WI: Operation Downfall happens?

Speaking of kamikazes, statistics show that 14% of Kamikazes managed to hit a ship, and 8.5% sank the ships. The US might be able to withstand kamikazes better if they built armored flight decks on their carriers, but this late in the war, all the fighter pilots were inexperienced since the best ones had already died. Kamikaze attacks were a "desperate times call for desperate measures" thing; pilots only launched such attacks in '44-'45.

Also, apparently "kamikaze pilots were only given enough fuel for a one-way trip" is a misconception.

 

nbcman

Donor
12k aircraft in Japan total does not equal 12k piloted aircraft let alone 6k kamikaze trained. And all of the Kamikazes will not attack simultaneously so the Allied fighters can engage the Japanese aircraft over the course of many hours.

The majority of those aircraft were on Honshu (9k according to the Downfall wiki page) which means they have to fly from Honshu to the southern end of Kyushu or stage their way down Honshu to get to an attack location. TF-58 is able to disrupt their movement to get to Kyushu to attack as well as to interdict the airfields that they start flying from so there’s no need to dishonestly remove their A/C from the Allies total.

The Japanese managed about a 9:1 ratio at Okinawa and hoped for a 6:1 ratio according to the Downfall wiki page.
Fewer than 2,000 kamikaze planes launched attacks during the Battle of Okinawa, achieving approximately one hit per nine attacks. At Kyūshū, because of the more favorable circumstances (such as terrain that would reduce the Allies' radar advantage), they hoped to raise that to one for six by overwhelming the US defenses with large numbers of kamikaze attacks within a period of hours.
 
The amount of amphibious lift required was staggering. Neptune/Overlord was going to look like a warm-up if Downfall is executed.

There were so many invasion beaches, they were named after car companies. See


b) even more Japanese civilians die from starvation/suicide attacks/atrocities/etc,

I think you're going to see the near extinction of the Japanese as a people. Japanese kids went to school year-round; in the summer of 1945 all the schools were closed. Kids and women were being taught to attack with sharpened sticks. It's only going to take a few of those attacks to kill American G.I.s and EVERYONE on the other side is going to be a target. Which is why I think the atomic bombs saved a lot of lives, especially Japanese, but I digress.

Also, once the invasion starts the Japanese are likely to try to kill every Allied POW in the Home Islands.

My thoughts,
 
The amount of amphibious lift required was staggering. Neptune/Overlord was going to look like a warm-up if Downfall is executed.

There were so many invasion beaches, they were named after car companies. See


I think you're going to see the near extinction of the Japanese as a people. Japanese kids went to school year-round; in the summer of 1945 all the schools were closed. Kids and women were being taught to attack with sharpened sticks. It's only going to take a few of those attacks to kill American G.I.s and EVERYONE on the other side is going to be a target. Which is why I think the atomic bombs saved a lot of lives, especially Japanese, but I digress.

Also, once the invasion starts the Japanese are likely to try to kill every Allied POW in the Home Islands.
Yeah, Downfall is definitely going to be a complete bloodbath unlike anything seen before in the history of humanity. That was what I was thinking for my story, too. The Japanese that are left after the invasion (definitely less than 10% of the initial population) will probably have their culture suppressed, although a precious few might try to keep it alive. Japan's history and even language will probably be forgotten and replaced with Western notions and English as a main language. (In other words, it'll be like Manifest Destiny and the American treatment of the First Nations/American natives.) Whether Japan will ever regain its identity, I can't say for sure. Japanese-Americans will also suffer since Americans will hate anything to do with Japan and Japanese culture.

In other words, anime doesn't exist ITTL.

Jokes aside, though, the link you provided was very useful. I'll probably spend hours reading it and planning my Downfall fic (only the prologue will take place during Downfall, btw; most of the story takes place during the Cold War after). Do nukes exist ITTL? When are they invented? (My gut tells me late 50s ITTL for the US, a few years later for the Soviets.)

P.S. To quote Cody (AlternateHistoryHub) in his Operation Downfall video (the following quote appears in the captions only): "Honestly, they should have done this instead. Epic points for Murica"
 
There is a case to be made that the Soviet Invasion of Japanese-occupied Manchuria was as important as Hiroshima and Nagasaki in convincing the Japanese to surrender. The Japanese had been holding on for some time in the mistaken belief that the Soviets could potentially act as a mediator for a more palatable peace settlement, and the Japanese had offered the U.S. very similar terms to those that they eventually accepted after the atomic bombs fell, both with the caveat that the Emperor be spared. The Soviet Invasion of Manchuria forced the Japanese to reconsider their position, or risk getting similar treatment as Nazi Germany (a partition into Soviet and American occupation zones).
No. In his surrender speech, Hirohito specifically mentioned the a-bomb as a reason for surrender. He didn't mention the Russians.
 
Yeah, Downfall is definitely going to be a complete bloodbath unlike anything seen before in the history of humanity. That was what I was thinking for my story, too. The Japanese that are left after the invasion (definitely less than 10% of the initial population) will probably have their culture suppressed, although a precious few might try to keep it alive. Japan's history and even language will probably be forgotten and replaced with Western notions and English as a main language. (In other words, it'll be like Manifest Destiny and the American treatment of the First Nations/American natives.) Whether Japan will ever regain its identity, I can't say for sure. Japanese-Americans will also suffer since Americans will hate anything to do with Japan and Japanese culture.

In other words, anime doesn't exist ITTL.

Jokes aside, though, the link you provided was very useful. I'll probably spend hours reading it and planning my Downfall fic (only the prologue will take place during Downfall, btw; most of the story takes place during the Cold War after). Do nukes exist ITTL? When are they invented? (My gut tells me late 50s ITTL for the US, a few years later for the Soviets.)

P.S. To quote Cody (AlternateHistoryHub) in his Operation Downfall video (the following quote appears in the captions only): "Honestly, they should have done this instead. Epic points for Murica"
No. Just no. The Japanese were not all blind fanatics willing to die for the Emperor. There were already signs of dissent before Downfall and I imagine those would have increased if the situation worsened. 10% survival rate? You do realize you're saying that casualties would be more than 60 million?

That just would not happen. Neither would the obliteration of Japanese culture. This idea that the Japanese were mindless zerglings during the Second World War is annoying prevalent and it just isn't true.

I think it's telling that these issues rarely come up when discussing the Germans. The Germans are rarely if ever portrayed as mindless. The average German is usually treated as a rational actor, with fanaticism usually limited to descriptions of the SS or other die hard Nazis.
 
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No. In his surrender speech, Hirohito specifically mentioned the a-bomb as a reason for surrender. He didn't mention the Russians.
This is a misconception.

Hirohito did mention the impact of the Soviet invasion in a later speech given to the Japanese military on August 17, 1945.

Now that the Soviet Union has entered the war against us, to continue the war under the present internal and external conditions would be only to increase needlessly the ravages of war finally to the point of endangering the very foundation of the Empire's existence.
 
According to Jeff Kingston

There is contentious debate among scholars about why Japan surrendered in World War II. Some believe the Aug. 15, 1945, declaration was the result of the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

It’s possible that these finally pushed Emperor Hirohito (posthumously called Emperor Showa) to break the deadlock in the Supreme War Council and accept the terms of the Potsdam Declaration for unconditional surrender issued by the Allied leaders on July 26, 1945. In that declaration, there was a promise of “prompt and utter destruction” if the armed forces of Japan didn’t surrender. The use of weapons of mass destruction causing the incineration of large swaths of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in quick succession backed up that threat, highlighting the futility of continuing the war. Emperor Hirohito’s intervention on the side of those favoring capitulation was crucial to winning over those hardliners who didn’t. In this narrative, the dawning of the nuclear age brought peace. It also allowed military leaders to save face, since they could claim that the war was not lost on the battlefield, and agree to surrender to spare the Japanese people from more suffering.




This meant abandoning ketsu-go, the strategy of fighting one last decisive battle intended to inflict so many casualties on a war-weary America that it would relax its demands for unconditional surrender and negotiate a peace. This would, at a minimum, safeguard the Emperor, and potentially preserve the armed forces and shield them from prosecution for war crimes. This strategy was affirmed in June 1945 as the gruesome and bloody Battle of Okinawa was winding down. Reinforcements had been transferred from Manchuria to bolster the defense of Kyushu where the U.S. was expected to attack next.

In February 1945, Joseph Stalin met with Allied leaders in Yalta, promising to attack Japan three months after Germany’s surrender. He kept his promise, and Soviet troops invaded Manchuria in the wee hours of Aug. 9 before the Nagasaki bombing later that day. This came as a shock to Japanese leaders who had been trying throughout July that year to engage the Soviets as brokers in a peace deal with the Allies.

Soviet entry into the war was an alarming development for a military leadership that vowed to keep fighting to save the Emperor. The fate of the czar at the hands of communists, and prospects for a punitive Soviet occupation, influenced the calculus of surrender.

In February 1945, the Japanese military conducted a survey that concluded that Japan could not win the war. But they were not squeamish about the suffering of the Japanese public — more than 60 Japanese cities were subjected to extensive firebombing in 1945, displacing, maiming and killing several hundred thousand civilians. Military leaders could not contemplate the ignominy of surrender, so they compelled their nation to continue fighting a war that was already lost, subjecting the Japanese to horrific suffering that they could have ended far sooner.

Historian Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, in his 2005 book “Racing the Enemy,” provides compelling evidence that the Pacific War ended due to the entry of the Soviets, not the atomic bombings. Having tasted defeat at the hands of the Soviets twice in the late 1930s in Manchurian border clashes, the generals knew that the new front meant further resistance was futile.

Sheldon Garon, a professor of history at Princeton University, takes issue with Hasegawa’s contention that the military was insouciant about Japanese suffering and ready to fight to the last civilian. Recently, Garon gave a talk in Tokyo about an ongoing book project focusing on how the war was lost for Germany and Japan.

He argues that the U.S. was surprised by Japan’s sudden surrender, noting that by Aug. 19, 1945, America would have had three more atomic bombs ready and had six more in production — it did not anticipate a swift end.

According to Garon, the Japanese military was deeply concerned by worsening conditions in Japan because they were undermining the war effort. Authorities, for example, planned the evacuation of a few hundred thousand school children to spare them the urban conflagrations, but were not prepared for the mass exodus of adults who bailed because they knew the military could not protect them. Roads out of Tokyo were clogged with these refugees: 8.5 million fled Japanese cities in the final five months of war, paralyzing transport networks.

This rural-escape survival strategy meant demoralized workers were abandoning factories, compounding existing shortages of war-related production.

According to Garon, these acts of sabotage also meant that an orderly society was no longer obeying orders, responding to accumulating signs of impending defeat. Alas, many of these unlucky refugees fled to smaller cities, and thus were subject to more bombings as America moved onto second-tier targets. The U.S. dropped leaflets warning of impending strikes, and then delivered, stoking fear and undermining faith in the government.

Officials were also demoralized by Germany’s surrender, and the horrific fight to the end that Adolf Hitler insisted on, subjecting his people and cities to a relentless pounding.

Garon observes that the Germans fought like samurai, sacrificing all even when they knew it was for a losing cause. While much is made of Japanese authorities training women and children to resist U.S. invaders with bamboo staves, Garon notes that none ever did so. In contrast, Germany took desperate measures, resorting to full mobilization and deploying these untrained conscripts to battlefields where many died or were injured.

Japan’s diplomats in Europe were shocked by the devastation of Germany and conveyed their concerns about Hitler’s “fighting to the finish” strategy. They advised against emulating the Germans, and thus implicitly counseled surrender for the national interest. But finding an exit with dignity proved elusive.

Garon attributes Japan’s delayed surrender to military intransigence and diplomatic incompetence, a dithering that subjected Japan to needless devastation.

Finally, it was the Soviet entry into the war and the atomic bombings that precipitated a hasty surrender. But it was overdue because the signs of defeat, including a devastating series of setbacks on the home front, had been gathering for some time: endless fire bombings, growing shortages of food due to the U.S. blockade “Operation Starvation,” bereaved families and the subversion of people voting with their feet. There was no appetite for suffering the fate of the Nazis or subjecting the nation to more nightmarish ruination.

As the public — no longer willing to endure — soured on the war, what choice did the Emperor and his advisers have if the Imperial Household was to survive?
Source - here

another source - here

“THE HIROSHIMA BOMB... IT INFLICTED A SERIOUS BODY BLOW, BUT IT WAS HARDLY A KNOCK-OUT PUNCH.”
TSUYOSHI HASEGAWA
Could it really be possible that, all these decades later, after so many countless books, films, textbooks and TV documentaries, we’ve got the final days of World War Two all wrong? That the truth about the fall of Japan has been obscured by the smoke and fire and fallout of the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki?
Some historians certainly think so. And it is their contention that the consensus on the end of World War Two completely ignores what really happened in 1945.
THE STANDARD NARRATIVE
Let’s recap the conventionally accepted account of how the bloodiest conflict in the history of the world finally came to an end. In May 1945, the battle against the Nazis was done. Hitler was dead, his genocidal regime had been smashed, and there had been cheering in the streets of the Allied nations. But the celebrations were premature, because the war itself was very definitely not over.
Japan still stood firm, seemingly determined to fight to the bitter and bloody end. The question was, how to finally crush their seemingly unbending resolve? The battle in the Pacific had already distinguished itself by its horror and brutality, and the prospect of a full-scale ground invasion of Japan – a new D-Day – was nerve-jangling for millions of Allied soldiers.

But there was one possible way to avoid the mass casualties of a ground assault, and that was to unleash the awesome, unprecedented power of a new weapon: the nuclear bomb, which had been developed in secret by the United States.
Fair warning was issued to the Japanese in the form of the “Potsdam Declaration” of July 1945, which demanded the “unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces”. As the Declaration bluntly put it, “the alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction”.
https://www.history.co.uk/shows/the...-did-nixon-resign-and-could-trump-do-the-same
The promise was carried out. On 6 August, a mushroom cloud rose above Hiroshima, heralding the dawn of a new, apocalyptic age. The city was utterly obliterated, as was Nagasaki in a second nuclear attack just days later. Cowed by such a show of force, and facing their own complete demise, the Japanese finally surrendered.
This is the standard take on the fall of Japan. As US Secretary of War Harry Stimson put it, the nuclear attacks were “our least abhorrent choice” and “ended the ghastly spectre of a clash of great land armies.”
But what if Stimson was wrong? What if everything you’ve just read misses the point completely?
THE RUSSIAN INTERVENTION
“The Hiroshima bomb did not make the Japanese ruling elite feel as though their backs were to the wall. It inflicted a serious body blow, but it was hardly a knock-out punch.”
So says eminent historian Tsuyoshi Hasegawa. He and other dissenting voices believe that the real reason Japan surrendered was down to something far less titanic and earth-shattering than the nuclear bombs. One man, it seems, played a far more important part. And that man was Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin.
Many people today don’t realise that, while the Soviets had been allied with Britain and the US in the fight against Hitler, they were not actually at war with Japan at the time of the Potsdam Declaration. The Soviet Union and Japan had in fact signed a neutrality pact back in 1941, which served both their interests nicely. The Soviets could focus on taking on the Nazis without worrying about being attacked on the other side by Japan, while the Japanese were free to concentrate on their brutal battles with the US.
Things only changed on 9 August, the very day of the second atomic attack on Nagasaki, when the Soviets suddenly broke the pact, mounting a massive invasion of Japan’s territories that decimated Japanese troops.
https://www.history.co.uk/shows/x-company
Hiroshima had happened days before, but it was only now that the Japanese leaders fell into a panic. As historian Tsuyoshi Hasegawa puts it, “The Soviet entry into the war played a much greater role than the atomic bombs in inducing Japan to surrender because it dashed any hope that Japan could terminate the war through Moscow's mediation.”
That’s the key point: the Japanese weren’t fighting to win. They knew they’d have to give in eventually, but they wanted to surrender on the most favourable terms, in a way that would preserve their internal power structure, save their military leaders from war crimes trials, and avoid being a puppet state of the Allies. Until 9 August, they held out hope that the Soviets, as a neutral party, could help them negotiate the best deal with the US. During one meeting in June of that year, top Japanese military commander Torashirō Kawabe couldn’t have been clearer: “The absolute maintenance of peace in our relations with the Soviet Union is imperative for the continuation of the war.”
As historian Terry Charman tells us, “The Soviet attack changed all that. The leadership in Tokyo realized they had no hope now.” In fact, the situation was now completely reversed, with the Japanese fearing a Communist invasion which would overturn their rigid, imperial hierarchy and transform their nation forever. Immediate surrender was the only option.
BUT WHAT ABOUT HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI?
Historian Ward Wilson, who vigorously disputes the significance of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs, says “It’s very hard to make people give up their myths.” Indeed, in the case of the nuclear attacks, it borders on blasphemy.
For so many decades, the moral justification of Hiroshima and Nagasaki has been passionately debated. The standard argument in favour of US President Truman’s decision to drop the bombs has always been that, by unleashing such devastating force, the president avoided an even more devastating ground war that might have gone for many more months, taking untold numbers of Allied lives.
Not only that, but Hiroshima and Nagasaki have taken on an almost religious significance in the world’s consciousness – both because of the huge loss of civilian lives, and because of how these attacks signalled the beginning of a new and terrifying era in world history.

And yet, it can convincingly be argued that Hiroshima and Nagasaki were not hugely important in the context of Japan in 1945. What many people forget is that huge swathes of the country had already been utterly obliterated by the most extensive bombing raids the world had ever seen. These were conventional bombs, but no less effective at slaughtering civilians.
Tokyo, for example, had been completely incinerated, with around 100,000 people killed. US bomber crews could smell charred flesh as they flew over the firestorms. Dozens of other Japanese cities had been flattened under the never-ending barrage. Yet, despite this nationwide inferno, surrender wasn’t forthcoming. One politician, Kijūrō Shidehara, echoed the general sentiment when he suggested their “unity and resolve would grow stronger”, and that it was important to endure the attacks in order to negotiate the best outcome, further along the line.
So when President Truman, hinting at the nuclear attacks to come, said that the Japanese could “expect a rain of ruin from the air” if they didn’t surrender, it wasn’t really much of a threat. There had already been a rain of ruin, and it hadn’t changed the Japanese game-plan. When Hiroshima happened, Japan realised a new kind of weapon had been unleashed, but the devastation was not significantly different to what they had seen in countless cities already. It’s only from our vantage point today that the mushroom clouds eclipse everything else.
RECLAIMING THE TRUTH
So if it really was the Soviet intervention that brought about the end of the war, why isn’t it more widely known? The fact is, the complicated period between the fall of Hitler and the fall of Japan haven’t received as much mass media attention as it deserves. While events like Dunkirk, the Battle of Britain, the D-Day landings, not to mention the controversial Allied attacks on Dresden, have all received plenty of media attention, the only thing most of us know about the endgame in Japan is that it saw the beginning of the nuclear age.
Even major events like annihilation of Tokyo in March 1945 are still not common knowledge, while the decisive Soviet invasion of 9 August is completely overshadowed by the Nagasaki attack that same day.
On top of that, when people think of the Soviet Union in World War Two, it’s not the Pacific theatre that comes to mind, but the savage skirmishes against Hitler’s forces, the massacres meted out by the SS in Russian towns and villages, the hellish confrontation in Stalingrad and the pivotal Nazi defeats that eventually turned the war against Hitler.
 
I note overwhelming emphasis on the use of American forces. Where is the British and Imperial and Dominion's forces? Where are the British, Indians, Nepalese, Australian and New Zealanders? Surely America isn't so selfish that it would just keep the spoils of OLYMPIC and DOWNFALL for itself? Surely, it would have allowed others to contribute to the end of Japan?

If OLYMPIC and DOWNFALL to have gone ahead, I don't doubt that the Allies would have quite willing to use their superior firepower to level each and nearly every village, town, city that opposed them. The Japanese, in response would have used Chemical and Biological weapons. The Allies would have been quite willing to respond in kind. The Japanese death rate would have been stupendous as a consequence. The Allies slight lower but still large. 10% Japanese left? Perhaps. I think it would be closer to about 50%. That is still an awful lot of dead bodies. An awful lot.
 
I note overwhelming emphasis on the use of American forces. Where is the British and Imperial and Dominion's forces? Where are the British, Indians, Nepalese, Australian and New Zealanders? Surely America isn't so selfish that it would just keep the spoils of OLYMPIC and DOWNFALL for itself? Surely, it would have allowed others to contribute to the end of Japan?

If OLYMPIC and DOWNFALL to have gone ahead, I don't doubt that the Allies would have quite willing to use their superior firepower to level each and nearly every village, town, city that opposed them. The Japanese, in response would have used Chemical and Biological weapons. The Allies would have been quite willing to respond in kind. The Japanese death rate would have been stupendous as a consequence. The Allies slight lower but still large. 10% Japanese left? Perhaps. I think it would be closer to about 50%. That is still an awful lot of dead bodies. An awful lot.

There would have been a Commonwealth Corps. One British, one Canadian and one Australian division and two NZ brigades plus air and naval forces. No Indians, MacArthur forbade any Indian units to avoid "linguistic" complications.
 
Yeah, Downfall is definitely going to be a complete bloodbath unlike anything seen before in the history of humanity. That was what I was thinking for my story, too. The Japanese that are left after the invasion (definitely less than 10% of the initial population)

Closer to 80% would survive; the spot famines were estimated to kill up to 10 million and then the fighting all over Japan another 10 million to 20 million IIRC. Honestly though, after Operation OLYMPIC fails I wouldn't be surprised if the U.S. seeks an armistice.
 
According to Jeff Kingston


Source - here

another source - here

Hasegawa's points fall apart when Kido's diary is brought in, given it shows the Emperor's thoughts and actions, as well as that of other key players. See the debate between him and Sadao Asada here, where Asada basically body slams with this and other points:

"I cited from Shusen shiroku, an authoritative collection of documents, when I wrote that the Hiroshima bomb induced Foreign Minister Togo to seek surrender on the basis of Potsdam terms at the August 7 cabinet meeting. Hasegawa dismisses this account merely as a commentary by the editor. Actually the editor in question is the late Dr Kurihara Ken, the Foreign Ministry archivist par excellence and himself an outstanding historian. He presumably had access to Foreign Minister Togo, and I trust Kurihara. In addition I arrayed other sources to fortify my view on the prime importance of the bomb.​
Hasegawa gives the impression that he extensively used the ‘Japanese archives’ in writing his book, but there are no ‘Japanese archives’ for this period. In the weeks before General MacArthur’s arrival, the Japanese government systematically destroyed its records. The few sources that have by chance survived must be used with utmost care. My parenthetical remark that Hasegawa ‘makes no use of new Japanese sources’ was made with specific reference to his utter failure to document the primacy of Soviet entry in Japan’s decision to surrender, not to his entire book.​
Hasegawa simply repeats, without evidence, that the Soviet entry into the war rather than the atomic bombings forced Japan’s surrender. Such an assertion, of course, is nothing new: it has long been the article of faith among Japan’s left-wing historians and even appeared in junior high school textbooks. In order to show that the bomb did not have a great impact on the emperor, Hasegawa cites Hirohito’s aide-de-camp Hasunuma Shigeru’s later testimony. How important was Hasunuma? He does not even appear in Hasegawa’s index. Incomparably more weighty were Foreign Minister Togo and Kido who, as Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, was the emperor’s ‘eyes and ears.’ Their records vividly reveal how shocked the emperor was by the Hiroshima bomb. A scientist, Hirohito understood its destructive power.​
Hasegawa categorically stated that the Japanese army did not expect Soviet entry ‘right up to the moment of attack’ and that ‘it caught the army by complete surprise.’ When I challenged him, he admitted that ‘there was a division within the Army General Staff’ about anticipation of Soviet entry. Of course, the Japanese army carefully monitored the massive transport of Soviet troops and equipment near the Manchurian border. Contrary to Hasegawa, I would argue that Soviet intervention did not convince senior military leadership of the need to surrender. I agree with Richard B. Frank that Vice Chief of Staff Kawabe was determined to continue the war and he was supported in this by War Minister Anami on August 9 and Chief of Staff Umezu at the Imperial Conference of August 10. It was the emperor’s ‘sacred decision’ that finally made military leaders accept surrender. And what moved the emperor was the shock of the atomic bomb."​
 
There would have been a Commonwealth Corps. One British, one Canadian and one Australian division and two NZ brigades plus air and naval forces. No Indians, MacArthur forbade any Indian units to avoid "linguistic" complications.

Except Indians brought their own officers, who were fluent in Hindi/Ghurkali/Native languages. Sounds more like Macarthur was letting Racism interfere.

Where was this Commonwealth Corps to be used? How was it to be used?
 

TDM

Kicked
IGHQ had been stockpiling aviation fuel for months in preparation for the invasion, with total inventory being 1,156,000 barrels by July of 1945. Much the same had been done for pilots, with IJA having 2,000 pilots with at least 70 hours of flying time while the IJN had 4,200 on hand who were considered sufficiently trained for night or low light missions; given the type of challenges those conditions presented, that means they were well trained. Overall, when the Japanese formulated KETSU-GO starting in July of 1945, the plan called for 9,000 aircraft to be brought to bare against the invasion fleet. Contemporary to this, the Japanese inventory already contained 8,500 ready planes and IGHQ expected another 2,000 by the fall. When the Allies conducted a census in August following the surrender they found 12,684 aircraft of all types in Japan, suggesting that IGHQ's estimates were spot on for 10,500 aircraft by November. As for planned uses, of the 9,000 to be used in KETSU-GO, kamikazes were to comprise 6,225 of the total.

That last bit is perhaps the most important, as experience at Okinawa had shown that a 6:1 ratio existed in the expenditure of kamikazes to achieve a successful ship sinking. Japanese planning held, and U.S. estimates agree with them, that they believed in the initial 10 days of the invasion they could sink at least 500 transports out of the expected 1,000 the U.S. was bringing for the attack. This would've amount to the loss of about five divisions and much of the logistical network, crippling the invasion before it even stormed the beaches. There is every reason to believe this would've worked, as the Japanese would've enjoyed several advantages they didn't have at Okinawa, such as:
  1. The mountainous terrain meant that Japanese attacking aircraft would've been shielded from radar detection almost until they were right up on the fleet. At Okinawa, the U.S. had been able to deploy destroyers as pickets dozens of miles out but that wouldn't have possible here because the invasion fleet obviously had to be closely anchored off Japan.
  2. The "Big Blue Blanket", which was an Anti-Kamikaze tactic devised by the U.S. during Okinawa, involved masses of fighters kept aloft and being fed data by the picket ships. However, this would've been impossible to counter the Japanese here, as the U.S. was only bringing 5,000 total aircraft from the Far Eastern Air Force in the Ryukyus and the carriers of the 3rd and 5th Fleets. The problem, as outlined by Giangreco, was that U.S. planning called for TF-58 with its 1,900 plans to be 600 miles to the North attacking targets in Honshu instead of supporting the 7th Fleet. This left just two carrier groups to provide a combat air patrol for the fleet, which means that American fighters would've been outnumbered by the Japanese by about a staggering 10 to 1. In other words, even if every American fighter pilot became an ace during those first 10 days, thousands of Japanese aircraft would've still broken through.
  3. The Japanese had 60 airfields on Okinawa and the aforementioned fact of short distances to target meant that mechanical issues, a problem that plagued kamikaze operations during Okinawa given the hundreds of miles distance from Japan to the island, would not have been anywhere near as prevalent.

The question I always have on the KETSU-GO kamikaze numbers was not so much the planes but where were the pilots going to come from (unless they were going to use up all the 2,000 and 4,200 mentioned above).

I'm also not sure that it would be 10:1 for the air forces in downfall?

(OOB for Downfall)

United States Naval and Air Forces


There's also the problem that Japan know Kyushu is not going to be the only Allied landed in a home island invasion so it unlikely they spend all their kamikazes on downfall. Also even of they do decide to expend them all on downfall are they going to base all of them on Kyushu or are some going to have come in from Honshu?

(similarly there were dummy attacks planned to lure them out as well).

There;s also the point that the air force will be running campaigns against the Japanese airfields in the run up to all this, so assuming that there will 6000 kamikazes ready to go or be deployable when it's time is a bit of an assumption.

I;m also not sure about that 6:1 kamakazes to ship sinking. figure either

simply because not every hit ended up in a ship sinking!

The exact number of ships sunk is a matter of debate. According to a wartime Japanese propaganda announcement, the missions sank 81 ships and damaged 195, and according to a Japanese tally, kamikaze attacks accounted for up to 80% of the U.S. losses in the final phase of the war in the Pacific. In a 2004 book, World War II, the historians Wilmott, Cross and Messenger stated that more than 70 U.S. vessels were "sunk or damaged beyond repair" by kamikazes.
According to a U.S. Air Force webpage:

Australian journalists Denis and Peggy Warner, in a 1982 book with Japanese naval historian Sadao Seno (The Sacred Warriors: Japan's Suicide Legions), arrived at a total of 57 ships sunk by kamikazes. Bill Gordon, an American Japanologist who specialises in kamikazes, lists in a 2007 article 47 ships known to have been sunk by kamikaze aircraft. Gordon says that the Warners and Seno included ten ships that did not sink. He lists:


That's with either 2800 or just under 4,000 Kamikaze attackers, but a few points

1). even if not sunk, damaged can still inflict causalities on an invasion force.

2). the above is for all kamikaze attacks throughout the, only anti Kamikaze tactics improved

3). conversely to 2 above the quality of IJN and IJAAF pilots was decreasing, and the worse your pilots the worse your kamikazes.


Ultimately kamikaze never really proved strategically decisive so, any plan that's based on well this time they will be, I'm not sure about
 
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I note overwhelming emphasis on the use of American forces. Where is the British and Imperial and Dominion's forces? Where are the British, Indians, Nepalese, Australian and New Zealanders? Surely America isn't so selfish that it would just keep the spoils of OLYMPIC and DOWNFALL for itself? Surely, it would have allowed others to contribute to the end of Japan?

If OLYMPIC and DOWNFALL to have gone ahead, I don't doubt that the Allies would have quite willing to use their superior firepower to level each and nearly every village, town, city that opposed them. The Japanese, in response would have used Chemical and Biological weapons. The Allies would have been quite willing to respond in kind. The Japanese death rate would have been stupendous as a consequence. The Allies slight lower but still large. 10% Japanese left? Perhaps. I think it would be closer to about 50%. That is still an awful lot of dead bodies. An awful lot.

What level of Civil Defence protection did the Japanese civilian population have against gas. In the UK everyone got a gas mask including babies, I am certain the German's provided excellent levels of protection to their own populace though I am not sure if those in occupied territory got similar levels of protection.
 
A very interesting thread. A couple of comments, both to reinforce points already made, and to introduce some new ones.

1. As for a rationale for the thread, I concur with History Learner that the success of the Kyujo Incident would be sufficient. In addition, I believe it highly likely that Emperor Hirohito would not survive this coup attempt. The plotters were after all, conspiring to defy the will of their god. Killing that god to atone for the disgrace of having made a record accepting Japanese defeat is not unlikely. Especially if Hirohito were uncooperative with relatively low-ranking officers leading the coup.

2. The impact of Typhoon Louise, which hit Okinawa on 9 October 1945 has not been factored in. The typhoon destroyed or damaged 80% of the buildings on Okinawa, most of which were temporary or Quonset construction after its capture in June. 12 ships were sunk, 32 seriously damaged and 222 (mostly small landing craft) were grounded but salvaged. If Okinawa were crowded with troops, shipping and aircraft to support Operation Olympic (Invasion of Kyushu) scheduled for 1 November 1945, the damage would likely force a delay of perhaps 60-90 days. The morale impact on the Japanese defenders of a “second divine wind” saving Japan would also be considerable.

3. The three first atomic bombs were successful prototypes, but due to cost mass production was not set up until after the Soviet test of a nuclear device in 1949. Add to that factor the uncertainty of their initial success, and it is understandable that a fourth bomb was not available until January 1946 and at a slow rate thereafter. As late as June 1950, the U.S. arsenal had only 100 nuclear weapons. Without a Japanese surrender, it is likely that industrial preparation for mass production would be set in motion in September 1945, but until that took effect, weapons would be used one at a time as they were completed. It’s tough to calculate the effects of the acceptability of nuclear bombs as just another tactical weapon on the postwar world.

4. Resistance to the Soviet invasion of Manchuria after 14 August 1945 would have been fierce, but not have affected the eventual outcome. However, with the investment of additional time and a much higher butcher’s bill; it is likely that Josef Stalin would refuse to return Manchuria to Nationalist China. The USSR never broke diplomatic relations with the puppet government of Manchukuo, and characterized its invasion as the result of an “invitation” from the people of Manchuria to depose their Japanese overlords. The longer that fiction remains in place, (that is until the eventual surrender of Japan), the easier for the USSR to keep Manchukuo as a puppet state, eventually becoming a part of Stalin’s insatiable appetite for territory. The split between Soviet and Chinese Communists is likely in 1946, not the late 1950’s.

5. Korea is also likely to fall under Soviet control.

6. Southern Sakhalin Island will be occupied relatively easily, but because of the lack of Soviet tactical expertise and the deteriorating weather in September 1945, I doubt a resisted amphibious attack on the Kuriles would succeed. This is a far different prospect than an administrative landing after Japan’s surrender. I am not certain the Soviets could succeed even if they tried in 1946.

7. An invasion of Japan would remain an overwhelming American enterprise. As an aside, the X Commonwealth Corps under LTG Charles Kneightley was allocated 3 British, 6 Canadian and 10 Australian Divisions. I believe 4 NZ Armoured and 9 New Zealand Infantry Brigades were allocated as well, but cannot confirm. 9 New Zealand Infantry Brigade did arrive in Japan as occupation troops in February 1946. X Commonwealth Corps was allocated to Operation Coronet, the invasion of Honshu in March 1946, initially as a reserve afloat pending success or failure of initial landings. Two additional divisions, never identified by planners, were to reinforce X Commonwealth Corps about 40 days later.

8. Operation Zipper, the invasion of Malaya and northern Sumatra will proceed on schedule in early September 1945. By then the Japanese defenses were quite hollow. The invasion of India in 1944 and re-conquest of Burma in 1945 destroyed divisions that could not be replaced from Japan. This is followed by landings in Java in November 1945. The defeat and destruction of the Japanese by force of arms rather than a docile administrative surrender achieved by American atomic bombs changes the equation regarding independence movements in Southeast Asia. Again as an aside, these operations were largely borne by the Indian Army; no divisional sized formations could be trained for a major amphibious operation by March 1946. I know of no plan to send Indian troops to Japan until after December 1945, when 1 Guards Infantry Brigade, intended for occupation duties was ordered to remain in Palestine to quell disturbances there. 268 Indian Lorried Infantry Brigade was then hastily substituted, arriving in Japan from Malaya in February 1946.

9. Postwar economics will also be dramatically changed. As early as 27-28 March 1945, President Franklin D Roosevelt cancelled two Midway class aircraft carriers (CVB 55-56), six Essex class (CV 50-55), four Des Moines class heavy cruisers (CA 150-153), six Worcester class light cruisers (CL 154-159), 36 Gearing class destroyers (DD 891-926) and 18 submarines (SS 545-562). This was not because they could not be completed in time for a war expected to last into 1947; but because of doubts they could be paid for. By then a saturation point on U.S War Bonds had been reached and the U.S. Treasury was financed by printing money. This would no doubt continue until the Japanese surrendered in 1946-47, but the power of the postwar U.S. economy will be correspondingly reduced as the money supply was contracted.

10. For this reason, President Harry S Truman ended Lend-Lease within days after the surrender of Japan. Lend-Lease not only included war equipment, but foodstuffs and raw materials as well. Continuation of Lend-Lease will give the breathing space for Western Europe to recover before payment in hard currency created a “Dollar Gap” that destroyed postwar reconstruction gains and required the Marshall Plan to correct.

I would be interested in responses, as these points may change opinions, both altering and reinforcing them as the case may be.
 
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