~ "No colonias, sino reinos" ~
Parte I: Fin del Quinto Sol
"¡Ya cavalleros! dezir vos he la verdad:
qui en un logar mora siempre lo so puede menguar."
“Hear me, my knights, and I will tell you the truth:
He who stays in one place will see his fortunes diminish."
- El Cantar de mio Cid
On January 3rd of 1516, Francisco de Montejo, Juan de Grijalva, Pedro de Alvarado, Alonso Hernández Puertocarrero, Francisco Hernández de Córdoba, Pánfilo de Narváez, and Hernán Cortés [1] came ashore the mainland of the Americas, at a site that used to host a settlement known as the Puerto Rico de la Vera Cruz - which now was a gathering of empty shacks and feral pigs. This piteous sight fed these Spaniards’ anger, but it was not merely anger that had brought them to these shores, nor the host of nearly 2,300 others [2] that accompanied them or filtered in shortly after. What had also brought them here was a choice: having settled in the Americas, were they to make their abode in the empty, malarial Caribes, or this enticing, populous, and - most importantly - rich kingdom that they now laid their eyes on. This expedition had been in formation since the early months of 1515, and had received volunteers and investors from all over the Indies and in Castile as well. The mineral wealth of the peoples the Spaniards called “Nahuas” was enough to overwhelm the senses, and, with a casus belli given by the natives’ diplomatic mishap, were ripe for any man bold enough to take. Montejo, Grijalva, Cortés, and Narváez had provided this campaign with its four heftiest investments, and therefore were its commanding officers - before the voyage pledging at the port of San Severino de Hicacos [3] that any and all booty gained would be divided first amongst them four ways.
Whatever divvying of spoils or equality of leadership this pact seemed to provide for, Cortés would very quickly become almost universally acknowledged as the de facto leader, and would consequently receive the lion’s share. Cortés embodied all of the characteristics that would come to define the “gentleman conquistador:” he was cautious, tactful, steady under immense pressure, willing to adapt, learn, and ingratiate, and was possessed of an almost outrageous boldness and physical courage. Cortés, while certainly seeking that “gold by which men become rich,” was also curiously unconcerned with material comforts, and, like many conquistadors that preceded or followed him, was involved in numerous trysts and affairs with Indio women - many of which were romantic and sometimes quasi-marital in nature.
Un joven Hernán Cortés, c. 1516
However, what this expedition found was not quite the same land of the Nahuas that had been described to them in 1514, bristling with densely populated towns and cities. Many of the villages encountered in the vicinity of Vera Cruz were in the death throes of a smallpox epidemic, others completely devoid of life. Fearing the “evil air” of such illness, the Spaniards avoided contact with these Indios - who made a few confused, desperate skirmishes against them. This uncoordinated resistance continued until the Spaniards received a formal delegation on February 23rd from the confederacy of Tlaxcala, offering friendship and “the most beautiful of their daughters and nieces” - the reason for which was the bitter hatred the Tlaxcalans had for the empire that engulfed them, that of the “Azteca.” This early friendship would be instrumental in establishing Spanish control, especially considering that the Tlaxcalans, being impoverished by the Aztecs' commercial blockade, could only offer the Spaniards one form of gift - warriors. Unsure if these Indios were the same that had massacred their compatriots, the Spaniards began preparing for hostilities. Luckily for both Spaniard and Tlaxcalan, before such an ambush could be undertaken, the Spaniards camped on the fringe of Tlaxcala were greeted by another embassy from Moctezuma, inviting them to Tenochtitlan. As Vera Cruz had been a colony commissioned by Montejo, he chose to remain on the coastal plain with around 500 Spaniards and Indio slaves to consolidate his control of the area and maintain good faith with the Tlaxcalans, while the other conquistadors continued elsewhere or proceeded into the Valley of the “Mexica.” Cortés, Alvarado, Puertocarrero, and a force of about 900 were received in the grand lake-city of Tenochtitlan and its environs by Moctezuma on March 19th, and were received with an amity and hospitality that exceeded even the bombastic reception they received in Tlaxcala. The warm welcome offered to these strange men, so clearly prepared for war, can be explained by what preceded it: shortly after Moctezuma’s warriors killed the Spaniards they were meant to protect, the devastating effects of European disease began to appear in force - killing off roughly one-fourth of the population between Tenochtitlan and Vera Cruz, with many more still gravely ill. This was taken as an obvious omen by Moctezuma and many others, with Spanish reports of “entire villages fleeing at our very sight, or more often surrendering themselves utterly to our authority, offering us their daughters, as well as many trinkets of gold and silver, in supplication.”
Viejo México-Tenochtitlan
Yet the Spaniards were equally bewildered by their hosts. Were these not the same infidels that had extinguished Old Vera Cruz? The concessions made by Moctezuma and the many throngs of generous Aztec nobles could not help but make Cortés suspicious, nor could it hide the conspicuous evidence of unsavory pagan idolatry seen at every corner - most horrid of which was the ritual sacrifice of human captives. Also, while Moctezuma was not afraid to make broad overtures to the Spaniards (even reputedly offering to convert to Christianity and swear fealty to King Miguel), many of his realm’s power brokers were leery of their new visitors - after all, the Aztec “empire” was only a federation of tribes and city-states, if Moctezuma had brought the wrath of the Spaniards to their land and needed to make amends, that was his own problem. Both sides were convinced of their own superiority, both claimed to be less barbaric than the other and in possession of a higher religious truth. With the passing of nearly two months in Tenochtitlan, Cortés and his companions began to feel the tension: the sickness had not abated with their arrival, causing confusion amongst the Aztecs, and word had reached the Spanish camp that Puertocarrero (who had broken off and headed southeast with a company of about 300 new arrivals) had almost immediately entered into open warfare with the Zapotecs of the Oaxaca Valley, while reports of Montejo and his men rounding up dozens of Nahua villages into encomiendas and exploiting the Indios mercilessly came shortly after. Sensing a growing sense of both contempt and superstitious dread accumulating amongst the common folk of Tenochtitlan (and not a few Aztec nobles as well), Cortés organized a rapid, yet orderly retreat from the city onto the shores of Lake Texcoco on May 17th - but not before inviting Moctezuma to accompany him, then seizing him when he had the chance. With just over 1,000 Spaniards and Indio cohorts, Cortés held both Tenochtitlan and its Tlatoani hostage, occupying the main bridges at Azcapotzalco, Tlacopan, and Chapoltepec, while sending his fastest riders on what few horses he had to request assistance from Montejo. After a week, the Aztecs of Tenochtitlan decided to interpret this action as aggression, and began mounting assaults on the Spanish lines. However, these sallies amounted to nothing, as the close quarters of the bridges bottlenecked the Aztecs, rendering their vast numerical superiority ineffective, while maximizing all the advantages of the Spaniards. While Montejo, who was building fortifying Vera Cruz and building himself an estate in the foothills, could not be bothered to succor Cortés’ forces in person, he did elect to send a relief force of about 250 men (85 of whom were mounted, thankfully) under his lieutenant Francisco Hernández de Córdoba, which arrived at Tenochtitlan on June 4th. With his forces bolstered, Cortés decided to intensify his siege, but there were still sizeable obstacles: firstly, Cortés’ 5 cannons all had to be left behind in Tenochtitlan when he withdrew from the city, and secondly, hostilities between the Tlaxcala and the Aztec satellite-city of Cholula had drawn in Spanish combatants. The latter issue prevented Montejo from sending Cortés any artillery, but would also serve to resolve itself. Leaving Alvarado and Francisco de Córdoba in charge, Cortés departed from the Valley of Mexica with 120 horsemen, hoping to link up with Montejo and assist in the transport of any cannons that could be spared. Rallying near a Nahua settlement named Tepeyacac on the morning of June 29th, Cortés, Montejo, their 450 Spaniards, and about 2,000 Tlaxcalans were approached by an Aztec army numbering possibly greater than 70,000 warriors, who unwisely chose an open plain as their field of battle. The battle that followed was something of legend, with tens of thousands of Aztecs butchered before the day was over (primarily while in retreat), while only 63 Spaniards lost their lives.
Una carga de caballería en la batalla de Tepeaca
There were multiple reasons the Nahua resistance melted before the Spaniards in such a precipitous manner - both at Tepeyacac and in the conquest of the Nahuas in general - but five carry the most weight. Firstly, the Spaniards that the Nahua encountered and fought were simply of a different breed than their warriors: nearly all of them were battle-hardened, having fought in the Italian Wars and the conquest of Española, Boriquén, Cuba, and elsewhere, and nearly all of them had to toil for their survival in the difficult early process of Caribbean colonization - these particular Spaniards were lean and powerfully strong. Secondly, the preferred weapon of the Spanish soldier, the steel sword, was superior in reach, durability, and lethality to the Nahuas’ obsidian-edged macuahuitl, which had been designed with the intention of wounding - rather than killing - one’s opponent, for the sake of obtaining prisoners to either barter with or sacrifice. Thirdly, many aspects of the Spaniards shocked and intimidated the Nahuas more so than any aspect of the Nahuas did vice versa. For instance, these Indios had never before encountered the alien-looking, statuesque horse and its fearsome capacity in battle, nor the rabid ferocity of leather armored fighting mastiffs, nor the bottled thunder that was gunpowder - each of which were terrifying enough in their own right. Fourthly, there was, of course, the devastating effects of European disease, which left many many of the Nahuas not only dead but also too weak to fight. As Gonzalo de Sandoval remarked: “It is as if God himself is at our vanguard; reaping scores of the heathen before we even catch sight of them.” And fifthly, there occurred all throughout the European colonization of the Americas something called the “stranger effect:” older societies had very strict requirements for treating strangers with a great deal of hospitality (due to the necessity of accommodating strangers to ancient systems of commerce), and strangers were also highly valued in such communities due to their insight about the outside world and their ability to arbitrate disputes with impartiality. More biologically speaking, being a newcomer carries with it an aura of both mystery and freshness, often piquing sexual interest, which explains a Spanish soldier’s account of Indio women being “very chaste around their men,” yet “throwing themselves” at Spaniards.
The battle of Tepeyacac was the death knell for the Aztecs. With so many of their most experienced and decorated soldiers snuffed out, there was little that could be done to throw more weight at the Spaniards or their native allies - leaving the door to Tenochtitlan wide open for the arrival of Spanish ordnance, which shattered all but the Tlacopan bridge and turned the battle for the city into an unfathomable massacre. Cortés used Moctezuma as a bartering chip, the ransom of which the surviving Aztec nobility met for the sole purpose of murdering their traitor-king. On August 11th of 1517, Tenochtitlan and the Valley of Mexica were fully in Spanish hands, and plans were being made for the joint founding of a town at Tepeyacac (Hispanicized as Tepeaca) and for further conquests. The fall of Tenochtitlan and its rumored ease of conquest and fabulous wealth opened the floodgates to hundreds of Spaniards - with anywhere from 3,500 to 4,500 permanently settling in the land now deemed “Nueva Castilla” over the years 1515-1530. Puertocarrero (with reinforcements and supplies) would eventually succeed in subjugating the Zapotecs of the valley of Oaxaca and the neighboring Mixtec by late 1518 - founding San Isidoro de Oaxaca [4] - before moving on into the region of Chiapas, while Narváez - heretofore subjugating the Otomi to the north - moved westward with Cortés, conquering the region of Michoacán and participating in the capture of Colima alongside Gonzalo de Sandoval and of the fertile Bajío alongside Gaspar de Espinosa and Cristóbal de Olid - all by early 1521. Meanwhile, Francisco de Montejo and Pedro de Alvarado moved on to the Nahua kingdom of Tabasco and the Kuchkabals of Yucatán (fully subjugated and pacified by 1528), with Alvarado founding Badajoz de Ichecanzejo [5] in the land of Ah Canul, with a westerly port at San Carlos de Campeche [6]. The frontier would be pushed even further east by Francisco de Córdoba and Nicolás de Ribera - who would conquer the region Guatemala by 1525 and found San Germán de Guatemala [7] - and by Francisco de Saavedra and Rodrigo de Águilas, who would conquer the region of Guaimura [8] by 1527, founding the cities of Santa Rosa [9] and Puerta Natividad [10] on the north coast.
Nueva Castilla, c. 1525
(1 = concesión de Cortés, 2 = concesión de Montejo, 3 = concesión de Puertocarrero, 4 = concesión de Narváez)
Nueva Castilla, c. 1535 - Nuevas capitanías generales
(1 = México [Cortés], 2 = Tabasco [Montejo], 3 = Oaxaca y Chiapas [Puertocarrero], 4 = Michoacán [Narváez], 5 = Xalisco [Sandoval], 6 = Yucatán [Alvarado], 7 = Guatemala [de Córdoba])
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[1]
Also present were Hernando de Soto and Álvar Núñez Cabeza de Vaca
[2]
Some 2,800 Spaniards would be participating in the pre-fall of Tenochtitlan period of the conquest
[3]
Near OTL Matanzas, Cuba
[4]
OTL Oaxaca de Juárez
[5]
Roughly OTL Mérida
[6]
OTL Campeche
[7]
OTL Santiago de los Caballeros
[8]
OTL Honduras and most of Nicaragua
[9]
Near OTL Trujillo
[10]
Near OTL Puerto Caballos
