What if Britain had stayed out of WW1?

Well, I think in that point we have rather opposing opinions.
IMHO Grey never and likely would never "want" war. IOTL to me he seemed VERY eager to avoid war if ever possible as long as what he saw as Britains interests were achieved otherways. And following Lord Palmerston : "We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow." this did not include to stand aside allying withFrance may come what wants.
On several occasions during the late July-crisis he tried to make it clear to Cambon and thereby France also ordering Sir Bertie to tell the same in Paris that France can and should not count on Britains military assistence/participation in a continental, military conflict. Grey tried to keep Germany and France away from any warring against each other at all by "threatening" Germany with Britains - potential - participation in war and "threatening" France with its - potential - NON-participation in war.

To me Grey was "pro-intervention" but not "pro-war" seeing intervention as a diplomatic one. Since 1904/05 despite whatever loud the 'sabe-rattling' was international conflicts were solved diplomatically :
both Moroccan crises, the 'Great Game' with Russia, the italo-türkish war, the Balkan-wars, Bagdad-Bahn and Lieman-von-Sanders affair.
All these crises had been solved without military involvement of a great or self-perceiving great power not counting the rather dilettantic colonial intervention against a dying, uncivilized wanna-be empire (italo-turkish war).
And Grey was - though unsuccessfully - trying to sell his 'conference-approach' on each and every occasion. Unfortunatly this time it did not stuck with the 'usual' participants, despite at one point or the other one or other diplomat of these ventilated a possible favour for this. ... if some conditions might be met beforehand.
So he 'failed' on his own approach and standards : the diplomatic one.

If he would have been really commited to "war-on-France-side-whatever" IMHO he wouldn't have carried the cabinets decisions as it did on making Belgium the "casus belli"-Litmus-test, neglecting the sending/embarkation of the BEF, waiting until midnight 4th when the germans finally rejected (by non-answering) even the last request/ultimatum to keep away from Belgium (and thereby the belgian channelcoast). ... even after everybody knew they had already invaded it.
From all written I've read he was truely and deeply affected when war actually came though he seems to have accepted it as the very last remaining card to be drawn.


(proposal for different development ot follow ... as soon as RL lets me)

Thank you and keep up with the next part, I look forward to it. My opinion likely solidified long ago under a different bias, but as I revisit different scenarios I welcome a different perspective to refresh how I see it. I might chalk up Grey's caution and approach to his sober understanding of the politics at home, but if I take him as not pro-war can I still see him as anti-German?
 
Thank you and keep up with the next part, I look forward to it. My opinion likely solidified long ago under a different bias, but as I revisit different scenarios I welcome a different perspective to refresh how I see it. I might chalk up Grey's caution and approach to his sober understanding of the politics at home, but if I take him as not pro-war can I still see him as anti-German?
Grey is an interesting character. I think he may have been keen to maintain the Entente as a priority for Imperial policy not because he was necessarily anti-German personally. Hence choosing to support French and Russian actions in July 1914 even though they risked war.

This fits with a thesis I read (Niall Ferguson maybe?) which stated Britain chose to align with France, and then Russia, because it was more afraid of war with the pair of them than it was of Germany. The price for ending the colonial rivalry between Britain and the Dual Alliance being the UK supporting them in any diplomatic confrontation. Like the Moroccan crises or during the Balkans wars. And of course also in July 1914.

I'm not sure I believe this but the basic premise is plausible. As the switch to Entente predates Grey as Foreign Secretary.
 
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Grey is an interesting character. I think he may have been keen to maintain the Entente as a priority for Imperial policy not because he was necessarily anti-German personally. Hence choosing to support French and Russian actions in July 1914 even though they risked war.

This fits with a thesis I read (Niall Ferguson maybe?) which stated Britain chose to align with France, and then Russia, because it was more afraid of war with the pair of them than it was of Germany. The price for ending the colonial rivalry between Britain and the Dual Alliance being the UK supporting them in any diplomatic confrontation. Like the Moroccan crises or during the Balkans wars. And of course also in July 1914.

I'm not sure I believe this but the basic premise is plausible. As the switch to Entente predates Grey as Foreign Secretary.

And that fits with my opinion that it was German weakness that lured Britain to the Entente, if Germany was mighty enough to keep Russia pinned then Britain would retain her as the counter weight, by 1914 the estimate appears to be that Germany will lose so align with the victors. That Germany damn near won shades British policy henceforth. I wonder if in a world where she is undefeated, would Britain chose friendship or eternal opposition?
 
IMHO Grey never and likely would never "want" war. IOTL to me he seemed VERY eager to avoid war if ever possible as long as what he saw as Britains interests were achieved otherways. And following Lord Palmerston : "We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow." this did not include to stand aside allying withFrance may come what wants.
On several occasions during the late July-crisis he tried to make it clear to Cambon and thereby France also ordering Sir Bertie to tell the same in Paris that France can and should not count on Britains military assistence/participation in a continental, military conflict. Grey tried to keep Germany and France away from any warring against each other at all by "threatening" Germany with Britains - potential - participation in war and "threatening" France with its - potential - NON-participation in war.

My recent reading of Prince Lichnowsky's pamphlet (from my last post) does make me more sympathetic to this idea, as well as to Grey himself somewhat. That being said he, IMHO, still made the blunder of blunders. I can understand that he thought Britain's interest lay in the war, though I feel he was dead wrong.

To me Grey was "pro-intervention" but not "pro-war" seeing intervention as a diplomatic one.
And Grey was - though unsuccessfully - trying to sell his 'conference-approach' on each and every occasion. Unfortunatly this time it did not stuck with the 'usual' participants, despite at one point or the other one or other diplomat of these ventilated a possible favour for this. ... if some conditions might be met beforehand.
So he 'failed' on his own approach and standards : the diplomatic one.

Again Prince Lichnowsky lays credence to this: he was desperate to keep Britain out of the war and if he could, keep the whole continent at peace. He wasn't shy in excoriating those who he held responsible for the war. The one thing that still needs explaining to me is why he feels that he should switch from the diplomatic intervention to the naval action, other than the underlying agreements that Britain had. Henry Wilson, British chief of staff was also apparently making negotiations behind the backs of everyone, including Grey with Ferdinand Foch before the war.

This fits with a thesis I read (Niall Ferguson maybe?) which stated Britain chose to align with France, and then Russia, because it was more afraid of war with the pair of them than it was of Germany. The price for ending the colonial rivalry between Britain and the Dual Alliance being the UK supporting them in any diplomatic confrontation. Like the Moroccan crises or during the Balkans wars. And of course also in July 1914.

Well, I can understand, France being a maritime/financial rival as always, and Russia waiting to play the 'Great Game'. Though that belies the fact that if Britain truly did have to contend with France, then it had the navy covered, and Germany would be more than a match (perhaps it is clearer to us than it was to the British government of the time) for the French army. As for Russia, well the Japanese are in play, not to mention they have gone toe-to-toe with the Russians on one front and won comfortably, especially at sea in 1905.
The only reason to *fear* this alliance would be if Russia had completed its industrialisation and armament of its vast army, which then could have threatened certainly Austria-Hungary and perhaps even the Germans themselves. Then Britain's interests are served by being roped in with the Triple Alliance.

And that fits with my opinion that it was German weakness that lured Britain to the Entente, if Germany was mighty enough to keep Russia pinned then Britain would retain her as the counter weight, by 1914 the estimate appears to be that Germany will lose so align with the victors. That Germany damn near won shades British policy henceforth. I wonder if in a world where she is undefeated, would Britain chose friendship or eternal opposition?

Depends on the circumstances, though I think most scenarios would have it be more bearable for Britain than the likes of Sir Max Hastings would have you believe. I don't see why if it genuinely is a case that whatever happens, Britain is playing the winners she didn't just stay out and prepare to fight a well-worn victor, as she did vis-a-vis Napoleon, even Germany would have its struggles, especially out East and if it has to spread its army across Europe to occupy its gained territories. Whilst the British could sit back and take stock of just what is or isn't done on the battlefield, bringing substantial force to bear as and when it needed, she just might fleece the lot of 'em.

If Britain just stayed out and decided not to be beastly to the Germans, on the other hand, I also think Britain would be fine: Germany would be busy and divided, both at home and in the occupied territories, with the SDP and perhaps the Russians still breathing down the necks of the Kaiser's Establishment. If anytime that changed Britain would still be wealthy, powerful and in good shape to take on the challenge.
 
This fits with a thesis I read (Niall Ferguson maybe?) which stated Britain chose to align with France, and then Russia, because it was more afraid of war with the pair of them than it was of Germany. The price for ending the colonial rivalry between Britain and the Dual Alliance being the UK supporting them in any diplomatic confrontation. Like the Moroccan crises or during the Balkans wars. And of course also in July 1914.
I believe this is was Christopher Clark's argument.

And that fits with my opinion that it was German weakness that lured Britain to the Entente
I agree.

I wonder if in a world where she is undefeated, would Britain chose friendship or eternal opposition?
Most of the "eternal opposition" arguments seem to come from a blend of germanophobia and historical determinism. Britain would likely become markedly more friendly and respect Germany's "rightful" position as continental hegemon.

I can see even with a push through Belgium getting the British to stand aside, but I think the "readership" just can't buy it, feels too academic and not "real" enough.
What exactly did you have in mind? I've been trying to come up with a "plausible" scenario for ages.
 
I believe this is was Christopher Clark's argument.


I agree.


Most of the "eternal opposition" arguments seem to come from a blend of germanophobia and historical determinism. Britain would likely become markedly more friendly and respect Germany's "rightful" position as continental hegemon.


What exactly did you have in mind? I've been trying to come up with a "plausible" scenario for ages.

I have ranged over them and if I want to use any of what I know I think a merely stalemated war is best, it is most like OTL. I toy with an East First, no right-wing kickoff and Britain left without casus belli, more complex is Germany lurching forward into Belgium but the Liberals unable to get a consensus.

Most plausible to me at first blush is a fuller build up and delay in invading Belgium, a weeks delay might be enough to derail the move to war.

Russia jumps the gun and invades East Prussia with as severe a thrashing, A-H somehow avoids calamity, and Moltke sets off to kick France aside with an oddly secured East for what he thinks is a swift campaign before he must return East and vanquish Russia.

That lets Grey fall apart and open Russia as aggressor, if we do not let Germany fully swing East and still go for the original plan, we have the war more or less as is. But it has some serious wonky bits there barely papered by handwaivium.
 
more complex is Germany lurching forward into Belgium but the Liberals unable to get a consensus.

Most plausible to me at first blush is a fuller build up and delay in invading Belgium, a weeks delay might be enough to derail the move to war.

Any way to make the first one work?

Yeah I've thought about the second idea, I really like that one. It allows France to hang herself by declaring war and attacking first and getting completely caught up in Alsace-Lorraine, all while Germany mobilizes and comes in with the right hook. Best part too is if British neutrality can somehow be secured by Grey being made to look like a fool and discredited.
 
Any way to make the first one work?

Yeah I've thought about the second idea, I really like that one. It allows France to hang herself by declaring war and attacking first and getting completely caught up in Alsace-Lorraine, all while Germany mobilizes and comes in with the right hook. Best part too is if British neutrality can somehow be secured by Grey being made to look like a fool and discredited.

I think my idea is that the second part is how we get the first part. Without going to the "East First" scenario, maybe we can half-arse our way there. Wilhelm holds firm that more must be done to defend East Prussia. Moltke delays the invasion of France to allow (a) the full strength of troops to move to the border and (b) bleed off two Corps from those mobilizing to be re-directed East. Russia moves as OTL, the 8th knows it is getting two reinforcing Corps so deploys less frightened and manages to accomplish the defense of East Prussia just as well even if Prittwitz is a bit befuddled. Maybe here we avoid things looking so bad it stops the invasion of Belgium and we derail the recall of Hindenburg. If in the intervening days Joffre invaded A-L then there is no preemptive German invasion of Belgium, instead it is a counter attack to flank the French 5th Army and whatever may be opposite Belgium. Germany still has sent the ultimatum and seized Luxembourg, but those are weaker than hitting Liege. Here Third Army takes Luxembourg per OTL and then moves towards the 5th, Moltke decides he is too weak to swing as far as he would like, orders Bulow to coordinate with Kluck to sweep tighter in to envelop if possible the 5th, his First to screen whatever may be to the West. The BEF has not been deployed in the dithering. Thus we crush the war closer to A-L, maybe totally. We likely still need to take Liege with ugliness abounding in overrunning Belgium. Maybe we pull the Germans off that here, if not we leave open Britain entering the war or having the hawks already lost, Britain backs the Entente but is not committing the BEF to France. A very rough and cobbled way to give us the several days to let this war kickoff more fitfully, less apparently Germany the aggressor, etc.
 
The irony is that France might get a lighter peace in order to move everyone they can to Russia for the finishing blow. Italy might then jump on the Central Powers bandwagon to get French territory before a ceasefire or peace is signed and we get a potentially milder treaty in the East if Russia thinks it can't win against the CP alone. Luxembourg and slivers of France and/or Belgium (perhaps Lithuania too?) become German, Poland is split, Serbia becomes a puppet of Vienna, Bulgaria grows somewhat, Corsica or Tunisia *might* become Italian, (Ottomans might get Kars? and) maybe a few colonies change hands, perhaps little else. Russia remains Tsarist, America isolationist, UK image is still one of near-invincibility, and dec9nization likely just got handed a major delay. It could all literally end by the summer of 1915 but would anyone be satisfied with the outcome given the stated ambitions of those involved?
 

BooNZ

Banned
Any way to make the first one work?

Yeah I've thought about the second idea, I really like that one. It allows France to hang herself by declaring war and attacking first and getting completely caught up in Alsace-Lorraine, all while Germany mobilizes and comes in with the right hook. Best part too is if British neutrality can somehow be secured by Grey being made to look like a fool and discredited.
A couple of potential spanners to plan.
1. I understand the German excursion though Belgium was expected to get much more difficult the longer it was delayed as the Belgium feild armies were incorporated into front line defences.
2. Germany really did not want Britain in the war, but OTL most (incorrectly) beleived it to be inevitable. If after one week, the British are not in the war, and the Germans are not in Belgium, Anglo-German diplomacy should have rehabilitated sufficiently to communicate the genuine British interests in Belgium to the Germans. I cannot imagine any plausible scenario where a German excursion beyond the Belgian Ardennes does not result in British entry.
 
2. Germany really did not want Britain in the war, but OTL most (incorrectly) beleived it to be inevitable. If after one week, the British are not in the war, and the Germans are not in Belgium, Anglo-German diplomacy should have rehabilitated sufficiently to communicate the genuine British interests in Belgium to the Germans. I cannot imagine any plausible scenario where a German excursion beyond the Belgian Ardennes does not result in British entry.

As I have elucidated before: the British establishment including Grey used Belgium as a pretext to get into the war when Britain lacked an open alliance or casus belli otherwise. If this scenario where Britain, for whatever reason is still not at war, and Germany is yet to reach Belgium, I am not sure: it might by that point be too late, although Prince Lichnowsky and Grey (if he is still in the job) might well try their best to reach an agreement.

That said, if Britain had really genuinely considered Belgian neutrality to be a national interest then it would have probably got the Belgians to build large defences on its borders and field a large army, not to mention trying to get long-standing solid agreements in place with her neighbours over and above the vague 1839 treaty or the temporary yet effective arrangements quickly cobbled together by Gladstone in 1870.

Gladstone was able to get German and French signatures on his agreements in about 2/3 weeks. With PL desperately trying to get British neutrality at almost any price to the German war efforts, it's very marginal but hope against hope something might be done.
 
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The question of British neutrality in the Great War has come up several times on this discussion board, as it should.

With the last set of arguments, a sort of consensus occurred that if the Germans had NOT invaded Belgium, the British really would have had to remain neutral, at leas through late 1915. Resulting in a Central Powers victory in the winter of 1916-17 with moderate French and Russian concessions and no American intervention.

British neutrality even with a German invasion of Belgium as Ferguson postulated is more difficult to achieve. Its not impossible, but you really need the left wing of the Liberal Party in power after 1908 (Lloyd George or Morely) or maybe you could just get it with a super pragmatic Tory PM-FM team not inclined to play balance of power politics on the continent. However, either scenario affects British government policies in other areas, notably Ireland. British involvement is a perfect storm of either right wing Liberals or moralistic Tories.
 
The question of British neutrality in the Great War has come up several times on this discussion board, as it should.

With the last set of arguments, a sort of consensus occurred that if the Germans had NOT invaded Belgium, the British really would have had to remain neutral, at leas through late 1915. Resulting in a Central Powers victory in the winter of 1916-17 with moderate French and Russian concessions and no American intervention.

British neutrality even with a German invasion of Belgium as Ferguson postulated is more difficult to achieve. Its not impossible, but you really need the left wing of the Liberal Party in power after 1908 (Lloyd George or Morely) or maybe you could just get it with a super pragmatic Tory PM-FM team not inclined to play balance of power politics on the continent. However, either scenario affects British government policies in other areas, notably Ireland. British involvement is a perfect storm of either right wing Liberals or moralistic Tories.

Indeed if Morley and Lloyd George had been in the big offices, Britain's entry is very unlikely. Apparently on August 2nd it took Grey, Asquith and Churchill almost the entire 3 hours of the midday cabinet meeting to get anything - including the naval guarantee to France over which Grey and Asquith threatened resignation, which they eventually sold to the cabinet in the form of a 'doorstep' to protect the English Channel and the North Sea against German incursions. John Burns saw this as an act of alliance with France (which Britain did not openly have) and a declaration of war against Germany (to which he was opposed) for which he announced his resignation at the end of that cabinet meeting there and then. The pro-war liberals took some turning though, including Grey, who it seems only gave up on actually trying to keep peace just before the last weekend before war was declared.

As for the Tories - they apparently were in the middle of a witchhunt over rumours that there were Conservative figures not in favour of war. Lansdowne and Bonar Law were so intent that the war was not just in Britain's interest but almost a moral crusade. Churchill allegedly was leaking cabinet proceedings to them as well at this point, he had already ordered full mobilisation of the RN and its reserves across the empire before the Aug 2nd cabinet even took place.

Damn Fools.
 
Great stuff in this thread.

Others have suggested it here and elsewhere but I can see a world where Britain stays out of WWI and then wages their own separate side war vs the Ottomans.

So you have France/Russia/Serbia vs Germany/Austria-Hungary in the "main event" WWI and then a Anglo-Turkish War going on at the same time. I don't know what Italy and the minor Balkan states do in such a war.
 
Great stuff in this thread.

Others have suggested it here and elsewhere but I can see a world where Britain stays out of WWI and then wages their own separate side war vs the Ottomans.

So you have France/Russia/Serbia vs Germany/Austria-Hungary in the "main event" WWI and then a Anglo-Turkish War going on at the same time. I don't know what Italy and the minor Balkan states do in such a war.

It has been discussed on previous threads but I wonder if at some point Britain releases the first Ottoman dreadnought and the Greeks not in the war sink her. That could well bring the British into the Aegean. France should back Greece. Russia too. That back door to a British go at OE?
 
It has been discussed on previous threads but I wonder if at some point Britain releases the first Ottoman dreadnought and the Greeks not in the war sink her. That could well bring the British into the Aegean. France should back Greece. Russia too. That back door to a British go at OE?

I can see a Venizelos-led Greece having a go at the Ottomans for sure.
 
I can see a Venizelos-led Greece having a go at the Ottomans for sure.

It is a wild card in any scenario sidelining the UK, even in any averting the assassination of FF, I think a lot of tinder has piled in the Aegean as well the Balkans, making this timeframes fraught with dangers.
 
It is a wild card in any scenario sidelining the UK, even in any averting the assassination of FF, I think a lot of tinder has piled in the Aegean as well the Balkans, making this timeframes fraught with dangers.

Yeah, the Balkans are a mess regardless. If we're operating under a POD post-Sarajevo shooting then the chances of the Balkans going up in flames is pretty much a certainty regardless of what the British do or don't do.
 
I can see a Venizelos-led Greece having a go at the Ottomans for sure.

Is that wise? Their main ally would be indisposed, so without British help they’d be fighting the Turks alone. And the British would lack a casus belli against the Porte.
 
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