To the Victor, Go the Spoils (Redux): A Plausible Central Powers Victory

[boredviewer1234]

Interesting, in a way while obviously the AH empire suffered a tremendous loss this might have been the best thing to occur.

Mainly because by the end everyone lost faith in them in Galicia, the Austrian army massacred over thirty thousand civilians during their awful retreat from Russia, The Ruthenians for being seen as Russian spies and then subsequently feeling starved and forgotten besides the purges, the Polish lost faith for becoming a joint partner of the empire and saw the German empire gain their own puppet Poland then get a chance to expand the empire, the Jews increasingly felt the brunt of war anti Semitism ect I very much doubted it could continue to be apart of the empire without a lot of bloodshed so it being lost now while the empire is still adjusting is not the worst case.

Though the question of what next will be a big thing as with losing this much of Galicia the question of being able to feed itself without being hopelessly dependent on Germany for their vassal states will be challenge.

 

[ReconGuy02]

As a Ukrainian it a bit saddens me to see that Poles will likely get all of Galicia in the end. Eastern and Southern Galicia had Ukrainian majority in rural areas and outside of a big cities
I'd still prefer to have Ukraine without Galicia 80 years earlier, than no Ukraine whatsoever until 1991, but I am from Donbas, so I might be biased there.
Great story anyway, keep going.

 

[Athelstane]

Also for the record, that update (and part two) took maybe 50 to 100 hours of research and writing to complete. Let nobody say I don't research my stuff 😂

No, you really did your homework here, and it shows. I think your timeline here is not implausible, given the outcome of the war and its circumstances.

In the end, the endgame is bound to follow Argo logic, and you can only hope they actually choose "the best bad option."

Curious if you'll get around to sorting how things play out in the Baltics and Finland. These won't be nearly as messy as Austria-Hungary, but obviously, not friction-free, either. Carlton Bach did some research for his own alt-Great War timeline which may be helpful here.

 

[Rion_marcus]

Good chapter, good chapter, but as a Hungarian, who read a lot about the political history of the country during the dualist period (for a timeline I will never have the will to write) I have to point out some things that I found at least unlikely or in a few cases even outright wrong. These aren't by any margin so big to derail your amazing plans (great fan of your timeline by the way), as your research was methodological enough, but more or less nitpicks by someone, who read to much about this period and is too set in ideas about it.

First the clearest and most obvious mistake, Wekerle wasn't an aristocrat. Sándor Wekerle was famously the first commoner (more precisely he was from a family of burghers) to be elected as Prime Minister of Hungary. This still means largely nothing to your timeline, as as he became a career politician, he acclimated to the class which dominated it, aka the magnates. This meant he became a large scale landowner and generally behaved as an aristocrat, but crucially he wasn't one. He tried to become one at least in behavior as he became successful.

On Károlyi you are correct his break from the mainstream of the nationalists was inevitable, he became to much wedded to socialist sounding policies, to remain with them. Although his lack of organisational talent should harm him hard enough, but there isn't a political force in the country which has an organisation and a political platform similar-ish to Károlyi's to help him out to a degree. Wait there is one, but about them later.

On Tisza I am a little bit conflicted, Wekerle throughout his last tenure as Prime Minister complained about Tisza's undue influence over the diet and at certain point he felt that in reality Tisza commands the majority in the assembly. Tisza was a canny political operator and simply sitting behind Wekerle without making a challenge to regain the highest office of the realm sounds unlike him. He had the connection and the political capital to try something and he was power hungry enough to do so. This doesn't mean that there was no chance that Wekerle wouldn't outplay him (you don't become 3 term prime minister without being good at politics), but him sitting in silently behind Wekerle sounds like another person and not István Tisza.

It should also be noted that he wasn't as a big reactionary as you depict him. Sure he wanted to prolong the rule of the hungarian aristocracy eternally, but he unlike many of his fellow party members realised that the current system is untenable even in the short run. In fact, although almost all narrative surrounding the late dualistic hungary omits this, but under Tisza's premiership the electoral law of 1913 was accepted. This was a minor change to the electorate, raising it to ~13% of the total population and wasn't much more than a bone throne to the people arguing for electoral reform, but he was surprisingly willing to go through with that. So him going openly against the "universal" suffrage being introduced, is to me somewhat unlikely, although undeniably possible. In Fact I found it more surprising, that the same diet which did not fail in patting itself on its imaginary shoulders, for their enlightened reform, would actually vote for something as radical as happens here.

And atlast returning top the question to an organised force for reform: What happened to the social democrats? The Social Democratic Party of Hungary was the only true mass party of the country in 1918 and were one of the main pillars of Karolyi's OTL rise to power and were the reason behind his abrupt fall. The only party with a national (if city focussed) organisation and the only one which managed to organise mass strikes and a protests in the last 20 or so years (and also the nationalist parties of the minorities, before I forget them) their lack of gaining seats is highly surprising to me. The social democrats should thrive in this reorganisation of national politics, but now they are outcompeted, by a practically random intellectual from inner city Budapest and his 10 friends who decided to found a party dedicated to a fringe ideology. Alright that's a little bit harsh, as Ervin Szabó was one of the main ideological and intellectual force behind the soon to be (OTL) Communist Party, but so easily sidestepping one of the most organised political force of the country sounds still deeply unrealistic. The MSZDP should be in the national assembly by any metric, and be at least a bit higher then the Labourers which would be a party drawn in a 1000 direction by it's competing ideas about how to make a revolution.

On a similar level I found it unlikely that a small landowners party wasn't founded, as these pro-landreform, but socially conservative parties were very popular in OTL after the war.

Sorry if I'm complaining, but this is one of the few fields in history in which I feel some level of competence and I had to get this out of myself. Once again, a great story and I am very glad that you did not employ the common, but at least false tropes one could have about this period, as you had undoubtedly amazingly well researched the period, just I have my nitpicks.

 

[Rattenfänger von Memphis]

An excellent, minutely detailed chapter in “The Hapsburg Reckoning I”. There were two interesting facts that jumped out at me that I especially enjoyed learning :

“While this was all under way, within a matter of days an unexpected issue would leave Austrian commanders unsure exactly how to redirect troops to the east. It would ultimately be decided that troops from Ukraine, who were occupying the region, would be moved westwards, while troops from Italy would be deployed through Austria proper and into northern Galicia thanks to Austria’s disjointed rail network which featured different gauges in each half of the Empire.”

I knew, as most here probably knew, that the railway gauges between Germany and Russia, for example, were different, for military and security reasons but not that there were different gauges between the two halves of the Dual Monarchy. Since this is new to me, I was wondering if this situation also had any OTL effect on the otherwise rapid Central Powers’s conquest of Romania in 1916 ?

“Inspired by the heroic fighting of the students of Lemberg and the quick takeover by Śmigły’s forces - living up to his nickname’s meaning.”

This statement went over my head; I did not see any reference to the meaning of Śmigły’s nickname in the chapter. I could have overlooked it; there was a lot to absorb in this informative chapter. I checked Edward-Rydz-Śmigły out at Wikipedia and the article there listed his nom de guerre as : “Śmigły, Tarłowski, Adam Zawisza”. I was unable to find any of these names’s meanings, if they are the nickname that you referred to, even using a translation service. If it won't be too much trouble, could you elaborate about his nickname ?

 

[Kylia]

Ah, the Hungary of this period. Never change.

I mean, please change, change now, but yeesh, so predictable that they'd be like this.

Not that the Austrogermans are much better. Karl should just pivot and become King of the Slavs and just flip the scripts entirely. Oppress the Germans and Hungarians for a change.

(That is not a serious notion just... christ. Fucking nationalism, man)

 

[Ragedit]

That was an awesome update. I just hope the situation doesn't become another "Austria-Hungary collapse and Germany puppets the splinters" situation.

 

[TheReformer]

Good chapter, good chapter, but as a Hungarian, who read a lot about the political history of the country during the dualist period (for a timeline I will never have the will to write) I have to point out some things that I found at least unlikely or in a few cases even outright wrong

Well volunteered to check my work in the future! Happy to admit my lack of ability to speak Hungarian has somewhat hamstrung me during research into this process, particularly into the Hungarian aspect of it. Sources are rather hard to come by in English-language form, so will gladly take pointers in the future. As some readers may know, I tend to let people familiar with the period per country occasionally look over updates before I post them - so I shall add you to the list for Hungary in the future.

Wekerle wasn't an aristocrat. Sándor Wekerle was famously the first commoner

I'm aware, that is actually something of a poorly communicated sentence I'd say. As you see in the text as it's written;

This was largely because both Wekerle and Apponyi were from the same aristocratic background, despite Wekerle having actually been born poor, that had ruled Hungary for centuries - and both now feared the likes of Count Mihály Károlyi who wished to change that.

The intent was to describe the two as having been from the same aristocratic political persuasion, which they were, though perhaps 'elite' background may have fitted better in this case.

Tisza was a canny political operator and simply sitting behind Wekerle without making a challenge to regain the highest office of the realm sounds unlike him

This is a fair point. From what I had read Tisza had largely fallen out of favour but perhaps in my mind I overestimated the degree to which he had, again due to lack of available sources. Also doesnt help of course that he was assassinated. This sounds like a rather good area to explore for the next update.

It should also be noted that he wasn't as a big reactionary as you depict him. Sure he wanted to prolong the rule of the hungarian aristocracy eternally, but he unlike many of his fellow party members realised that the current system is untenable even in the short run. In fact, although almost all narrative surrounding the late dualistic hungary omits this, but under Tisza's premiership the electoral law of 1913 was accepted.

Helpful to know, though in practice I dont particularly see any meaningful difference in terms of the vast majority of Hungarian voters between 8% and 13%. A five percent increase is easily going to be overlooked by the other 35% or so of the populace who would, ya know, like to vote. Also, I suspect a key aspect in missing this was the bolded area... again; lack of sources.

So him going openly against the "universal" suffrage being introduced, is to me somewhat unlikely, although undeniably possible. In Fact I found it more surprising, that the same diet which did not fail in patting itself on its imaginary shoulders, for their enlightened reform, would actually vote for something as radical as happens here

Again, over-estimation of Tisza's downfall I would say.

What happened to the social democrats?

From Wiki:
The chaos which followed the war resulted in the collapse of the Dual Monarchy. The MSZDP leadership entered into government as part of an unsuccessful post-war socialist administration and subsequently Béla Kun's Communist dictatorship, which carried out a Red Terror against those deemed to be enemies of the revolution and the working class.[4] When the Communist regime collapsed MSZDP supporters were killed in the subsequent anti-Communist backlash. The entire left-wing boycotted the elections of 1920, which resulted in a right-wing victory and continued right-wing government for the inter-war period.

Them not being present throughout the period and not having been elected in 1911, or referenced in any of my research (I primarily focus on pre and during the war information as, particularly with Hungary, the entire country was re-set politically after the war) is why I'll have missed em. The fact they also appeared to split into factions during the war was also unhelpful. Perhaps you can drop me a DM with what you'd vaguely expect them to do in this circumstance and I can either re-work it into this past update, or add it to the next one etc.

Sorry if I'm complaining, but this is one of the few fields in history in which I feel some level of competence and I had to get this out of myself. Once again, a great story and I am very glad that you did not employ the common, but at least false tropes one could have about this period, as you had undoubtedly amazingly well researched the period, just I have my nitpicks.

Tis alright, I don't mind people pointing out areas where I literally dont know what they are referring to due to a lack of information on my end. As you say, the lack of Socialists for example was actually something I found very weird - thus why I added the party under Ervin Szabó. What I don't like is when people come here and go "I don't think this is realistic/plausible" over what essentially amounts to a gut feeling, or simply incorrect information - but that isn't what you've done.

So, as mentioned before, drop me a DM about where the Socialists may have fitted in all this. I honestly dont actually expect they'll have changes stuff that much, so happy to add a para or two and put them in the National Assembly etc - makes my life easier.

 

[TheReformer]

I knew, as most here probably knew, that the railway gauges between Germany and Russia, for example, were different, for military and security reasons but not that there were different gauges between the two halves of the Dual Monarchy. Since this is new to me, I was wondering if this situation also had any OTL effect on the otherwise rapid Central Powers’s conquest of Romania in 1916 ?

There were not just different gauges, but sometimes entirely new tracks. Ie, a rail line would just abruptly stop at the border, passengers would have to get off, cross the platform/border, and get on a new rail line entirely. I'm not aware of any major impact on the conquest of Romania, that said; if Romania did have the same gauges - that would naturally make it far easier for a German/Austrian force to cross rapidly into the country.

This statement went over my head; I did not see any reference to the meaning of Śmigły’s nickname in the chapter. I could have overlooked it; there was a lot to absorb in this informative chapter. I checked Edward-Rydz-Śmigły out at Wikipedia and the article there listed his nom de guerre as : “Śmigły, Tarłowski, Adam Zawisza”. I was unable to find any of these names’s meanings, if they are the nickname that you referred to, even using a translation service. If it won't be too much trouble, could you elaborate about his nickname ?

Śmigły is a pseudonym, basically meaning Fast or Agile.

 

[Othala]

There were not just different gauges, but sometimes entirely new tracks. Ie, a rail line would just abruptly stop at the border, passengers would have to get off, cross the platform/border, and get on a new rail line entirely. I'm not aware of any major impact on the conquest of Romania, that said; if Romania did have the same gauges - that would naturally make it far easier for a German/Austrian force to cross rapidly into the country.

Over the (international) border, yes. But your own text implies that the Cisleithanian and Hungarian parts of the Empire had different track gauge - when as far as I'm aware most important routes either were built to standard gauge in both parts of the monarchy.

The exception were the "Bosnian Gauge", but those were mostly used for (mountainous) side tracks outside of Bosnia itself. And that narrow gauge was actually standardised by law for new builds, because of the military implications, soon after the Occupation of Bosnia - though various lines with other narrow gauges remained in service.

(Electrification, of course, was stopped when the war started, so differing standards there aren't a problem.)

 

[TheReformer]

Over the (international) border, yes. But your own text implies that the Cisleithanian and Hungarian parts of the Empire had different track gauge - when as far as I'm aware most important routes either were built to standard gauge in both parts of the monarchy.

I'm sure the main routes were likely kept on the same gauge, however I'm merely repeating what I heard in Pandora's Box, by Jorn Leonhard and Patrick Camiller, which implies that both halves in many cases had differing gauges or disconnected tracks.

It is also noted in Fall of the Double Eagle: The Battle for Galicia and the Demise of Austria-Hungary by John R. Schindler, who notes that the AH Rail system was vastly overstretched and not uniform, with Austrian state railways provider owning some 82% of Austrian tracks, while the Hungarians had their own state company with restrictions upon Austrian use. The International Railway History Association also notes that notes that one of Austria's main issues was that there was little to no rail connectivity between Hungary and Galicia in particular, save for three regular single-track lines from Budapest direction.

 

[Othala]

I'm sure the main routes were likely kept on the same gauge, however I'm merely repeating what I heard in Pandora's Box, by Jorn Leonhard and Patrick Camiller, which implies that both halves in many cases had differing gauges or disconnected tracks.

It is also noted in Fall of the Double Eagle: The Battle for Galicia and the Demise of Austria-Hungary by John R. Schindler, who notes that the AH Rail system was vastly overstretched and not uniform, with Austrian state railways provider owning some 82% of Austrian tracks, while the Hungarians had their own state company with restrictions upon Austrian use. The International Railway History Association also notes that notes that one of Austria's main issues was that there was little to no rail connectivity between Hungary and Galicia in particular, save for three regular single-track lines from Budapest direction.

Going from memory here...

Disconnected in the sense that there were a couple dozen competing companies - who as in the example of Vienna, built at least 6 terminal stations that weren't connected - though most of them had been consolidated down to the two state railway companies by the war. And with that most of those infrastructure gaps around cities had been filled in too.

Track gauge was near universally standard gauge (1,435 mm).
Hungary used it from the start.

In Hungary, too, the first railway line between Pest and Vác was built with a standard gauge, and subsequent railway constructions also used this gauge. The tram and metro lines in Hungary, as well as the Budavar cable car, were built with standard gauge. Apart from the 1435 mm gauge, the economic light railways in the country have a narrow gauge, and in the vicinity of Záhony, due to the proximity of Ukraine, railway lines with wide or braided gauge were built.

In Austria the first (horse drawn) railway was built to 1106 mm gauge, but even the first 'proper' railway, the Nordbahn, was already built to standard gauge - and so were as far as I know all 'big' lines that followed. Certainly everything 'main line' built (or upgraded) after 1884 (IIRC) due to international treaties.

As mentioned before: the exception was (partially) Bosnia - where narrow gauge mountain railways were built (and there the internally to be standardised by the late 1870s 760 mm 'half standard' 'Bosnian' gauge) - though at least some of them were built to be easily converted to standard gauge.

Similarly several 'local railways' - for example Zillertalbahn, Mariazellerbahn, Bregenzerwälderbahn. But those are just that - side spurs connecting mostly mountain valleys to the main track. Not significant transport arteries. And those and similar lines make up most of the 18% missing - the rest are mostly what would these days likely be termed 'light rail' - see for example the Badnerbahn - who does in fact use standard gauge.

Going further on the quote.

Overstretched? Yep, that it certainly was. Not uniform - can't really deny that, on an administrative level - but not necessarily on a infrastructure level.

Hungarian state railway restricting a competitor from using their rail infrastructure? Sure, absolutely happened. Two different transport Ministries involved too. Though without looking into things, I'd assume those were soon overrules for 'necessity for the war effort'.

And that also (partially) explains why there were so no high capacity connections from Budapest to Galicia - the Hungarian part of the Empire, their state railway company, and their transport Ministry didn't give those lines to Cisleithania priority. Though IIRC the Első Magyar-Gácsországi Vasút (EMGV) was double tracked. (I hope that was the right one, 2 minutes with Google might have given me the wrong line). (And IIRC correct that one ran through Premysl too, leaving the trans-Carparthian areas further south more than once cut off from that transport route, leaving probably two or three lines running there - explaining what you quoted? I've forgotten to much about the area and the time.)

Prior to the war, the main railway route to Galicia was the one running through Krakow, entirely within Cisleithania, but reality on the ground did mean that several parts of those lines fell under Russian control more than once.

And even aside from political considerations when planing rail lines, there was geography: The Carpathians were (and still are) a formidable obstacle for rail.

 

[TheReformer]

Going from memory here...

Disconnected in the sense that there were a couple dozen competing companies - who as in the example of Vienna, built at least 6 terminal stations that weren't connected - though most of them had been consolidated down to the two state railway companies by the war. And with that most of those infrastructure gaps around cities had been filled in too.

Track gauge was near universally standard gauge (1,435 mm).
Hungary used it from the start.


In Austria the first (horse drawn) railway was built to 1106 mm gauge, but even the first 'proper' railway, the Nordbahn, was already built to standard gauge - and so were as far as I know all 'big' lines that followed. Certainly everything 'main line' built (or upgraded) after 1884 (IIRC) due to international treaties.

As mentioned before: the exception was (partially) Bosnia - where narrow gauge mountain railways were built (and there the internally to be standardised by the late 1870s 760 mm 'half standard' 'Bosnian' gauge) - though at least some of them were built to be easily converted to standard gauge.

Similarly several 'local railways' - for example Zillertalbahn, Mariazellerbahn, Bregenzerwälderbahn. But those are just that - side spurs connecting mostly mountain valleys to the main track. Not significant transport arteries. And those and similar lines make up most of the 18% missing - the rest are mostly what would these days likely be termed 'light rail' - see for example the Badnerbahn - who does in fact use standard gauge.

Going further on the quote.

Overstretched? Yep, that it certainly was. Not uniform - can't really deny that, on an administrative level - but not necessarily on a infrastructure level.

Hungarian state railway restricting a competitor from using their rail infrastructure? Sure, absolutely happened. Two different transport Ministries involved too. Though without looking into things, I'd assume those were soon overrules for 'necessity for the war effort'.

And that also (partially) explains why there were so no high capacity connections from Budapest to Galicia - the Hungarian part of the Empire, their state railway company, and their transport Ministry didn't give those lines to Cisleithania priority. Though IIRC the Első Magyar-Gácsországi Vasút (EMGV) was double tracked. (I hope that was the right one, 2 minutes with Google might have given me the wrong line). (And IIRC correct that one ran through Premysl too, leaving the trans-Carparthian areas further south more than once cut off from that transport route, leaving probably two or three lines running there - explaining what you quoted? I've forgotten to much about the area and the time.)

Prior to the war, the main railway route to Galicia was the one running through Krakow, entirely within Cisleithania, but reality on the ground did mean that several parts of those lines fell under Russian control more than once.

And even aside from political considerations when planing rail lines, there was geography: The Carpathians were (and still are) a formidable obstacle for rail.

Rather interesting subject matter really tbh.

 

[PeytonTucker]

I think it will be interesting to see the future of the eastern puppets. France, after being fucked in the ass by Prussia/Germany twice now, is likely gonna just willingly become a junior partner in the European order, Britain can’t really do much without France as the western landing area, and would be hesitant to promote a socialist takeover of Eastern Europe, especially if the Germans placate the US + UK with investment opportunities in the puppets, but the soviets, while perhaps not entering an official war, will likely promote socialist uprisings in the German puppets, both to defend the national security of the USSR, and to liberate their East Slav cousins from German industrial dominanation, and if the Germans are particularly overbearing (a very real possibility) these revolts could become popular. This could have interesting consequences. Germany would not just sit by and allow swathes of their puppets go to the USSR, but also can’t feasibly puppetize the whole of Russia in response. Admittedly the soviets will take a while, especially without Ukraine, to industrialize and take advantage of unrest in the east, but that may work out better for them, as the East Slavs and maybe even the Baltics could have more time to grow disillusioned with German control. And if the Germans try to rampage through Russia to install a friendly capitalist regime, it will almost certainly fully cement capitalism in the eyes of the Russians as a tool of western imperialism. The situation seems to have the makings of a perpetual conflict that either side is unable to conclusively win, and could have interesting impacts on Eastern Europe long term.

Also. This could be the seed of an eventual western/German reproachment in general. Given the choice between being lesser powers in a German dominated Europe, and having the European order overthrown completely in favor of internationalist socialism, the UK US France combo will almost definitely choose the former.

 

[Athelstane]

Also. This could be the seed of an eventual western/German reproachment in general. Given the choice between being lesser powers in a German dominated Europe, and having the European order overthrown completely in favor of internationalist socialism, the UK US France combo will almost definitely choose the former.

It's a real possibility.

Hard to grok the powerful the fear of communism was in western countries in the immediate postwar years really was: That would be true here, too.

But even before any possible rapprochement, there will be other butterflies: How will the U.S. and the Entente countries negotiate repayment of war debt? (Not easily.) Will there be any kind of Washington Naval Treaty? (Not in anything like the form we got in OTL, given that the Kaiserliche Marine still exists in robust - if modestly diminished - form.) And so on.

Or think about the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. In OTL, it was nuked because the US demanded it as the price of the Washington Naval Treaty, and the British were so keen to get US agreement that they reluctantly acquiesced. But given that any naval arms reduction regime remotely as robust as the WNT simply won't be acceptable in Whitehall (regardless of which party is running it) so long as there is still a potent war fleet sitting on the opposite end of the North Sea, it's also unlikely that Britain will be willing to to kill the treaty with Japan. And now that alliance will have this new justification being piled on: If the Reds gain control of even most of the Tsarist territory that they did in OTL, Japan will be seen as a bastion against communist expansion in East Asia, and I have to think that British leadership will be making that point to their disgruntled cousins across the Pond whenever the opportunity arises.

Mind you, no power is going to be in a position to indulge a hugely expensive naval armament program in this postwar world. The Reformer has already done a fine job of outlining why it will not be possible or desirable for Germany to indulge any Tirpitzian ambitions for the time being; Japan and France certainly won't be able to *pay* for it; Britain will only be able to with considerable pain; meanwhile, the USA can afford it, but won't have the desire; whereas Italy and Austria-Hungary, of course, have bigger problems to sort out. But with Germany now established as continental hegemon (more or less), none of these powers will feel they can disarm in any serious way, either. And after all, even if an SPD dominated regime in Berlin sagged with massive war debt may be in no position shirk off the coming naval treaty, and even if some kind of rapprochement happens in the 1920's, British elites will still appreciate that this might not be the case in ten or twenty years, and the Germans will have an ample first class navy on which to build up something even more dangerous if that moment arises.

I don't know that The Reformer is obliged to go delve into all of this stuff; to my mind, he has already discharged his duty by giving us a (very plausible) playout of the war and its peace treaties! Anything more is simply icing on the cake.

[Apologies for editing this into a much longer comment than I originally posted!]

 

[PeytonTucker]

It's a real possibility.

Hard to grok the powerful the fear of communism was in western countries in the immediate postwar years really was: That would be true here, too.

But even before any possible rapprochement, there will be other butterflies: How will the U.S. and the Entente countries negotiate repayment of war debt? (Not easily.) Will there be any kind of Washington Naval Treaty? (Not in anything like the form we got in OTL, given that the Kaiserliche Marine still exists in robust - if modestly diminished - form.) And so on.

Or think about the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. In OTL, it was nuked because the US demanded it as the price of the Washington Naval Treaty, and the British were so keen to get US agreement that they reluctantly acquiesced. But given that any naval arms reduction regime remotely as robust as the WNT simply won't be acceptable in Whitehall (regardless of which party is running it) so long as there is still a potent war fleet sitting on the opposite end of the North Sea, it's also unlikely that Britain will be willing to to kill the treaty with Japan. And now that alliance will have this new justification being piled on: If the Reds gain control of even most of the Tsarist territory that they did in OTL, Japan will be seen as a bastion against communist expansion in East Asia, and I have to think that British leadership will be making that point to their disgruntled cousins across the Pond whenever the opportunity arises.

Mind you, no power is going to be in a position to indulge a hugely expensive naval armament program in this postwar world. The Reformer has already done a fine job of outlining why it will not be possible or desirable for Germany to indulge any Tirpitzian ambitions for the time being; Japan and France certainly won't be able to *pay* for it; Britain will only be able to with considerable pain; meanwhile, the USA can afford it, but won't have the desire; whereas Italy and Austria-Hungary, of course, have bigger problems to sort out. But with Germany now established as continental hegemon (more or less), none of these powers will feel they can disarm in any serious way, either. And after all, even if an SPD dominated regime in Berlin sagged with massive war debt may be in no position shirk off the coming naval treaty, and even if some kind of rapprochement happens in the 1920's, British elites will still appreciate that this might not be the case in ten or twenty years, and the Germans will have an ample first class navy on which to build up something even more dangerous if that moment arises.

I don't know that The Reformer is obliged to go delve into all of this stuff; to my mind, he has already discharged his duty by giving us a (very plausible) playout of the war and its peace treaties! Anything more is simply icing on the cake.

[Apologies for editing this into a much longer comment than I originally posted!]

I agree. I imagine the USSR’s early struggle to industrialize will take long enough for a period of tension to remain between Germany and the west. If that tension boils over at any point it may be enough for the west to make a temporary alliance of convenience with the soviets ala OTL, if it remains just tension, which I see as more likely, personally, a rejuvenated USSR that begins to poke around in Eastern Europe could be enough for a compromise to be reached in order to contain the soviets. Almost an inverse of the OTL Cold War. In OTL the victors of WWII obliterated the losing party, and promptly split into opposing camps, here the losers of WWI seem likely to split into opposing camps with the victors picking the ideologically aligned side. In OTL Germany was nuetered and remade into a western aligned state to combat the soviets, here the west has not been nuetered, but humbled, and can be coaxed into an understanding with the Germans to combat the soviets. But you are absolutely correct that the years, and possibly decades immediately after the war will be the defining moments in the construction of the “modern”global order. A western/German detente will require both sides to consent to each other’s respective hegemonic spheres, and Japan particularly seems to be the primary sticking point, especially with regards to the Anglo-American relationship and its bearing on the larger western-German relationship.

Also, I’d being up that India may involve itself in Britain’s strategic calculus. India has always been unruly and that will only get worse over time, without the necessity of Soviet alliance against Nazis, the USSR will begin to look like an existential threat against India, and likely will be one in reality. The Germans will have a similar outlook on their eastern puppets. Any Anglo-German detente will likely involve them each relenting to the other’s position in light of the mutual need to preserve their economic satellites against the USSR. America is tricky because they are not nearly as directly threatened by the USSR, but are threatened by Japan’s growing pacific power, though I doubt that would be enough to provoke an alliance with the socialists when Britain and Germany would both be on the other side. Like I said before, economic influence in Eastern Europe and some sort of compromise with regards to Japan will be necessary for the US to buy into any Anglo-German detente.

 

[longtimelurker]

. In OTL Germany was nuetered and remade into a western aligned state to combat the soviets, here the west has not been nuetered, but humbled, and can be coaxed into an understanding with the Germans to combat the soviets.

Hopefully, in ITTL, Germany will be the one holding the shears

A western/German detente will require both sides to consent to each other’s respective hegemonic spheres, and Japan particularly seems to be the primary sticking point

I see neither the Anglos or the French being capable of doing that. Ironically, the Japanese would most likely be the most reasonable ones.

 

[PeytonTucker]

Hopefully, in ITTL, Germany will be the one holding the shears

I see neither the Anglos or the French being capable of doing that. Ironically, the Japanese would most likely be the most reasonable ones.

The French are likely too humbled to ever stand up to Germany again. The brits won’t enjoy a German dominated Europe, and it will always be considered a threat to Britain’s national security, but given limited economic influence in the eastern puppets, and the socialist cloud hanging over India, Africa, and Western Asia, the British could accept it as a necessary fait accompli. The empire is more important to Britain than Europe, and if the soviets are a big enough threat to Eastern Europe and India, Britain and Germany could be somewhat soothed by their mutual interests in those spheres. There will always be reluctance, but there was potentially even more reluctance in the OTL WWII allied powers. Britain’s ideal situation is a divided Europe and British dominance everywhere else. But divided Europe has already fallen through to German hegemony, the British would be better served by maintaining the empire at the cost of Europe, than they would be by giving up the empire while simultaneously squabbling with the Germans. There’s also the fact that Germany’s eastern puppets will chafe, and once the soviets have been locked out of the region, Britain and the US could lead the effort to establish a divided Eastern Europe, leaving Germany as junior partner to the Anglo-American world order. Conversely, once the empire is lost to Britain, it can never be regained, and then Germany, even without the puppets, would outclass Britain by an order of magnitude.

 

[LordCalner]

Impressive! Bravo sir! Terrific update!

 

[Athelstane]

In OTL the victors of WWII obliterated the losing party, and promptly split into opposing camps, here the losers of WWI seem likely to split into opposing camps with the victors picking the ideologically aligned side.

Not a bad way of putting it.

In this timeline, of course, the Soviets will not ... you know, have the ability to march on Warsaw. So the direct conventional threat to the West that they posed in OTL in 1920 won't be here in quite the same way, even if they somehow manage to pry most of Ukraine or any of the Caucusas into their control (which, I think is unlikely). A German-garrisoned Mitteleuropa stands in the way, even if some of its precincts are a little rowdier than Berlin would like.

But, elites in all of these countries will be living in dread fear of a threat from within. And if they can't find ways to make their economies deliver for most of their populaces, they are gonna find all sorts of occasions for seeing substance in those fears...

Also, I’d being up that India may involve itself in Britain’s strategic calculus. India has always been unruly and that will only get worse over time

This is a great point, because there is very good reason to think that India will be even more of a problem for Britain in this postwar, because for the first time since 1783, it has fought a major power war that it didn't win. Yes, they can make an argument that they didn't exactly lose it, either... But it's still a weakening of British moral authority, at least as an empire maintainer, and that will absolutely be felt in India.

Thanks for the kind comment.