yboxman
Banned
First of all an introduction- this is an unapologetic China Wank. What that means is not that I'm throwing plausibility out of the window but that I am choosing a POD which can plausibly lead to China being spared the century of Opium addiction, civil war, foreign invasion, misrule, and warlordism. I admit however that the 15 years following the POD are tweaked towards that end and while plausible is unlikely to occur exactly as I am positing it.
That does not mean I'm running a "Meiji China" TL. The success of the Japanese to modernize, industrialize and become a colonial power in their own right during the period of high imperialism is due to a wide variety of factors which China could not imitate. These include:
1. Pre existing high literacy and manafucturing.
2. Cultural and ethnic homogeneity.
3. A healthier high protein diet requiring less manpower to harvest (seafood)
4. Greater availability of coal and hydroelectric power per capita.
5. Exceptional forest reserves which were never endangered by population pressure (the 80% of Japan which is uncultivatable is usually thought of as a weakness. Not so. Or at least not for the early stages of industrialization when charcoal and naval stores are of critical importance).
6. Geographic isolation reducing military burden
7. China first drawing the attention of the colonial powers away from Japan, then serving as an abject lesson of the consequences of failure, and finally serving as a captive market and source of tribute for Japan's nascent industries. Japan was able to industrialize as much as it did because China did not. Japan was able to import rice to support a growing population- because China could not.
However, China, does not need to be as successful as Japan was in order to become a wanked up superpower. It just needs to be as successful as Siam/Thailand (just look at OTL). And that 19th century China is capable of doing- if it can avoid three things:
First, Qing rule. There is a mound of research explaining why Prince Gong's self strengthening movement failed. But what it boils down to was that the failure was not a defect of Qing rule- it was a feature.
The ruling elite of Qing China, the Banner people, however Sinified they might appear still viewed themselves and were viewed by their subjects as alien. The Ethnic Manchu and allied ethnicities and Han collaborators in China proper kept themselves separate by dress, name, language, perks available by birth, and were literally FORBIDDEN by the Qing government going into business or integrating into the general Han population.
The Qing could not reform successfully since such reform would empower the masses and lead to the end of Banner people (and Han collaborator) privilege and possibly survival. If they tried the Banner people would somehow find a figurehead to stage a coup- as occurred in 1898. Junkers, nobles and Samuries in Prussia, Russia and Japan were a similar burden to reform- but they were viewed as more legitimate by the commoners and felt sufficiently secure to advance reform to some extent- and if they lost power they could always fade into the general population rather than be massacred (A simplification- but true enough for all that)
Second, and a function of the first is the lack of a pressure valve for the Malthusian horrors which pushed China in the direction of a cycle of famine, revolt and slow recovery from the 1820s onwards. Those cycles swallowed up any surplus capital which might have gone towards industrialization (as occurred in Japan) or external conquest.
Two such pressure valves exist. The first are Manchuria and Mongolia which if opened to Han immigration fully could absorb population growth for nearly a generation before the cycle resumed. But the Qing kept those outlets closed until 1895 and were of two minds about Han immigration until the very end.
The other outlet, immigration overseas, was also kept closed by the Qing until 1860 in theory and until the late 1890s was viewed with great hostility and suffered from official and unofficial restrictions. And at any rate by that time settled white populations, even in the tropics, proved hostile to Asian immigration. What if Chinese immigration starts earlier? Might larger overseas communities backed by a more powerful China gain sufficient influence to keep the door open?
If these pressure valves are opened then Chnia has nearly 50 years before the pressure Valves close again. During that time China might industrialize and prove able to import grain from the new world and the Tropics to feed a growing population. Or it might embrace a population control policy similliar to OTL China. Or it might become strong enough to wage war on it's neighbors and colonize them as Japan did OTL. Or it could develop a proto Green revolution and raise agricultural output.
Third- Qing rule must be removed in a way which does not wreck the country and which replaces it with rulers with broad based support, centralized command structure, a rational (or at least functionally insane) worldview, pro-technology and modernization agenda and open to later reform into some sort of market oriented and semi-representative government.
OTLs Taiping revolution was the worst possible thing which could have happened to China. It held the seeds of it's own defeat at inception and even had it succeeded would have been worse for China than the Qing. Worse, it sucked up all the revolutionary potential of South-Central China for a generation and discredited the concept of anti-Qing revolution amongst the Han Gentry, effectively prolonging Qing rule for a generation.
It did, however, succeed in killing 30-50 million Chinese, plunging the Qing into inescapable debt, destroy much of the infrastructure of central China and lay down the seeds of later Warlordism,
So let's look over both the strengths and Weaknesses of the Taiping:
Strength:
1. An ideology which rationalized the land hunger of the peasants.
2. A religion which provided a rationalization for fighting the Qing and potential common ground with the West.
3. An ethnic core of Hakka which were largely loyal to each other without being viewed as alien by Han outside the Southeast.
4. A clear Anti-Manchu sentiment which potentially translates into appeal to the Han population.
5. An ability to mobilize and organize large numbers of recruits into well motivated armies.
Weaknesses:
1. Decentralized command and constant warfare between the de facto leaders.
2. A figurehead leader who lacked the experience or capabilities to lead and the confidence to delegate- but who could still sabotage any effective leader who might threaten him.
3. An ideology which alienated the Han Gentry whose support had underlain any previously successful dynastic change.
4. A religion which alienated both Chinese and ultimately the Westerners as well.
5. No military or administrative experience among the leadership and few defectors with the relevant skills. It may be politically incorrect but revolutions without upper and middle class leadership generally do not do so well.
6. Although the rebellion started in the provinces most open to Western trade they failed to establish any real contact with Westerners who might have provided training or weapons.
So what POD could possibly change the Taipings inbuilt deficiencies into strengths?
