LeX takes this discussion quite a ways from the original Operation Downfall thesis, and in doing so points out correctly that Stalin's ability to take Manchukuo, and keeping it for the long term are two different things. There are also so many "ifs", that my response becomes highly speculative. I will use the term Manchukuo deliberately because I make an assumption that The Soviets will retain control not only of Manchuria but also adjacent regions of Jehol and Inner Mongolia incorporated by the Japanese in 1933-34. In addition, in the OTL the Soviets used a claim of invitation by the "people of Manchukuo" as a pretext for their invasion. The USSR never formally broke diplomatic relations with Manchukuo, relations ended after signing the 15 August 1945 Treaty of Friendship in de facto fashion.
I do not believe Manchukuo will be annexed into the USSR. It undercuts the rationale for Soviet intervention by "popular demand". The eventual outcome depends most significantly on other events; namely:
1. Do the Nationalists and Communists reach a stalemate - perhaps along the Yangtze River as postulated by LeX in an earlier post?
2. Do the Communists prevail, and by the end of 1949 control the remainder of Mainland China?
3. Do the Nationalist prevail?
4. Do the Soviets control all of Korea, or do the Japanese stall the Russians sufficiently for an American occupation below the 38th Parallel in accordance with the Potsdam Agreement?
I believe the Soviets will retain control of Manchukuo with comparative ease until 1950 by a combination of pitting minority groups against the dominant Han Chinese majority together with blunt repression. The Manchu (10-13% of the population), Koreans (2-2.5%), Russian residents (1% or so), Mongolians (1-2%) and even the Japanese (2% or less) will be used against the Han Chinese (80-84%) . Given postwar conditions that beset the majority Han Chinese, there is little they can do besides survive and nurse their bitter resentment.
If there is a Korean War in 1950, then Stalin will conscript Manchukuo troops to intervene, and I doubt they will perform as well as did PLA armies in OTL. Tens of thousands of captured PLA troops preferred resettlement in Taiwan over repatriation. Manchukuo conscripts would be even more willing to surrender, and refuse repatriation in much higher numbers. Stalin will not intervene directly in Korea for the same reasons as OTL. The strain on internal Manchukuo conditions will reach a boiling point. Once Stalin dies, full-scale revolts are inevitable, probably even prior to the OTL 17 July 1953 revolution in East Germany. The conditions for protracted guerilla warfare in Manchukuo are far better than in Europe, especially if there are Manchukuo troops in UN custody willing to join the cause and UN (overwhelmingly American) troops in Northern Korea.
If the Soviets control all of Korea the conditions for a 1953 revolt are less favorable. If this revolution fails, then a second will follow Polish and Hungarian revolts in 1956. The Soviets cannot hold forever.
If the Nationalists have won the Civil War, then Manchukuo is likely to be reunited under a Central Chinese Government, a main reason being protection against any return of Russian troops.
If the Chinese Communists have won, then lingering resentment against Communist ideology and repression may lead Manchukuo to attempt to remain independent. Mao Ze-Dong will have to conquer it by military force. If there is a stalemate is in effect, then the Communists may not have sufficient military power to succeed; especially if the UN has won the Korean War. Manchukuo may enter a second generation separated from China, and with each successive generation the separation becomes more entrenched.
I do not believe Manchukuo will be annexed into the USSR. It undercuts the rationale for Soviet intervention by "popular demand". The eventual outcome depends most significantly on other events; namely:
1. Do the Nationalists and Communists reach a stalemate - perhaps along the Yangtze River as postulated by LeX in an earlier post?
2. Do the Communists prevail, and by the end of 1949 control the remainder of Mainland China?
3. Do the Nationalist prevail?
4. Do the Soviets control all of Korea, or do the Japanese stall the Russians sufficiently for an American occupation below the 38th Parallel in accordance with the Potsdam Agreement?
I believe the Soviets will retain control of Manchukuo with comparative ease until 1950 by a combination of pitting minority groups against the dominant Han Chinese majority together with blunt repression. The Manchu (10-13% of the population), Koreans (2-2.5%), Russian residents (1% or so), Mongolians (1-2%) and even the Japanese (2% or less) will be used against the Han Chinese (80-84%) . Given postwar conditions that beset the majority Han Chinese, there is little they can do besides survive and nurse their bitter resentment.
If there is a Korean War in 1950, then Stalin will conscript Manchukuo troops to intervene, and I doubt they will perform as well as did PLA armies in OTL. Tens of thousands of captured PLA troops preferred resettlement in Taiwan over repatriation. Manchukuo conscripts would be even more willing to surrender, and refuse repatriation in much higher numbers. Stalin will not intervene directly in Korea for the same reasons as OTL. The strain on internal Manchukuo conditions will reach a boiling point. Once Stalin dies, full-scale revolts are inevitable, probably even prior to the OTL 17 July 1953 revolution in East Germany. The conditions for protracted guerilla warfare in Manchukuo are far better than in Europe, especially if there are Manchukuo troops in UN custody willing to join the cause and UN (overwhelmingly American) troops in Northern Korea.
If the Soviets control all of Korea the conditions for a 1953 revolt are less favorable. If this revolution fails, then a second will follow Polish and Hungarian revolts in 1956. The Soviets cannot hold forever.
If the Nationalists have won the Civil War, then Manchukuo is likely to be reunited under a Central Chinese Government, a main reason being protection against any return of Russian troops.
If the Chinese Communists have won, then lingering resentment against Communist ideology and repression may lead Manchukuo to attempt to remain independent. Mao Ze-Dong will have to conquer it by military force. If there is a stalemate is in effect, then the Communists may not have sufficient military power to succeed; especially if the UN has won the Korean War. Manchukuo may enter a second generation separated from China, and with each successive generation the separation becomes more entrenched.
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