On December 18, 1940, Hitler issued Directive No. 21, ordering German forces to attack the USSR in Operation Barbarossa. In March 1941 it was later postponed on June 22, and we know what happened eventually. What if Hitler stuck to the original date of May 15? With the German forces having been previously engaged in Yugoslavia and Greece, it would take time to transfer those forces to the border, and they would be less prepared. On the other side, the situation would be different, as the troops would be in different positions. Do the Germans get stuck in the mud on May? Do they manage to take even one of the following:Moscow, or Leningrad, for any length of time? How would this change the Eastern Front, and the execution of the war? How does the Western Desert campaign get affected? Does the war end sooner or later?
WI: Barbarossa happens on May 15?
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Martin L. Van Creveld, Hitler's Strategy 1940-1941: The Balkan Clue (Cambridge University Press 1973), pp. 173-4, has argued that even apart from the Balkans operations and the late spring thaw, equipment shortages would have made it difficult to start Barbarossa earlier than in OTL:
"Halder's diary bristles with references to various units, none of which had anything to do with the Balkans, and whose equipment and training were not yet complete as late as the end of May 1941. Long before the Yugoslav campaign was in sight an entry reads 'the conversion of tanks into underwater tanks will require 12 weeks.' Allow another few days for transportation and 'Barbarossa', for which these machines were vital, could not start before the first days of June...
"Throughout May Halder was recording the difficulties encountered in supplying such diverse units as 100th armoured brigade, 13th, 17th and 18th armoured divisions and 14th and 18th motorized divisions, units which may have had nothing in common except for the fact that they had not been connected in any way with the Balkan campaign.
"Indeed, it is hardly possible to open a history of any 'fast' unit that took part in the war against Russia without being struck by the belatedness with which it was supplied with its full motor vehicle park. Thus, the so-called Panzerzüge [freight trains adapted to carrying and rapidly unloading armor and materials for use in occupying bridges, strongholds, etc.]; before the Yugoslav coup it had been decided five of these should be constructed but they were not ready for transportation to the east until mid-June, after finallly receiving French supplies. The 10th motorized division did not receive its equipment until after marching east on 10 June, and even then the vehicles had to be collected piecemeal from...Germany, Belgium, Holand and France!...Indeed, the problems created by the general shortage of equipment, particularly motor vehicles, were not limited to only the 'fast'units. At the time of the German offensive against Russia, no less than 92--or 40 percent--of the army divisions had to be supplied, wholly or in part, with French material. Since the losses in material resulting from the Balkan campaign were extremely limited, it is quite clear that lack of equipment of all kinds would have prevented 'Barbarossa' from starting before the end of June even if neither 'Marita' nor '25' [the Greek and Yugoslav operations] had come into the world." https://archive.org/stream/HitlersS... 1940-1941 the Balkan Clue#page/n179/mode/2up
"Halder's diary bristles with references to various units, none of which had anything to do with the Balkans, and whose equipment and training were not yet complete as late as the end of May 1941. Long before the Yugoslav campaign was in sight an entry reads 'the conversion of tanks into underwater tanks will require 12 weeks.' Allow another few days for transportation and 'Barbarossa', for which these machines were vital, could not start before the first days of June...
"Throughout May Halder was recording the difficulties encountered in supplying such diverse units as 100th armoured brigade, 13th, 17th and 18th armoured divisions and 14th and 18th motorized divisions, units which may have had nothing in common except for the fact that they had not been connected in any way with the Balkan campaign.
"Indeed, it is hardly possible to open a history of any 'fast' unit that took part in the war against Russia without being struck by the belatedness with which it was supplied with its full motor vehicle park. Thus, the so-called Panzerzüge [freight trains adapted to carrying and rapidly unloading armor and materials for use in occupying bridges, strongholds, etc.]; before the Yugoslav coup it had been decided five of these should be constructed but they were not ready for transportation to the east until mid-June, after finallly receiving French supplies. The 10th motorized division did not receive its equipment until after marching east on 10 June, and even then the vehicles had to be collected piecemeal from...Germany, Belgium, Holand and France!...Indeed, the problems created by the general shortage of equipment, particularly motor vehicles, were not limited to only the 'fast'units. At the time of the German offensive against Russia, no less than 92--or 40 percent--of the army divisions had to be supplied, wholly or in part, with French material. Since the losses in material resulting from the Balkan campaign were extremely limited, it is quite clear that lack of equipment of all kinds would have prevented 'Barbarossa' from starting before the end of June even if neither 'Marita' nor '25' [the Greek and Yugoslav operations] had come into the world." https://archive.org/stream/HitlersS... 1940-1941 the Balkan Clue#page/n179/mode/2up
raharris1973
Gone Fishin'
I don't know - how muddy was it in fact in the weeks from May 15-June 22 in the western USSR? I'm not asking about seasonal averages. I'm asking if anyone on this site or in the published world has looked up the weather reports from that time.
Overall it's a riskier decision and the Germans will do worse if their units are in the logistical state Halder describes.
Of course there's nothing insurmountable about making a what-if where German logistical preparations are all better, faster, more professional. Or where Hitler issues the Barbarossa order earlier than Dec 18th. There can be counterbalancing butterflies, but the butterflies don't have to counterbalance.
I've heard the weather was poor in May and that Stalin was on alert due to reports of an invasion in May. When it didn't happen, he had his forces stand down. Likely the Germans get bogged down and the Soviets don't collapse as quickly.
If Germany is invading the Soviet Union on May 15th, they're not going to be invading Crete on May 20th..
Snow pack over the preceding winter had been large and the thaw was relatively late so the rivers were still quite high through May.
Thomas E. Griess and Thomas B. Buell make the argument https://books.google.com/books?id=HP3-9NNz71sC&pg=PA101 that the Balkan operations in themselves need not have caused a delay in Barbarossa if Hitler had attached much importance to the May 15 deadline--which he didn't. "In the last analysis, anticipation of blitzkrieg success in Russia influenced German thinking more than the Balkan campaign did."
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The strategic hybris in the German high command is quite mindboggling. The changes meant that a breakthrough was not planned in Moldovia, despite the overall strategic goal in Barbarossa which was to trap the Russian Army in the western. Thus, the faith in the Blitzkrieg was so strong that reaching the main priorities in the Blitzkrieg was not even attempted on the southern front.....
The end result of that was the kiev campaign which although succesful did fatally postpone Typhoon. I think overall the effects of an earlier start might be counteracted by a less efficient onset of Barbarossa, but combined with having the armored units ready in time you start seing some changes synergistic changes.
An earlier Balkan campaign and you might get there.
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I just wonder if the Germans invaded June 1st, all things being equal, that this would trigger all the Russian responses, activating reserves from their remote places, etc.. the Germans would run into supply issues just the same, the Dnieper bridges blown, etc..., So maybe there is a couple weeks better weather for the end stages of Typhoon, but weather is just one of their problems, the end result is the Germans get a bit closer to Moscow, or the Russians release some armies earlier for the Moscow defense that were OTL used in the counter attack. Maybe in this time line the German offensive stalls out early November, and the Soviets counter attack November 15th instead of December 5th OTL.
(since a lot of authors argue the Germans have lost after OTL Smolensk, does extra time really matter??????)
OR
With different timing the Soviets could make better guesses of what points the Germans are attacking in, i.e. the Soviets expect a Typhoon, because there is 3 more weeks of clear weather.
To the first point, the German AGC will only be a few weeks ahead of OTL and will still be battered after Smolensk so they will need to refit after an ATL Smolensk. Here you are right, maybe it wont make a world of difference, or maybe the Soviets need to commit sooner which may still precent the fall of Moscow, bit draw out some of the teeth in the counteroffensive. I think ITTL it could also end so that the Germans might enter, but not capture Moscow. This could make it harder to dislodge them and push them back, with all sorts of butterflies for 1942, but Athis certainly not
However, if the reason for the earlier start is that the Balkan campaign is over sooner, the the AGS with its armor can make its own breakthroughs.
With AGc not having to go South ITTL they need a shorter refit and can initiate Typhoon sooner after Smolensk. The a few weeks grow to more than a month and you get the Germans in Moscow after having traveled less against an opponent who have had less time to mobilize its forces in front of it.
Counter attacks would be just as strong quantitatively ittl but much more difficult to deploy north or south, so they would attack into well established German defensive positions.
Then come spring of 1942, the Germans are stronger, sit on Moscow and the Soviets have severe transport difficulties. That might knock them out during 1942.
I don’t understand your last point.An earlier start wouldn’t change the points ofthe strongest attack. OTL Moscow was expected after and before Kiev, ITTL the attack would just come sooner.
Fair enough if the Balkan campaign finishes early or Italy never invaded Greece, You might be able to have an extra armored corps ready to go in the South (not sure if supply and political arrangements needed in Romania can handle having that placed there though). A couple hundred Ju52s not lost in Crete would keep some panzer divisions supplied in critical days as well.
On the last point I was thinking if Typhoon was going to start Mid or early Sept due to an earlier invasion start, the Soviets might be stacking reserves in Moscow vs Leningrad and the Donetz as in OTL before the offensive starts. (which might mean the fall of Leningrad and the retainment of Rostov by the Germans as a result of butterflies, a lot of decision making changes in a early start scenario).
Moscow is just too important to let fall , but agree the Germans may be better off in 1942.
Ok, now I Got the last point. Yes, in the southern front things might change a lot due to the lack of an external Army (AGC) causing a breakdown at a later time. Conversely as you say, Leningrad might not be reinforced and May Fall quite early.