Wehrmacht vs Polish Army, 1936
- Thread starter Iggies
- Start date
Yes. I assume it would be a pretty clean curb-stomp in the Allies' favor if Britain and France got involved.
If Germany attacks, I think Poles might had a decent chance to stop them, at least for some time. Unlike German divisions, Polish units were fully organized and trained. German Panzer divisions were still being organized and reliability of their equipment left much to desire. The technological gap between Polish Air Force and Luftwaffe was much smaller (Polish P-7 and P-11 would be worthy adversaries for Arado Ar 68).
However with time Germany would win (unless their economy collapses). They have much bigger industry, better equipment being designed or close to being mass produced (Messerchmidt Bf-109) and bigger human resources. In a war of attrition Poland would lose.
However with time Germany would win (unless their economy collapses). They have much bigger industry, better equipment being designed or close to being mass produced (Messerchmidt Bf-109) and bigger human resources. In a war of attrition Poland would lose.
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Poland stomps Germany easily, even without help from Britain and France. German army in 1936 was tiny compared to the Polish army. In fact, in 1936 after the remilitarization of the Rhineland, Poland was ready to invade Germany but France stopped then and threatened Poland with military action if they invaded Germany. Dishonorable French, unwilling to go to war with Germany while they are weak because “Oh, we have trauma of World War 1, nobody wants a war again” but willing to go to war against your own ally! How dishonorable is that!
Any source for that? The following quote from the wikipedia page on the Rhineland Crisis kinda goes against your statements.
There is some evidence that Piłsudski might have proposed France joint military action against Germany shotrly after Hitler had taken over in 1933. France wasn't interested. Again, in 1936 Poland informed France that if they decided to stop by force remilitarization of the Rhineland, Poland would support them under the condition that France mobilizes first. France said no. I never heard about any threats of military action against Poland. And how exactly was France supposed to do that? Send their troops to Gdynia? The French didn't want to fight the Germans, but they would fight their traditional ally?
As far as German Army being tiny comparing to Polish Army. According to "Wehrmacht and German Rearmament" by Wilhelm Deist, in autumn 1936 Germany had about 520 000 soldiers. But it was still a peacetime army, far from being fully mobilized. Poland would have advantage as far as organization and training and they could have stopped German invasion. But if the Germans withdraw behind their fortification on Polish-German border, Polish Army would have problems with breaking their lines, giving Germany time to fully mobilize and improve their equipment. In a war of attition, Poland looses.
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I am skeptical of the notion that Pilsudski proposed a preventive war in 1933, though clearly some people at the time believed there was some such proposal. Jan Karski discusses this in some detail in *The Great Powers and Poland: From Versailles to Yalta*: "There is no evidence that he contemplated a preventive war, nor is there any direct documentary evidence of specific proposals forwarded to Paris or London. Nevertheless, many of his contemporaries believed that Pilsudski suggested some concerted international action. Others thought his initiative was nothing but a myth created by his admirers..." http://books.google.com/books?id=1zelAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA114
"..Pilsudski's alleged proposals were not corroborated by the French statesmen in office at that time. When General Maxime Weygand, head of the French army, was asked for comment in 1953, he observed curtly that he 'never heard of such an initiative by Pilsudski.' Foreign minister Joseph Paul-Boncour; prime minister Édouard Daladier; and General d'Arbonneau, military attaché in Warsaw, also stated years later that they were unaware of any Polish proposals for military action..." http://books.google.com/books?id=1zelAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA117
Unfortunately, this is a situation where there is no direct evidence and where both sides have a motive to deceive. For Pilsudski's friends, to claim that there was such an initiative and that the French turned it down helps to justify the 1934 Non-Aggression Pact and subsequent conciliatory Polish moves toward Nazi Germany. OTOH, the French political and military leaders obviously had every motive to later deny there was any such initiative, and thus to escape blame for not stopping Hitler at an early stage. The fact that there were undoubtedly *rumors* of such an initiative in 1933 proves very little, because such rumors might have been part of a strategy by Pilsudski to pressure Hitler into relaxing his terms for a German-Polish pact. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German–Polish_Non-Aggression_Pact
Also, David E. Kaiser writes in *Economic Diplomacy and the Origins of the Second World War: Germany, Britain, France, and Eastern Europe 1930-1939* (Princeton UP 1981)
"Hitler's accession to power on January 20 led quickly to a new crisis in German-Polish relations. Pilsudski's well-known military measures in early March-—the reinforcement of the Polish army garrison at the Westerplatte, the entrance to Danzig harbor, and the movement of several Polish divisions to the environs of Danzig-—may have been designed merely to guard against a possible Nazi coup in Danzig. They may also have been designed to intimidate the Germans by threatening a preventive war. Whether Pilsudski, as numerous rumors would have it, actually discussed a preventive war with the French remains highly questionable. No evidence for such discussions has emerged from Polish or French archives. We shall see that Pilsudski apparently frightened Hitler into an accommodation with Poland, and this may have been his aim all along..." https://books.google.com/books?id=lhbWCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA105
I don't think anyone here said the French would fight the Poles. The question is whether they would fight the Germans in alliance with the Poles. (If they do, Germany's defeat in 1936 seems to me extremely likely.) After all, the weak French response to the Rhineland remilitarization was partly motivated by the belief that Hitler did not have any immediate aggressive intentions--something which a crazy decision to attack Poland in 1936 would certainly call into question (as well as leaving Germany even weaker in the west than in OTL's 1936).
BTW, Beck's position in the Rhineland crisis was a bit more ambiguous than you seem to believe: https://books.google.com/books?id=1zelAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA150
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Maybe it would be ugly without a decisive winner. No blitzkrieg, but each side takes and loses some territory, and there's some nasty ethnic "sorting" and population exchanges, kind of like the the Greco-Turkish war in the early 1920s. Maybe it results in one of the borders I outlined back in the day in this thread:
AHC - map challenge, German-Polish border
Or, the Germans slug out a win, but they can't swallow Poland whole this early:
Plausible German gains in a "Notzi"-Polish War in 1930 or early 1940s?
AHC - map challenge, German-Polish border
AHC - map challenge, German-Polish border
The challenge is with a PoD any time between 1914 and 1945 end up the German-Polish border that looks like one of the options listed below, with 1920s Greco-Turkish style population exchanges, or no population exchanges, if you wish.
www.alternatehistory.com
Or, the Germans slug out a win, but they can't swallow Poland whole this early:
Plausible German gains in a "Notzi"-Polish War in 1930 or early 1940s?
Plausible German gains in a "Notzi"-Polish War in 1930 or early 1940s?
Professional historian Henry Ashby Turner, and countless others have speculated on the Hitler and the Nazi party failing to come to power with some alternative military, monarchical or democratic regime in its place. Turner, for his part, elaborates on what he sees as the likely foreign policy...
www.alternatehistory.com
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Pommernstellung, Ostwall, Oderstellung... they are unfinished, of course, but still count for something, if there is a field army to utilize them.
Nope, they were real. Far for them to be anything like the Maginot Line, but a significant part of those fortifications (especially Pommerstellung) was ready in 1935. They were generally relatively light bunkers (not only), but they still could be a big help in stopping the Poles, especially since the Polish Army had little heavy artillery: the main heavy guns were French howitzers Schneider modele 1917, and Poles had only about 340 of them, and only 230 in the first line units. The heaviest guns Poland had were Skoda 220mm howiters - all 27 of them, and only 18 in combat units.
In real life they got destroyed in 3 days. With the Poles I’d say a week, 2 weeks at the max.
In real life they faced the Red Army with thousands of heavy cannons.
Any fortification only works as a delaying factor, as a rule. It might become a permanent effect if the enemy runs out of resources, say men, ammunition, or time. That wouldn't be the case for the Soviets in 1945, but could entirely be the case for the Poles in 1936.
That said, generals will still try their best to bypass fortifications, if at all possible, even when they have plenty of resources. They attack them head on when there is no other alternative.
In the specific case, I wouldn't be surprised if the Poles (who would not go to war against Germany alone; this happens only if the French are all in) do their part under the alliance treaty by focusing on the most profitable part of the front, that terrible enclave threatening their back, East Prussia, rather than advancing into the best German positions in Pomorze. If they managed to nibble away at Prussia, or, with luck, to entirely overrun it, that would put paid to the threat to Gdańsk, and become a relatively easier to hold on annexation.