To the Victor, Go the Spoils (Redux): A Plausible Central Powers Victory

[Athelstane]

I view that as a possibility, but at what point in that process do the British decide they’d rather drop Japan than the US?

In OTL, the British only ditched the alliance under duress of sorts. It was the price the Americans demanded for the WNT. So, even though few in Whitehall wanted to lose the Japanese alliance, they ditched it anyway, because they prized a serious limitation of naval arms more than they did alliance with Japan, because Britain was nearly broke. (In the long run this backfired pretty badly on U.S. interests, but that was not so apparent, maybe, in 1921-22.)

Well, in this timeline, that calculation won't be there. Britain, whether it be with Bonar Law, Croft, Churchill, or even Adamson or MacDonald in Number 10, is not going to be prepared to drastically hack down the RN with a first rate navy operated by a European hegemon right across the North Sea. Due to their parlous finances, they really can't afford to build like the maniacs they were in 1895-1914, but no naval agreement with Berlin is going to make the paranoia in London go away. Most of the G3's and N3's are likely getting built here, along with a serious commitment to development of formal ASW capabilities. Unfortunately for Britain, this means the Americans are going to be building a lot of super dreadnoughts, too...

Anyway, what other levers could the U.S. use? Debt repayment is the one obvious one I can see. I'm not sure that's enough, but maybe it could be used to push modest modifications of the Alliance treaty at its next renewal?

It could also be that Bonar Law (or his successors) try hard to pursue some more formal strategic relationship with the U.S., to counterbalance Germany, especially if attempts at rapprochement are not bearing fruit. If so, that could be a *positive* incentive for abrogating the alliance. The thing is, the way our author paints the U.S.'s stance, it seems unlikely that the U.S. is going to greet any such overture with any enthusiasm. Odds are, you could get an even more isolationist America than what we got in our TL.

 

[NoMommsen]

...
This was something of a ‘fudge’ solution to the Austro-Polish debate after Germany had essentially informed the Austrians in July 1918 that Austria would have to accept military and economic ties after the war - and that the Poles would be able to choose a German King, not an Austrian. ...

... and here you seem to somewhat miss your claim of plausibility by IMHO too clicheesque aperception of german politicians as bullying idiots. Such a 'demand' by the german side is rather unfounded in OTL esp. late in the war (I talk about politicians not about Ludendorff lackeys).
It was already clear to the germans in 1916 that a ruler in Poland won't be a german noble. Berlin and Vianna rather quickly settled on Archduke Charles Stephen of Austria or his son Archduke Karl Albrecht of Austria. The german politicians knew very well that an insult as you propose would be out of question. A rebellious revolutionary and upheveal Austria-Hungary wasn't anything anybody wanted.

The term "germano-polish" - you might want to refer to in your proposal -refers more to the extent the new polish state should have. They - the protagonists for this germopolish solution - envisaged a polish state at least reunified with Galicia/Lodomeria if not even embracing the eastern parts of the polish kingdom of 1793 (Curland, Lithunia, western Ruthenia, Wolhynia) reaching from the Irben street of the Baltics to the borders of the Bukowina.
Vienna - well aware of the precariously balanced relation between all other parts of the austro-hungarian empire which would have been busted with such a big solution - aimed at a "Small Poland" solution aka aka Congreß-Poland of 1815. ... though they actually were aslo well aware of the frictions this would cause within both such polish parts of the empire (Congress-Poland and Galicia/Lodomeria).

 

[PeytonTucker]

In OTL, the British only ditched the alliance under duress of sorts. It was the price the Americans demanded for the WNT. So, even though few in Whitehall wanted to lose the Japanese alliance, they ditched it anyway, because they prized a serious limitation of naval arms more than they did alliance with Japan, because Britain was nearly broke. (In the long run this backfired pretty badly on U.S. interests, but that was not so apparent, maybe, in 1921-22.)

Well, in this timeline, that calculation won't be there. Britain, whether it be with Bonar Law, Croft, Churchill, or even Adamson or MacDonald in Number 10, is not going to be prepared to drastically hack down the RN with a first rate navy operated by a European hegemon right across the North Sea. Due to their parlous finances, they really can't afford to build like the maniacs they were in 1895-1914, but no naval agreement with Berlin is going to make the paranoia in London go away. Most of the G3's and N3's are likely getting built here, along with a serious commitment to development of formal ASW capabilities. Unfortunately for Britain, this means the Americans are going to be building a lot of super dreadnoughts, too...

Anyway, what other levers could the U.S. use? Debt repayment is the one obvious one I can see. I'm not sure that's enough, but maybe it could be used to push modest modifications of the Alliance treaty at its next renewal?

It could also be that Bonar Law (or his successors) try hard to pursue some more formal strategic relationship with the U.S., to counterbalance Germany, especially if attempts at rapprochement are not bearing fruit. If so, that could be a *positive* incentive for abrogating the alliance. The thing is, the way our author paints the U.S.'s stance, it seems unlikely that the U.S. is going to greet any such overture with any enthusiasm. Odds are, you could get an even more isolationist America than what we got in our TL.

This seems quite likely to me. A (rough and tenuous) Anglo-German detente to counter the soviets, with America pledging neutrality in Europe while making absolutely clear what they will and will not tolerate from Japan. How exactly this would work I’m not sure, as in the case of war, if east Asia is roughly the same as otl, it would make the US and USSR de facto allies in the region, which idk how the Americans would feel about that if Britain and Germany are fighting the USSR simultaneously in Europe and Central Asia. Japan really is what throws a wrench in any US-UK-Germany anti-Soviet pact. Without Britain dropping Japan outright due to the WNT, what do you think could be a possible compromise to keep the US on board? And would Japan accept the British telling them to limit themselves for the sake of the US? The whole situation post-WWI is very tricky in general. Of the five main players (US, UK, Germany, USSR, Japan) they all have very different interests, often overlapping. The UK and Germany may be able to swallow their differences in the face of the shared soviet threat, but the US and Japan seem harder to reconcile with each other without one of them outright refusing the compromise brokered by the British. And the USSR, without pulling in the US or Japan is largely completely isolated, though geography makes that isolation less of an existential threat than it would be for most. If the communists in China get going as OTL, they, the USSR, and the US would have a mutual interest in containing Japan, but ideology and the European situation severely complicate that potential relationship.

 

[boredviewer1234]

One interesting consequence I think you might see will be a ''red doublethink'' myth because of the current balance of power.

By that their will be no Russian intervention their will be much less data about the USSR strength, surely this lack of war should improve relations right? Unfortunately it makes it much easier for propaganda by Whites defeated to portray them as supermen however it also means the people who think they can just crush communism and such will be able to do more easily given the USSR did not beat a divided coalition of over 10 nations including Germany, Japan, USA and Britain that convinced the powers that be they are not just going away soon from power.

So I think for how the USSR get's treated will be along this spectrum, Britain might actually be willing to become a investor of the USSR if they are convinced they are weak to try and avoid complete German hegemony but Japan thinking they are facing a super power that is could soon subsume their government and way of life be far more aggressive land grabbing for the war they are soon convinced will happen with the USSR and step on a lot of toes, France is looking mighty weak now for example.

Though for Italy it will be curious to see how it impacts Africa given the colonies there should be experiencing the same divided for the civil war, you could see Egypt become the homeland of royalists Italians if they lose.

 

[TheReformer]

It was already clear to the germans in 1916 that a ruler in Poland won't be a german noble. Berlin and Vianna rather quickly settled on Archduke Charles Stephen of Austria or his son Archduke Karl Albrecht of Austria. The german politicians knew very well that an insult as you propose would be out of question. A rebellious revolutionary and upheveal Austria-Hungary wasn't anything anybody wanted.

This is plainly incorrect. The Austro-Polish solution was over by mid, if not early 1918 and Austria was forced to make massive concessions to Germany throughout the last year of the war both economically, politically and even diplomatically - including a commitment to joining Germany's planned Mitteleuropa. This is backed up both by research conducted on the 1914-1918 encyclopedia online, and also Germany's War Aims in the First World War - Fritz Fischer, which explicitly states this to be the case.

... and here you seem to somewhat miss your claim of plausibility by IMHO too clicheesque aperception of german politicians as bullying idiots. Such a 'demand' by the german side is rather unfounded in OTL esp. late in the war (I talk about politicians not about Ludendorff lackeys).

I disagree with this assertion, and don't particularly see how I am doing so. Dont cast asperions on the plausibility of my timeline on the basis of your own lack of information. It's demoralizing, and not the first time you've specifically referenced 'plausibility' despite the OP explicitly stating not to do this.

 

[Disraeli2004]

... and here you seem to somewhat miss your claim of plausibility by IMHO too clicheesque aperception of german politicians as bullying idiots. Such a 'demand' by the german side is rather unfounded in OTL esp. late in the war (I talk about politicians not about Ludendorff lackeys).
It was already clear to the germans in 1916 that a ruler in Poland won't be a german noble. Berlin and Vianna rather quickly settled on Archduke Charles Stephen of Austria or his son Archduke Karl Albrecht of Austria. The german politicians knew very well that an insult as you propose would be out of question. A rebellious revolutionary and upheveal Austria-Hungary wasn't anything anybody wanted.

The term "germano-polish" - you might want to refer to in your proposal -refers more to the extent the new polish state should have. They - the protagonists for this germopolish solution - envisaged a polish state at least reunified with Galicia/Lodomeria if not even embracing the eastern parts of the polish kingdom of 1793 (Curland, Lithunia, western Ruthenia, Wolhynia) reaching from the Irben street of the Baltics to the borders of the Bukowina.
Vienna - well aware of the precariously balanced relation between all other parts of the austro-hungarian empire which would have been busted with such a big solution - aimed at a "Small Poland" solution aka aka Congreß-Poland of 1815. ... though they actually were aslo well aware of the frictions this would cause within both such polish parts of the empire (Congress-Poland and Galicia/Lodomeria).

The Austrians had little to no capability to resist German demands on the East by late 1918, which were becoming increasingly expansive and developed towards the end of the First World War as militarists in the German high command turned to their eastern gains to justify the huge losses in the war. They had already been seen as ramshackle and precariously reliant on German patronage, even before the war. During the war, which was launched in part of hopes of proving the empire's metal against nationalistic challanges, only eroded the autonomy further as Austria had to rely repeatedly on Germany- including against Russia in 1914 and 16, against Italy in 1916 and against even Serbia- to avoid complete collapse. The empire was exhausted, in a state of famine and on the brink of internal implosion by 1918. The Germans weren't passive observers here. The Duel Alliance was meant to bind Austria heavily to Germany and provide a buffer in the Balkans, but all these failures directly damaged Germany's war effort and there was a growing mood of anger at the empire that makes, so I doubt the German military authorities would take protestations about the ruler very seriously. Ref's TL here isn't a miracle on the Danube- the precarities and inadqueacies accentuated by the war are still raw. I think it's pretty reasonable to assume the least of Austria's worries would be resisting German designs on Poland or demanding an Austrian Poland given their fall to near vassalage under the spectre of wartime failure.

 

[Ambusher11]

The French are likely too humbled to ever stand up to Germany again.

On the other hand, the French wouldn't have as heavy of a reparations burden and be disarmed to the same extent that Germany was OTL.

 

[PeytonTucker]

One interesting consequence I think you might see will be a ''red doublethink'' myth because of the current balance of power.

By that their will be no Russian intervention their will be much less data about the USSR strength, surely this lack of war should improve relations right? Unfortunately it makes it much easier for propaganda by Whites defeated to portray them as supermen however it also means the people who think they can just crush communism and such will be able to do more easily given the USSR did not beat a divided coalition of over 10 nations including Germany, Japan, USA and Britain that convinced the powers that be they are not just going away soon from power.

So I think for how the USSR get's treated will be along this spectrum, Britain might actually be willing to become a investor of the USSR if they are convinced they are weak to try and avoid complete German hegemony but Japan thinking they are facing a super power that is could soon subsume their government and way of life be far more aggressive land grabbing for the war they are soon convinced will happen with the USSR and step on a lot of toes, France is looking mighty weak now for example.

Though for Italy it will be curious to see how it impacts Africa given the colonies there should be experiencing the same divided for the civil war, you could see Egypt become the homeland of royalists Italians if they lose.

I could see British investment in the USSR early on as a counter to Germany, but as the USSR begins to solidify and exert its strength I doubt it will lead to an alliance. France is subservient to Germany for all intents and purposes at this point, and while German hegemony is a massive threat to Britain, helping the USSR rebuild the Russian empire, while only getting in exchange the French and Belgian territories returned, and empowering a nation perfectly situated to strip the jewel of the empire from her, is not in Britain’s best interest. German dominated Europe sucks for Britain, but the Germans are in no place to threaten the empire, so unless the Germans start sending warships across the North Sea, I can’t see the British outright fighting with the soviets. OTL WWII was a very different situation. The British and Americans could not tolerate Nazi plans for Europe under any circumstances, TTL European order, while certainly unpalatable, is something that can be reasonably dealt with as long as Britain keeps decent men on the diplomatic front. The British have to ask themselves, “if we give the soviets everything up to Warsaw, where will they go next?” And the answer to that question is India. We must also consider the USSR’s position, unlike OTL, they are reduced quite a bit more in territory, and enveloped in the west by countries that exist solely for German (and western, if the Germans are smart) exploitation. When soviet leaders look west, regardless of the reality on the ground, they will see a continent waiting to be liberated by their brothers in arms, much more so than OTL. I wouldn’t be surprised if the doctrine of “permanent revolution” becomes much more influencial in the USSR purely because of the shared border with mittleuropa. This would become even more prevelant if, as is likely, the Germans crack down on socialist revolutionaries in the puppets, as those people, if they could escape death or imprisonment, would likely flee to the USSR, and spend much of their time convincing soviet authorities that revolution in Eastern Europe is imminent and all they need is a bit of help from “big brother Russia.”

 

[PeytonTucker]

On the other hand, the French wouldn't have as heavy of a reparations burden and be disarmed to the same extent that Germany was OTL.

But they lack the ability of Germany to so quickly build a fighting force to tear through Europe. Losing the briey-longwy mines will put a sizable dent in the French economy and war-making capabilities, even without reparations and debt to the allies. There is also the psychological effects of this being the second war in little over half a century that France has lost to Germany, and that Germany, with the eastern puppets and western annexations, is stronger than ever. If the soviets are somehow occupying Berlin, I’m sure the French would jump to grab the lost lands, outside of that though I just can’t see it.

someone on here said it before, but I can’t remember who. But that France would be more similar to Germany post-WWII, than Germany post-WWI, still a strong nation, still capable of a vibrant economy, still able to throw around its weight with money, but unable to militarily exert its will on its immiediate neighbors.

 

[PeytonTucker]

Sorry for posting so much in a row, but another thing I was thinking about was the colonies. France, being reduced to a second rate power in Europe, will likely try and hold onto the empire with everything they have, much more so than OTL. The British will be much less willing to part with their empire as well considering it is at this point all that keeps them in the same league as Germany and the US. And the US, seeming to trend more towards neutrality in Europe, will probably have much less ability to force the European powers to replace empire with “independent” republics to be exploited as OTL. We could see longer lasting European empires, particularly in Africa, and this could have a myriad of effects on the European powers, economically, diplomatically, and socially.

 

[TheReformer]

Sorry for posting so much in a row, but another thing I was thinking about was the colonies

Honestly I'm rather enjoying watching your brain work. Tis funny seeing how hot or cold you are when it comes to my actual plans lol

 

[PeytonTucker]

Honestly I'm rather enjoying watching your brain work. Tis funny seeing how hot or cold you are when it comes to my actual plans lol

I can’t wait to see your plans come to fruition!! I’m also interested in seeing how close I am to what you’re gonna do ITTL lolol

 

[Kylia]

On the other hand, the French wouldn't have as heavy of a reparations burden and be disarmed to the same extent that Germany was OTL.

One of the reasons France surrendered in 1940 was they were still reeling from the population losses of WWI. And this france doesn't have piles of money they got out of germany like candy from a Pinata

 

[Athelstane]

One of the reasons France surrendered in 1940 was they were still reeling from the population losses of WWI. And this france doesn't have piles of money they got out of germany like candy from a Pinata

There's that famous table Churchill stuck in The Gathering Storm, titled, "Table of the Comparative French and German Figures for the Clases born from 1914 to 1920, and called up from 1934 to 1940." The grand total of men in these seven induction classes came to 3,172,000 men for Germany, and only 1,574,000 for France - basically, the Germans had twice as many men being inducted into the Wehrmacht every year. Which is remarkable given that Germany suffered almost 700,000 more casualties in the Great War than France did. The reason was twofold: Germany already had a much larger population base to work from by 1914, and the greater efficiency of its army (and lessened exposure to Spanish Influenza) meant that it had a significantly lower casualty rate than France (3.4% to 4.3%).

{And this doesn't even include the additional military age manpower Germany had access to once it annexed Austria and the Sudetenland in 1938 - an additional population of over 10 million Germans!]

The French Army general staff was painfully aware that this was going to be case almost as soon as the killing stopped in 1918. And this was a big driving impulse behind the pursuit of the Maginot Line: a big force multiplier for a smaller force to offset an enemy with more men. It was far from a stupid idea.

But there's another point that needs to be made about those horrendous casualties. In France as well as Germany, it had a pacific effect on the population. The irony is, it was clearly more intense in victorious France, in part because unlike defeated Germany, there was no compensating sense of injustice over its postwar treatment, nor relentless Nazi propaganda whipping up revanche 24/7.

All that is in a world where France *won* the First World War. I wonder if we can properly imagine how deep the demoralization of those losses would be in a timeline where it *lost* in 1918. I confess, I struggle to do so.

Albert Bettannier's "La Tache Noire" (1887)

Culture, the old axiom goes, is the stories a people tells itself about who they are. France had had competing cultural narratives it told itself after 1789, but one thing they had in common was a sense of the greatness of France: a France with special mission in the world (even if they could not always agree on what that mission was). France had enjoyed more than its share of military glory before the Revolution, and after it, too. In these narratives, the defeats of 1814-15 and 1870 could be, and were, explained away in various ways, but usually centered on Bonapartist overreach (Napoleon I) or Bonapartist ineptitude (Napoleon III). In our history, the Great War could still fit in this narrative, albeit in a terribly costly way. But in this timeline, as someone else has already pointed out, France has suffered crushing military defeats by Germany twice in less than 50 years. Worse, it happened in spite of having five great power allies this time around! At this point, the moral despair felt by the Macedonians and Carthaginians after Zama and Cynoscephalae is going to start feeling a little too familiar.

​

 

[Kylia]

All true. But we also have to consider that the losses in WWI also tailored german strategy in WWII. Blitzkrieg was basically a textbook example of people responding to the problems in the last war, and immediately overcompensating. Germany knew they didn't have the manpower to throw forever at problems either.

 

[Von Tyrconnell]

Social Conflict & Elections
Britain
January 1919​

British society had emerged from the war profoundly changed. Strengthened by the need for constant and high-output industry, key sectors of the economy had become vital to the war effort in the absence of many men fighting, and thus the power of mining and manufacturing unions had greatly increased.

Unlike most states in Europe at the time, Britain’s experience with political socialism had not been built off the back of academia, but unions. In France for example, there were multiple Socialist parties. This was also true of Germany where their unions had, on instruction of their political leaders, just forced Germany into political concessions. In Britain though, Labour was a party that was made up of a collection of political bodies including the trade unions, and intellectual ‘think tank’ groups like the Independent Labour Party and the Fabians.

Far from a revolutionary party, Labour had supported the Government during the war but had left the coalition when it became clear that the loss of Amiens had proven too much for the British war effort on the continent. Party leader William Adamson, a firm trade unionist from Scotland, led a party that still felt deeply divided over the value of the war. What they were united on though was the belief that Britain should end the war and that she should not engage in imperialism any further.

For most working class Britons these policies seemed very reasonable, if the war in Europe was essentially lost, why continue to lose soldiers elsewhere? This after all was a war against Germany, who had attacked Belgium. Everyone else, in their eyes, was an afterthought. Even after Gallipoli the British public had learned to hate the Turks, but only as much as they despised the men who screwed the pooch on the operation’s plans.

Despite this, the war had continued and relations between Britain’s social classes had rapidly declined. By the time negotiations for peace with Germany began, there were very real signs of unrest in the Rhondda valley, Manchester and the Clyde. These were the heartlands of the ‘triple alliance’ trade unions; the National Transport Workers' Federation, National Union of Railwaymen and the Miners' Federation of Great Britain.

These three unions alone had the capability to cripple British infrastructure if they had wished, but despite the more revolutionary attitude of the Independent Labour Party, who had opposed the war and were spurred on by Italy’s strife, direct action never took place. This was in part precisely because of the fears of an Italian style state schism.

This changed though in January 1919. Since the defeat in France, many British soldiers had been simply demobilised and returned to Britain. This had prompted a rapid rise in unemployment as these soldiers returned to a nation where their jobs had been filled by other men or even women. Unions thus proposed that the working week be reduced to 40 hours for every worker to provide more hours overall for more workers and share the burden.

This policy was widely supported in the ‘red’ regions of Britain, notably on the Clyde, in Manchester and Rhondda valley in Wales. In Glasgow though, this would take a bad turn. On January 27th, around 3,000 striking workers opted to meet at the St. Andrew's Halls. Just three days later though these numbers would swell to the tens of thousands as the city’s shipbuilding and engineering workers joined.

Police soon sought to crack down on the protesters, and thus when on January 31st a large congregation of tens of thousands of protesters met on George square, police immediately charged the workers to disperse them. In what became known as the ‘Battle of George Square’, the workers in their anger and frustration at the war and the further declining economic situation, actually fought back and ‘won’ the battle. Police forces were driven off and the fighting spread into the surrounding streets.

During the fighting, representatives of the workers had been meeting with the Lord Provost of Glasgow at the city chambers. Immediately upon hearing of the violence they went to leave, but were set upon by police after leaving the building. CWC leaders David Kirkwood and Emanuel Shinwell, along with Trade Unionist leader Willie Gallacher, were all arrested and detained - enraging the protesting workers who soon descended upon the city council building where they were being briefly detained.

Here, the protesters eventually managed to storm the building and compel the release of their leaders. Gallacher, who had been jailed repeatedly, then turned the strikers to march on the barracks in the Maryhill district of Glasgow. Here, thousands of workers surrounded the complex and began calling on the soldiers to join them.

Demoralised and generally sympathising with the strikers demands on better hours and pay, the soldiers of the barracks remarkably arrested their commanders and joined the now armed protest. Thankfully, by then the Government had already met and ordered the dispatch of 12,000 soldiers to Glasgow to prevent any ‘bolshevist incident’ from taking place.

Joined by six tanks, the large force quickly took control of Glasgow railway station in the night and deployed in force. While strikers had been furious, and soldiers at the local barracks had gone over to the other side, the reality was this protest had never been an attempt at revolution. Overnight the rioters had, unsurprisingly, gone to bed - save for a few radicals - and thus the crisis came to an abrupt halt.

Simply getting ahead of themselves and acting to protect their own interests, the protesters soon abandoned the idea of actually fighting for control of the city even if they implicitly controlled it for several hours and their mutineering soldier allies largely just slowly melted back into their barracks in the face of the overwhelming army presence.

The close call of the strike sent shockwaves through the British establishment. Genuinely confident that a major strike by the triple alliance of British trade unions would topple the Government, the Prime Minister soon met with the heads of the three unions together to discuss the political situation.

Not revolutionaries, railway workers union leader Jimmy Thomas even spoke in Parliament against unofficial and wildcat strikes, saying: “However difficult an official strike may be, a non-official strike will be worse, because there is always the grave danger in unofficial strikes of no one being able to control them”. Such was the strength of feeling against action that could undo the stability of the state that even Trade Union leaders cautioned against it.

Fearful of similar or even worse incidents elsewhere, Bonar Law finally felt compelled and comfortable enough to end Britain’s wartime measures and call fresh elections set for February 1919. This allowed the unions to deliver a rallying cry for major financial and time committed support for Labour at the polls, lessening the chance of strikes and thus reducing the chance of a revolutionary incident. In this backdrop, the country entered a rather tense and uncertain election season.

The 1919 Election
The first election in over eight years, the 1919 election was a woefully overdue poll that would reshape British politics.

The Tories under Bonar Law entered the voting with 271 seats - 53 short of a majority having been propped up by the weakened National Liberals (now Coalition Liberals) out of a desire for self preservation more than anything else. Despite the chaotic period of his premiership, Bonar Law was widely sympathised with among the middle classes and elite cadres of society, winning over swathes of Liberal voters who were impressed by Law’s victory over the Ottomans and deft negotiations with Germany where both Asquith and Lloyd George had failed.

Labour meanwhile looked set to win their greatest number of seats yet - and were very genuinely touted in the press as possibly being on the verge of taking power altogether. This was either scaremongering or naive optimism though among the media establishment. Sure, one would not struggle to find a labour voter on the streets, but in reality the country was ready for change - but not that much change.

Ironically though this worked against the party, who were unfairly portrayed as being bolshevik adjacent with their platform aiming at nationalising the mines and railways under leader William Adamson.

The Liberals meanwhile looked set to be decimated. Deeply alienated from their voters by Asquith and Lloyd George’s double flunking of the war, many Liberal voters had abandoned the party for the Tories. Still headed by a naive Asquith who sought to ‘ride out’ the near-certain defeat at the coming poll, the party stood on a platform aimed at more radical political and social reform in a bid to win over wavering middle class Labour voters, but in reality few trusted the party anymore. Ironically they expected poor results - with Asquith’s close ally Donald Maclean actually favouring the idea of a pact with Labour to shore up voters, though Asquith didn't believe the effect of a ‘khaki’ election would be so severe and rejected the idea.

The formerly National Liberals meanwhile still propping up the Tory ministry under Bonar Law, notably including figures like Churchill and even Lloyd George - though politically he remained a shadow of his former self. Identified mainly as ‘Coalition Liberals’, this bloc generally campaigned on the Tory platform and piggybacked off their voters. Now led by Churchill, who was frankly one of the last prominent National Liberals left, the party initially sought reconciliation with Asquith’s liberals for a united campaign but ultimately proved unable to dislodge Asquith from his position in the party. While the rift was healable, that would have to wait for the end of the war.

The overwhelming sense among the public was that a change was needed, but the most important change needed was stability. After years of mixed coalitions of various parties and blocs, the country needed one party in power with a clear agenda and competence in Government - and the obvious choice therefore was the Tories.

The Tories also benefited from the unexpected and remarkable rise of Britain’s ‘lost boys’ - roving bands of demobilised soldiers named for their similarity with the characters of 1911 classic ‘Peter Pan’. These troops had escaped confinement upon disembarkation in Britain’s ports and service in the army still with their uniforms and/or arms, and used them to engage in criminal activity and begging on the streets of Britain’s cities.

Somewhere between brigands and beggars, they were reported across the country but were particularly concentrated in the south and major ports of the country where demobilised troops often disembarked. Often pushed by a lack of jobs and general apathy or uncertainty, the lost boys became a political issue during the buildup to the election after the roaming groups caused a steep rise in crime throughout Britain’s cities.

Seen as not easily controlled by police and technically out of the army, and where not armed therefore not the army’s problem, the mobs could be found in ‘units’ as large as whole platoons in some cases. This was primarily because the troops often had not found work and found the prospect of a return to normal civilian life daunting or difficult.

While the lost boys tended to be unofficial criminal mobs, some soldiers and veterans mobilised their own politically oriented groups during late 1918 to early 1919. Groups such as the Labour allied National Association of Discharged Sailors and Soldiers (NADSS), which excluded officers, and Conservative allied anti-socialist Comrades of the Great War could often be found ‘sparring’ in the streets in debate - or more often just straight yelling matches.

These were not paramilitaries or militias, but they acted as increasingly large, politically hostile bodies of men attached to their respective parties. Their disagreements mostly stemmed over the continuation of the war and the terms of the peace. The NADSS and Labour primarily opposed the terms with the Ottomans as an entrenchment of imperialism, along with the annexation of German colonies, while the Comrades of the Great War tended to back Bonar Law’s seeing through of the conflict to the end and the focus on the middle east.

A debate also raged over the role of Britain in Russia’s ongoing civil war. British troops had landed in Arkhangelsk in Northern Russia in March 1918 as part of an attempt to prevent Bolshevik troops from seizing one of the allies’ major arms dumps in the city. Now nearly a year on, a debate continued to rage over what exactly the allies were doing there. While the National Liberals under prominent jingoists like Winston Churchill still called on a British intervention in Russia to establish a ‘stable friend to the east’ as a check on Germany by installing the Russian whites, the Government had grown increasingly ambivalent about the whole situation.

In some cases the emergence of these groups even directly affected the ballot box, with the left-liberal National Federation of Discharged and Demobilised Sailors and Soldiers (NFDDSS) becoming the most cohesive political bloc and standing thirty candidates in the election.

Focused on military pensions, opposed to re-conscription and tentatively allied with the Labour Party, the group drew a remarkable number of left-Liberal Party MPs backing including prominent Asquith-ite Liberals James Hogge, William Wedgwood Benn and William Pringle. Hogge was a rising player in the Liberals and save for Asquith’s endless determination to go on and on, he may have become sooner party leader. This allowed the group to gain some considerable support from frustrated former Liberal voters and propelled them into a position where they could win multiple seats.

Alongside these ‘soldiers parties’ also came a slew of other new parties, most notably the National Party under Henry Page Croft which entered the election with 7 MPs due to Conservative Party defectors. Page Croft, a protectionist imperialist with a military record who despised Germans, led the party on a policy of ‘total victory’ over Germany and a bizarre working class ‘patriotic’ appeal in a party largely dominated by the aristocracy. Supporting ‘no limits on wages’ in exchange for ‘no limits on production’, the party even briefly offered to back Labour, seeing it as the future of politics - despite its deeply divergent political views.

There was also Ireland of course. Now one might have initially assumed that the ‘defeat’ to Germany would have ignited some kind of powder keg in Ireland immediately, but in actual fact the buildup to the Irish revolutionary period was slow, gradual and far less dominated by the radicals in Sinn Fein than one might assume. If anything, Sinn Fein was marginally weakened by Germany’s victory indirectly.

The sudden rise in the popularity of British Labour in fact convinced the party that it could win seats in Ireland. As such, where before leader William Adamson had planned to let Sinn Fein run free in Ireland without splitting the worker vote, he now chose to try and bolster his own party’s seat count and take the position of the official opposition. As such, Labour would run candidates in Ireland, putting Irish working class voters in something of a bind.

Nationalism in Ireland was without a doubt a minority view. While very popular, there was no landslide majority for independence in 1918 even after the conscription crisis. Working class voters in many of Ireland’s cities for example put more emphasis on the class struggle than that of the national struggle with the British, and thus where historians have speculated Sinn Fein may have won as many as 73 seats without Labour, in actual fact by election day they were looking at around ten fewer.

Naturally, the nationalists had not sat on their hands throughout this period. Sinn Fein had made clear that the path forward for Ireland was independence, or at the very least its own Parliament - and thus they promised exactly that. Come election day, they would promise not to take any of their seats in Westminster, and instead to form their own Parliament in Dublin.

The Results
The results after a short and somewhat tense campaign were clear. The Liberals, the party of Government at the start of the war with 272 seats, were reduced to just 37 seats after suffering a heavy split between Lloyd George’s and Asquith’s camps. The former ‘national’, now Coalition Liberals of Churchill and Lloyd George would take 43 seats. Embarrassingly, Churchill himself actually lost his seat to Edwin Scrymgeour of the Scottish Prohibition party - leaving the leadership open yet again. Asquith too was ousted in his Fife East seat by Scottish Unionist Alexander Sprot.

Labour meanwhile performed the best of any poll to date, but unsurprisingly failed to suddenly take power as some papers and political ‘observers’ predicted. Taking 119 seats and with it the mantle of the official opposition, along with over 25% of the national vote share. Quite the shock to some in the country, Adamson himself hailed that the result would “produce a different atmosphere and an entirely different relationship amongst all sections of our people”.

The biggest winner of the election though were, unsurprisingly, the Tories. Winning a total of 391 seats in the Unionist Camp, including the Scottish, Irish and Labour Unionist parties under the Tory umbrella. Bonar Law was now unquestionably the Prime Minister of the country for the time being - and held the largest majority since Henry Campbell-Bannerman’s premiership in 1906.

Now no longer in need of support from the Coalition Liberals, it quickly became clear to everyone that despite their best hopes, David Lloyd George’s half of the party would not be involved in this Government - sealing his political demise for good. Together still on 80 seats, the two Liberal halves would begin the process of healing the national rift soon after thanks to the demise of Asquith, though naturally this would take some time.

Elsewhere there were some surprising victors. The Nationals in their limited numbers managed to maintain five of their seven seats prior to the poll, demonstrating surprising staying power. Christabel Pankhurst, daughter of women's suffrage movement leader Emmeline Pankhurst, won the election in Smethwick and became Britain’s first ever woman MP - joined by Constance Markievicz of Sinn Fein, who never took her seat and is thus discounted. The NFDDSS too would snag seats, winning in Ashton-under-Lyne, Clapham and Liverpool Everton.

Meanwhile in Ireland, Sinn Fein would win overall with 63 of Ireland’s 102 seats. This would have two main effects; it would greatly enlarge the Government’s de facto Parliamentary majority, and pivot Irish politics towards eventual independence. The Irish Parliamentary Party meanwhile would take 15 seats, down from 74 prior to the election. Still alive, but barely clinging on, albeit without their leader John Dillon who would be defeated in his East Mayo seat.

In all, the results would greatly re-shape British politics and return some normality to the country after the war. While the country faced many challenges, particularly financial, the Government’s large majority would provide the country with stability and give Bonar Law a solid opportunity to re-establish Britain’s place at home and abroad.

It's confusing why the IPP got more seats than OTL, the party was a spent force at this point and I don't see any reason for it to change in this TL.

Labour could take a few seats from Sinn Féin (OTL the Democratic Programme of 1919 was drafted as a sop to the Irish Labour Party in exchange for them not standing, though Republican leaders like Collins and Brugha made clear their contempt for it in private) but socialism and the idea of class conflict had little influence in the very conservative Ireland of this era, the likes of James Connolly and the ICA were always a small minority and the Labour Party had to majorly downplay how left-wing they were to not be wiped out in elections.

 

[TheReformer]

It doesn't make much sense Sinn Féin to do worse than OTL, the defeat of Britain in the war would absolutely encourage Irish nationalism, and it's confusing why the IPP is still alive and kicking, the party was a spent force at this point OTL and I don't see any reason for it to change in this TL.

Defeat in the war does not automatically mean that all political views in the country become "screw Britain". Unfortunately people have a perception that defeat of any single major power in the Great War would mean that all OTL seperatist movements and radical movements (socialists in France for example) would be greatly inflated, whereas in actual fact the effects would of course inflate some - but not all. This I suspect is a consequence of Germany's loss of lands to the Poles, which was more a consequence of the German army being dismantled by force, and Austria's total collapse, which was a consequence of Austria Hungary's unique circumstances. Not to mention - Britain was not defeated, France was. There was Russia too - but again, different circumstances.

Ireland was something of a unique case in the modern era. The Easter rising was initially a rather unpopular move, and the vast majority of the Irish population did not seek such a radical outcome. Of course the fact the rising was so heavily crushed, notably by primarily Irish troops, did not play well on the conscience of many Irishmen - understandably giving credence to the vuiews of the radicals. However, it's worth noting that hundreds of thousands of irishmen volunteered for the war, and most frontline troops opposed the rising, according to Pandora's Box - Jorn Leonhard, Patrick Camiller. It was conscription that really gave Sinn Fein it's strength, and ittl the effects of conscription are heavily dampened due to the collapse of the western front months before OTL.

As for the IPP, it is no more alive ittl than it was irl. The key difference is that ittl, Labour competes in Ireland whereas irl they did not, splitting the vote in specific seats and delivering a 15 seat result for the IPP rather than their 7 seats as per OTL. They do this entirely because of the war, which inflates the party's chances of taking power of the opposition - thus meaning they run in Ireland and even if they win just 5% in some seats will naturally stop Sinn Fein winning them.

Labour could take a few seats from Sinn Féin (OTL the Democratic Programme of 1919 was drafted as a sop to Labour in exchange for them not standing, though Republican leaders like Collins and Brugha make clear their contempt for it and Labour in private) but socialism and the idea of class conflict had little influence in the very conservative Ireland of this era, the likes of James Connolly and the ICA were always a small minority and Labour had to majorly downplay how left-wing they were to not be wiped out in elections.

I'm fully aware of this fact, however it seems contradictory to me that you are on the one hand saying Sinn Fein voluntarily adopted a Democratic Programme to placate would-be Labour voters they needed, while also claiming that there were very few socialist Irish voters.

Regardless, I'm not intentionally downplaying the success of Sinn Fein, the party does better here vote wise than it does IOTL - before you subtract the would be Labour voters. My Irish friend @Gonzo assisted with the seat calculations though, so he probably could probably break the numbers down a little better.

 

[Von Tyrconnell]

Defeat in the war does not automatically mean that all political views in the country become "screw Britain". Unfortunately people have a perception that defeat of any single major power in the Great War would mean that all OTL seperatist movements and radical movements (socialists in France for example) would be greatly inflated, whereas in actual fact the effects would of course inflate some - but not all. This I suspect is a consequence of Germany's loss of lands to the Poles, which was more a consequence of the German army being dismantled by force, and Austria's total collapse, which was a consequence of Austria Hungary's unique circumstances. Not to mention - Britain was not defeated, France was. There was Russia too - but again, different circumstances.

Ireland was something of a unique case in the modern era. The Easter rising was initially a rather unpopular move, and the vast majority of the Irish population did not seek such a radical outcome. Of course the fact the rising was so heavily crushed, notably by primarily Irish troops, did not play well on the conscience of many Irishmen - understandably giving credence to the vuiews of the radicals. However, it's worth noting that hundreds of thousands of irishmen volunteered for the war, and most frontline troops opposed the rising, according to Pandora's Box - Jorn Leonhard, Patrick Camiller. It was conscription that really gave Sinn Fein it's strength, and ittl the effects of conscription are heavily dampened due to the collapse of the western front months before OTL.

I later edited that comment but regarding a British defeat encouraging nationalism it's less viewpoints changing to "screw Britain" and more that Britain's defeat would encourage people who have underlying nationalist sympathies but felt that the chance of successfully getting independence from Britain normally was impossible or unlikely.

I'm aware of the history, though I've seen it debated more recently whether sentiment for Home Rule was genuinely all the Irish people wanted or rather the most that they thought was feasible at the time (which ties into my point above a bit). The thing about Irish troops volunteering is true (John Redmond encouraged Irishmen to fight in the war to secure Home Rule) although it should be noted that recruitment in Ireland slowed down after the first year, though the Easter Rising and especially the conscription crisis did definitely change things. The British government's proposal during the conscription crisis that Ireland would be granted Home Rule in exchange for accepting conscription was particularly harmful for public perceptions of it and the IPP.

As for the IPP, it is no more alive ittl than it was irl. The key difference is that ittl, Labour competes in Ireland whereas irl they did not, splitting the vote in specific seats and delivering a 15 seat result for the IPP rather than their 7 seats as per OTL. They do this entirely because of the war, which inflates the party's chances of taking power of the opposition - thus meaning they run in Ireland and even if they win just 5% in some seats will naturally stop Sinn Fein winning them.

Ah, that makes more sense.

I'm fully aware of this fact, however it seems contradictory to me that you are on the one hand saying Sinn Fein voluntarily adopted a Democratic Programme to placate would-be Labour voters they needed, while also claiming that there were very few socialist Irish voters.

Regardless, I'm not intentionally downplaying the success of Sinn Fein, the party does better here vote wise than it does IOTL - before you subtract the would be Labour voters. My Irish friend @Gonzo assisted with the seat calculations though, so he probably could probably break the numbers down a little better.

I'm not being contradictory, it was to placate Labour leaders so the party wouldn't run against Sinn Féin and split the vote, not voters. The Democratic Programme was released in 1919 after the 1918 general election after all.

 

[TheReformer]

I'm not being contradictory, it was to placate Labour leaders so the party wouldn't run against Sinn Féin, not voters. The Democratic Programme was released in 1919 after the 1918 general election after all.

Ah yes you're quite right there, got my dates confused between the OTL 1918 election and ITTL's 1919 election lol

Anyway, main thing really is that ittl Sinn Fein getting fewer seats would not really have any dissimilar impact to OTL. Sure, ittl Sinn Fein does slightly worse seat wise. But the sentiments still exist, the issue still remains and, as you say, the war did not go Britain's way - even if they didn't really 'lose' either. As such, Sinn Fein's shockingly good result would likely be met very similarly ITTL to OTL, as the people of this timeline don't consider the fact they could have done better without Labour etc.

Thus in Ireland the political situation is very similar, if not more or less identical to OTL atm.

 

[Athelstane]

Not to mention - Britain was not defeated, France was.

But you did say otherwise in your Georgette post.

Britain, even if it didn’t know it yet, was defeated.

But I think I know what you meant: Michael and Georgette were serious tactical reverses for the British Army, but it doesn't mean they could be said to have lost the war, at least not in the way the French did. (Certainly not when you look at the treaty outcome!)