Hmm, it shouldn't IMHO not be forgotten, that in Germany many not only military persons rendered "Britain" as its major enemy, being the one actually denying Germany its "rightfull" position as a Great - global - Power on equal footing.
Not that I would like to discuss this opinion, but it was one rather widely spread in Germany with quite some influence on german willingness to come to whatever terms with the Brits.
A noteworthy point: but then their willingness would also be determined by the post-war circumstances: what had they won, could they keep it, were the Russian still a threat, what had they lost to get it and who were they negotiating with back in Britain (Conservatives or Liberals) and who was negotiating for them (the SDP or the German aristocracy)?
The sources that tought me what I know about the ... less-than-firm-tory-position looking at some momenty rather desinterested in it during the July-crisis including not at least Bonar Law :
The conservative party and anglo-german relations, 1905-1914
and
Conservative leaders, coalition, and Britain's decision for war in 1914.
They paint anything than a firm pro-war picture of the Torys as so often stated (not only on this board, often without much reference) during the July.crisis. Sure, they were no germanophils, by far, but not much more francophils.
Bonar Law and consorts were more interested in the Ireland conflict - Bonar Law had agreed on the 30th July in a gentlemens agreement with Asquith and Carson not to make it a topic for the
moment of this crisis - and domestic economical as well as foreign trade issues like the actual sagging of the stock markets, the recent Miner "issues" and the planned for (next) approach of Lloyd George regarding land taxation.
This "doorstep" argument was brought up by Grey actually already on the 29th when he showed the originasl treaty-papers of 1839 and 1870 with Gladstones handwritten notes on it.
Since then this ... "themes" was at first decently but then ever more obviously boiling on the cabinet members minds. Morley confided to his diary already on 31st July that this theme has to be adressed.
My response for these two quotes comes from Douglas Newton's
Darkest Days: Bonar Law's hesitance is noted, though he does eventually fall in line with Lansdowne. Indeed it does seem that there were those in the Tory party who were sympathetic to the cases of non-intervention. Newton says that this worried in particular, (surprise surprise) Henry Wilson, as well as Cambon. Apparently Wilson talked, (unbelievably if true) of a 'pogrom': that there was a Germano-Jewish conspiracy in the London press and financial circles to commit Britain to neutrality. Naturally, it was a load of rubbish but it was to intimidate the soft conservatives and anti-war liberals. It also strengthened the relations between the Tories and the French Embassy.
Morley was mortified on August 2nd when he learned that Churchill had mobilised the Naval Reserve. When Churchill threatened to resign over not going to war if Belgium was invaded, he countered with his own resignation if the reverse was true. Lloyd George wasn't impressed, and John Burns resigned, Morley apparently believed at the time that the 'doorstep' was what had worked for the pro-war faction in that cabinet meeting, claiming it was to be enacted solely in Britain's interest.
Regardless, I don't think I am wrong to say in general, that the conservatives were more pro-war than the liberals, or dare I say that some were actively desperate for us to have that war.
Well :
Liege
Namur
Antwerp
... all formidable fortresses kept constantly modernized by the Belgians.
I conceded a similar point about what Britain could have done to ensure Belgium was prepared for the war, hopeless and plucky as they were. I am also well aware of the Liege defences, the Germans failed to break them until they brought the Austrian 305s and their own 420s to reduce them to rubble. I will concede this point as well.
I would be interested in what this lecture actually was/is ...
I have to admit I have another perception of the personnel as you desribe it.
Grey was IMHO - as explained earlier - not for war but for supporting France as far as possible, regarding the 'military card' as a very last option only - at best - with more cons than pros aside keeping France as an ... 'entented' friend.
That this 'gal' brough a rather ugly 'brother-in-law' (Russia) with it was one of the major cons.
If France would have been able to actually throw Russia under the bus he probably might have offered even kind of a formal alliance. At least 'more' support as IOTL as he indicated to Cambon on some occasions.
Churchill ... well, yes he was kinda pro-action guy but mainly focused on 'his' navy to make a show of its 'ruling the waves'. However, probably the only one actually interested in military action at all.
Asquith and Haldane (
who btw was NOT war minister anymore since 1912 ... In 1914 this office was held in personal union by Asquith ... to much regret of the militairs esp. francomaniac Henry Wilson) were also rather non-supportive of war, Asquith due to kinda 'genetic lineral anti-war' attitude and Haldane also due to being the only one incabinet actually somewhat educated about the capabilities of the BEF he had created.
Both were rather of a 'preparedness'-position as Asquith wrote to his sister before morning cabinet of 2nd August :
The ideas that on the one hand we can wholly disinterest ourselves and on the other we ought to rush in are both wrong. And the real course, that of being ready to intervene if at a decisive moment we are called on, is difficult to formulate in clear terms. Yet I think this is what we must attempt.
According
to Allan Mullison Haldane was of the same position. As it seems to me actually only Churchill was for anything militarily and with that all 'hawks' are gone. ... if somehow the channelcoast can be secured from the other only comparative power ... Germany.
As before, from
Darkest Days, Grey falls in favour of British intervention after he is given a rebuke from King George and learns of Germany's declaration of war with Russia. on the 1st August he had to go to Buckingham Palace and explain why His Majesty had received a cable from the Kaiser, agreeing not only to Germany not invading Belgium,
but also her not invading France, should Britain ensure the French remained neutral (impossible). This, it should be noted, was the result of Grey, then trying to still preserve peace and keep his options open, sending Lichnowsky, to his joy, tentative 'feelers' which he passed to Berlin. The dim view that came from the British monarch was because His Majesty was not particularly fond of Wilhelm, and much closer to cousin Nicky.
Newton himself concedes, that there is no guarantee that Wilhelm was not doing this merely to avoid a two-front war, as opposed to actually keeping peace on the Western Front. The Kaiser's generals, however, were worried he did intend to confine war to the East.
I recognise the correction regarding Haldane's position, though my salient point is still valid since it was held by Asquith: that the non-interventionists in the cabinet did not have anyone in the War Office (Asquith was committed to Grey), the Admiralty (WSC) or the Foreign Office (Grey) which meant they lacked the latest information available to the hawks (or even the Tories, via WSC).