In OTL, the Korean War ended in a stalemate which persists to this very day. What if, though, the US and South Korea outright lost to North Korea in 1953 like how the US lost Vietnam in OTL around 1973. Thoughts?
WI: The US loses the Korean War
- Thread starter PGSBHurricane
- Start date
marathag
Banned
1973 wasn't an outright loss, though. the loss occurred when Ford didn't have enough support in Congress to get any sort of Resolution, and didn't have the balls to begin bombing again, to make 1975's invasion look like 1972
So say the Korean peace talks actually work in 1953, Stevenson Wins over Ike somehow.
Really think that he wouldn't order bombing to save Rhee? He wouldn't have been a pushover, look what he did at the UN during the Cuban Crisis.
2nd, DPRK was spent, unlike North Vietnam in 1974
Kaze
Banned
At the time I am writing this - technically it is still a draw. It is the world's longest ceasefire - technically, the war is still on.
But I would say since we are going with a North Victory Senerio -- I would say:
1. Shore up Japan.
a. Article 9 might be revoked from the Japanese Constitution.
b. Japan militarizes (see letter a)
c. More US bases
2. Shore up Taiwan.
a. US bases?
b. naval patrols -> which might lead to war with China
c. more arms for Taiwan
3. Rethink Vietnam, but will commit none the less.
But I would say since we are going with a North Victory Senerio -- I would say:
1. Shore up Japan.
a. Article 9 might be revoked from the Japanese Constitution.
b. Japan militarizes (see letter a)
c. More US bases
2. Shore up Taiwan.
a. US bases?
b. naval patrols -> which might lead to war with China
c. more arms for Taiwan
3. Rethink Vietnam, but will commit none the less.
This. During the war we knew, the United States deindustrialised and dehoused non US-occupied Korea in the most effective aerial campaign in history. Northern Korea was where Zaibatsu had preferentially exported capital, it had a dense industrial configuration and a developed urban proletariat.
Even if the Heer Logistics Fairy magically sprinkles petrol, artillery shells, and second echelon assault units for the KPA; to the point at which the defensive perimeter is reduced to evacuation; before a peace treaty there is likely to be a conflaguration supplied by an airforce that perfected its operations over Japan and is facing a problem it knows how to solve.
It won't save Rhee. But then again this won't happen because the Heer Logistics Fairy doesn't exist.
I have read that if NK had finished SK off before the US could land ground troops, without raising the stakes with a few atom bombs the US would be unable to secure victory. Potential ways that could happen are that NK waits for longer, marking time until the US army and navy are less capable as the Truman cuts take their toll or that the SK Communists (actually the larger of the two Korean parties, so this has big implications for the politics of Korea) weathers the assaults by the Rhee regime better, and are more able to assist the NK invasion.
But basically all of this comes down to giving NK the ability to finish off the South before the US can attempt an intervention. Without a South Korean army active on the field, US ability to land troops and supplies fast enough to push the North back is pretty dubious.
If that doesn't go straight to a very one-sided nuclear war, my bet is the likely outcome is that the US commits itself more strenuously elsewhere, for example, Vietnam and Iran could see an even more forceful US intervention TTL. But the US could also become more wary about interventions in mainland Asia.
fasquardon
This question seems to imply a 1953 POD (which I think is implausible). However, a 1950 POD seems plausible. Specifically, imagine that the landing at Inchon turns into a fiasco similar to Gallipoli. The UN forces cannot gain a foothold and are pinned down in the landing areas. After several months of this and the horrific causalities, it seems plausible that UN forces pull out of Inchon and evacuate Pusan meaning a DPRK victory.
BlackDragon98
Banned
Truman has to give the Marines his treatment of the Navy for America even to have a possibility of losing.
They just have such an overwhelming advantage.
And don't forget that Canada, UK, Australia, etc. also made some hefty contributions in the Korean war.
U would somehow have to convince the entire Commonwealth to leave Korea alone to get a bigger possibility.
They just have such an overwhelming advantage.
And don't forget that Canada, UK, Australia, etc. also made some hefty contributions in the Korean war.
U would somehow have to convince the entire Commonwealth to leave Korea alone to get a bigger possibility.
Have China and USSR not abstain from the vote to support.the south. Could delay US involvement long enough for the.south to fall.
bguy
Donor
A Soviet veto wouldn't have delayed US intervention more than a day or two at most. Later on in 1950 the US was seeking UN authorization to invade North Korea itself, and the Soviets vetoed the resolution. The US simply took the resolution to the General Assembly and got authorization through them. The US would certainly have done the same if the Soviets had tried to veto the initial authorization to defend South Korea and given how lopsided the General Assembly was in favor of the United States in 1950 such a resolution would have easily and quickly passed.
Rhee was not popular and support for NK was there in SK. Unification was the big issue; hence the desire to fight NK came later when atrocities really got discovered - as far as I have read in Max Hastings' book.
Could NK then have been successful? If Inchon had been voted down and the (few) resources piled into the Pusan area, NK might have had a chance.
If we now assume that is so, it leaves with a great: 'What now?'
If NK can somehow get SK behind the unification drive led by NK, there is not a lot US can do.
How will Vietnam go? maybe US will be reluctant to get involved? Or maybe US will really get involved with an invasion of NV in the likes of Iraq.
Could NK then have been successful? If Inchon had been voted down and the (few) resources piled into the Pusan area, NK might have had a chance.
If we now assume that is so, it leaves with a great: 'What now?'
If NK can somehow get SK behind the unification drive led by NK, there is not a lot US can do.
How will Vietnam go? maybe US will be reluctant to get involved? Or maybe US will really get involved with an invasion of NV in the likes of Iraq.
Have NK wait one more year before attacking. By then the actions of Secretary of Defense Johnson, Secretary of the Navy Mathews, and others would have gutted the Navy and the Marines. Any air support would have to come from Japan, Inchon landings would have been made impossible, and it’s questionable whether the Pusan pocket could have been supplied/reinforced to any effective degree before the perimeter collapsed.
en.wikipedia.org
ric350
Revolt of the Admirals - Wikipedia
ric350
marathag
Banned
Would have taken years past for the USN reduction to take effect, and as it was, the WWII B-29 leftovers wrecked the DPRK faster and more completely than what Lemay did in 1944-45
The performance of the B-29s in summer of 1950 was quite poor and doesn’t seem to have had as much an impact on the North Korean logistics as their own logistical organization, which was a complete mess. Now by the fall, reinforcement and improved combat readiness along with the lack of North Korean air resistance let the FEAF really get into gear. But by then the threat of Pusan falling had already passed.
Had North Korean logistics been better organized, then it’s conceivable they could have retained the strength to punch through the Pusan Perimeter in August or perhaps even July.
This loss was a massive kick to the idea (ie the post war defence planning under Truman) that defence spending and actual numbers of warm bodies in the armed services can be reduced due to the use of Nuclear weapons - particularly when there was no appetite to use them!
The army in Japan had no spares etc and the worldwide fleet of M26s was in an incredible poor state - IIRC despite there being a number of T26s in the Western Pacific region - there were zero spares including any fan belts - which for months effectively meant that there were zero M26s in that part of the world.
The available troops that were initially sent to reinforce the ROK forces had equipment dating back to the early 40s and for many of the early units to arrive were reliant on the M1 Bazookas as their sole AT weapon despite this weapon having been deemed as being obsolete.
So the upshot of the defeat for the US Armed forces was that there was a massive investment in conventional warfare, training and modernising equipment for all 3 services.
The army in Japan had no spares etc and the worldwide fleet of M26s was in an incredible poor state - IIRC despite there being a number of T26s in the Western Pacific region - there were zero spares including any fan belts - which for months effectively meant that there were zero M26s in that part of the world.
The available troops that were initially sent to reinforce the ROK forces had equipment dating back to the early 40s and for many of the early units to arrive were reliant on the M1 Bazookas as their sole AT weapon despite this weapon having been deemed as being obsolete.
So the upshot of the defeat for the US Armed forces was that there was a massive investment in conventional warfare, training and modernising equipment for all 3 services.
marathag
Banned
the Bombings were very limited until November 1950, because Dugout Doug vetoed Gen 'Rosie' O'Donnell CICPAF request to do what quote 'brought Japan to its knees' ,massive firebombing, until November. After that go ahead, took three weeks to make much of North Korea like Japan was in 1945.
But Doug did have an escalation clause, bombing tempo could be suddenly ramped up, if the overall Military Situation warranted it.
By June 1951, O'Donnell admitted that he had grounded much of the 5thAF, not from MiGs, but from lack of cities to burn.
For tonnage of Bombs, 130,000 tons more were dropped on the DPRK than the entire PTO in WWII, and most of that by 1952
I think a US defeat in 1953 is unlikely. 1950-1 is more plausible. Indeed, the US was so desperate that by January 1951 it agreed to a ceasefire line south of Seoul. https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/a-seoul-less-south-korea-mao-accepts-january-1951-un-cease-fire-resolution.315177/ I think it would have been hard to spin that as anything but a defeat--not a total defeat but clearly a defeat. But Mao was so confident of total victory that he turned down the proposed cease-fire. As I pointed out:
"Note that the resolution was very favorable to the PRC not only in the location of the truce line but in the fact that the PRC would be included (along with the US, UK, and USSR) in the meeting to resolve the status of Taiwan and the representation of China in the UN--but the Republic of China would not. Chiang Kai-shek's reaction was predictable: he "called the proposed resolution that excluded the Republic of China from the projected meeting the 'most despicable and nasty' decision by an international organization in the twentieth century, and an act portending 'the doom of the world.'" Taylor, p. 448.
"Mao never again got a chance for such favorable terms. On January 17, 1951--the very day Zhou Enlai officially announced the PRC's rejection of the UN plan--the extreme defeatism in the US camp began to dissipate..."
"Note that the resolution was very favorable to the PRC not only in the location of the truce line but in the fact that the PRC would be included (along with the US, UK, and USSR) in the meeting to resolve the status of Taiwan and the representation of China in the UN--but the Republic of China would not. Chiang Kai-shek's reaction was predictable: he "called the proposed resolution that excluded the Republic of China from the projected meeting the 'most despicable and nasty' decision by an international organization in the twentieth century, and an act portending 'the doom of the world.'" Taylor, p. 448.
"Mao never again got a chance for such favorable terms. On January 17, 1951--the very day Zhou Enlai officially announced the PRC's rejection of the UN plan--the extreme defeatism in the US camp began to dissipate..."
You would very probably have one less poster on this forum, As my father spent time as both A) A Guarding Prisoners of War and B) on Heartbreak Ridge. Amongst other locations).
So if the IS loses presumably they take heavier casualties and thus I may not have a chance to be typing this (or anything else) as I was not born until (well) after the war.
So this goes to show that not every POD has to result in just world changing outcomes.
So if the IS loses presumably they take heavier casualties and thus I may not have a chance to be typing this (or anything else) as I was not born until (well) after the war.
So this goes to show that not every POD has to result in just world changing outcomes.