What if Britain had stayed out of WW1?

[NoMommsen]

...
If I chase an ATL without Britain at war I might get too ambitious and have no war at all.

That's one of my major problems in modelling an ATL :

how to plausibly get the Brits into the war after staying at least non-belligarant (not to use the 'ugly' word neutral Grey tried to avoid IOTL at utmost) esp. after an 'East-First' approach of the Germans​

 

[MichaelWest]

Is another war inevitable? I will argue no, not even very likely, probably not even likely but it will always be possible and at different times probable.

This UK and its Empire are still at the top of the heap, militarily and economically. Even if Germany can actually integrate the continental economies she will be a peer. Unless and until she can gain access to the global market place, or develop Russia as its surrogate, she will be hindered on the raw material side of her industrial economy. Without gold you do not make rules.

That said, a German led Europe will be a big market and a huge economic zone, even without Russia in play, the advantages of a relatively free market over most of Europe is compelling. Both London and New York will have cash to buy and invest. British ships are ready to carry goods. The markets for money, bonds, stocks, commodities and trades are open in London, I doubt they do not swiftly engage this opportunity.

And there is the friction. Not competition to sell more widgets but as it is now, oil. Germany will have a meager supply (Romania, Ukraine, likely DEI), as her economy and all those in alignment with her grow they crave oil. Depending on how things went in the OE, the nearest place to go is Arabia. Yet before the war the oil was already divided by agreement, post-war the US majors gained entry without bombing London, war is not inevitable, just convenient. Aside from this I do not see either side jazzed to go to war anywhere else. And worse the atomic era is near at hand. At best we are looking at war about the same time as OTL, 20 years out. Those who are in command are still peeved by the last war they feel they did not win (enough) in and old enough not to die trying to win the next one. After that I think the underlying political, social and economic fabric shifts the rug from beneath a war. At worst it looks a lot more like a Cold War, yet here with democratic states operating under monarchs related to each other and all happily capitalist with a bunch of socialists eager to spread the wealth. No hard ideological divide, no real religious divide, barely much difference in corporate culture or ambitions, even the language is related. So I grant that like many twins they may still hate one another, they can certainly live on opposite sides of the house and carry on.

Will this world be nicer? Not really, maybe not as not nice as we are today or maybe as nice as we hoped to be. Casual sexism will fade slower, casual racism will persist longer, most of the world's peoples are subjects to a colonial power, the really important decisions are made in London by an elite few, they have to sometimes get the agreement of more elites in Frankfurt or Berlin, sometimes even New York. A lot of folks feel oppressed, live in poverty, and have little voice in the grand schemes. There may have been yet more really big wars, many little ones, or far fewer. Technology may have lagged or missed whole paths, the world may still feel bigger, more distinctly separate, nationalism may still divide us, the world may still be paced slower. In many ways this world will be as great as one believes the British at the height of Empire can make it. They will be a benchmark and influence on the way things ought to be.

 

[MichaelWest]

That's one of my major problems in modelling an ATL :

how to plausibly get the Brits into the war after staying at least non-belligarant (not to use the 'ugly' word neutral Grey tried to avoid IOTL at utmost) esp. after an 'East-First' approach of the Germans​

With "East First", I would not foresee the UK entering the war actively. We should see a very muddled election in 1915 with Ireland consuming the "to-do" list. The biggest place Britain wants to see settled is the OE. Yet "geopolitical balance of power" is hardly a rallying cry. Soft power should gain London what she craves. Her lending will have the strings or levers needed to shape events and more so her likely lead in mediating an end.

The most sublime irony might be how Britain negotiates the German victory to a balanced peace. She will not physically dominate Europe but have far greater influence and impact than before 1914. Letting these old antagonists finally hammer blow their sleights and ill regards to exhaustion may be just what London needed to really get the balance of peace.

 

[SpicyJuan]

"I am not convinced. It is extemely unlikely that a victorious Germany would have stuck to the terms of any prewar agreement. The idea that she would have been content with the leadership of some form of prototype EEC is laughable. In any case, a conflict between any nation that dominated the continent and the foremost imperial power would have been inevitable sooner or later. It was very much in Britain's interests to enter the war when she did."

"Respecting France and Belgium's territorial integrity" does not mean that the German's wouldn't tear down the forts, impose massive war indemnities, or include them in a German trade bloc. It would mean just that, that Germany would forgo annexations. Germany would have no reasons to alienate herself by breaking her agreement with Britain when she can do the above to France, and carve up Russia to her heart's content.

This is an important difference as it keeps the Germans from seizing the Belgian Channel ports, or worse yet, the French Atlantic ports, both of which would most assuredly fall into German hands if Britain joins the war and France still loses.

 

[David T]

"Respecting France and Belgium's territorial integrity" does not mean that the German's wouldn't tear down the forts, impose massive war indemnities, or include them in a German trade bloc. It would mean just that, that Germany would forgo annexations. Germany would have no reasons to alienate herself by breaking her agreement with Britain when she can do the above to France, and carve up Russia to her heart's content.

This is an important difference as it keeps the Germans from seizing the Belgian Channel ports, or worse yet, the French Atlantic ports, both of which would most assuredly fall into German hands if Britain joins the war and France still loses.

Hey, why not do all those things and annex, say, the Briey-Longwy iron ore area as well, despite any promises? (An excuse can always be found--the French aren't meeting their reparations obligations or whatever.) Because the British wouldn't like it? What could Britain do about it with France and Russia reduced to impotence? As one reviewer noted,

"This argument hinges on Ferguson's assertion that "it would have been foolish [of Germany] to have reneged on such a bargain." But why would it have been foolish? Ferguson acknowledges that what he terms the "limited" price Germany would have exacted even under these circumstances would have included crippling the French military capacity, thus making France "economically dependent" on Germany; constructing an economic bloc in Northern and Central Europe under "Germany's economic dominance"; and effectively eliminating Russia as a counterweight to Germany. In other words, Germany, vastly stronger militarily and economically, would have been in a position at any point in the future to go back on its bargain, especially because the injured party—Britain—would no longer have allies to help it put muscle behind its protestations. Since Britain's inaction would have allowed Germany to strengthen its capabilities enormously, London would have taken a gigantic gamble based on nothing more substantial than German good will. In short, even had the European settlement that Germany would have imposed been one that (to use Ferguson's judgments) Britain could have "lived" with, the British would henceforth have been powerless to prevent it from being transformed into one that could not be "tolerated."

"Furthermore, Ferguson exaggerates the power Britain gained from its empire. He breezily suggests that German hegemony on the Continent wouldn't have mattered to Britain, given its "overseas power," but he fails to define the extent of that power and what, precisely, it afforded Britain. And even if Britain did benefit from its imperial position, after the gains from the empire were balanced against the costs of sustaining it, the British almost certainly benefited more from economic relations with the Continent. This was particularly true for Britain's dynamic financial and commercial sectors, the central elements of its economic power. These relations would obviously have been jeopardized by German domination of Europe, especially since one of Germany's primary motives for establishing a Continental preponderance was to challenge Britain economically. Moreover, even those British statesmen who were most devoted to the empire, such as the ultra-imperialists Sir Alfred Milner and Leo Amery, argued vigorously that German hegemony had to be prevented, since, they held, once dominant on the Continent, Germany would resume its fleet expansion with greater devotion and resources than before, shattering British naval mastery, the sine qua non of Britain's imperial system.

"Finally, in arguing that no vital British interests were at stake in preventing German hegemony on the Continent in 1914, since, after all, German hegemony doesn't menace Britain now, Ferguson fundamentally misunderstands which power is actually preponderant in Europe today. Although Germany's is the strongest European economy, the United States is indisputably Europe's military and political leader—and in crucial ways it has sheared Germany of military and political power. By providing for Germany's security and by enmeshing its military and foreign policies in a U.S.-dominated alliance, the United States contained its erstwhile enemy, thus enabling the Western Europeans to cooperate politically and economically. Whether German hegemony in Europe would in fact have been inimical to Britain (or any more inimical than U.S. hegemony) may be an open question, but Ferguson is wrong to equate the position of a Germany victorious in the Great War with that of Germany today [the 1990's]." https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1999/05/was-the-great-war-necessary/377605/

Even if it is true that Germany would have kept its promise, it seems to me that saying that Germany could have achieved complete hegemony on the Continent, could have reduced Russia and France to military impotence and economic dependence even without formally "annexing" any French or Belgian territory is a pretty weak argument against British involvement in the War. So what if they don't seize the Belgian or French Atlantic ports immediately? They would be in a position to seize them any time they would want to. Yes, of course they could also do so "if Britain joins the war and France still loses." That, to British statesmen of the time, would be an argument not to stay out of the War but to be sure the Germans don't win it...

 

[Athelstane]

Is another war inevitable? I will argue no, not even very likely, probably not even likely but it will always be possible and at different times probable.

It's harder to generate the dynamic that leads to a second general war with Germany in such a dominating position. Harder, of course, does not mean impossible.

Barring revolution or collapse in Germany itself, we're left to look at the three other major belligerents:

• It's not entirely clear that Austria-Hungary survives long-term (here: beyond another generation) in any form in such a scenario. An East-first strategy likely averts the disaster in Galicia in August-September 1914, which would be a real help, as will Italy's near-certain neutrality. Still, even if it falls apart, German power seems sufficient to salvage a resolution favorable to its position in some way.
• It's not terribly hard to see a France which sees the advent of a revanchist regime, either of left or (more likely) right. What's harder to see is how it has the innate power after even a limited defeat as a scenario like this would suggest. Even more than in 1871-1914, France now needs a major ally or allies to break German power.
• Russia on the other hand seems like the likeliest aggrieved party looking for a rematch. While the loss of much of the Pale would leave it arguably as economically disadvantaged as France is, its resentments are less likely to be drowned in blood as France's were in OTL or this ATL; and with so much space - and bodies! - to trade for time (and to stew in), risks will look worth running after a reasonable recovery period. The most interesting timeline in this vein is Carlton Bach's outstanding Es Geloybte Aretz - a Germanwank (which I know you commented on), in which a 1906-08 Russo-German war tracks closely enough with our Great War to be instructive: what emerges in the defeated Russia is a right wing integrist regime burning for revanche, which it ends up trying to exact (unsuccessfully) a generation later.

On the whole, though, I tend to think you're basically right that another war is a good deal less likely in this ATL than it was after Versailles.

And there is the friction. Not competition to sell more widgets but as it is now, oil. Germany will have a meager supply (Romania, Ukraine, likely DEI), as her economy and all those in alignment with her grow they crave oil. Depending on how things went in the OE, the nearest place to go is Arabia. Yet before the war the oil was already divided by agreement, post-war the US majors gained entry without bombing London, war is not inevitable, just convenient.

It really does come down to whether the Ottoman Empire remains intact. If it does, the source is obvious. Otherwise, it's Ploesti and hard currency to buy it from America, Britain, the Netherlands, or Russia.

 

[Athelstane]

Hey, why not do all those things and annex, say, the Briey-Longwy iron ore area as well, despite any promises? (An excuse can always be found--the French aren't meeting their reparations obligations or whatever.) Because the British wouldn't like it? What could Britain do about it with France and Russia reduced to impotence?

I think a great deal depends on the endgame of the Great War in this scenario. And remember the paerspectives will be different: Germany in a presumed 1916 victory scenario here will certainly be in better condition than in OTL, but the participants won't be aware of it. France may be bled white, but unless Germany is willing to go into Belgium, it would still face a bloody task in grinding through what would now be a formidably fortified and entrenched frontier along the Vosges and Lorraine. And Germany will still have suffered several hundred thousand dead. What would domestic pressures in Germany be?

Likewise, Britain may not be able to go conquer Berlin or even Bremen, but her economic and maritime power will be intact, and Germany's will be considerably damaged.

But I could see, as a minimum, a peace clause in which Germany occupies Briey-Longwy for 20 years, with rights to full exploitation, perhaps with a renewal clause. Analogous in some way to how the Saar was treated by Versailles. But even this would be a hard blow for France, for obvious reasons.

 

[Coulsdon Eagle]

Be interested to see it.

The book is Virtual History, a review of counterfactuals and a series of essays, edited by Niall Ferguson.

The piece in question is The Kaiser's European Union: What if Britain "stood aside" in August 1914 by Ferguson himself, so given earlier posts about his views, they are not particularly surprising.

The quote is: -
"Yet, in his determination to preserve the Entente with France, Grey was willing to make military commitments which made war with Germany more rather than less likely, sooner rather than later. By a completely circular process of reasoning, he wished to commit Britain to war with Germany - because otherwise there might be war with Germany."

 

[MichaelWest]

It's harder to generate the dynamic that leads to a second general war with Germany in such a dominating position. Harder, of course, does not mean impossible.

Barring revolution or collapse in Germany itself, we're left to look at the three other major belligerents:

• It's not entirely clear that Austria-Hungary survives long-term (here: beyond another generation) in any form in such a scenario. An East-first strategy likely averts the disaster in Galicia in August-September 1914, which would be a real help, as will Italy's near-certain neutrality. Still, even if it falls apart, German power seems sufficient to salvage a resolution favorable to its position in some way.
• It's not terribly hard to see a France which sees the advent of a revanchist regime, either of left or (more likely) right. What's harder to see is how it has the innate power after even a limited defeat as a scenario like this would suggest. Even more than in 1871-1914, France now needs a major ally or allies to break German power.
• Russia on the other hand seems like the likeliest aggrieved party looking for a rematch. While the loss of much of the Pale would leave it arguably as economically disadvantaged as France is, its resentments are less likely to be drowned in blood as France's were in OTL or this ATL; and with so much space - and bodies! - to trade for time (and to stew in), risks will look worth running after a reasonable recovery period. The most interesting timeline in this vein is Carlton Bach's outstanding Es Geloybte Aretz - a Germanwank (which I know you commented on), in which a 1906-08 Russo-German war tracks closely enough with our Great War to be instructive: what emerges in the defeated Russia is a right wing integrist regime burning for revanche, which it ends up trying to exact (unsuccessfully) a generation later.

On the whole, though, I tend to think you're basically right that another war is a good deal less likely in this ATL than it was after Versailles.

It really does come down to whether the Ottoman Empire remains intact. If it does, the source is obvious. Otherwise, it's Ploesti and hard currency to buy it from America, Britain, the Netherlands, or Russia.

Part of my math is that Germany is facing a lot of expense rehabilitating A-H, I do not see the Austrians falling to pieces but it will be decades before it is recovered and the fractures may be insurmountable. At bottom Germany needs A-H, so it will invest in keeping it functioning. This extends to whatever post-war puppets Germany gains, they will drain money, expertise and time, drawing Germany into believing they are pursuing grand strategic aims but actually drawing their attention from the British more than I think is obvious. Trade with Britain will be a strong motivator to settle into complacent détente with London.

I tend to give the right a far more likely go at usurping power and being revanche than the left. Overall I think the next 20 years in Germany is a reformist coalition of Socialists, Center Catholics and Liberals, who should mesh well with the French left as it likely returns to seeking peace with Germany and relaxation of whatever restraints are in place to hold France impotent. If Germany was forced to overrun France than she is simply no longer on the board. If a peace was arrived at before such a calamity then I think Britain is investing the French as much as they can as a counter-weight. That might actually push France into German hands as they quickly see they are the front-line and the lamb to be offered up.

And I agree on Russia. It is my most challenging player. I think this scenario virtually assured no October Revolution but instead some bland left SR republic emerging, more Weimar than anything else, and a vague right that will be scheming to get back into power. Indeed, that timeline inspired a lot of thought on how to re-do Russia. But I would foresee a more conservative, religious and monarchist bend to the Russian revivalist right, likely quite anti-Sematic and rather xenophobic yet I do not see it being a Nazi analogue despite the historic Pogroms of Russia's past. A greater part of the Jewish population is under German auspices and most of that is actually under Austrian control, keeping the clash of cultures in Austrian hands. Ripping away the Ukraine handicap[s Russia and forces it look into the Muslim south for agriculture, setting up a different clash over land and resources. Overall I think Russia is an ongoing mess despite its mineral wealth and oil/gas riches. Best case scenario the right never actually takes power and the socialist leaning German governments engage the lefty Russian governments to bind the two economies together as the alternative to maybe British trade barrier markets or a distant USA market and undeveloped rest of the world. And as the Christian right coalesces in Germany to effectively oppose the center-left ruling paradigm Russia should be reaching the same rightward shift to center and revived Orthodox influenced nationalism. So long as Liberals continue to bang on about trade and industry these governments are equally compatible. More just muddling along.

And the "writers block" for me is what to do with the OE. I am not convinced Germany wastes its political/diplomatic capital upon her needs, certainly sees the dangers of aggrandizing the Ottoman hold on oil, but cannot neglect her biggest potential ally and oil source. I note that it was not until 1965 that the whole Middle East out produced the USA in oil, I think Germany can speed up the oil production but the USA will be the biggest player through the formative post-war era. That means Standard Oil is the biggest influence on things. The UK is effectively insulated by virtue of controlling Persian oil, Germany has Romania as a cushion but if the growth comes then it must find a lot of oil for Europe. If the UK was neutral then I presume the pre-1914 agreements remain, leaving the UK at least an equal share to Germany's in Ottoman oil. (Likely Germany only holds a 25% stake). Overlaying modern production to consumption, Germany alone will consume all it gets and be buying the rest for its trading bloc. (I estimate a modern Germany consumes at least 4 million BBLs per day, today Iraq is striving to produce that much from its fields.) Until Arabian oil is developed the Middle East barely meets the needs of an industrial Germany, and that is also subject to cooperation with the British who are still in Kuwait, Oman, the Trucial States and some other fringes of the peninsula. Until Russia exploits its true reserves in Siberia, the oil pie is American, British and Ottoman, itself divided between the British and Germans. Even with the Ottomans intact the oil equation includes British interests at every turn and London remains a major player in the global market for oil. I have not even begun to ponder just how that boosts Sterling as an exchange for oil.

Assuming the British Empire evolves into a more coherent and bound commonwealth market, London will be the center of either the biggest or the next biggest economic bloc. An ersatz super power by association rather than integration but still a massive player rivalled only by the USA economy and whatever Germany can create as a European common customs union. Even if as fully integrated as the EEC, Europe will merely be a peer and one highly dependent upon external markets for materials and exports, in theory never as powerful as the Empire with its more "domestic" like arrangements and patterns. Every turn might wank Germany but it should wank the British to yet another plateau. I think too many eyes see Imperial Germany as a superman it was not, it will be an equal to, in fact a bigger kid than the UK by itself, but in relation to the full Empire, even with its sphere, it is a runner up. And we assume that Germany can mash up the continent into a content, productive and successful economic powerhouse, something as rife with pitfalls as ever. I like that this ATL presents a greater potential to keep falling short of the wars, disasters and tragedies of OTL, it is no utopia, rather modestly better, but in its bland muddling it should set up a brighter tomorrow, somewhere in the future. So if you like a TL that goes quietly into the night, I think this it.

 

[SpicyJuan]

The book is Virtual History, a review of counterfactuals and a series of essays, edited by Niall Ferguson.

The piece in question is The Kaiser's European Union: What if Britain "stood aside" in August 1914 by Ferguson himself, so given earlier posts about his views, they are not particularly surprising.

The quote is: -
"Yet, in his determination to preserve the Entente with France, Grey was willing to make military commitments which made war with Germany more rather than less likely, sooner rather than later. By a completely circular process of reasoning, he wished to commit Britain to war with Germany - because otherwise there might be war with Germany."

I think a good quote to sum up Britain’s strategic dilemma was this:

To Grey’s warning that France would be overwhelmed if Britain stayed out, Lloyd George retorted, “How will you feel if you see Germany overrun and annihilated by Russia?”

From July 1914: Countdown to War by Sean McMeekin.

By 1914 Britain was in a precarious position. Through her appeasement of France and Russia, Britain strengthened her main colonial rivals to the point where they were not seeking to avoid war. However because Britain had not explicitly joined the Triple Entente, German power was not completely broken, allowing her to fight and potentially win. This meant that if Britain didn’t join the war, no matter which side who won would turn their sights on Britain.

Had Britain truly tried to maintain a balance of power on the continent, she would have done everything possible to make sure that war never broke out in the first place between the great powers.

 

[cjc]

Part of my math is that Germany is facing a lot of expense rehabilitating A-H, I do not see the Austrians falling to pieces but it will be decades before it is recovered and the fractures may be insurmountable. At bottom Germany needs A-H, so it will invest in keeping it functioning. This extends to whatever post-war puppets Germany gains, they will drain money, expertise and time, drawing Germany into believing they are pursuing grand strategic aims but actually drawing their attention from the British more than I think is obvious. Trade with Britain will be a strong motivator to settle into complacent détente with London.

I tend to give the right a far more likely go at usurping power and being revanche than the left. Overall I think the next 20 years in Germany is a reformist coalition of Socialists, Center Catholics and Liberals, who should mesh well with the French left as it likely returns to seeking peace with Germany and relaxation of whatever restraints are in place to hold France impotent. If Germany was forced to overrun France than she is simply no longer on the board. If a peace was arrived at before such a calamity then I think Britain is investing the French as much as they can as a counter-weight. That might actually push France into German hands as they quickly see they are the front-line and the lamb to be offered up.

And I agree on Russia. It is my most challenging player. I think this scenario virtually assured no October Revolution but instead some bland left SR republic emerging, more Weimar than anything else, and a vague right that will be scheming to get back into power. Indeed, that timeline inspired a lot of thought on how to re-do Russia. But I would foresee a more conservative, religious and monarchist bend to the Russian revivalist right, likely quite anti-Sematic and rather xenophobic yet I do not see it being a Nazi analogue despite the historic Pogroms of Russia's past. A greater part of the Jewish population is under German auspices and most of that is actually under Austrian control, keeping the clash of cultures in Austrian hands. Ripping away the Ukraine handicap[s Russia and forces it look into the Muslim south for agriculture, setting up a different clash over land and resources. Overall I think Russia is an ongoing mess despite its mineral wealth and oil/gas riches. Best case scenario the right never actually takes power and the socialist leaning German governments engage the lefty Russian governments to bind the two economies together as the alternative to maybe British trade barrier markets or a distant USA market and undeveloped rest of the world. And as the Christian right coalesces in Germany to effectively oppose the center-left ruling paradigm Russia should be reaching the same rightward shift to center and revived Orthodox influenced nationalism. So long as Liberals continue to bang on about trade and industry these governments are equally compatible. More just muddling along.

And the "writers block" for me is what to do with the OE. I am not convinced Germany wastes its political/diplomatic capital upon her needs, certainly sees the dangers of aggrandizing the Ottoman hold on oil, but cannot neglect her biggest potential ally and oil source. I note that it was not until 1965 that the whole Middle East out produced the USA in oil, I think Germany can speed up the oil production but the USA will be the biggest player through the formative post-war era. That means Standard Oil is the biggest influence on things. The UK is effectively insulated by virtue of controlling Persian oil, Germany has Romania as a cushion but if the growth comes then it must find a lot of oil for Europe. If the UK was neutral then I presume the pre-1914 agreements remain, leaving the UK at least an equal share to Germany's in Ottoman oil. (Likely Germany only holds a 25% stake). Overlaying modern production to consumption, Germany alone will consume all it gets and be buying the rest for its trading bloc. (I estimate a modern Germany consumes at least 4 million BBLs per day, today Iraq is striving to produce that much from its fields.) Until Arabian oil is developed the Middle East barely meets the needs of an industrial Germany, and that is also subject to cooperation with the British who are still in Kuwait, Oman, the Trucial States and some other fringes of the peninsula. Until Russia exploits its true reserves in Siberia, the oil pie is American, British and Ottoman, itself divided between the British and Germans. Even with the Ottomans intact the oil equation includes British interests at every turn and London remains a major player in the global market for oil. I have not even begun to ponder just how that boosts Sterling as an exchange for oil.

Assuming the British Empire evolves into a more coherent and bound commonwealth market, London will be the center of either the biggest or the next biggest economic bloc. An ersatz super power by association rather than integration but still a massive player rivalled only by the USA economy and whatever Germany can create as a European common customs union. Even if as fully integrated as the EEC, Europe will merely be a peer and one highly dependent upon external markets for materials and exports, in theory never as powerful as the Empire with its more "domestic" like arrangements and patterns. Every turn might wank Germany but it should wank the British to yet another plateau. I think too many eyes see Imperial Germany as a superman it was not, it will be an equal to, in fact a bigger kid than the UK by itself, but in relation to the full Empire, even with its sphere, it is a runner up. And we assume that Germany can mash up the continent into a content, productive and successful economic powerhouse, something as rife with pitfalls as ever. I like that this ATL presents a greater potential to keep falling short of the wars, disasters and tragedies of OTL, it is no utopia, rather modestly better, but in its bland muddling it should set up a brighter tomorrow, somewhere in the future. So if you like a TL that goes quietly into the night, I think this it.

I have never got why people think Germany would want austrea to servive let alone help them to do it, much more likely Germany lets A-H hang and if it colapses it creates a bunch of smaller, more esaly controlled and gratful nation states out of its corpse.

 

[MichaelWest]

I have never got why people think Germany would want austrea to servive let alone help them to do it, much more likely Germany lets A-H hang and if it colapses it creates a bunch of smaller, more esaly controlled and gratful nation states out of its corpse.

Certainly an option. But why would the Lutheran Prussian elite and majority want the Catholic Austrians to be assimilated? And the Hapsburgs have a better dynastic claim too. And next we get the fragmented mess of all the non-German bits, surely puppeted but still, a dangerous precedent for breaking up Empires? Easier to let the Austrians oppress the Slavs in their own country I would think? Germany owns the debt, holds the gold, controls the customs union, A-H is a rather nice buffer to the eternally messy Balkans, a good sidekick for ruling the East, so I never quite understand the trope of breaking it up and adding Austria to the German borders? If it implodes then yes, Germany will likely clean up the mess and absorb the German shards. Perhaps that is what occurs by the mid to late 1950s or the 1960s, but post-war, I doubt the Prussians want the tail to be added to their dog.

 

[David T]

Assuming the British Empire evolves into a more coherent and bound commonwealth market, London will be the center of either the biggest or the next biggest economic bloc. An ersatz super power by association rather than integration but still a massive player rivalled only by the USA economy and whatever Germany can create as a European common customs union. Even if as fully integrated as the EEC, Europe will merely be a peer and one highly dependent upon external markets for materials and exports, in theory never as powerful as the Empire with its more "domestic" like arrangements and patterns. Every turn might wank Germany but it should wank the British to yet another plateau. I think too many eyes see Imperial Germany as a superman it was not, it will be an equal to, in fact a bigger kid than the UK by itself, but in relation to the full Empire, even with its sphere, it is a runner up. And we assume that Germany can mash up the continent into a content, productive and successful economic powerhouse, something as rife with pitfalls as ever. I like that this ATL presents a greater potential to keep falling short of the wars, disasters and tragedies of OTL, it is no utopia, rather modestly better, but in its bland muddling it should set up a brighter tomorrow, somewhere in the future. So if you like a TL that goes quietly into the night, I think this it.

And why should we assume that the Commonwealth is going to be an economic unit as Canada, Australia, etc. get complete self-rule? Why won't they eventually be seeking deals with the US and the German-dominated Continent? And if the British Empire does continue to be the biggest economic unit on Earth, are you sure that the Germans will quietly accept this? After all, with all the resources they have gained from their new hegemonic position on the Continent , they can restart naval competition...

 

[Darrenb209]

And why should we assume that the Commonwealth is going to be an economic unit as Canada, Australia, etc. get complete self-rule? Why won't they eventually be seeking deals with the US and the German-dominated Continent? And if the British Empire does continue to be the biggest economic unit on Earth, are you sure that the Germans will quietly accept this? After all, with all the resources they have gained from their new hegemonic position on the Continent , they can restart naval competition...

First, naval build up is ridiculously hard to hide, second, naval build up is ridiculously expensive. So not only would Britain be well aware of the German attempt to restart naval competition, but the German's would have to have some fairly shitty priorities that would cause them severe issues. In OTL after WW1 Britain scrapped all Capital ships with guns smaller than 13.5 inches and cancelled multiple classes of ships and several ships of current classes simply because it was too expensive.

So in this proposed timeline, Germany will have been bled extremely painfully as will most of Europe, their economies will probably be a bit better than hanging by a thread but nowhere near up to a decent naval expansion never mind one required to keep up with Britain and the Royal Navy. You're looking at more than a decade before they'll be capable of it and longer before it'll be viable without having to reroute a lot of money that really needs to go elsewhere.

Even then the Royal Navy won't just stand still and stagnate. It'll likely continue the long practice of growing larger with better ships and might even manage to learn from other people's mistakes during their WW1 and thus avoid a few of the deathtrap style ships. Not counting on that though. British arrogance and overconfidence was still near it's height during the time period.

 

[swanner95]

Hmm, it shouldn't IMHO not be forgotten, that in Germany many not only military persons rendered "Britain" as its major enemy, being the one actually denying Germany its "rightfull" position as a Great - global - Power on equal footing.

Not that I would like to discuss this opinion, but it was one rather widely spread in Germany with quite some influence on german willingness to come to whatever terms with the Brits.

A noteworthy point: but then their willingness would also be determined by the post-war circumstances: what had they won, could they keep it, were the Russian still a threat, what had they lost to get it and who were they negotiating with back in Britain (Conservatives or Liberals) and who was negotiating for them (the SDP or the German aristocracy)?

The sources that tought me what I know about the ... less-than-firm-tory-position looking at some momenty rather desinterested in it during the July-crisis including not at least Bonar Law :
The conservative party and anglo-german relations, 1905-1914
and
Conservative leaders, coalition, and Britain's decision for war in 1914.

They paint anything than a firm pro-war picture of the Torys as so often stated (not only on this board, often without much reference) during the July.crisis. Sure, they were no germanophils, by far, but not much more francophils.
Bonar Law and consorts were more interested in the Ireland conflict - Bonar Law had agreed on the 30th July in a gentlemens agreement with Asquith and Carson not to make it a topic for the moment of this crisis - and domestic economical as well as foreign trade issues like the actual sagging of the stock markets, the recent Miner "issues" and the planned for (next) approach of Lloyd George regarding land taxation.

This "doorstep" argument was brought up by Grey actually already on the 29th when he showed the originasl treaty-papers of 1839 and 1870 with Gladstones handwritten notes on it.

Since then this ... "themes" was at first decently but then ever more obviously boiling on the cabinet members minds. Morley confided to his diary already on 31st July that this theme has to be adressed.

My response for these two quotes comes from Douglas Newton's Darkest Days: Bonar Law's hesitance is noted, though he does eventually fall in line with Lansdowne. Indeed it does seem that there were those in the Tory party who were sympathetic to the cases of non-intervention. Newton says that this worried in particular, (surprise surprise) Henry Wilson, as well as Cambon. Apparently Wilson talked, (unbelievably if true) of a 'pogrom': that there was a Germano-Jewish conspiracy in the London press and financial circles to commit Britain to neutrality. Naturally, it was a load of rubbish but it was to intimidate the soft conservatives and anti-war liberals. It also strengthened the relations between the Tories and the French Embassy.

Morley was mortified on August 2nd when he learned that Churchill had mobilised the Naval Reserve. When Churchill threatened to resign over not going to war if Belgium was invaded, he countered with his own resignation if the reverse was true. Lloyd George wasn't impressed, and John Burns resigned, Morley apparently believed at the time that the 'doorstep' was what had worked for the pro-war faction in that cabinet meeting, claiming it was to be enacted solely in Britain's interest.

Regardless, I don't think I am wrong to say in general, that the conservatives were more pro-war than the liberals, or dare I say that some were actively desperate for us to have that war.

Well :
Liege
Namur
Antwerp
... all formidable fortresses kept constantly modernized by the Belgians.

I conceded a similar point about what Britain could have done to ensure Belgium was prepared for the war, hopeless and plucky as they were. I am also well aware of the Liege defences, the Germans failed to break them until they brought the Austrian 305s and their own 420s to reduce them to rubble. I will concede this point as well.

I would be interested in what this lecture actually was/is ...
I have to admit I have another perception of the personnel as you desribe it.

Grey was IMHO - as explained earlier - not for war but for supporting France as far as possible, regarding the 'military card' as a very last option only - at best - with more cons than pros aside keeping France as an ... 'entented' friend.
That this 'gal' brough a rather ugly 'brother-in-law' (Russia) with it was one of the major cons.
If France would have been able to actually throw Russia under the bus he probably might have offered even kind of a formal alliance. At least 'more' support as IOTL as he indicated to Cambon on some occasions.

Churchill ... well, yes he was kinda pro-action guy but mainly focused on 'his' navy to make a show of its 'ruling the waves'. However, probably the only one actually interested in military action at all.

Asquith and Haldane (who btw was NOT war minister anymore since 1912 ... In 1914 this office was held in personal union by Asquith ... to much regret of the militairs esp. francomaniac Henry Wilson) were also rather non-supportive of war, Asquith due to kinda 'genetic lineral anti-war' attitude and Haldane also due to being the only one incabinet actually somewhat educated about the capabilities of the BEF he had created.
Both were rather of a 'preparedness'-position as Asquith wrote to his sister before morning cabinet of 2nd August :

The ideas that on the one hand we can wholly disinterest ourselves and on the other we ought to rush in are both wrong. And the real course, that of being ready to intervene if at a decisive moment we are called on, is difficult to formulate in clear terms. Yet I think this is what we must attempt.​

According to Allan Mullison Haldane was of the same position. As it seems to me actually only Churchill was for anything militarily and with that all 'hawks' are gone. ... if somehow the channelcoast can be secured from the other only comparative power ... Germany.

As before, from Darkest Days, Grey falls in favour of British intervention after he is given a rebuke from King George and learns of Germany's declaration of war with Russia. on the 1st August he had to go to Buckingham Palace and explain why His Majesty had received a cable from the Kaiser, agreeing not only to Germany not invading Belgium, but also her not invading France, should Britain ensure the French remained neutral (impossible). This, it should be noted, was the result of Grey, then trying to still preserve peace and keep his options open, sending Lichnowsky, to his joy, tentative 'feelers' which he passed to Berlin. The dim view that came from the British monarch was because His Majesty was not particularly fond of Wilhelm, and much closer to cousin Nicky.

Newton himself concedes, that there is no guarantee that Wilhelm was not doing this merely to avoid a two-front war, as opposed to actually keeping peace on the Western Front. The Kaiser's generals, however, were worried he did intend to confine war to the East.

I recognise the correction regarding Haldane's position, though my salient point is still valid since it was held by Asquith: that the non-interventionists in the cabinet did not have anyone in the War Office (Asquith was committed to Grey), the Admiralty (WSC) or the Foreign Office (Grey) which meant they lacked the latest information available to the hawks (or even the Tories, via WSC).

 

[MichaelWest]

And why should we assume that the Commonwealth is going to be an economic unit as Canada, Australia, etc. get complete self-rule? Why won't they eventually be seeking deals with the US and the German-dominated Continent? And if the British Empire does continue to be the biggest economic unit on Earth, are you sure that the Germans will quietly accept this? After all, with all the resources they have gained from their new hegemonic position on the Continent , they can restart naval competition...

You are correct, that is a big assumption. But in many ways the Empire survived through to at least 1960, but for a second war the likes of Australia, New Zealand and even India likely do not feel so peeved at London, and even the oppressed elsewhere may not feel the alternatives are better. Even Canada can trade with the USA as the commonwealth gateway and remain rather loyal to the commonwealth and London. Each will gain independence, but I see no hurdle to them staying on Sterling, as their reserve currency blended with gold, and trading through London. The USA likely still amasses some $4.5 out of $6 billion in gold, dominating that specie and destroying the gold standard as a genuine medium, despite the likely attempts to chase the impossible. That leaves Sterling for the commonwealth, just as it was until Bretton Woods cemented the Dollar as gold and removed Sterling, and even then Sterling held on as a lesser reserve. As to deals, again you have the crux of the challenge. Germany was already dependent upon imported food and materials pre-war, much of that was from the commonwealth, and those suppliers would love to sell. But the challenge is with what? I have so far deliberately glossed the deep and long recovery, Germany will be shy on gold, its currency undervalued, it credit weak, the most likely trade partner is the USA who can finance its own deals. We have only hinted at the protectionism that may stymy German access to the Empire and deter the commonwealth doing such business. Longer term I think you may be correct as to how the Empire and commonwealth unravel, but in the first 20 years post-war the system of trade is quite wonky enough to keep the Dominions looking to London for finance, markets and guidance. And just as likely the USA steals the best deals, Japan in after them, and the Empire is dismantled by the free traders upon the Open Door.

Pre-war the USA was about the size, in GDP terms, to the UK, France and Germany combined. One on one the only metric the UK led Germany on was per capita GDP. Germany had won the economic battle, only by adding in the rest of the Empire does the British bloc return to a peerage. I assume that Germany behaves as smartly as it did post-WW2, undervalued currency, focus on industry, strive for exports, encourage savings and deter imports other than the building blocks of industry. So yes, Germany will challenge Britain industrially, financially too, before the war she was growing as a finance hub, with France gone she likely rises to the third place, but how is that a war? Japan ravaged the American economy until both sides figured it would be ruinous, so Japan stopped. Neither fired a shot. The biggest automaker in the world is Toyota, they build more cars in the USA than any "American" automaker, they employ a lot of Americans, so has the USA lost? Who won that trade war? You have more I think to fear in winning a war versus the USA.

Germany had effectively conceded naval supremacy after 1912, the war will have shown that supremacy is geographically impossible, the threat is how they choose the other potential technologies to up end Britain. But here we likely never had much USW, rather the neutral USA pushed its freedom upon the sea and undercut the blockade, the German fleet did not lose but did not win this war, the land and now air is where Germany stakes its defense. I would argue they find ties to the USA far more strategic than they did in 1914. I will argue that a big German Navy forestalls the deindustrialization of Britain, it keeps shipyards open, steel mills working, suppliers tinkering. And even if Germany achieves parity or better, so what? When does Germany can such hegemony in Europe that it can invade the Isles? If it does then the British appease her, they did that to the USA after 1812. I doubt they join the customs union so they never face leaving it. I will accept that the British governance may inevitably ruin the Empire and lower the UK to its lone self and poverty of being one of the three richest nations in Europe, one of the top five global powers or top ten nations by almost any measure. A few million less dead and a few billions less spent on swords might cushion that fall even more. It makes bragging at the pub less effective, Britain might do as bad in the World Cup, the Mini might still be a German car, but I fail to see how London could become as adjunct to Berlin as it is to Washington.

 

[Athelstane]

You are correct, that is a big assumption. But in many ways the Empire survived through to at least 1960, but for a second war the likes of Australia, New Zealand and even India likely do not feel so peeved at London, and even the oppressed elsewhere may not feel the alternatives are better. Even Canada can trade with the USA as the commonwealth gateway and remain rather loyal to the commonwealth and London. Each will gain independence, but I see no hurdle to them staying on Sterling, as their reserve currency blended with gold, and trading through London. The USA likely still amasses some $4.5 out of $6 billion in gold, dominating that specie and destroying the gold standard as a genuine medium, despite the likely attempts to chase the impossible. That leaves Sterling for the commonwealth, just as it was until Bretton Woods cemented the Dollar as gold and removed Sterling, and even then Sterling held on as a lesser reserve. As to deals, again you have the crux of the challenge. Germany was already dependent upon imported food and materials pre-war, much of that was from the commonwealth, and those suppliers would love to sell. But the challenge is with what? I have so far deliberately glossed the deep and long recovery, Germany will be shy on gold, its currency undervalued, it credit weak, the most likely trade partner is the USA who can finance its own deals. We have only hinted at the protectionism that may stymy German access to the Empire and deter the commonwealth doing such business. Longer term I think you may be correct as to how the Empire and commonwealth unravel, but in the first 20 years post-war the system of trade is quite wonky enough to keep the Dominions looking to London for finance, markets and guidance. And just as likely the USA steals the best deals, Japan in after them, and the Empire is dismantled by the free traders upon the Open Door.

Without the Great War, I think it's reasonable to argue that Westminster would have been delayed by as much as a generation, and might well have been more gradual.

The ship for a genuine imperial federation had sailed at least a couple decades before. But that doesn't mean that something like a genuine imperial commonwealth trading/sterling block stabilizing deep into the 20th century (though the Raj will be gone by the 1960's, I presume) couldn't happen - especially facing a rising American economy and a German-led trading bloc on the Continent, which has all kinds of potential to undermine the free traders over time.

 

[Wendell]

A century (more) of Pax Britanica.

 

[swanner95]

I think there is also the consideration of what happens during the war. Adam Tooze's The Deluge goes into substantial detail about how Britain, France and the rest of the Entente became so indebted to the US and just how that financial power translated into industrial and political power. If Britain is neutral in this conflict, which lasts for about 1-2, maybe three years, then she is likely to be getting a very large proportion of the loans and demand coming from across Europe, and it will be substantial. Whilst Germany and Russia eventually recover they will take substantial short and maybe medium run hits to their finances and population, something Britain can wield to her advantage. The Germans and Russian are, for me, likely to be at odds with each other regardless of who is in charge of either nation, although I do not know about whether there is another war, only that Britain will just as likely be better served by staying out.

France is probably well beaten, and although she is unlikely to lose territory, or even her colonies straight away, the writing is on the wall sadly. Whatever she does is as a second-tier nation, perhaps having to choose between her worst rivals for reinvestment and restoration of her finances.

As for the Commonwealth bloc, Britain did establish imperial preference in the interwar period, this will annoy the US but they are unlikely to be in a position for some time to challenge it. I get the impression that the 'Cold War' in this TL becomes the economic one between the US and the British Commonwealth, likely to still be loyal to London. Without the wars wrecking Britain's empire and finances I struggle to see its undoing, especially if the Ireland issues are resolved, there is no precedent to independence in most places: Bombay and later Hong Kong became pro-British in outlook. The dominions would likely receive their autonomy (as they should) at some point, though I doubt they would look outside the Commonwealth for trade.

 

[cjc]

Well :
Liege
Namur
Antwerp
... all formidable fortresses kept constantly modernized by the Belgians.

That funny, only Antwerp was in any way "modern" (even then I don't think they had steel reanforcments) they had brown powder cannons for God's sakes! (Not smokless which mint after a coupple of salovos the guns vecame worthless untill the smoke cleard) plus the belum army wasn't even larg anuff to garison the fortresses (liege need 2 full divitions of a garison, slitly l

I conceded a similar point about what Britain could have done to ensure Belgium was prepared for the war, hopeless and plucky as they were. I am also well aware of the Liege defences, the Germans failed to break them until they brought the Austrian 305s and their own 420s to reduce them to rubble. I will concede this point as well.

The austrea 305 where only used at Antwerp, the 420 where not used at namur, most of the forts at liege fell do to 21cm morters becuse the fort was built to withstand 21cm guns back during the 1880's, guns had advanced to the point that that test was the aqivalint of a 14 cm cannon( most notably smokeless powder and gun brakes but explosives had also made extensive strides sence the first had been built) and the worst part is that the Belgium staff new about this but count got the funds to upgrade the forts so there was a argument about whether to even gard liege before the war, it was eventually disided not to which is way 3ad was retreated agenst a inferior strength foe, they don't even know that lieve was under attack when they gave the order.