgart starting in late March but by early May the French armies had broadly repulsed the forces and had full control and occupation in the city. In order to ward off further attacks, the government ordered limited destruction of some residential and commercial areas of Stuttgart, and pillaged paintings from the galleries. The destruction was a serious tactical mistake for the French government, not just because of the wave of outrage in unleashed in the German world (the underground pan-German chronicle in Austria unleashed a paper with the headline "The betrayal of the German world by our emperor- blind eye turned to horrors in Stuttgart), bolstering faltering Prussian morale and decimating Austrian morale, it changed the whole narrative of the war. Gladstone got up at the dispatch box and urged "The French government to cease and desist violence against innocent German civilians who should play not part in this war". Tsar Alexander latched onto this as an opportunity to declare war. He announced: "This man, Napoleon III, is unleashing a level of horror on Europe comparable to his uncle and Louis XIV. How this man can be named "protector" of the Christian faith across the Balkans is an insult to the most basic principles of morality and Christendom itself". The rhetoric was increasingly jingoistic and to most observers by early May it looked increasingly likely war was coming.
Most observers in Britain were now increasingly alarmed by the prospect of a Russian-Prussian alliance. The Foreign Office sent increasingly alarmist memos to the government. In them, they made facts clear. One, that Russia was motivated primarily by unpicking the Crimean settlement and expansion of power in the Balkans. Two, if Russia intervened the victory of Prussia and Russia was almost certain- this is because both that Prussia had defied expectations to rebuff most French invasion attempts and held the line both in Austria and Prussia, although manpower was no depleting,, and that Austria was still chronically weakened by the earlier offensives and the long aftermath of the rout of 1866. The only way a Russian intervention could be counterbalanced was an Ottoman-British offensive in the Balkans against Russia, and without that Russian-Prussian victory was almost certain. Analysists and growing factions within both Liberal and Conservative Parties pointed out that the collapse of Austria (or the reduction of Austria to a joint vassal) and the humbling of France would leave Britain truly alone in protecting the crumbling Ottoman Empire from Russian encroachment- meaning Russians ships would quickly reach the Mediterranean, and Russia would be restored as a pre-eminent continental power, which threatened in turn British interests in the near-East, including the wealthy trading posts in India. The solution that the pro-intervention lobby gave to this was simple: announce to Russia if they declared war on France, Britain would declare war on Russia. If intervention was successfully prevented through this, Prussia would ultimately fail in their objectives, restoring continental balance- and British power and leverage could be utilised to convince France and Austria to adopt a lenient peace settlement.
But Gladstone refused to adopt this strategy. The first reason of the high nature of risk that was involve- if the game of high-stakes diplomacy backfired, Britain would find herself embroiled in a difficult war against the Russians and Prussians that she would be far from guaranteed to win. The potential for this heinous bloodshed meant that a lot of liberal politicians baulked at the idea of intervention. And Gladstone did not find the prospect of intervention acceptable. He could not see, simply put, the moral case. Gladstone thought little of the reactionary, ramshackle Austrian Empire and thought little of the need to prop it up. Napoleon's atrocities in Germany, as he saw them, did not make him a credible partner or ally, and he felt a moral obligation 'to protect the families of those poor Rhenish civilians', and Napoleon's lofty ambitions in Germany meant Britain would have to contend with an ascendant France again, which was not a recipe for long-term peace. And most importantly, Gladstone did not share the fanaticism of his predecessors about preventing the decline of the Ottoman Empire. Gladstone saw the Ottoman system as corrupt and based on the fundamentally immoral system of religious oppression, and had watched Anglo-French reform initiatives flounder. Waving goodbye to Ottoman control there would, therefore, be an inherent moral good for the Christian world. Gladstone therefore did work to prevent Russian intervention, but stopped short of promising that Britain would go to war. He also pushed for the idea of an international conference. Both sides, fearing British intervention, decided to take up the offer. And thus the stage was set for the London Conference, held on May 8th 1872.
By May 1872, all necessary preparations and been made for the Russian Empire to enter the war. There had been a certain amount of scrambling in Moscow in order to find a pretext to justify a war for honour and conquest that would, to a certain extent, satisfy international opinion. They found this in the form of what is to be known as Stuttgart rising, which was a military confrontation between the occupying French forces and a new force, the so-called Unified German Resistance (Einheitlicher deutscher Widerstand, more commonly known as the EDW in Germany)- this paramilitary organisation had close affiliations and links to the Prussian governments and had become operational in January, and had carried out small raids and attacks to cut off supplies to the invading French army in the Rhineland. French forces clashed with the EDW around Stuttgart starting in late March but by early May the French armies had broadly repulsed the forces and had full control and occupation in the city. In order to ward off further attacks, the government ordered limited destruction of some residential and commercial areas of Stuttgart, and pillaged paintings from the galleries. The destruction was a serious tactical mistake for the French government, not just because of the wave of outrage in unleashed in the German world (the underground pan-German chronicle in Austria unleashed a paper with the headline "The betrayal of the German world by our emperor- blind eye turned to horrors in Stuttgart), bolstering faltering Prussian morale and decimating Austrian morale, it changed the whole narrative of the war. Gladstone got up at the dispatch box and urged "The French government to cease and desist violence against innocent German civilians who should play not part in this war". Tsar Alexander latched onto this as an opportunity to declare war. He announced: "This man, Napoleon III, is unleashing a level of horror on Europe comparable to his uncle and Louis XIV. How this man can be named "protector" of the Christian faith across the Balkans is an insult to the most basic principles of morality and Christendom itself". The rhetoric was increasingly jingoistic and to most observers by early May it looked increasingly likely war was coming.
Most observers in Britain were now increasingly alarmed by the prospect of a Russian-Prussian alliance. The Foreign Office sent increasingly alarmist memos to the government. In them, they made facts clear. One, that Russia was motivated primarily by unpicking the Crimean settlement and expansion of power in the Balkans. Two, if Russia intervened the victory of Prussia and Russia was almost certain- this is because both that Prussia had defied expectations to rebuff most French invasion attempts and held the line both in Austria and Prussia, although manpower was no depleting,, and that Austria was still chronically weakened by the earlier offensives and the long aftermath of the rout of 1866. The only way a Russian intervention could be counterbalanced was an Ottoman-British offensive in the Balkans against Russia, and without that Russian-Prussian victory was almost certain. Analysists and growing factions within both Liberal and Conservative Parties pointed out that the collapse of Austria (or the reduction of Austria to a joint vassal) and the humbling of France would leave Britain truly alone in protecting the crumbling Ottoman Empire from Russian encroachment- meaning Russians ships would quickly reach the Mediterranean, and Russia would be restored as a pre-eminent continental power, which threatened in turn British interests in the near-East, including the wealthy trading posts in India. The solution that the pro-intervention lobby gave to this was simple: announce to Russia if they declared war on France, Britain would declare war on Russia. If intervention was successfully prevented through this, Prussia would ultimately fail in their objectives, restoring continental balance- and British power and leverage could be utilised to convince France and Austria to adopt a lenient peace settlement.
But Gladstone refused to adopt this strategy. The first reason of the high nature of risk that was involve- if the game of high-stakes diplomacy backfired, Britain would find herself embroiled in a difficult war against the Russians and Prussians that she would be far from guaranteed to win. The potential for this heinous bloodshed meant that a lot of liberal politicians baulked at the idea of intervention. And Gladstone did not find the prospect of intervention acceptable. He could not see, simply put, the moral case. Gladstone thought little of the reactionary, ramshackle Austrian Empire and thought little of the need to prop it up. Napoleon's atrocities in Germany, as he saw them, did not make him a credible partner or ally, and he felt a moral obligation 'to protect the families of those poor Rhenish civilians', and Napoleon's lofty ambitions in Germany meant Britain would have to contend with an ascendant France again, which was not a recipe for long-term peace. And most importantly, Gladstone did not share the fanaticism of his predecessors about preventing the decline of the Ottoman Empire. Gladstone saw the Ottoman system as corrupt and based on the fundamentally immoral system of religious oppression, and had watched Anglo-French reform initiatives flounder. Waving goodbye to Ottoman control there would, therefore, be an inherent moral good for the Christian world. Gladstone therefore did work to prevent Russian intervention, but stopped short of promising that Britain would go to war. He also pushed for the idea of an international conference. Both sides, fearing British intervention, decided to take up the offer. And thus the stage was set for the London Conference, held on May 8th 1872.
Put this way, I understand better Gladstone's position and actually empathize with him. He's mostly a man who doesn't want to send hundreds of thousands of his own subjects to die, and even less in a pointless war between two equally morally "bad" sides (which can also both become a threat to British interests if they win).
And the peace conference might not work, but it's a good idea, as the war is, indeed, quite pointless now. France will likely never get her dreamed conquests in Germany (and if she does get them, it will be a quagmire), while Prussia and Austria will only get further hammered if they continue the war (and might BOTH end up as Russian satellites). Only Russia truly has to gain.
And the peace conference might not work, but it's a good idea, as the war is, indeed, quite pointless now. France will likely never get her dreamed conquests in Germany (and if she does get them, it will be a quagmire), while Prussia and Austria will only get further hammered if they continue the war (and might BOTH end up as Russian satellites). Only Russia truly has to gain.
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Part 7- Failure of the London Conference
Part 7- Failure of the London Conference
I may have my criticisms of Mr Gladstone, but I will say this. He will go down in the history books for this settlement. Never in the history of mankind has a leader of a great nation gone into negotiations, folded on all of his demands and failed in every objectives, but still has the tenacity to walk out and claim that it was a triumph.’- Benjamin Disraeli, 24th May 1872
Gladstone's ambitious attempt to end the war ended in failure. But many historians have noted that his objectives were far more limited than ending the war entirely, and he succeeded in a sense from extracting Britain from the war. It may first help to start with the principle objectives of Gladstone's little conference in London. The first, and most achievable, was the ending of what he saw as atrocities in Germany and Bohemia committed by French and Prussian forces. This he saw as the 'urging and pressing humanitarian need to alleviate suffering of citizens'. The second, and one that Gladstone was less focused on, was the need to prevent Russian influence. Whilst Disraeli and other hawks from both sides of the aisle saw this as the most important, this was rather secondary in Gladstone's thinking. Although he acknowledged the potential damages from an Russo-Prussian victory, he was ambivalent at the idea of a victory. Gladstone stated privately that 'It should not be the policy to prop up the saccrelidgous and corrupt Ottoman control in the Balkans over some potential Russian encroachment', and many of the pan-German associations were moulded in the liberal nationalist traditions, although they sat uneasily with the Prussian conservativism. So whilst Gladstone did recognise the need to contain Russia and prevent intervention, his objections were that primarily it had the capacity to prolong the war, and not because he feared Russian encroachment. The third, and more lofty aim, was to end the war entirely, which Gladstone prioritised by seemed a remote possibility, was the end of the war entirely. After all, the war looked like a stalemate, and had done for quite a while. It was clear that the French government, with Russian intervention now threatened, could not knock Prussia out of the war, seize territories it wanted or prevent the unification of Germany at the same time. It was also clear to the Prussians were uneasy with the idea of Russian subservience and increased presence should be avoided, or at least mitigated. And the Austrians were desperate to get out of the war on account of increasing levels of Hungarian dissent and a decaying domestic situation. Peace, therefore, did not look entirely unattainable, as some historians have claimed, at this juncture.
But there was a myriad of difficulties. The most obvious of which was the objections of the French. Napoleon III's regime was increasingly crumbling as the domestic situation tightened. The empire was already in trouble before the onset of the war, requiring a set of reforms known collectively as the liberal empire, and the war was seen s a high command as a remedy to the opposition posed by the increasing weakness of this system. As part of the propoganda effort, the focus of the war was placed on defeating the 'Prussian menace'. Newspapers churned out headlines with news of Prussian atrocities and condemnation of the 'pattern of militarism' that defined the Prussian state. Vast portions of school lessons were redirected to instil anti-Prussian propoganda, with excessive focus placed on 'the suffering of the people of Silesia'. The government had also encouraged pamphlets to be distributed, claiming that the Kaiser wanted to annex vast swathes of the East of the country. This meant that the very survival of the regime was staked upon the need to defend against the unification of Germany. By trading away that concession, he would be jeopardising, probably fatally, the security of his regime. The relatively poor performance of the army was also blamed not only on the corrupt generals but the corruption at the very heart of the French government, and to salvage his reputation Napoleon desperately needed to prevent German unification, and conceding it was quit e out of the question. Conversely the Prussians were unwilling to give up the prospect of unification of Germany under their balanced, even if they maintained a strong sphere of influence there, because of the multitude of pan-Germanic sentiment unleashed by the war. The government would already struggle to persuade the vocal elements to give up the annexation of Austria, but the sacrifice of the German project would be seen as an outrageous perfidy, especially now victory was apparently in sight. Whilst Gladstone and the British attempted to find some compromise, where the German Empire remained in place but Prussia relaxed domestic controls over the South, both France and Prussia found this proposal unappealing, France because it did not meet the needs of her security (which was mainly about preventing a strong unified German army from ever threatening French security again and any kind of concession in this sought would incite domestic wrath in Prussia. Prussia also refused a “Demilitarized Zone” proposal designed to shore up French security. The talks, therefore, of continental peace floundered.
But even with this failure, the other objectives of the conference were significantly more achievable. The focus of the conference turned to the question of Russian intervention. Gladstone sought to avoid Russian intervention in a two pronged strategy- first, by removing their casus belli and secondly by threatening British intervention. Gladstone had success in the first area. Eager not to alienate Gladstone, the French agreed to ratify a protocol outlawing attacks on civilians and allowing for British organisations to survey the Rhineland and British charity workers to enter there, creating the International Rhenish Force (IRF) to help keep the peace in the area. A more general treaty, called the London Protocol, was signed by all great powers, committed all powers to renouncing warfare against the civilians and excessive force in combat, as well as setting up a consultatary international body in Geneva to assess potential breaches of this convention. But although this allayed much of Gladstone’s concerns, it was not enough to prevent Russian intervention. The Russians stressed the fact that France, who had so recently committed atrocities in the Rhineland, could not be trusted to run the Rhineland: the Russian emissary espoused to Gladstone ‘How can a nation that has demonstrated it’s violent contempt against the German people be trusted to run one of her most populated reigons?’. Russia therefore demanded that France vacate the Rhineland; a demand France couldn’t accept without a more general peace settlement. Prussia also played on the nationalist sympathies of Gladstone, and stressed the national self-determination of the people of the Rhineland. The Prussians proposed a Rhenish referendum between German and French control, something the French would have to reject, to paint Napoleon III as an illiberal aggressor. These continual delaying tactics by the Prussian and Russian delegation meant the conference came to an increasing impasse about how intervention could be avoided.
Gladstone therefore had to rely more heavily on threatening intervention. However, the Russians had come to the conclusion that this was not a credible threat. Not only did the vacillating impression that Gladstone left on the conference meant that these threats looked increasingly like a bluff, the internal tumult in Britain, in which Gladstone had staked much of his political reputation on keeping Britain at peace, meant a u-turn on this issue could be very damaging to his reputation. Not only that, his reluctance to help the Ottomans and his condemnation of the Ottoman system meant that Gladstone would not be able to recruit any new allies. During the conference, Gladstone reached out to the Porte to request a joint blow through the Dardanelles in the event of war and Ottoman help. The Porte flatly rejected, because they saw Gladstone as deeply untrustworthy and hostile to the Empire, aspiring for her dissolution, who could not be trusted to hold up his guarantees or negotiate a favourable peace.
As negotiations continued to stall in London, Gladstone was presented with a clear choice about courses of action. It was clear that Russia was going to intervene in the war. One option was intervention on the side of the Franco-Austrian alliance. But doing this would not only be costly in terms of lives and resources, especially given that this war would be protracted, it may in fact be pointless- it was far from clear, without Ottoman support, what Britain could meaningfully do to halt the Russians, and Austria would swiftly collapse, leaving the British fighting a nasty land war on behalf of the French emperor in France that they may well lose. The second option was to intervene on the side of the Prusso-Russian alliance- this was quite out of the question, not least because of the massive Russophobia back home in parliament, and doing this would be political suicide for Gladstone. But the third option was neutrality. Critics panned this option as a shameful abdication of British leadership that deprived the British a seat in the voice of Europe, and would allow an insurgent Russia to continue to role back the result of the Crimean conflict and even threatened British possessions in India. But it was the option that preserved British lives, and Britain could still act as a useful arbiter of the conflict.
On May 21st, the Congress dissolved, producing the London Protocol and various arrangements about humanitarian aid. Gladstone decried the conference a success, much to the uproar of the opposition back home, saying that ‘I have extracted Britain from a war, in which the soil would have been soaked with blood for causes so far removed from our own security, and saved the Rhenish from the hideous tide of war that they are being engulfed’. But Gladstone’s reputation, and the failure to prevent the expansion of Russia, meant his personal reputation never recovered from this utter humiliation. Britain suddenly looked like it had abdicated it’s position in upholding the balance of power in Europe, ushering in a new, more uncertain, age of diplomacy.
I may have my criticisms of Mr Gladstone, but I will say this. He will go down in the history books for this settlement. Never in the history of mankind has a leader of a great nation gone into negotiations, folded on all of his demands and failed in every objectives, but still has the tenacity to walk out and claim that it was a triumph.’- Benjamin Disraeli, 24th May 1872
Gladstone's ambitious attempt to end the war ended in failure. But many historians have noted that his objectives were far more limited than ending the war entirely, and he succeeded in a sense from extracting Britain from the war. It may first help to start with the principle objectives of Gladstone's little conference in London. The first, and most achievable, was the ending of what he saw as atrocities in Germany and Bohemia committed by French and Prussian forces. This he saw as the 'urging and pressing humanitarian need to alleviate suffering of citizens'. The second, and one that Gladstone was less focused on, was the need to prevent Russian influence. Whilst Disraeli and other hawks from both sides of the aisle saw this as the most important, this was rather secondary in Gladstone's thinking. Although he acknowledged the potential damages from an Russo-Prussian victory, he was ambivalent at the idea of a victory. Gladstone stated privately that 'It should not be the policy to prop up the saccrelidgous and corrupt Ottoman control in the Balkans over some potential Russian encroachment', and many of the pan-German associations were moulded in the liberal nationalist traditions, although they sat uneasily with the Prussian conservativism. So whilst Gladstone did recognise the need to contain Russia and prevent intervention, his objections were that primarily it had the capacity to prolong the war, and not because he feared Russian encroachment. The third, and more lofty aim, was to end the war entirely, which Gladstone prioritised by seemed a remote possibility, was the end of the war entirely. After all, the war looked like a stalemate, and had done for quite a while. It was clear that the French government, with Russian intervention now threatened, could not knock Prussia out of the war, seize territories it wanted or prevent the unification of Germany at the same time. It was also clear to the Prussians were uneasy with the idea of Russian subservience and increased presence should be avoided, or at least mitigated. And the Austrians were desperate to get out of the war on account of increasing levels of Hungarian dissent and a decaying domestic situation. Peace, therefore, did not look entirely unattainable, as some historians have claimed, at this juncture.
But there was a myriad of difficulties. The most obvious of which was the objections of the French. Napoleon III's regime was increasingly crumbling as the domestic situation tightened. The empire was already in trouble before the onset of the war, requiring a set of reforms known collectively as the liberal empire, and the war was seen s a high command as a remedy to the opposition posed by the increasing weakness of this system. As part of the propoganda effort, the focus of the war was placed on defeating the 'Prussian menace'. Newspapers churned out headlines with news of Prussian atrocities and condemnation of the 'pattern of militarism' that defined the Prussian state. Vast portions of school lessons were redirected to instil anti-Prussian propoganda, with excessive focus placed on 'the suffering of the people of Silesia'. The government had also encouraged pamphlets to be distributed, claiming that the Kaiser wanted to annex vast swathes of the East of the country. This meant that the very survival of the regime was staked upon the need to defend against the unification of Germany. By trading away that concession, he would be jeopardising, probably fatally, the security of his regime. The relatively poor performance of the army was also blamed not only on the corrupt generals but the corruption at the very heart of the French government, and to salvage his reputation Napoleon desperately needed to prevent German unification, and conceding it was quit e out of the question. Conversely the Prussians were unwilling to give up the prospect of unification of Germany under their balanced, even if they maintained a strong sphere of influence there, because of the multitude of pan-Germanic sentiment unleashed by the war. The government would already struggle to persuade the vocal elements to give up the annexation of Austria, but the sacrifice of the German project would be seen as an outrageous perfidy, especially now victory was apparently in sight. Whilst Gladstone and the British attempted to find some compromise, where the German Empire remained in place but Prussia relaxed domestic controls over the South, both France and Prussia found this proposal unappealing, France because it did not meet the needs of her security (which was mainly about preventing a strong unified German army from ever threatening French security again and any kind of concession in this sought would incite domestic wrath in Prussia. Prussia also refused a “Demilitarized Zone” proposal designed to shore up French security. The talks, therefore, of continental peace floundered.
But even with this failure, the other objectives of the conference were significantly more achievable. The focus of the conference turned to the question of Russian intervention. Gladstone sought to avoid Russian intervention in a two pronged strategy- first, by removing their casus belli and secondly by threatening British intervention. Gladstone had success in the first area. Eager not to alienate Gladstone, the French agreed to ratify a protocol outlawing attacks on civilians and allowing for British organisations to survey the Rhineland and British charity workers to enter there, creating the International Rhenish Force (IRF) to help keep the peace in the area. A more general treaty, called the London Protocol, was signed by all great powers, committed all powers to renouncing warfare against the civilians and excessive force in combat, as well as setting up a consultatary international body in Geneva to assess potential breaches of this convention. But although this allayed much of Gladstone’s concerns, it was not enough to prevent Russian intervention. The Russians stressed the fact that France, who had so recently committed atrocities in the Rhineland, could not be trusted to run the Rhineland: the Russian emissary espoused to Gladstone ‘How can a nation that has demonstrated it’s violent contempt against the German people be trusted to run one of her most populated reigons?’. Russia therefore demanded that France vacate the Rhineland; a demand France couldn’t accept without a more general peace settlement. Prussia also played on the nationalist sympathies of Gladstone, and stressed the national self-determination of the people of the Rhineland. The Prussians proposed a Rhenish referendum between German and French control, something the French would have to reject, to paint Napoleon III as an illiberal aggressor. These continual delaying tactics by the Prussian and Russian delegation meant the conference came to an increasing impasse about how intervention could be avoided.
Gladstone therefore had to rely more heavily on threatening intervention. However, the Russians had come to the conclusion that this was not a credible threat. Not only did the vacillating impression that Gladstone left on the conference meant that these threats looked increasingly like a bluff, the internal tumult in Britain, in which Gladstone had staked much of his political reputation on keeping Britain at peace, meant a u-turn on this issue could be very damaging to his reputation. Not only that, his reluctance to help the Ottomans and his condemnation of the Ottoman system meant that Gladstone would not be able to recruit any new allies. During the conference, Gladstone reached out to the Porte to request a joint blow through the Dardanelles in the event of war and Ottoman help. The Porte flatly rejected, because they saw Gladstone as deeply untrustworthy and hostile to the Empire, aspiring for her dissolution, who could not be trusted to hold up his guarantees or negotiate a favourable peace.
As negotiations continued to stall in London, Gladstone was presented with a clear choice about courses of action. It was clear that Russia was going to intervene in the war. One option was intervention on the side of the Franco-Austrian alliance. But doing this would not only be costly in terms of lives and resources, especially given that this war would be protracted, it may in fact be pointless- it was far from clear, without Ottoman support, what Britain could meaningfully do to halt the Russians, and Austria would swiftly collapse, leaving the British fighting a nasty land war on behalf of the French emperor in France that they may well lose. The second option was to intervene on the side of the Prusso-Russian alliance- this was quite out of the question, not least because of the massive Russophobia back home in parliament, and doing this would be political suicide for Gladstone. But the third option was neutrality. Critics panned this option as a shameful abdication of British leadership that deprived the British a seat in the voice of Europe, and would allow an insurgent Russia to continue to role back the result of the Crimean conflict and even threatened British possessions in India. But it was the option that preserved British lives, and Britain could still act as a useful arbiter of the conflict.
On May 21st, the Congress dissolved, producing the London Protocol and various arrangements about humanitarian aid. Gladstone decried the conference a success, much to the uproar of the opposition back home, saying that ‘I have extracted Britain from a war, in which the soil would have been soaked with blood for causes so far removed from our own security, and saved the Rhenish from the hideous tide of war that they are being engulfed’. But Gladstone’s reputation, and the failure to prevent the expansion of Russia, meant his personal reputation never recovered from this utter humiliation. Britain suddenly looked like it had abdicated it’s position in upholding the balance of power in Europe, ushering in a new, more uncertain, age of diplomacy.
So Gladstone ends up becoming Neville Chamberlain to, presumably, Disraeli's Churchill.
Remember, the Bulgarian crisis is still going to happen in this ATL (nothing in this POD puts it off) and Disraeli is still going to be elected. I'm currently planning for an escalation of that confrontation to war because of increased tension (and also Britain's suez purchase raises tensions, along with the empress of India proclamation).
So I've got a fairly solid idea of the end of the war (France and Austria are going to lose) and the peace settlement (the whole spheres of influence things discussed earlier), but there are a few matters I want to consult about.
. The political situation within France. Because no Sedan, Napoleon III will probably be deposed in an active revolution, which may come before or after a civil war. The three year war is certainly enough to strengthen the Paris commune, but I don't think to a great enough degree- I also haven't decided whether the war will continue long enough for a siege of Paris (Napoleon III may see domestic trouble and swiftly sue for peace). So some advice on what to do with France would be much appreciated.
. The backlash in Prussia to not annexing Austria may be very significant. I don't think it'd be significant enough to change the course of events, but it'll certainly be large enough to create a large anti-Russian lobby. This, combined with the inherent friction of the overlapping interests in Austria, may be enough to form a British-German alliance against the Russians.
. As already mentioned above, 1878 (Russo-Turkish war because of the Bulgarian revolt) is still going to happen. Given Germany would probably not want to play the role of dealmaker because of the aforementioned friction, and the significantly heightened state of tensions between Britain and Russia, I plan that this will escalate. What would this war look like? Depending on the situation, we might have Britain and the Ottomans alone against Russia, but perhaps Germany could join the British side. I also plan to make the Suez purchase and the proclamation of Victoria as empress of India into more serious crises because of the huge friction.
I'll also try and make some nice maps/images. It is a bit like a brick wall of text at the moment
. The political situation within France. Because no Sedan, Napoleon III will probably be deposed in an active revolution, which may come before or after a civil war. The three year war is certainly enough to strengthen the Paris commune, but I don't think to a great enough degree- I also haven't decided whether the war will continue long enough for a siege of Paris (Napoleon III may see domestic trouble and swiftly sue for peace). So some advice on what to do with France would be much appreciated.
. The backlash in Prussia to not annexing Austria may be very significant. I don't think it'd be significant enough to change the course of events, but it'll certainly be large enough to create a large anti-Russian lobby. This, combined with the inherent friction of the overlapping interests in Austria, may be enough to form a British-German alliance against the Russians.
. As already mentioned above, 1878 (Russo-Turkish war because of the Bulgarian revolt) is still going to happen. Given Germany would probably not want to play the role of dealmaker because of the aforementioned friction, and the significantly heightened state of tensions between Britain and Russia, I plan that this will escalate. What would this war look like? Depending on the situation, we might have Britain and the Ottomans alone against Russia, but perhaps Germany could join the British side. I also plan to make the Suez purchase and the proclamation of Victoria as empress of India into more serious crises because of the huge friction.
I'll also try and make some nice maps/images. It is a bit like a brick wall of text at the moment
@CalBear Given I've just written an instalment that answers the poll, can you take the poll down again? Sorry for asking you to do that again
Part 8- The End of the War
Part 8- The End of the War
"It is my sincere belief that with this decisive strike on the Habspurg Empire, not only have we saved the situation of Europe as a whole, we have re-captured the honour, prosperity and glory of the Russian motherland."- Tsar Alexander II
With the failure of the London conference, Russian intervention was now almost guaranteed. On May 23rd Russian troops announced their intention to declare war on the French Empire, promoting the Austrian Empire to declare war on the Austrian Empire as they were bound by treaty on May 24th. The Russian army had improved significantly as a result of the reforms instituted after the Crimean disaster of 1853-1856 and therefore had little trouble destroying the battered Austrian army. The Austrian Army had been weakened by a series of successive defeats, first to France in 1859 then to Prussia in 1866, and barely managed to hold off a second Prussian invasion attempt in 1870 to great damage of their army. Many of thre soldiers, both on the German, Hungarian and Slavic sides of their empire, were disloyal and mutanies were common. Prussia, in a risky move designed to knock Austria out of the war, moved troops from the Western Front to the East and began what is called the second Vienna offensive. The Austrians were now truly overwhelmed. Within a month the entirety of Galicia had been captured by Russian forces and Limberg had fallen to Russian troops. The focus of the Russian army now turned to capturing Budapest. As the situation became increasingly grim for the Austrians, panic set in at the capital. If the Russians captured Budapest, the empire would most likely collapse and a puppet regime in Hungary could be set up- if the Prussians captured Vienna, the annexation of the remaining Austrian territories could bring an end to the war. The situation was not helped by the sudden entry of Italy into the war. Italy had taken a neutral stance during the war, but the evacuation of French troops from Rome led to the seizure of Rome by the Italian army, which raised tensions with France. Italy also held territorial claims to North Tyrol and Dalmatia and eyed the port of Trieste. Thus as it was clear the Austrian army was in a serious state of collapse Italy launched a surprise attack, quickly overwhelming the scant Austrian garrisons stationed there- the French, realising the writing on the wall for their Austrian allies now defending against a tripartite attack, did not bother to make themselves another enemy and did not uphold their defensive pact with Austria and refused to attack Italy. The Austrians now scrambled to sue for peace as quickly as they could with the Prussians and Austrians. After all, the Prussian move eastward had put the Western situation in increasing jepordy- Napoleon III had broken through the trenches on June 5th and now threatened the industrial and vital Ruhr valley region, and it was imperative that the Prusso-Russian forces be turned to the West as quickly as was possible. In a secret protocol, the Austrians admitted to an almost unconditional surrender- Russian forces would march through Budapest and Prussian forces through Vienna, and significant territorial loses would be exacted, from Bohemia to Galicia, and the Austrian Empire would lose much of her autonomy on foreign policy in exchange for Prussia and Russia keeping the Austro-Hungarian Empire in tact. Given the growing calls and marches for independence in Budapest and the pan-German rallies in Vienna, the Austrian government had little choice but to accept as the military and domestic situation deteriorated rapidly. The Prussian government, as agreed in the secret protocol with Russia, held off from pushing for annexation- although the armistice protocol for Austria remained secret for now and would be formalised at a later peace conference. Francis Joseph took the 'poisoned chalice' on July 24th, 1872 and signed the armistice and Russian and Prussians occupied Vienna and Budapest. Most assumed the Hasbpburg empire dead; nationalist movements swiftly took control and what remained of the army struggle to suppress moves for Illyrian, Hungarian and Slovak independence across the empire.
France's position therefore became increasingly dire. Although it had enjoyed increasing success against the deflated Prussian army, breaking through the trenches earlier that year and expanding their hold on the Rhineland, threatening the ports in the North West and beginning to close into the north west. As the reality of the Austrian collapse dawned upon Napoleon III, he ordered a desperate push to capture Dortmund. It looked very much in the early stages like he might proceed and deal a severe blow to the Prussians, forcing them to the negotiating table, but the rapid return from the East helped Prussian defences and the line held. As Russian forces streamed through Prussia, Napoleon III quickly found himself outnumbered. The Russian and Prussian command planned what was dubbed the September Offensive, a universal push along the frontline designed to drive France back to Alsace Lorraine, by pushing from the North and East of the French positions on the Rhineland. After months of fighting an increasingly frenzied offensive, and with victory now a remote prospect, the French morale plummeted. Napoleon III's attempts to rally his soldiers fell on deaf ears, and the Empire came into sudden jepodary. The French Army, outnumbered and exhausted, collapsed with terrifying speed, and the frenzied evacuation of French west only had limited success, with hundreds of thousands captured. The French attempted to put up a defence near Cologne, but the Battle of Cologne turned into a rout and worsened the strategic situation. By mid November the Prussians had re-captured nearly all of the Rhineland and now looked to take the offensive back into France. Napoleon III returned from the frontlines to Paris to give a speech to rally the nations and call for unity in beating back the invaders- but his regime was collapsing around him. The war was seen as proof of the parastic elitism, as well as endemic imcompetence, of the empire. As reports grew worse by the day, the protests grew calling for the abdication of Napoleon. Major protests on November 19th turned into open rioting, starting what are known as the November days. At this sight Napoleon III panicked. He realised that keeping the army tied up in fighting the Prussians would lead to his own deposition- and perhaps even execution- and his only hope, to preserve his empire any longer, was to cut his loses and accept a humiliation peace. As Prussian forces began to surround Strasbourg, Napoleon III wrote to Kaiser Wilhelm I for an armistice, with arbitration performed by England, in an almost unconditional surrender- the details of the peace were to be agreed upon later at the peace conference, and Napoleon III desperately needed his soldiers- he provisionally agreed a large reparation payment, recognition of the conquests of the German Empire, and the abdication of his religious rights in the Holy sites of the Middle East won in the Crimean War. On November 27th 1872 the guns ceased for the first time in two years. The war was over.
The war, fought for a horrific two years, claimed hundreds of thousands of lives, eventually toppled Napoleon III and the Bonaparte's forever and re-made the map of Europe. The Concert of Europe had descended into a nightmare cacophony, and the balance of power had been ripped up beyond repair, with terrifying consequences in years to come. It was a war, as historians had noted, that came from the hubris, greed and ambitions of the rulers of Europe against the better advice of their ministers. The price for their mistakes was to be paid by the blood of their soldiers, not only in this war but in years to come.
"It is my sincere belief that with this decisive strike on the Habspurg Empire, not only have we saved the situation of Europe as a whole, we have re-captured the honour, prosperity and glory of the Russian motherland."- Tsar Alexander II
With the failure of the London conference, Russian intervention was now almost guaranteed. On May 23rd Russian troops announced their intention to declare war on the French Empire, promoting the Austrian Empire to declare war on the Austrian Empire as they were bound by treaty on May 24th. The Russian army had improved significantly as a result of the reforms instituted after the Crimean disaster of 1853-1856 and therefore had little trouble destroying the battered Austrian army. The Austrian Army had been weakened by a series of successive defeats, first to France in 1859 then to Prussia in 1866, and barely managed to hold off a second Prussian invasion attempt in 1870 to great damage of their army. Many of thre soldiers, both on the German, Hungarian and Slavic sides of their empire, were disloyal and mutanies were common. Prussia, in a risky move designed to knock Austria out of the war, moved troops from the Western Front to the East and began what is called the second Vienna offensive. The Austrians were now truly overwhelmed. Within a month the entirety of Galicia had been captured by Russian forces and Limberg had fallen to Russian troops. The focus of the Russian army now turned to capturing Budapest. As the situation became increasingly grim for the Austrians, panic set in at the capital. If the Russians captured Budapest, the empire would most likely collapse and a puppet regime in Hungary could be set up- if the Prussians captured Vienna, the annexation of the remaining Austrian territories could bring an end to the war. The situation was not helped by the sudden entry of Italy into the war. Italy had taken a neutral stance during the war, but the evacuation of French troops from Rome led to the seizure of Rome by the Italian army, which raised tensions with France. Italy also held territorial claims to North Tyrol and Dalmatia and eyed the port of Trieste. Thus as it was clear the Austrian army was in a serious state of collapse Italy launched a surprise attack, quickly overwhelming the scant Austrian garrisons stationed there- the French, realising the writing on the wall for their Austrian allies now defending against a tripartite attack, did not bother to make themselves another enemy and did not uphold their defensive pact with Austria and refused to attack Italy. The Austrians now scrambled to sue for peace as quickly as they could with the Prussians and Austrians. After all, the Prussian move eastward had put the Western situation in increasing jepordy- Napoleon III had broken through the trenches on June 5th and now threatened the industrial and vital Ruhr valley region, and it was imperative that the Prusso-Russian forces be turned to the West as quickly as was possible. In a secret protocol, the Austrians admitted to an almost unconditional surrender- Russian forces would march through Budapest and Prussian forces through Vienna, and significant territorial loses would be exacted, from Bohemia to Galicia, and the Austrian Empire would lose much of her autonomy on foreign policy in exchange for Prussia and Russia keeping the Austro-Hungarian Empire in tact. Given the growing calls and marches for independence in Budapest and the pan-German rallies in Vienna, the Austrian government had little choice but to accept as the military and domestic situation deteriorated rapidly. The Prussian government, as agreed in the secret protocol with Russia, held off from pushing for annexation- although the armistice protocol for Austria remained secret for now and would be formalised at a later peace conference. Francis Joseph took the 'poisoned chalice' on July 24th, 1872 and signed the armistice and Russian and Prussians occupied Vienna and Budapest. Most assumed the Hasbpburg empire dead; nationalist movements swiftly took control and what remained of the army struggle to suppress moves for Illyrian, Hungarian and Slovak independence across the empire.
France's position therefore became increasingly dire. Although it had enjoyed increasing success against the deflated Prussian army, breaking through the trenches earlier that year and expanding their hold on the Rhineland, threatening the ports in the North West and beginning to close into the north west. As the reality of the Austrian collapse dawned upon Napoleon III, he ordered a desperate push to capture Dortmund. It looked very much in the early stages like he might proceed and deal a severe blow to the Prussians, forcing them to the negotiating table, but the rapid return from the East helped Prussian defences and the line held. As Russian forces streamed through Prussia, Napoleon III quickly found himself outnumbered. The Russian and Prussian command planned what was dubbed the September Offensive, a universal push along the frontline designed to drive France back to Alsace Lorraine, by pushing from the North and East of the French positions on the Rhineland. After months of fighting an increasingly frenzied offensive, and with victory now a remote prospect, the French morale plummeted. Napoleon III's attempts to rally his soldiers fell on deaf ears, and the Empire came into sudden jepodary. The French Army, outnumbered and exhausted, collapsed with terrifying speed, and the frenzied evacuation of French west only had limited success, with hundreds of thousands captured. The French attempted to put up a defence near Cologne, but the Battle of Cologne turned into a rout and worsened the strategic situation. By mid November the Prussians had re-captured nearly all of the Rhineland and now looked to take the offensive back into France. Napoleon III returned from the frontlines to Paris to give a speech to rally the nations and call for unity in beating back the invaders- but his regime was collapsing around him. The war was seen as proof of the parastic elitism, as well as endemic imcompetence, of the empire. As reports grew worse by the day, the protests grew calling for the abdication of Napoleon. Major protests on November 19th turned into open rioting, starting what are known as the November days. At this sight Napoleon III panicked. He realised that keeping the army tied up in fighting the Prussians would lead to his own deposition- and perhaps even execution- and his only hope, to preserve his empire any longer, was to cut his loses and accept a humiliation peace. As Prussian forces began to surround Strasbourg, Napoleon III wrote to Kaiser Wilhelm I for an armistice, with arbitration performed by England, in an almost unconditional surrender- the details of the peace were to be agreed upon later at the peace conference, and Napoleon III desperately needed his soldiers- he provisionally agreed a large reparation payment, recognition of the conquests of the German Empire, and the abdication of his religious rights in the Holy sites of the Middle East won in the Crimean War. On November 27th 1872 the guns ceased for the first time in two years. The war was over.
The war, fought for a horrific two years, claimed hundreds of thousands of lives, eventually toppled Napoleon III and the Bonaparte's forever and re-made the map of Europe. The Concert of Europe had descended into a nightmare cacophony, and the balance of power had been ripped up beyond repair, with terrifying consequences in years to come. It was a war, as historians had noted, that came from the hubris, greed and ambitions of the rulers of Europe against the better advice of their ministers. The price for their mistakes was to be paid by the blood of their soldiers, not only in this war but in years to come.
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N.b.- Next instalment will be about the French Revolution of 1872 and/or the peace conference. Any help, comments, thoughts or criticisms on any of the TL or what the peace treaty and revolution would be like would be greatly appreciated
If bismarck otl was able to contain things..here Willy I will not, he would demand Eltass Lothringen in full , Bohemia too, we would see an small austria of being austria+slovenia just to kick out the hasburgs permanetly of germany