On November 14, 1914, the Ottoman government issued a call to Jihad on behalf of Sultan-Caliph Mehmed V. The summons exhorted the Muslim subjects of the Entente empires to rise up against these powers in defense of Islam and in support of the Ottoman Caliphate.

However, this call to Jihad proved largely unsuccessful, and had a negligible outcome on the war. My question here is: why? What factors prevented a general Muslim uprising in one or more territories of the British, French, and Russian empires? What prevented there being a flood of recruits to the Ottoman cause from every corner of the Muslim world?
 
I've wondered this myself and defer to anyone else with better knowledge on the subject...
But with that being said, if I had to guess I might say that it was fact many Muslims of the time paid little respect to the Sultans self declared title as Caliph, compared to say the Hashimites in Mecca who could actually prove lineage to the prophet.
 
I've wondered this myself and defer to anyone else with better knowledge on the subject...
But with that being said, if I had to guess I might say that it was fact many Muslims of the time paid little respect to have title as Caliph, compared to say the Hashimites in Mecca who could actually prove lineage to the prophet.
Well, it likely wasn't the title itself, but rather who occupied it. The Ottomans really did some questionable things that diminished their claim to the title (corruption, etc.)
 
Well, it likely wasn't the title itself, but rather who occupied it. The Ottomans really did some questionable things that diminished their claim to the title (corruption, etc.)

No, Global Humanism is more or less right. The Ottoman claim to the Caliphate, and the title of Caliph itself, were not taken very seriously by most Muslims at the time. Caliphs had largely ceased to matter since the thirteenth century after all, and the Ottoman attempt to claim the office was half hearted at best, except perhaps under Abdulhamid. Even then, it was controversial and of little practical effect.
The office in its classical form no longer existed and, ironically, as long as it existed in principle nobody missed it. This changed somewhat when the Caliphate was formally abolished by the Turkish Republic, but that was not the case yet in 1914.
The role of Sultan was felt to be paramount in the case of late Ottoman rulers, therefore diminishing their claim to a "religious" leadership (which was how the office of Caliph was perceived at the time - of course, it had started as a primarily political office, but that had ceased to be relevant centuries earlier).
I think that the call to jihad was regarded as a purely political Ottoman project, as opposed to true defense of the Muslim community, and therefore it got receptive audience only where Muslim communities were actually engaged in self-defense against an Entente power (primarily Libya and whereabouts - an area where the Ottomans had had a political presence and some actual loyalties shortly before).
 
No, Global Humanism is more or less right. The Ottoman claim to the Caliphate, and the title of Caliph itself, were not taken very seriously by most Muslims at the time. Caliphs had largely ceased to matter since the thirteenth century after all, and the Ottoman attempt to claim the office was half hearted at best, except perhaps under Abdulhamid. Even then, it was controversial and of little practical effect.
The office in its classical form no longer existed and, ironically, as long as it existed in principle nobody missed it. This changed somewhat when the Caliphate was formally abolished by the Turkish Republic, but that was not the case yet in 1914.
The role of Sultan was felt to be paramount in the case of late Ottoman rulers, therefore diminishing their claim to a "religious" leadership (which was how the office of Caliph was perceived at the time - of course, it had started as a primarily political office, but that had ceased to be relevant centuries earlier).
I think that the call to jihad was regarded as a purely political Ottoman project, as opposed to true defense of the Muslim community, and therefore it got receptive audience only where Muslim communities were actually engaged in self-defense against an Entente power (primarily Libya and whereabouts - an area where the Ottomans had had a political presence and some actual loyalties shortly before).
I find that I agree with the vast majority of your points. You are quite correct about the reactions to the jihad call.
However, regarding the title of Sultan, if, say, a new outfit came along and theoretically got the title, then Muslims of the time could have gave them a hearing. Of course that was a long-shot at best...
 

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
It was seen as an Ottoman political project and most Muslims around the world did not relate service to the Sultan to their personal interests nor their religious obligations.

Nevertheless some fringe individuals and groups in various parts of the Muslim world responded positively, even if fairly ineffectually. IIRC some Afghans in Australia went on a shooting rampage after they heard the jihad call and the declaration of war against the Entente. Wilhelm Wassmuss, a German agent in Persia, even found some Shiite Persians persuaded that Muslims should fight against the Entente. Authors including Sean McMeekin and Barbara Tuchman cover the instances in the Middle East and Asia to an extent in their books.
 
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The Islamic and especially Ottoman public may have become a bit too tired and burned out for that sort of thing. The Ottoman Empire had officially declared a Jihad 3-4 times throughout the long 19th century, and heavily employed Jihad-related concepts and imagery even in those wars when Jihad was not officially proclaimed.

Had the Jihad of 1914 been something fresh and without recent precedent, I think it might have had a bigger impact, especially with the empire's own Muslims. Although other factors would have still limited its success abroad.
 
I find that I agree with the vast majority of your points. You are quite correct about the reactions to the jihad call.
However, regarding the title of Sultan, if, say, a new outfit came along and theoretically got the title, then Muslims of the time could have gave them a hearing. Of course that was a long-shot at best...

I guess you meant "Caliph" not "Sultan". For a given value of "new", this is true*, but in the context of the time, this was actually attempted - it worked locally, ("Caliph" was a title used in Mahdist Sudan for instance) but not globally - the implicit idea being that a Caliph was no longer the central unifying pivot to the (Sunni) Muslim community, since in it practical terms it had been doing reasonably fine for centuries without it (from 1517 to 1774, the Ottoman Sultans themselves did not even bother to claim the office in any meaningful way - some claimants appeared in the meantime, but IIRC all had only local following).

* Mainstream Sunni authorities hold that Quraysh descent is a requirement for the office, and tradition also arguably plays an informal role - being able to prove a legitimate link to the Abbasid lineage or otherwise descent (either male or female line) from the Prophet or His immediate family (the lineage of Hashim) is hugely helpful for getting recognized as a Caliph - although in Sunni thought, it is recognition in itself the critical factor. Rulers in general, and Caliphs in particular, are legitimate primarily when, and because, their legitimacy is recognized and therefore their rule is generally obeyed.
 
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The Islamic and especially Ottoman public may have become a bit too tired and burned out for that sort of thing. The Ottoman Empire had officially declared a Jihad 3-4 times throughout the long 19th century, and heavily employed Jihad-related concepts and imagery even in those wars when Jihad was not officially proclaimed.

Had the Jihad of 1914 been something fresh and without recent precedent, I think it might have had a bigger impact, especially with the empire's own Muslims. Although other factors would have still limited its success abroad.

I think that the OP is referring to Muslims outside the Ottoman rule - they largely ignored any call to Jihad, and almost nobody thought of WWI as a clash between the Muslim community at large (as oppose to the Ottoman state) and the Entente. At the time, the Entente ruled in various ways a very large portion of the world's Muslims, probably the majority of them indeed - the only major Muslim groups who rebelled in significant numbers, or tried to, were the Libyans, which Italy was trying to subdue right then (so they were more resisting than rebelling actually), Darfur, and the Somalis under the Derwish State - the latter had not connection whatsoever with the Ottoman call to jihad as far as I can tell. Muslims in the Russian Empire, British India, North Nigeria, French North and West Africa, Italian Eritrea, etc. remained mostly obedient to their Christian overlords (so did the Muslim communities under Serbian rule, AFAIK - but I'd be happy to be informed more on this).
 
Kinda hard to take a call to jihad against Christian infidels seriously when it comes from someone who himself was allied with Christians.
 
I wonder if there was a caliph in the modern day, and he was some laid-back Indonesian or Malay guy, it would make the caliphate not seem like such a big deal, such an utopian project worth killing and dying for. Because that's what the Ottomans essentially were, a bunch of Europe-adjacent winebibbers who got pretty decadent.
 
I wonder if there was a caliph in the modern day, and he was some laid-back Indonesian or Malay guy, it would make the caliphate not seem like such a big deal, such an utopian project worth killing and dying for. Because that's what the Ottomans essentially were, a bunch of Europe-adjacent winebibbers who got pretty decadent.

Well, some Classical Caliphs were notoriously lax in applying the religious law to their personal life, particularly regarding wine-drinking - that however never stopped them being supposed to enforce that same law over the subjects. Indeed, "private" transgression was amply tolerated precisely on that premise.
 
I think that the OP is referring to Muslims outside the Ottoman rule - they largely ignored any call to Jihad, and almost nobody thought of WWI as a clash between the Muslim community at large (as oppose to the Ottoman state) and the Entente. At the time, the Entente ruled in various ways a very large portion of the world's Muslims, probably the majority of them indeed - the only major Muslim groups who rebelled in significant numbers, or tried to, were the Libyans, which Italy was trying to subdue right then (so they were more resisting than rebelling actually), Darfur, and the Somalis under the Derwish State - the latter had not connection whatsoever with the Ottoman call to jihad as far as I can tell.

Missed that part. When it comes to lack of foreign Muslim enthusiasm, I agree with your explanation. Especially since the Libyan movement of Sennusi had already declared its own Jihad in 1912. Their resistance coincided with the Ottoman state's WWI Jihad project, but was not really caused or inspired by it, I believe.
Muslims in the Russian Empire, British India, North Nigeria, French North and West Africa, Italian Eritrea, etc. remained mostly obedient to their Christian overlords (so did the Muslim communities under Serbian rule, AFAIK - but I'd be happy to be informed more on this).

Mostly true. Austria-Hungary and the Young Turks tried to organize an Albanian uprising/small-scale invasion against Serbia and Montenegro, but they failed. After the Central Powers occupied Serbia, the local Muslim communities split into several different factions. Some Albanians joined the Serbian resistance movement, some fought as a separate Albanian resistance movement, and some collaborated with Austria-Hungary as gendarmes and anti-guerilla bands.
 
Well, some Classical Caliphs were notoriously lax in applying the religious law to their personal life, particularly regarding wine-drinking - that however never stopped them being supposed to enforce that same law over the subjects. Indeed, "private" transgression was amply tolerated precisely on that premise.

Oh. So they're not so different from the Saudis after all.
 
If I recall correctly from a WWI doc I saw recently, was there a faction of the nascent Muslim League in British India that supported armed insurrection against the British in collaboration (or at least solidarity) with the Ottoman jihad? Can anyone confirm this?

I definitely know that Germany attempted to recruit a Jihadi legion from among Muslim Allied POWs, but I don't think this unit was fully formed or saw action.
 
I've seen indications that some of the people involved in the Armenian Genocide with killing Armenians at the local level took the jihad declaration seriously (so they could take their stuff).
 
If I recall correctly from a WWI doc I saw recently, was there a faction of the nascent Muslim League in British India that supported armed insurrection against the British in collaboration (or at least solidarity) with the Ottoman jihad? Can anyone confirm this?

I definitely know that Germany attempted to recruit a Jihadi legion from among Muslim Allied POWs, but I don't think this unit was fully formed or saw action.

So the proto version of SS Freies Arabien or the Hadshar-Division ? Al-Husseini during WW1 served as an Ottoman officier
 
So the proto version of SS Freies Arabien or the Hadshar-Division ? Al-Husseini during WW1 served as an Ottoman officier

Pretty much, yeah! In fact, here's a good article about the whole project, termed the Halbmondlager (half moon camp):
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/museums/11022199/Germanys-Grand-WW1-Jihad-Experiment.html

Apropos of the thread topic, from this article:

Why weren’t the men motivated by jihad? It’s perhaps more pertinent to ask, “Why would they have been?” As Rogan points out, the concept was daft to begin with. “It was not a natural thing: a targeted jihad focusing on three Western countries but excluding three other European countries. You hate Britain and France but not Germany, Bulgaria and Austria – what is that about?”

Rogan also thinks Oppenheim and his enthusiastic band of orientalists were deluded. “There was this misconception that Muslims behave in a uniformly fanatical way: they pray together in massive numbers, they obviously all surrender their thoughts in a uniform way, and if you turn that to your advantage you’ve got a powerful force to motivate and mobilise. It just doesn’t work that way.

“Muslims are like people anywhere else. Their willingness to get into something as risky as war is going to be determined by their interests, or their fears, or the threats that they face. It’s not because somebody waves a sword or a Koran and tells them to go to war.”

The article also mentions the WWI doc I had seen: the BBC documentary "The World's War". It's an excellent look at the participation of African and Asian colonial troops in the war, saw it last year on Netflix.
 
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