I don't see how a lack of Nationalist troops moving into Manchuria would have changed the Soviet calculus that much. Stalin had little strategic interest in China beyond its being a buffer or at least a weak, non-hostile state. Overtly taking over or puppeting parts of China, especially the region that arguably triggered the Second Sino-Japanese War when the Japanese took it in 1931, would not have benefited Moscow if its goal was to keep China vaguely friendly.
You mean if the Soviets advanced into China proper? IOTL the Red Army did occupy all of Manchuria, no need to move "deeper" into it.
The Soviets would probably exert more political influence over Mao's movement, but unless there was some pressing reason I think Stalin would have largely left the CCP to its own devices after securing the railway/port and stealing Japanese industrial objects.
This just isn't Stalin's style; in the absence of a powerful threat like Nazi Germany vis-a-vis Poland, there is simply no need to cause diplomatic bad blood with the Nationalists and sabotage the CCP's efforts to conquer China by making them look like an obvious fifth column. Of course, this could happen by accident if the Soviets overstay their welcome, but the fact that they could let CCP cadres take over the Northeast the way they did IOTL, plus the pressure to demobilize would make this unlikely.
Based upon the historical record, I find no evidence Stalin was concerned with maintaining cordial relations with Nationalist China. Point by point.
“This just isn't Stalin's style; in the absence of a powerful threat like Nazi Germany vis-a-vis Poland, there is simply no need to cause diplomatic bad blood with the Nationalists and sabotage the CCP's efforts to conquer China by making them look like an obvious fifth column.”
Regarding Stalin’s style in the absence of a powerful threat. The military operations against Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Finland in October-November 1939 were all made in the absence of a powerful threat, and as I noted, provoked a strong reaction in Great Britain, France and the United States.
On 29 June 1945, Stalin forced Czechoslovakia to cede the Carpatho-Ukraine to the USSR, although Czechoslovakia posed no powerful threat. In December of 1945, Stalin attempted to annex Iranian Azerbaijan, which resulted in strong diplomatic protests by the United States. Iran posed no powerful threat either. As I already noted, the Port Arthur Lease unilaterally proclaimed by Stalin certainly fit this pattern of either taking, or attempting to take territory from weaker nations. It is significant that Port Arthur was not returned to China until after the death of Stalin.
Bad blood already existed between the Soviets and Nationalists. It began with the slaughter of Chinese Communists in October 1926 in Shanghai. In November 1929, the Special Red Banner Far Eastern Army employed ten divisions to decisively defeat the Chinese Northeastern Army, forcing the Nationalists to sign a humiliating Khabarovsk Protocol on 13 December 1929 to obtain an armistice. In 1931 the USSR broke diplomatic relations, recalling its own diplomats and expelling the Nationalists. Between January and April 1934, 7,000 Soviet GPU troops invaded Sinkiang (Xinjiang) but were defeated by the Nationalist 36th Division. Between April and October 1937, the Soviets attacked again more successfully incorporating armor and air support to virtually destroy the Nationalist 36th Division.
The Nationalists accepted this defeat because of the commencement of the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937. The Soviets viewed the Japanese as a greater threat and on the grounds of “the enemy of my enemy…” restored diplomatic relations and provided about U.S. $250 million dollars in military aid by April 1941. Upon the signing of the Soviet-Japanese Non-Aggression Pact that month the Soviets cut off all aid, which the Nationalists regarded as a tremendous betrayal.
On 26 November 1940, the Nationalist commander in Sinkiang, Sheng Shicai was forced by the Soviets to sign the Agreement of Concessions which virtually made Sinkiang a Soviet satellite. In November 1944, the Soviets set up the Second East Turkestan Republic which declared its independence from China. The USSR signed the 15 August 1945 Treaty of Friendship to fulfil a promise made at the Yalta Conference, and afforded it the same respect as other Yalta promises such as free elections in Poland. The Soviets recognized Chinese sovereignty over Sinkiang, but did not disarm their satellite Uighur troops, withdraw the Red Army officers advising them, or disband the Second East Turkestan Republic.
The Nationalists responded with a military assault, which was attacked by Soviet aircraft in October 1945. Thereafter the Soviets did not intervene again until June 1946, when the Chinese reached the northern part of Sinkiang where the uranium and beryllium deposits near Kashgar were located. There Soviet aircraft, artillery and ground troops stopped the Chinese offensive. Presumably this was to protect the supply of critical minerals used in the first Soviet atomic bomb; but that is a matter of dispute among historians. What is beyond dispute is that the pro-Soviet Second East Turkestan Republic survived. Fighting spread east from Sinkiang towards Mongolia and by June 1947 reached regimental scale at Pei-ta-shan.
This is Stalin’s historical record. From Poland and the Baltics though Czechoslovakia and Iran to Sinkiang and Port Arthur; it speaks for itself.
I now apply it to the Downfall scenario originated by DragonsInAmerica. Japan has not surrendered, and the war has continued past 14 August 1945. The million soldiers of the Kwangtung Army have been ordered to fight to the death. Instead of managing the surrender of 700,000 troops (another 300,000 fled to Korea or China in hopes of repatriation to Japan), the 1.5 million troops of the Manchurian Strategic Offensive Operation will begin to meet stiffening resistance from the Kwangtung Army. I have no doubts about the eventual Soviet victory, but I also have no doubt it will take longer than the 43 days IOTL to liquidate the Kwangtung Army. As I stated previously:
“Events have a momentum of their own. As the Soviets move deeper into Manchuria, local civil-military governments will be established to support and sustain further military advances.” I said Manchuria and I meant Manchuria – not China. The Soviets have to construct transportation networks; depots for food, ammunition, fuel and all manner of other supplies; airfields and their support structure; repair facilities for equipment; hospitals for the wounded – etc. To ensure this infrastructure, and their attendant lines of communication are kept secure, local civil-military governments will be established or else further advances cannot be sustained. This is true of every large scale military offensive.
I cannot say for certain how quickly the Soviet offensive will secure victory. I believe a minimum of 90 days for units to cover the 450-500 mile road distance to Harbin and then capture it. Another month will pass to consolidate and reconstitute frontline troops, and this time will also allow Soviet units advancing from the west along the Chinese Eastern Railway to reach Harbin. It is now winter, and the road network to support the offensive must still be expanded. Due to Lend-Lease, the Russians have the trucks and heavy equipment, but at the cost of delaying rehabilitating war damaged areas in Western Russia.
Despite the winter, the Soviet offensive may resume in February 1946, or four months after Japan’s refusal to surrender. During the next 60 days, Chi’angch’un, the next most important city in Manchuria is captured, an advance of nearly 200 more miles. More importantly, the flank area reaching to the Yalu River is cleared, permitting a large expansion of the Soviet toehold in Northern Korea. After another lull to restock logistical support follows with a resumption of the offensive in perhaps May 1946. The terrain is now more favorable, the weather allows Soviet air supremacy its full effectiveness, and the rate of resupply is increased. The Kwangtung Army is also severely degraded, whereas fresh Soviet troops are deployed as needed. The 300 miles to Mukden is covered in 30-45 days, and the 300 miles to Port Arthur in a similar time frame. The link-up with troops crossing Inner Mongolia is also achieved, and the Soviets halt in August 1946 at the Manchukuo borders. They are still over 150 miles from Peking or Tientsin. I doubt the Soviets will advance further.
During this time, other Japanese forces in China proper have been forced to retreat and consolidate. They no longer receive replacements from Japan, and forced to live off the land. The Nationalists will have probably reached Canton, and reopened a major port to supplies. The Communists were strongest in Shantung and in provinces to the west and southwest of Peking. The PLA has likely used the year between August 1945 and August 1946 to link those two regions, leaving Japanese forces isolated around Peking and the large plain reaching the Yellow Sea at Taku.
All of this is hypothetical. Depending on starvation levels of the number of atomic bombs used, Japan will eventually capitulate – certainly no later than mid-1947 if the fortunes of war fall their way; sooner if not.
Here is the case for Stalin retaining Manchukuo.
1. The Soviets have paid for it in blood. Their casualties could be 100,000 – or higher.
2. The Soviets have sacrificed their recovery elsewhere to conquer it – Stalin must have some compensation to justify this.
3. The Soviets have established governments and civil authorities throughout Manchukuo and assumed the responsibilities that constitute sovereignty.
4. Manchukuo is therefore a legitimate spoil of war.
5. Manchukuo forms the land bridge to Korea, which in turn is a dagger pointed at the heart of Japan.
6. Between November 1944 and October 1945, Stalin ordered Project 72 aircraft carriers; Project 24 battleships; Project 82 battlecruisers; Project 66 heavy cruisers; Project 65 (later Project 68-bis) light cruisers; and Project 30B destroyers to be constructed. They were to form powerful fleets for the Black Sea, Baltic, Arctic and Pacific. Neither Vladivostok nor Petropavlovsk is a suitable year-round base for the Pacific Fleet, but Port Arthur is.
7. Manchukuo’s vast resources are at the disposal of the USSR.
8. Stalin is a doctrinaire Communist. Expansion of Communism world-wide is an historical inevitability. It is arriving in Manchuria with the Soviet Army.
9. Mao Zedong was shabbily treated as a minor vassal by Stalin went he went to Moscow to seek economic aid in late 1949. I doubt he would receive better consideration in 1946.
I find the argument that Stalin would not act this way because he would be sensitive to the feelings of other nations unpersuasive.
