...Those Marvelous Tin Fish: The Great Torpedo Scandal Avoided

McPherson

Banned
How so?
The small 75mm turret also held the 105mm howitzer.
The T-34/76 had a more powerful gun than the small turret Sherman, on a smaller 56" diameter ring
The Churchill 75mmNA had the US 75mm on a 54.24" ring

US 75mm M3 893 pounds for tube and breech, 420ft-tons muzzle energy
UK 25pdr MkII 1124 pound, 555 ft-tons ME
US 105mm M4 1140 pounds, 555 ft-tons ME
Sov 76mm F-34 ??? pounds, 605 ft-tons ME

It is not apparent? I think I have better data to refute the claim?


12.8cm PaK44 L/55

Projectile weight: 28.3 kg PzGr.43 APCBC(HE)
Sectional Density: 1.727
Muzzle Velocity: 935 m/s
Total Kinetic Energy: 12370 KJ
Kinetic Energy pr. cm^2: 96.13 KJ

Performance against 90 degree 240 BHN RHA armour:
500m = 253mm
1,000m = 237mm
1,500m = 222mm
2,000m = 208mm
2,500m = 195mm
3,000m = 182mm

_________________________________________________

8.8cm KwK43 L/71

Projectile weight: 10.4 kg PzGr.39/43 APCBC(HE)
Sectional Density: 1.342
Muzzle Velocity: 1000 m/s
Total Kinetic Energy: 5200 KJ
Kinetic Energy pr. cm^2: 85.49 KJ

Performance against 90 degree 240 BHN RHA armour:
500m = 219mm
1,000m = 204mm
1,500m = 190mm
2,000m = 176mm
2,500m = 164mm
3,000m = 153mm

_________________________________________________

10cm D-10

Projectile weight: 15.88 kg BR-412D APBC
Sectional Denisty: 1.588
Muzzle velocity: 887 m/s
Total Kinetic Energy: 6246 KJ
Kinetic Energy pr. cm^2: 79.52 KJ

Performance against 90 degree 240 BHN RHA armour:
500m = 211mm
1,000m = 185mm
1,500m = 161mm
2,000m = 141mm
2,500m = 123mm
3,000m = 108mm

_________________________________________________

7.5cm KwK42 L/70

Projectile weight: 7.2 kg PzGr.39/42 APCBC(HE)
Sectional Density: 1.280
Muzzle Velocity: 925 m/s
Total Kinetic Energy: 3080 KJ
Kinetic Energy pr. cm^2: 69.7 KJ

Performance against 90 degree 240 BHN RHA armour:
500m = 168mm
1,000m = 149mm
1,500m = 132mm
2,000m = 116mm
2,500m = 103mm
3,000m = 91mm

_________________________________________________

7.62cm 17pdr

Projectile weight: 7.7 kg Mk.8T APCBC
Sectional Density: 1.326
Muzzle Velocity: 883 m/s
Total Kinetic Energy: 3001 KJ
Kinetic Energy pr. cm^2: 65.8 KJ


Performance against 90 degree 240 BHN RHA armour:
500m = 163mm
1,000m = 150mm
1,500m = 137mm
2,000m = 126mm
2,500m = 116mm
3,000m = 107mm

_________________________________________________

12.2cm D-25T L/43

Projectile weight: 25 kg BR-471B APC
Sectional Density: 1.679
Muzzle Velocity: 780 m/s
Total Kinetic Energy: 7605 KJ
Kinetic Energy pr. cm^2: 65 KJ

Performance against 90 degree 240 BHN RHA armour:
500m = 183mm
1,000m = 162mm
1,500m = 144mm
2,000m = 129mm
2,500m = 118mm
3,000m = 108mm

_________________________________________________

9.0cm M3 L/53

Projectile Weight: 10.94 kg M82 APCBC
Sectional Density: 1.350
Muzzle Velocity: 853 m/s
Total Kinetic Energy: 3980 KJ
Kinetic Energy pr. cm^2: 62.56 KJ

Performance against 90 degree 240 BHN RHA armour:
500m = 164mm
1,000m = 151mm
1,500m = 138mm
2,000m = 127mm
2,500m = 115mm
3,000m = 104mm

_________________________________________________

8.8cm KwK36 L/56

Projectile weight: 10.2 kg PzGr.39-1 APCBC(HE)
Sectional Density: 1.317
Muzzle Velocity: 773 m/s
Total Kinetic Energy: 3107 KJ
Kinetic Energy pr. cm^2: 51.09 KJ

Performance against 90 degree 240 BHN RHA armour:
500m = 151mm
1,000m = 138mm
1,500m = 126mm
2,000m = 116mm
2,500m = 106mm
3,000m = 97mm

_________________________________________________

8.5cm D-5T L/54

Projectile weight: 9.2 kg BR-365 APBC
Sectional Density: 1.273
Muzzle Velocity: 792 m/s
Total Kinetic Energy: 2885 KJ
Kinetic Energy pr. cm^2: 50.84 KJ

Performance against 90 degree 240 BHN RHA armour:
500m = 121mm
1,000m = 102mm
1,500m = 88mm
2,000m = 77mm
2,500m = 69mm
3,000m = 63mm

_________________________________________________

7.6cm M1 L/55

Projectile weight: 7.0 kg M62 APCBC(HE)
Sectional Density: 1.211
Muzzle Velocity: 792 m/s
Total Kinetic Energy: 2195 KJ
Kinetic Energy pr. cm^2: 48.38 KJ

Performance against 90 degree 240 BHN RHA armour:
500m = 116mm
1,000m = 106mm
1,500m = 97mm
2,000m = 89mm
2,500m = 81mm
3,000m = 74mm

_________________________________________________

7.5cm KwK40 L/48

Projectile weight: 6.8 kg PzGr.39 APCBC(HE)
Sectional Density: 1.208
Muzzle Velocity: 790 m/s
Total Kinetic Energy: 2122 KJ
Kinetic Energy pr. cm^2: 48.03 KJ

Performance against 90 degree 240 BHN RHA armour:
500m = 123mm
1,000m = 109mm
1,500m = 97mm
2,000m = 86mm
2,500m = 76mm
3,000m = 68mm

_________________________________________________

5.7cm 6 pdr L/52

Projectile weight: 3.23 kg Mk.9T APCBC
Secional Density: 1.005
Muzzle Velocity: 831 m/s
Total Kinetic Energy: 1115 KJ
Kinetic Energy pr. cm^2: 43.69 KJ

Performance against 90 degree 240 BHN RHA armour:
500m = 103mm
1,000m = 90mm
1,500m = 78mm
2,000m = 68mm
2,500m = 60mm
3,000m = 52mm

_________________________________________________

Penetration data derived from WW2 Armor Gunnery by Robert D. Livingston and Lorrin R. Bird, who's figures are based on US test firings conducted at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds USA.
 

marathag

Banned
Was this a goalpost shift? I've been giving examples of similar power guns, and on what platform they were mounted.

You would agree that in 1940-1941, a 25 pdr in a tank is a far better choice than a 2 pdr for Oz.
Even if they stop at a 25 pdr, that's all they need to fight against Japan, a DP gun that can penetrate any tank that Japan would build in number for the entire War, while still having a very useful HE round

Even in 1944 Europ it would still be useful, given how poorly the the Centaur CS tank turned out
 

McPherson

Banned
Was this a goalpost shift? I've been giving examples of similar power guns, and on what platform they were mounted.

You would agree that in 1940-1941, a 25 pdr in a tank is a far better choice than a 2 pdr for Oz.
Even if they stop at a 25 pdr, that's all they need to fight against Japan, a DP gun that can penetrate any tank that Japan would build in number for the entire War, while still having a very useful HE round

Even in 1944 Europ it would still be useful, given how poorly the the Centaur CS tank turned out

What goalpost shift would you be discussing? The one where someone, not me, brought up gun weights and muzzle energies per ton at the muzzle? I mean the Sherman 76 used a brand new turret on a 69 inch diameter ring for the 7.62 cm/L53 and the Soviet T-34/85 was equipped with a HUGE, new lozenge shaped turret, one almost could say was ridiculously top-heavy for the hull for the sole purpose of housing the 8.5cm D-5T L/54? The data I zeroed in on was the one set supplied by the person who also mentioned that the Sherman A1 had to have its back knocked out to accept the recoil travel of the 17 pounder, while to shoehorn in the French 10.5cm/40 gun, the Israelis had to make mods to the mantlet and countermass the T-28 turret on the Sherman 76. Would those be the goalposts under discussion? That a small tank + too big gun = ergonomic disaster type goal posts?

The data I gave was for the guns in the energy range of the 17 pounder. The bodged up tanks that carried those guns, with their ergonomic troubles engendered, are well known. The Chieftain has made about 80 videos about those horrible bolos.

While we are on the subject of a too small tank and a too big gun: let me give credit where credit is due.

The proposed production 25pdr Sentinel was going to have a 72" turret ring and carry 74 rds

https://tanks-encyclopedia.com/ww2/Australia/AC4_Sentinel.php

@pjmidd also gave good data on what the ACIV would have to become... a much much larger tank.
 
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marathag

Banned
What goalpost shift would you be discussing? The one where someone, not me, brought up gun weights and muzzle energies per ton at the muzzle? I mean the Sherman 76 used a brand new turret on a 69 inch diameter ring for the 7.62 cm/L53 and the Soviet T-34/85 was equipped with a HUGE, new lozenge shaped turret, one almost could say was ridiculously top-heavy for the hull for the sole purpose of housing the 8.5cm D-5T L/54?
Ridiculously top heavy?
upload_2019-12-2_0-48-50.jpeg

Yugo SO-122 M4 Project. Yes, 122mm Gun. Not utilized due to limits of low ammo storage and limits of gun depression, like the IS-3 suffered.

What was done, was the Israeli M50, with the small turret and the more powerful than the 17pd, the CN 75-50
M50-Supersherman-latrun-1.jpg




The data I zeroed in on was the one set supplied by the person who also mentioned that the Sherman A1 had to have its back knocked out to accept the recoil travel of the 17 pounder, while to shoehorn in the French 10.5cm/40 gun, the Israelis had to make mods to the mantlet and countermass the T-28 turret on the Sherman 76. Would those be the goalposts under discussion? That a small tank + too big gun = ergonomic disaster type goal posts?
Thing is you keep ignoring, is that the 25pdr is not too powerful a gun! look at the ME levels I posted, the T-34/76 is smaller in both exterior an interior space than an AC-1, an fitted a 76mm with more ME than either the US 75mm, 105mm, or 25 pdr.

Why do you think the single 25 pdr is too much? ammo stowage for the US M4A3(105) was fine, and would be for 25 pdr class rounds

The AC-3 used twin 25 pdrs, as the photo, to test recoil suitability. I'm not sure on that 74" number either, that's post war MBT ring size, overkill on 17pdr class weapons, 69" was fin for that, with Firefly as example
 

McPherson

Banned
Thing is you keep ignoring, is that the 25pdr is not too powerful a gun! look at the ME levels I posted, the T-34/76 is smaller in both exterior an interior space than an AC-1, an fitted a 76mm with more ME than either the US 75mm, 105mm, or 25 pdr.

It is not the muzzle energy which I never brought up. It is the recoil travel and size intrusion into the fighting compartment. Plus the ammo stowage seems to be a problem someone ignores. It was a headache when the rounds were "fat" and/or in two pieces.

Yugo SO-122 M4 Project. Yes, 122mm Gun. Not utilized due to limits of low ammo storage and limits of gun depression, like the IS-3 suffered.

(^^^)

Now can we get back to the topic at hand which happens to be the SWAPO shakeup and the little project that MacArthur's APES are about to lay on?
 
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McPherson

Banned
Quite right. In Burma in OTL the Chindidts used the CG-4A Waco extensively.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Waco_CG-4

mules_glider.jpg


The CG-4 was a capable glider but with flaws. However I belief the design could have been both simplified and improved. Made cheaper, ie disposable and more effective. This is how I think a 2 ton load capable glider should have been built.

https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/rethinking-the-design-of-the-waco-cg-4a-troop-cargo-glider.424114/


If anybody wishes to comment on my old thread please reply to this post here. So as not to necro.

Try this.


dada29e66f7077813b5894b77f56b0cc--the-army-gliders.jpg

xcg-16-test-20.jpg


"And the stupid shall be punished."

Keep an eye out for this turkey.

McP.
 
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McPherson

Banned
Gen. Douglas MacArthur calls the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands: “one of the saddest and most confusing combats of this war to date.” The three-day battle of 23-26 October 1943, simply stuns the Japanese military and finally changes the course of the Pacific war in the SWAPO area of operations. “Japan’s defeat there was unbelievable,” one of the destroyer skippers, CAPT Misawa, Otorii, said. “Never was there such a missed opportunity.” Thereafter, the war in New Guinea, New Britain, and the Solomon Islands becomes a doomed combat for Japan. VADM Mikawa, Guinichi; the commander of the Japanese Eighth Fleet at Rabaul, laments shortly afterward, “It is certain that the successes obtained by the American air forces in this naval battle deals a fatal blow to us in the South Pacific.”

More than that, the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands will become an enduring millstone (not milestone) in SWAPO history for the Americans and the South Seas (8th and 4th Fleet areas) Commands for the Japanese, as it causes the victors and vanquished to take a good hard look at their leaderships… and finally change that leadership.

The battle immediately convinces the Japanese that they cannot operate convoys into areas within range of land-based Allied airplanes due to Henderson Field as the Tanaka convoy has to turn back because of AirSols RIKKO attacks in spite of the air cover and support from Nagumo’s aircraft carriers. Unless Henderson Field is neutralized, Yamamoto is now convinced, the Japanese can only reinforce their Guadalcanal attackers by barges, small coastal vessels, and submarines to provide a supply line to their troops in the archipelago. It will quickly prove that Allied attacks by PT boats and airplanes continue to exact a dreadful price on the self-same barges, coastal luggers, and small freighters even as they hug the coasts in of Choiseul in desperate attempts to escape detection from above. IJN submarines, misused, meet with more success, of course; but cannot deliver the large quantities of men and materiel the 17th Area Army requires on Guadalcanal.

Without the necessary supplies or reinforcements, the Japanese shift to a defensive strategy and never can regain the initiative for the rest of the war. Admiral Mikawa had planned to “carry out lively air operations at the strategic moment” in mid-December by sending aircraft carrier-based planes to Lae, Rabaul, and the Salamaua. These plans fold up after Santa Cruz because the IJN refuses to risk its pilot cadre reserves as they now recognize the dangers of pilot attrition as a factor in degraded fleet performance. This is part of the lessons learned from the battle. Furthermore, the fuel situation has become more than desperatedesperate as during the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands the M-class submarine, the USS Mola torpedoes the JMV oil tankers, Toho Maru and Toeio Maru and sends them to the place they need to go, burning up 11,000 tonnes of precious heavy fuel oil in the process. The Japanese navy’s ability to conduct offensive operations as a result of this little noticed disaster is far more of a cripple effect than just the loss of the HIJMS Katsuragi and HIJMS Unryu proves to be. As a further consequence the Japanese army never receives the reinforcements, artillery pieces, antiaircraft guns, and ammunition it desperately needs under the cover of this further Nagumo botched refueling operation so rudely Silent Service interrupted as he flees back to Chu'Uk on 28 October 1942. Allied air power from Henderson Field, as mentionmed, turns back Tanaka, Raizio’s convoy effort back by this same date as he retreats back up the Slot, and sends the bulk of the IJA reinforcements embarked ,to strand them at Rabaul, thereby setting the next stage for a far more BRUTAL New Guniea Campaign as these troops must be redirected to conquer Southern New Guinea instead.

The IJA pragmatically now sees Guadalcanal as a complete write-off and IJN "political prestige project", another Yamamoto, Isoruku bête idee’ (stupid idea) instead of a viable and necessary military objective. (Bunch of clueless landlubbers from Hiyakutake, Harukichi downward. Explain a sea line of communication is: or what the IJN has done for the IJA ever since the first days of ADM Yokesuke of the Satsuma Clan and they stare off into space, like cattle. They, the IJA, do not, of course, over Imamura, Hiyoshi’s objections (He can read a map, apparently.) tell ADM Yamamoto that they have written him and his "little delusions" off.. One can lay the blame for this HUGE mistake firmly on the shoulders of Terauchi, Hisaichi, who more of less has a falling out with Yamamoto, Isoruku as a result of the Santa Cruz, “setback” when HE finds out through his IJA backchannels just how the IJN screws it all up… again. Can one really blame FM Terauchi? First Coral Sea, then Midway and now Santa Cruz? Who is this "Frank Jack Fletcher" and why do Japanese admirals fear him anyway? Is not Halsey the American Kaiju?

Yet the Allied victory at the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands is far from inevitable and might not have occurred at all were it not for a humiliating failure Allied air forces in SWAPO suffer just four months earlier during (Operation Ra). From Rabaul a convoy that carries the 144th Infantry Regiment, the 15th Independent Engineer Regiment and the 1st Company, 1st Battalion of the 55th Mountain Artillery Regiment of the IJA makes its landings. The first convoy consists of five transports and five destroyers. The 4,300 men make their landings despite the sinking of the JMV Ayatosan Maru. It sure opens GEN Thomas Blamey’s eyes and causes him to have his first serious row with SWAPO (Actual) about what a shambles the FEAAF under the two losers, GEN Brereton and GEN Brett, have created. They survived that debacle because they squashed the reportage about their joint failures at Lae and Salamauna. But the 912BG(M) has a senator's son flying with it and as the Germans say whenever something "political" gets stirred up in the manure pot;
die Scheiße ist im Begriff, den Lüfter zu treffen.^1

Blamey gets his reforms, he demands, finally as a result of the 912BG(M) political uproar, but too late to change things for the Buna/Gona campaign.

The Chickens have come home to ROOST! Who says naval battles do not affect land campaigns?

^1 Stinking steaming brown goo hits the aerial screw.
 
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Color me lost, but... what is this thread about now at this point? Is the story still updating under a new person and because of that is unlabeled, or is it all just minutiae and arguments on tiny details at this point? Not trying to be a jerk, but I've been lost for around 20 or so pages because of the shift to the picture/text/quote walls.
 

McPherson

Banned
Color me lost, but... what is this thread about now at this point? Is the story still updating under a new person and because of that is unlabeled, or is it all just minutiae and arguments on tiny details at this point? Not trying to be a jerk, but I've been lost for around 20 or so pages because of the shift to the picture/text/quote walls.
We're at the end of THE BATTLE OF THE SANTA CRUZ ISLANDS and are about to recount the DEATH OF THE MUTSU. Reread the career of the USSA Moondragon to this point and be prepared for a slugfest back in the SWAPO that will carry us through November.
 
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We're at the end of THE BATTLE OF THE SANTA CRUZ ISLANDS and are about to recount the DEATH OF THE MUTSU. Reread the career of the USSA Moondragon to this point and be prepared for a slugfest back in the SWAPO that will carry us through November.

Glad to hear it. Hopefully the Mutsu is destroyed by a submarine rather than a random explosion as in OTL.
 
We're at the end of THE BATTLE OF THE SANTA CRUZ ISLANDS and are about to recount the DEATH OF THE MUTSU. Reread the career of the USSA Moondragon to this point and be prepared for a slugfest back in the SWAPO that will carry us through November.
Is there a story only thread or a remake with proper threadmarks then? I legit get lost trying to figure out what isn't just technical details and what is story to be honest, and I've skimmed through about 10 pages worth to try and find it. I honestly thought this thread just became a slugging match between WW2 era weapons systems, ships, tanks, and so on.
 
Is there a story only thread or a remake with proper threadmarks then? I legit get lost trying to figure out what isn't just technical details and what is story to be honest, and I've skimmed through about 10 pages worth to try and find it. I honestly thought this thread just became a slugging match between WW2 era weapons systems, ships, tanks, and so on.

If you want threadmarks, you need to talk to the original poster, DaveJ576. He is the only person who can threadmark this thread. If you want a story only post, do like I did with another thread and talk to the OP and McPherson. If they say it is OK, you can build one.
 

McPherson

Banned
What if King Farouk made the adoption of cats mandatory?

Is there a story only thread or a remake with proper threadmarks then? I legit get lost trying to figure out what isn't just technical details and what is story to be honest, and I've skimmed through about 10 pages worth to try and find it. I honestly thought this thread just became a slugging match between WW2 era weapons systems, ships, tanks, and so on.

Seriously, I think the sections about Japanese cryptology and WHY the US feat cracking it are incredibly remarkable and at the same time so seriously ridiculous (Japanese typewriters) and the section about why Darwin was never going to be developed as a forward base because no-one had built a railroad,or how that happened to be changed , are the most interesting things in this whole thread so far.

As far as subs go, that story, of the American version of the Type VII, the story of the Mark XIV and the Mark 20 torpedoes, meanders through this ATL as the core. Can't understand this ATL without it.

Put it together with thread marks? Maybe, when I finish?
 
Put it together with thread marks? Maybe, when I finish?

I don't think you can. AFIAK, the only person who can threadmark a thread is the OP, so DaveJ576 would have to do it. I found out this the hard way when dealing with a few threads where the OP had been banned, so threadmarking those threads is not possible.
 

McPherson

Banned
I will probably have to check with the mods first, and I have checked with Dave. The only method I have that is feasible is copy paste with a copyright-notice attributing it all to @DaveJ576.
 

McPherson

Banned
USS Moondragon (SS 258C)

When last we left LCDR Oscar E Moosbreger of the USS Moondragon, he has just finished/bungled a torp-ex against the practice target HIJMS Kaga, which he finally sinks at approximately 02°08′S 156°50′E. The events that follow after that little escapade bear a little explanation. First on LCDR Moosbreger’s headache generator list is that ENS Barry “Barnacles” O. Pulliver (signals) reports that the buoy ejector, that is supposed to launch the recorder/message/radio buoy with the joyful recorded message to COMSOPAC and to TF61 Actual that Kaga is now an ornament at the bottom at the southeast end of the East Caroline Basin, cannot be used because when the Hei shelled the USS Moondragon, one of her 15.2 cm shells must have exploded close enough to the signal ejector that the explosion damaged it and jammed the outer door closed. USS Moondragon would have to risk a direct report over the radio to higher headquarters. LCDR Moosbreger could just imagine how RADM Arthur Schuyler Carpender would react to that violation of standing orders.

ENS Pulliver also brings the good news that zebra traffic has come in over the radio asking “Where the h-ll are you, Gunther?” from Tulagi, which just happens to be USS Moondragon’s radio call sign for this Disney operation. It cannot be USS Mooneye to whom the one way query is addressed, because LCDR Azer’s lucky boat is radio-call-signed “Brunehilda”. LT(s.g.) Howard Cushman (weapons officer), follows soon after. He conveys the happy news that the forward torpedo room leaks. The repairs made on the forward tubes at Brisbane, from the sneeze job with which the USS Moondragon damaged herself (ENS Pulliver’s recommendation if the reader remembers, McP.), during the Philippine Islands Spyron debacle, the incident with the train ferry, Cebu City, when she plowed herself into the silt nose-first off Guimaras Island at the 20 meter line, must not have held up in service. That !7 June 1942 had been a bad day. Here it is 26 August 1942; another Wednesday and the USS Moondragon is in danger of sinking again. That is only 73 days between incidents. For LCDR Moosbreger, that adds up to one thing. If, and that is a big if, they can make it back to Canopus II at Tulagi and patch up the bow tubes and then proceed to a proper sub tender at either Brisbane or Suva, it will mean another Board of Inquiry and possibly a court martial.

A Zebra requires an immediate answer, so LCDR Moosbreger authorizes a coded sit-rep at when they surface at 2030 hours. “No more than 30 seconds." he reminds ENS Pulliver. "The enemy has huff duff and radar. He can find us.”

To LT(s.g.) Howard Cushman, he says; “I’m giving you one hour to patch the leaks on the outer doors with tar and to find out how the inner door gaskets failed. You READ ME, Mister?” Cushman, who thought he was safe after the last two torpedoes kayoed Kaga, is disabused of that notion. If Moondragon Actual is going to Portsmouth on Articles 98, 108 and 110, and of course Article 134-42 - then Cushman will be wearing prison khakis in the cell next to him.

So, under clouds more metaphorical than the real ones which rain on poor USS Moondragon, her crew conducts post-battle repairs on the night of 26-27 August, under the delusion that they are in the doghouse again, fueled by the scuttlebutt that their senior officers are headed for the breakers, and they are a marked “bad luck” boat.

RADM Arthur Schuyler Carpender

The rear-admiral has no idea what is going on in the Eastern Solomons, this day of 26 August. He has been summoned by SWPOA himself, to the AMP building in downtown Brisbane, also known as MacArthur’s Mausoleum, so that is rather bizarre. “His” submarines are in desperate combat in support of TF 61 as the US fleet tries to beat back the latest IJN effort to retake Guadalcanal. The reports when he left, forwarded from MGEN Brett, (That brasshat's USAAF fliers sure love their radios.), had not been too good. SOPac, on the other hand, talks not a jot or Morse dot at all. Silence is all that comes from Noumea and the forward base at Efate. Carpender cools his heels outside MGEN Richard Sutherland’s office for most of the afternoon while the sun travels across a clear cool Brisbane sky. It is WINTER down here, for Murphy’s sake. Of course up there near the equator, everyone still gets the tropical treatment. Carpender still sweats too much in the cool dry building.

Finally out comes MGEN Sutherland. He glad-hands RADM Carpender and ushers him into his office. Being glad-handed by the cold clammy-handed MacArthur “fixer” is never a good sign and Carpender’s hackles rise as he senses some danger afoot.

It comes quickly. “Leary is out.” announces Sutherland. “You take over in two weeks.”

Carpender responds; “That is a Navy decision. MacArthur does not have the…”

Sutherland grins his puffer fish smile, the kind a Maryland politician or used car salesman or mob boss would use when he assures his latest victim that he is that person's best friend and avows to Carpender, “Ever since he ____ __ Coral Sea, we’ve been working with Washington to move that ______ out, and put someone who knows what the chief wants, in. You are that guy. Don’t disappoint us, Carpender, get me?”

RADM Carpender gets him, just fine.

VADM Herbert Fairfax Leary

VADM Leary bogies on Hole 11 at the Saint Lucia golf course. He has a gaggle of staff and aides with him as he is in a “gentleman’s”^1 game with Captain John Collins. An Australian RAN rate drives a jeep onto the green, which is simply not done, not even in wartime. The rate leaves the jeep, runs up to the American admiral and the Australian captain. He salutes them both, looks at the sealed envelope he carries in his hand, then hands it to CAPT Collins with another salute, hurries back to his jeep and takes off at a good clip, retreating the way he came, plowing fresh furrows in the manicured green.

^1 They are gambling, $ 20 USD a hole or £ 4.95 pounds sterling.

CAPT Collins hands it over to Herbert Leary, who is a good friend and tells him; “You can open it, if you like, but they’ve given you the ax, the way they gave it to Crace. And for about the same reason, I’m afraid.”

VADM Leary’s face turns beet red. “You knew?”

Collins shrugs; “I helped them do it, old boy. We have a war to win, and you are losing it. If it helps, ADM Sir Guy Royle should be getting his knife at the NHQ at about this time, too. Got to move Crutchley in his spot, for the good of the war.” What Collins does not tell Leary, is that Crutchley will not be CNS. That is the spot Collins has his eye upon. MacArthur, the final ultimate author of all these little shenanigans, has his eye on the USAAF, too, but that can wait until October. Right now, it is the Navy that he wants to fix his way.

=============================================================

What MacArthur does not know is that FADM King has his own ideas. It will take a couple months to gel, before “the Chief” understands this little monkey wrench; but you know what they say about the Army Navy game and Carpenders who build shabby houses?

EJK-golf.png


As for Admiral Robert L. Ghormley?

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He has seen better days.

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The Bull


Halsey and Ghormley are friends. ADM Nimitz sends VADM Halsey out to SoPAC to investiogate why VADM Ghormley has the trouble he has, after the results of the Battle of the Eastern Solomon Islands percolate in. The medical problems Ghormley suffers with the teeth come out, and so does the command mess that VADM Ghormley makes of things, but Nimitz is not the beast that either MacArthur or King is. He has room for compassion. He is a friend, too. He will find a gentle way to ease Halsey in and send Ghormley home for the health care he needs. "Exhaustion" will be the excuse.

VADM Frank Jack Fletcher

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He's having a better war than he has any right to expect. ADM King thinks he is gutless, but that is alright. Who else can claim five enemy aircraft carriers sunk so far, or three naval battles won? Frank is a terrible golfer. He never learned the game...

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As for the Japanese?

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Chūichi Nagumo (南雲 忠一 Nagumo Chūichi)

VADM Chuichi Nagumo would in the RTL and in this ITTL continue to command the 3rd Fleet long enough for the USN to ding him again. He will wind up where many of the IJN admirals who "do not do as well as hoped" migrate. He will command the Sasebo Naval district for a few months before he is sent to the Kure Naval District to park until IGHQ can find a face saver assignment.

Finally he returns to First Fleet (Now reduced to a shore based training command.). He administers it okay, but he is not outstanding at it. he has no resources and he has no able staff officers like the liar Fuchida or the incomparable Genda, so one can consider his tenure there to be an ultimate mission as he fails to replace pilot cadres the Americans will kill during CAETWHEEL.

As a reputation restorative, Nagumo requests and is given the 14th Air Fleet in the Marianas Island to command. It is there on Saipan that he will die when Spruance comes for him. The Marines will find him in his command cave where he dies honorably by his own hand of a pistol shot to the right temple on 6 July 1944 (RTL). ITTL he putts for par, far sooner.

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Isoroku Yamamoto (山本 五十六 Yamamoto Isoroku)

Isoruku Yamamoto remains a controversial figure. In many respects he is very much the hero to the Japanese in the Pacific War, with his stature cemented by the extraordinary efforts that his American enemies exert to put an end to him. "They fear him." seems to be the coda and the logic for this hero worship. But when one reads what this man does, what he decides and what the results are, one almost comes away with the impression that he is Japan's Robert E. Lee; a gambler who repeatedly and recklessly overestimates his odds and bets it all on a known losing hand and then is astounded when the odds bite him as they must. At least, like Lee At Gettysburg, when he commits his greatest blunder at Midway, he is honest enough to tell his men after the disaster unfolds: "I will apologize to His Majesty." which is quite un-Japanese for admitting; "It is all my fault." Truly it is laudable to take the blame, but would not a bit of pre-battle caution and humility have served his reputation better in the RTL? It is as much his arrogance that rejects the pre-battle wargame results, the tabletop exercises that replicate MI, that predicts the Midway disaster. He is the one who twice rejects VADM Nagumo's well-founded warnings that the plan: as finalized; is too complex, the forces too dispersed and timing envisioned that is flawed. We like to blame Nagumo for losing the First Air Fleet, but it is really whose fault? Isoruku Yamamoto's plan, his orders, his concept of operation, his mistake, it is.

One 1st LT Rex T. Barber in the RTL does Yamamoto a favor, before the later war piles up Yamamoto's mistakes to the mountain range size that they truly are. In this ITTL, we shall see if something else happens?

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This guy...

In about ten days...

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That is Holland Park Military Hospital Brisbane; Australia.


The thing is, he will be there for about six weeks, this ITTL, learning how to stump around on a new tin leg. You can imagine the "love" he will feel for the Japanese.

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

HIJMS Mutsu... T minus 100 days and counting.

USS Moondragon…. T minus 13 days from Brisbane and counting.

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Why exactly are you throwing so many oddballs into the mix anyway? As cool as some of them are, there's also a damned good reason a lot of them didn't enter service. Some had too many teething problems for the time that couldn't be worked out, some may have been better but had higher maintenance and logistics issues, like that large two engined fighter you saddled carriers with instead of wildcats.

Then other stuff wasn't ready in time and just didn't have a need.
 
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