Hopefully just some time away because of a busy schedule?
I assure you I'm still working on it. I know, it's been exactly two months since my last post on this TL, but there's been a lot on my plate lately, so the transition from lots-of-ideas-and-loose-bits-&-pieces to an installment I can actually post has been rough. You all know the feeling, I'm sure.
Over the last week, I've actually edited a lot of the scraps I've had lying around for two months now. The remainder of Part V is actually finished: there are two more installments. I'll post the penultimate one right now, and the final installment in a few days. Part VI is in the works, and will be posted in multiple installments throughout December. We are back on track, it seems.
Anyway: here's the penultimate installment of Part V:
---
Excerpted from A Concise History of our Confederacy by Porfirio Gilchrist (Rockwell Books, Confederacy of Southern America, 1959):
It was soon determined that the most pressing issues—the need for sound money, the rising public debt, and the proper means of paying the veterans’ pensions—would have to be discussed first, before any further debate could or should take place. The delegates knew that the Democratic-Republican and the Federalist viewpoints were completely opposed on these points, but time was pressing. Plymouth had already seen several minor riots by angry veterans when the General Convention first assembled, and there was no doubt that more unrest and violence would soon follow, unless the Confederavy managed to get its finances in order.
Jefferson and Hamilton—elected as delegates for Virginia and New York respectively, combining this task with their respective fuctions as Secretary and Congressman—debated the matters directly, and at times, the mood of the convention was nothing short of warlike. It was apparent that Jefferson had a majority for the general gist of his plans, but certain states had sent moderate Democratic-Republicans to the convention, and others had sent neutral delegates, not aligned to either Jefferson or Hamilton.
There would not be a majority for Hamilton’s proposed National Bank, that was quickly made evident, but Jefferson’s own proposal of tasking the states with issuing money backed by gold also ran into opposition. Many colonies objected to the idea that they would be bound to such a centrally-mandated gold standard. (It remains ironic that the states most vehemently opposed were the northeastern Federalist states, who supported centralism on nearly all other points.) On the other hand, it was similarly clear that a majority of states opposed Hamilton’s perverse notion that the general government adopt all state debts, and supported Jefferson’s proposal barring all forms of public debt throughout the Confederacy. Still, this only solved half the issue. The congressional debt would also have to be payed off, funding for which undertaking could only be found by resolving the issue of the veterans’ pensions. Congress would be able to generate sufficient revenue to pay off the debt, but only if the states were to either pay the wartime stipend of 2% of their revenue to Congress for some extended period… or if they ware assume took full and exclusive responsibility for paying the veterans’ pensions.
The states were divided on which of these options would be preferable, and the New England states were unwilling to accept either choice. While the debate was being held, news reached Philadelphia that an army of veterans had armed themselves, and were intent on deposing the state government. There was no more time—the issue would have to be resolved at once, or not at all. Hamilton at this point proposed assembling an army under general Washington, and crushing the so-called “Veterans’ Rebellion” by force. While Hamilton sought support for this drastic measure, Jefferson assembled his own delegates, and secretly met with the head of the Plymouth Delegation, the moderate Samuel Adams. Like no other, Adams understood the need for a solution. He frankly admitted to Jefferson that he was willing to back Hamilton, if all else failed. Plymouth and New York were simply unable to pay the pensions in full, or to pay an annual 2% of their revenue to Congress. There seemed to be no way out, no way of avoiding Hamilton’s military solution.
Jefferson knew the time had come to make concessions. Consulting with the Democratic-Republican delegations, Jefferson attempted to reach some came to the compromise that carried the day. It took trouble to convince the Democratic-Republican delagates, but faced with the alternative of Hamilton seizing the moment to promote his own agenda, they chose to back Jefferson. He then went back to Adams, and together, they secretly talked to the two members of the three-man New York delegation who were
not named Alexander Hamilton. Both were relatively moderate, and realizing the potential benefits, they were willing to make a deal.
---
Pennsylvania State House, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 29th of April 1784
“—which is why there cannot be any doubt that an unhesitant response is needed this instant, and a response by force if neccesary. I urge the good gentlemen of this convention to consider the peril to our United States…”
Samuel Adams silently made his way into the hall, where Hamilton continued to passionately expound on the need for a military response to the rebellion in Plymouth. He saw the two other delegates from New York make their way to their own seats, and then, just as Hamilton concluded yet another slightly melodramatic appeal for action, Jefferson walked into the room, indicating that he would like to interrupt for a moment. Standing in the middle of the suddenly silent covention hall, Jefferson smiled—a little
too smugly, Samuel felt—and announced that he regretted that Hamilton had so wasted his breath with all those impassioned pleas, since a compromise had been reached.
With some satisfaction of his own, Samuel observed that Hamilton’s face turned a particularly unflattering shade of puce at this statement, and the colonel in fact looked ready to murder Secretary Jefferson on the spot. But then, the doors to the hall swung open once more, and Consul Franklin slowly walked in, leaning heavily on his walking stick. All delegates stood, and Franklin cheerily sat down. “So. I hear that a breakthrough has been made. That is very good news, gentlemen. Let’s hear it.”
Samuel was absolutely certain, in that instant, that Franklin was in on it. That Jefferson had told him all about the deal, and made sure the Consul would arrive just in time to lend extra support—and validity—to the compromise. One glance at Hamilton confirmed that the colonel had realized this, too.
Jefferson began to explain. Congress would agree to take responisbility for half the cost of paying the pensions of all Revolutionary War veterans. To this end, the states would pay the wartime stipend of two percent of their annual revenue for a period of ten years, namely the period of 1785 through 1795. As a special exception to this, both New York and Plymouth, being in such dire straits, financially, would only pay the regular one percent—provided they would use the money thus saved to pay off their war debts. When the other two members of his own delegation joined in the applause that this proposal received, Hamilton stood up without a word, and stalked out of the hall. His fury was palpable, and Samuel had to admit: he enjoyed watching Hamilton’s impotent rage. That man had been long overdue a good come-uppance.
Samuel fully expected Hamilton to be back the next day, pushing his other proposals as well as he could, but Samuel had seen the look on Hamilton’s face when his own delegation abandoned him—the man knew he was defeated, that Jefferson had outplayed him. Hamilton had already lost the great debate about the American future, and in his heart, he clearly knew it. Samuel doubted the colonel would ever forgive Jefferson for this.
---
Excerpted from A Concise History of our Confederacy by Porfirio Gilchrist (Rockwell Books, Confederacy of Southern America, 1959):
When Jefferson walked in and announced a compromise had been reached, he was readily supported by the Plymouth delegation and two third of Hamilton’s
own delegation. It was not openly stated, but it was clear that these delegates from Plymouth and New York had secretly agreed to back Jefferson’s proposals for the debt issue and the monetary issue. These subjects were discussed in conjection with the subject of the pensions. At the end of the day, the convention had found agreement on all three issues.
Concerning public debt, the convention resolved that “
The Continental Congress may under no circumstance borrow Money on the credit of the United States, nor shall it be allowed that the Continental Congress adopts the debt of any State of this Confederacy, in part or in full. Likewise, no State may under any circumstance borrow Money on the credit of the United States, or any of them.” This prohibited both Congress and the states from borrowing any more money.
Concerning the monetary issue, the convention resolved that “
The States of this Confederacy shall have the Right and Power to coin Money and to issue Bills of Credit. All Coin and all Bills of Credit issued by the authority of the States of this Confederacy must be fully backed by Gold. All inhabitants of the United States are free to use, if they will, any Medium of Exchange, including Money and Bills of Credit issued by any foreign Government or any other Party.” It was immediately determined that the matter would be further worked out by an Act of Congress.
Concerning the payment of pensions, the convention resolved that “
The States exclusively shall be tasked with the payment of pensions to veterans of the Continental Army, but specifically regarding the payment of pensions to veterans of the War that led to American Independence, the Continental Congress shall imburse the States with money equivalent to half the expense incurred in payment of such pensions. In return for this, the States shall, during the years 1785 through 1795, anually supply two percent of their total revenue to the Treasury of the United States. This tax will be levied by the authority of the legislatures of the several States, and under the direction of the Finance Secretary of the United States. The States of Plymouth and New York shall be exempt from this, and shall supply the Treasury of the United States, in times of peace, with one percent of their total revenue during the years 1785 through 1795. These two States will in addition expend at least one percent of their total revenue for the purpose of paying off their public debts, until these debts are eliminated in full.”
Riders were immediately sent to Plymouth, so the news could be delivered to the veterans that the payment of their pensions would resume forthwith. This proved to be Jefferson’s great victory, and it was later recognized as the point where Hamilton lost the initiative. Had a compromise not been reached, Hamilton would in all likelyhood have gotten his wish of military action against the rebelling veterans, and his centralist cause would have been galvanized. History would have been vastly different. But as things actually turned out, the general opnion among the delegates was that Jefferson had proved himself to be right. Voluntary co-operation between the states, without the undue use of force, was clearly viable, and Hamilton’s drastic solutions were unneccesary after all.
This is perhaps why Jefferson was able to denounce and defeat Hamilton’s proposals for a far more centralist federal union so easily, when they were debated just a week later, in the early days of May. It must be admitted: colonel Hamilton recuperated admirably from his defeat a week before, and vehemently defended his New England Plan. The central message of his proposals can best be summed up by quoting from his own closing argument:
“
All communities divide themselves into the few and the many. The first are the rich and well born, the other the mass of the people. The voice of the people has been said to be the voice of God; and however generally this maxim has been quoted and believed, it is not true in fact. The people are turbulent and changing; they seldom judge or determine right. Give therefore to the first class a distinct, permanent share in the government. They will check the unsteadiness of the second, and as they cannot receive any advantage by a change, they therefore will ever maintain good government. Can a democratic assembly, who annually revolve in the mass of the people, be supposed steadily to pursue the public good? Nothing but a permanent body can check the imprudence of democracy. Their turbulent and uncontroling disposition requires checks.”
[1]
With such reasoning, Hamilton supported his plans to institute once more a tyrannical aristocracy in America. Jefferson righly attacked these ideas as being monarchial and despotic to the utmost, and many Democratic-Republicans and neutral moderates expressed their disgust at the very idea of such an authoritarian system as Hamilton had in mind. It was James Madison, however, who delived the killing blow to Hamilton’s proposals…
---
Excerpted from James Madison’s speech to the General Convention, in regards to the proposals for political reform introduced by colonel Hamilton:
I frankly admit it: when I first heard him in Congress, I was impressed by the proposals of colonel Hamilton, and not without sympathy towards them. I gave his suggestions all the proper consideration, but I have since abandoned his viewpoints—or rather: the colonel has abandoned
me, for his initial promise was to improve our Union, which I applaud, but his aim now is to destroy it altogether, and reduce America to a unitary state under the wicked despotism of a moneyed elite.
It cannot be denied that open debate on this issue is of the utmost importance, for so is the question itself. We have now heard colonel Hamilton’s sentiments on the subject—these, now, are mine. My opinion is that the general government and the state governments each comprise a vital part of our American Union, which is rightfully a Confederacy. The general government serves to secure the state governments. Colonel Hamilton reverse the matter, and argues that the states exist to serve the general government. But this is certainly not the case, as the states declared their independence separately, and then voluntarily joined into a Union, for their mutual benefit.
The present system, under the Articles of Confederation, is in theory a perfect balance of state and general government—without example and without precedent. In practice, that balance must yet be refined, and that is the purpose of our convening here. Colonel Hamilton, on the other hand, desires to smash that balance utterly, and to impose his own will on this convention. He urges for a union of the states which he terms “purely federal in nature”, but which is in fact a unitary system, wherein the states are reduced to mere provinces, fully subjected to the whims of a central authority. That, my good gentlemen, cannot be allowed. It could not even be allowed if that central government were one of somewhat good character, but it can certainly not be tolerated when that central government is one such as colonel Hamilton desires.
The basis of all ancient and modern confederacies is the freedom and the independency of the states composing it. States may surrender their sovereignty, but if they do, the liberties of their peoples are lost also. Were we to yield to colonel Hamilton and his New England Plan, we would be causing the end of our free and voluntary American union, which we fought so hard to establish. Indeed, I would rather dissolve the union altogether, than submit to the New England Plan. I urge the good gentlemen of this convention to keep foremost in their minds that powers once bestowed upon a government, should they be found ever so dangerous or destructive to freedom, can only rarely be wrested from that government but by another revolution. Therefore, in altering or amending our general government, no greater powers ought to be given, than experience has shown to be necessary. The New England Plan, as such, must be firmly rejected.
---
Excerpted from A Concise History of our Confederacy by Porfirio Gilchrist (Rockwell Books, Confederacy of Southern America, 1959):
Immediately after Madison’s speech, the Democratic-Republicans demanded a vote on Hamilton’s proposals—and they were soundly defeated, with half the Plymouth delegation (namely the person of Samual Adams) and one of New York’s delegates voting against most of Hamilton’s proposed reforms. And those were, generally speaking, solidly Federalist states! Hamilton had presented a too ambitious plan, which too few were willing to support.
With the urgently pressing problems resolved, and the fundamental proposal to replace the confederacy with a centralist federal union rejected by the convention, the major points of debate were out of the way. That is not to say the debate went smoothly from the point on. It is often said that men can agree on 90% of an issue, and then spend months debating the remaining 10%. This was the case, certainly, in 1784. In the end, much more debate was needed, lasting several months. But eventually, the convention saw the Virginia Plan largely adopted, be it with several concessions—some cosmetic, some crucially important. Among the more cosmetic points were the concessions to the moderates, such as the changing of the documents name from “Articles of Confederation” to “Continental Charter”—a name first proposed by Thomas Paine—which in no way altered the contents, but which
sounded more robust. Similarly, an article was added at the very end, confirming that the States all pledged to “inviolably observe” the Charter, while also determining that in the future, Congress would be responsible for proposing alterations to the Charter, which would subsequently need unanimous ratification by
all state legislatures.
More significant concessions by Jefferson included his failure to convince the delegates of his plan to have the Consul directly elected by the people, and the ultimte decision, which he firmly opposed, to establish a permanent Continental Navy. On the other hand, he managed to find support for limiting the navy’s size, and he prevented the establishment of a standing army, so perhaps he suffered no great lossed there. What he considered his greatest defeat during the whole convention was the unwillingness of the majority to support his proposal for nullification. He had to adapt that proposal considerably, which resulted in the now-familiar system of
qualified nullification, where at least one-third of the States must object to a Congressional law, before they may move to nullify it within their own territory.
The last major change to the Virginia Plan was an addition, but both Jefferson and Madison supported this: it was the stipulation that strictly defined the consulate as consisting of the consul, and four Secretaries, namely for Finance, for War, for Foreign affairs, and for Domestic affairs. This last, newly-created position would be required, since the proposal also entailed that the general government, in name of Congress, was to administrate and organize all present and future territories of the United States—rather than just the existing ones—until such time that they might join the Confederacy as states. Jefferson fully supported that plan, and was in fact appointed Domestic Secretary immediately following the convention, with Madison taking over as Foreign Secretary.
---
Excerpted from The Hands That Built America, by Emily Wright (Fontaine Publishing House, Confederacy of Southern America, 1978):
(…) have repeatedly asked how it came to be that the General Convention produced a document so favorable to the Jeffersonians, and so unfavorable to the Hamiltonians. Part of the explanation is surely that Hamilton overreached. But this does not fully explain the way things turned out. Why was so little effort invested in seeking a compromise between the centralist and the decentralist positions? From the perspective of the day, would it not have made more sense to aim for moderation? The issue has stumped researchers time and again.
The true reasons are possibly to be found in the way that the peoples and administrations of the several states viewed the general government: as a generally competent, but not yet perfected model. Had circumstances been different, and had the general government been noticably less equiped to deal with the various challenges it faced, popular opinion might have swung towards a more radical reform.
[2] But as things were, the common view was that reform would only need to be minor, surgical. No major overhaul was needer or desired. One may in fact conclude that so much of the groundwork was already done in 1774 that a decade later, the work became far more manageble.
[3] The British tyranny, so palpable, so very hated, made the American people willing to accept radical plans in 1774. They knew they needed unity, and that they lacked the time and leisure to debate the issue. A general government was established without much fuss. And therein lies the crux: fear of tyranny may have been the motivator to accept general authority in 1774, it made America wary of new oppressors in 1784. With the war over, and the British threat dispelled, state legislatures had no desire to allow further infringements upon their sovereignty.
When the General Convention met, priorities had shifted radically, compared to 1774. A centralist plan for America was simply a desire held by a distinct minority, and a decentralist plan could count on a distinct majority. Certainly, in hindsight, a compromise would have been much the wiser. But to the American people of 1784, a compromise of that kind would have been a betrayal of the principles they held most sacred. Principles that are in many ways, to many citizens of the Confederacy, sacred to this very day.
---
FOOTNOTES
[1] OTL quote; Hamilton said this at the Constitutional Convention IOTL.
[2] Which is exactly what happened IOTL.
[3] Again, ITTL the general government established in 1774 was considerably more bolstered and capable than the OTL system of 1776.
GENERAL NOTES
One installment left to go before Part V is concluded. Before posting that, however, I will post the full text of the Continental Charter. I actually wrote the whole thing down in full, mostly so I can reference it in the future. After all, it wouldn't do to accidentally contradict my own ATL "constitution", now would it?
You can expect the text of the Charter to be posted at some point during the weekend, and the final installment of Part V at the start of next week. Probably monday.