WI: Confederate States get support from European powers?

When the American Civil War was raging on, a series of diplomatic projects (both at home and abroad) were made to prevent European powers, namely Britain (who fought their own war with the US from 1812 to 1815) giving recognition to the Confederate States. One of the men who fought against European recognition was American author John Lothrop Motley, a close friend of a Prussian statesman and future German Chancellor, Otto von Bismarck. Another American who protested against European intervention was Secretary of State William H. Steward, who instructed the ambassador to England to tell the English ambassador to not give recognition to the CSA or risk war with the United States.

However, some European states still debated giving the CSA recognition; they could provide the European states with much-needed cotton, used for clothing, beds, and basically everything. In this timeline, let's say that this happens. What would change, and how would this affect American-European relations? Is it possible that the CSA could pull off a victory in the Civil War?
 
But who at this time would even support a place such as the CSA, giving it recognition and giving it support are two very different thing as many European powers had already abolished or began to abolish slavery.
 
But who at this time would even support a place such as the CSA, giving it recognition and giving it support are two very different thing as many European powers had already abolished or began to abolish slavery.
I would say nations that traded extensively with the US for cotton, like Britain and France.
 
The largest impact of a recognition of the CSA would be rendering the US’s blockade of the rebels theoretically illegal. Whether anyone acts on that is a totally different beast.
 
Recognition depended entirely on the CSA's success in the war, along with the USA's willingness and capability to continue fighting. If the US made it clear it would continue fighting, recognition would likely not happen since the US would end its grain exports, which would have been disastrous for anyone, especially the UK. However, if the CSA scored numerous victories and the USA lost the will to fight, recognition probably would have followed shortly after. But recognition would not have changed the outcome of the war on its own, and certainly would not have been contemplated if the US was perceived to be holding its own.
 
The largest impact of a recognition of the CSA would be rendering the US’s blockade of the rebels theoretically illegal. Whether anyone acts on that is a totally different beast.
Well, how about this - what if someone acted on the blockades?
 
Well, how about this - what if someone acted on the blockades?
The only ones who really could were Britain, who have nothing to gain by doing so, and France who aren't going to do so without British backing. The issue here is basically the fact that actively siding with the CSA brings no particular motive apart from thumbing your nose at the United States, and from a British perspective long-term antagonizing a major trading partner that's already friendly with your biggest enemy (Russia) is a really stupid move. The single best way to bring Britain in is to have them not be backing the CSA at all, and instead have war start independently (this is why the Trent Affair is popular as a POD). But even then you need someone significantly worse at running a country than Lincoln to provoke a war at all. And in that case breaking the blockade is really the least of the Union's problems.

Basically, open armed intervention by a foreign power isn't likely.

Beyond that, I've laid out an idea before that has a southern victory at Antietam (at least tactical if not strategic) mean the North doesn't feel confident enough to issue the Emancipation Proclamation, and more importantly sees the death of General George Meade. The resulting issues with the Northern army sees the OTL Chancellorsville debacle happen similiarly to OTL, and leading into a second one when another incompetent is put in charge of the Army of the Potomac, leading Lincoln to seek terms before the 1864 elections can see a peace Democrat elected and a worse treaty negotiated. In that case while Britain and France do recognize the CSA they do so only as a prelude to the negotiations, with Grant taking Vicksburg two months late as his army was reduced to make up for losses in the East, and this providing a major boost to the North's position during negotiations.
 

Marc

Donor
There is that problem about slavery. Which increasingly in Europe is regarded as a moral evil.
Let us put it this way, Southern planters knew better than to send their sons to Europe for an education.
 
Well, how about this - what if someone acted on the blockades?

Britain would be shooting itself in the foot, given they'd be setting an absurdly high standard in international law in that case for what constitutes a legal blockade and that's the main offensive military tool of the Royal Navy. The Admirality knows that if theres a future conflict in Europe (Likely, given the history of the Continent) non-Belligerents will be shoving the rulings back into their face to gleefully demand compensation for "Illegal by your own standards" efforts to stop trade with the enemy.
 
The largest impact of a recognition of the CSA would be rendering the US’s blockade of the rebels theoretically illegal. Whether anyone acts on that is a totally different beast.

Why? It is at war. Whether you recognize the CSA or not the US is still at war.
 
There is that problem about slavery. Which increasingly in Europe is regarded as a moral evil.
Let us put it this way, Southern planters knew better than to send their sons to Europe for an education.

Where did you receive this view? New Orleans had frequent transfers of people/students/marriages between families and such in Metropolitan France to Louisiana and New Orleans.

It should be mentioned, Spain had not abolished slavery in its colonies, nor had Portugal. The issue is, neither of these powers I believe could seriously support the CS most likely.
 
When the American Civil War was raging on, a series of diplomatic projects (both at home and abroad) were made to prevent European powers, namely Britain (who fought their own war with the US from 1812 to 1815) giving recognition to the Confederate States. One of the men who fought against European recognition was American author John Lothrop Motley, a close friend of a Prussian statesman and future German Chancellor, Otto von Bismarck. Another American who protested against European intervention was Secretary of State William H. Steward, who instructed the ambassador to England to tell the English ambassador to not give recognition to the CSA or risk war with the United States.

However, some European states still debated giving the CSA recognition; they could provide the European states with much-needed cotton, used for clothing, beds, and basically everything. In this timeline, let's say that this happens. What would change, and how would this affect American-European relations? Is it possible that the CSA could pull off a victory in the Civil War?

It very nearly happened in the Summers of both 1862 and 1863. Anglo-French recognition would immediately force the Union to the table.
 
No, it wouldn't. Recognition isn't intervention and there was zero support for that. Unless GB is willing to actually risk war with the uS, which it wasn't, nothing much will change.
 
And if it is at war it is a blockade.

I think the issue is that a wartime blockade must be effective to be legal. If you aren't actually closing the ports with your blockade, then neutral-flagged shipping has no obligation to stay away from the ports, and you have no right to stop, search, or seize any neutral shipping in and out of those ports. This rule came into being to stop "paper blockades" (declaring a blockade with little or no attempt to enforce it) from being effective either as a deterrent (scaring neutral countries away from trading with your enemies) or as a legal pretext for raiding neutral shipping. And while the Union Blockade was unquestionably effective late in the war, making it effective was a process that took some time (building up the navy, gaining experience with blockade patrols, and amphibious operations to seize ports and reduce the area that needs to be blockaded).

If Britain were to recognize the Confederacy early in the war and claim that the blockade wasn't effective enough to be binding on neutral shipping, then the Union could still stop US-flagged ships from entering Confederate ports (policing their own commerce), and they could still stop Confederate-flagged ships (commerce raiding), but attempting to stop British-flagged ships would have risked the British government considering that an act of war against Britain.

What actually happened IOTL was that Britain very early in the war recognized the Confederacy as a "belligerent" very early in the war (May 1861), but never recognized the Confederacy as an independent nation. This did have the effect of interpreting the Union blockade as a wartime blockade, and theoretically opened the door for Britain contesting the blockade as not effective enough to be binding on neutrals, but they never did so. Probably because of the reasons mentioned upthread that 1) Britain didn't have enough to gain to risk the costs of going to war with the US, and 2) it's in Britain's interests as a major naval power to interpret international law in favor of blockading powers.

(2) in particular in interesting since Britain cited several precedents established by the Union Blockade in its implementation of their WWI blockade of Germany. Most notably, the Doctrine of Continuous Voyage, which allows the seizure of contraband that's intended to eventually reach a blockaded destination even if it's not headed directly there. In the Civil War, this usually meant European ships stopping off at Bermuda on their way to Confederate ports, since Bermuda was easier to patrol than every single Confederate port. In WWI, the precedent set by Britain tolerating this provided a basis for Britain to intercept American shipping into Dutch and Scandinavian ports of cargo eventually bound for Germany.
 
I think the issue is that a wartime blockade must be effective to be legal. If you aren't actually closing the ports with your blockade, then neutral-flagged shipping has no obligation to stay away from the ports, and you have no right to stop, search, or seize any neutral shipping in and out of those ports. This rule came into being to stop "paper blockades" (declaring a blockade with little or no attempt to enforce it) from being effective either as a deterrent (scaring neutral countries away from trading with your enemies) or as a legal pretext for raiding neutral shipping. And while the Union Blockade was unquestionably effective late in the war, making it effective was a process that took some time (building up the navy, gaining experience with blockade patrols, and amphibious operations to seize ports and reduce the area that needs to be blockaded).

If Britain were to recognize the Confederacy early in the war and claim that the blockade wasn't effective enough to be binding on neutral shipping, then the Union could still stop US-flagged ships from entering Confederate ports (policing their own commerce), and they could still stop Confederate-flagged ships (commerce raiding), but attempting to stop British-flagged ships would have risked the British government considering that an act of war against Britain.

What actually happened IOTL was that Britain very early in the war recognized the Confederacy as a "belligerent" very early in the war (May 1861), but never recognized the Confederacy as an independent nation. This did have the effect of interpreting the Union blockade as a wartime blockade, and theoretically opened the door for Britain contesting the blockade as not effective enough to be binding on neutrals, but they never did so. Probably because of the reasons mentioned upthread that 1) Britain didn't have enough to gain to risk the costs of going to war with the US, and 2) it's in Britain's interests as a major naval power to interpret international law in favor of blockading powers.

(2) in particular in interesting since Britain cited several precedents established by the Union Blockade in its implementation of their WWI blockade of Germany. Most notably, the Doctrine of Continuous Voyage, which allows the seizure of contraband that's intended to eventually reach a blockaded destination even if it's not headed directly there. In the Civil War, this usually meant European ships stopping off at Bermuda on their way to Confederate ports, since Bermuda was easier to patrol than every single Confederate port. In WWI, the precedent set by Britain tolerating this provided a basis for Britain to intercept American shipping into Dutch and Scandinavian ports of cargo eventually bound for Germany.

Unless GB wants to get into an actual war with the US, which it didn't, it would take time to make that assessment at the very least. Time it did not have as the US blockade was getting stronger by the week. If a British Ship doesn't stop for a US warship it risks getting sunk, the US would argue the fact that it is in a position to intercept meant it was effective. GB had its fingers burned twice in NA and had no desire to go round 3, particularly to preserve slavery.
 
But who at this time would even support a place such as the CSA, giving it recognition and giving it support are two very different thing as many European powers had already abolished or began to abolish slavery.
Spain possibly, after all, didn't Cuba have slavery until the 1880s?
 
I would say nations that traded extensively with the US for cotton, like Britain and France.

This is a bit overstated IMO. Egypt and India were growing enough cotton that the lack of any CSA cotton didn't torpedo the British economy like the CSA hoped for as a means to get the Brits on their side. The British simply stopped buying CSA cotton and started importing more from their empire and didn't really miss a beat doing so.
 

Marc

Donor
Spain possibly, after all, didn't Cuba have slavery until the 1880s?

While slavery continued for some time in Spain's overseas possessions, In Spain proper it had been long abolished, along with the slave trade. Spain, like Portugal, found it hard to forgo the the economic advantages for extremely cheap labor in the handful of territories they still controlled (In part due to the massive corruption in Madrid).
Basically, at best slavery was regarded as a necessary evil, but very repugnant.
 
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