The Forge of Weyland

Holland wasn't an initial major target - if it was, they'd have assigned more forces.
Holland falling rapidly is a nice bonus, but not vital - its main purpose initially was as a distraction for the Allies. Holland holding doesn't mean a Dutch Army will be heading for Berlin, and they know the basic plan is to retreat behind the fortifications and water barriers, so once that happens Holland can be left for later. After all, if they win in France then Holland is really left with no military options anyway.

This is true but the forces assigned are 7 ID a cavalry div, the SS VT + , 1 Panzer division ( the weakest admittedy) and 7 Fleiger and 22 Luftland so not a trivial force. The critical issue for any long term is the LW losses. Its around 5% of the luftwaffe fighter and bomber strength but around 40% of the transport fleet. At least temporarily. This is worse than it sounds. the LW operational readiness rates are dependent on delivery of spares from the factories - by air. For the next few days, two weeks really this will not matter,

By the time of Dunkirk - 26 May - 4 June aircraft availability is crashing because they cant get the repairs done and there is no material reserve. If the fighting goes on at highish level the LW is in a death spiral. The British alone are outproducing Germany in single engine fighters pretty close to 2 to 1.
 
This is true but the forces assigned are 7 ID a cavalry div, the SS VT + , 1 Panzer division ( the weakest admittedy) and 7 Fleiger and 22 Luftland so not a trivial force. The critical issue for any long term is the LW losses. Its around 5% of the luftwaffe fighter and bomber strength but around 40% of the transport fleet. At least temporarily. This is worse than it sounds. the LW operational readiness rates are dependent on delivery of spares from the factories - by air. For the next few days, two weeks really this will not matter,

By the time of Dunkirk - 26 May - 4 June aircraft availability is crashing because they cant get the repairs done and there is no material reserve. If the fighting goes on at highish level the LW is in a death spiral. The British alone are outproducing Germany in single engine fighters pretty close to 2 to 1.
However they don't realise the aircraft situation they will be in then right now
 
some into reserve storage
Respectfully, I doubt this part. The B Series divisions had notoriously few antitank guns. Even the A Series didn't always have their full complement.

I think every 25mm gun that wasn't given to the British will find its way in frontline formations. It will take months to have enough 47mm guns, or even a couple of years. Who knows, maybe some of these additional guns knock out a couple of panzers in the Meyse crossings.
 
Respectfully, I doubt this part. The B Series divisions had notoriously few antitank guns. Even the A Series didn't always have their full complement.

I think every 25mm gun that wasn't given to the British will find its way in frontline formations. It will take months to have enough 47mm guns, or even a couple of years. Who knows, maybe some of these additional guns knock out a couple of panzers in the Meyse crossings.

Where on the line are the most B Series Divisions, that would have been most likely to receive such guns?
 
Respectfully, I doubt this part. The B Series divisions had notoriously few antitank guns. Even the A Series didn't always have their full complement.

I think every 25mm gun that wasn't given to the British will find its way in frontline formations. It will take months to have enough 47mm guns, or even a couple of years. Who knows, maybe some of these additional guns knock out a couple of panzers in the Meyse crossings.

Maybe not. The French have around 6000 25mm and 1000 47 mm AT guns. on the other hand they also have a Maginot line with AT guns in the fortress. This compares with around 12000 in the German army. The biggest noted problem is shortfall in manpower some of which self inflicted - troops sent on leave, unit cohesion and transport.

As they are in the process of reequipping with the 47mm and motorising, the hippomobile 25mm may be regarded as surplus - and the brits get those which why they mount them as portee.

The real problem OTL is not the weapons. The specific divisions at Sedan have been royally buggered about with poor training and companies, being taken out and replaced with others from other regiments. But unless the guns are in the right place they are useless. The French have identified the problem. Their exercises estimated a motorised attack would be at the Meuse in 60 hours and over in a day - they are three hours out. Huntzinger asks for 4 more divisions for labour work at least and the fortification effort is hampered by bad weather ( concrete don't cure below freezing).

If the French roll 6s then the Germans do run into a better bunker line, with AT mines and those specific points covered by AT weapons, and they will still lose to a Panzer Army with a full Luftflotte in all its pomp.

What matters is what happens next. The French institutionally know the vulnerability if the Meuse is crossed - which is one reason why they panic when they eventually get the word. Assuming Giraud is commanding 7th army he is competent and fond of personal recon so may react quickly and en masse.

Not as good as the Chasseurs Ardennais holding out in Bastogne and Foy but there you go.
 
Quick question from the neophyte in the group.....

Why didn't France have operatives in South Belgium and Luxembourg with radios monitoring all the main roadways? I have to imagine in such mountainous terrain there had to have been many cabins high up on the mountainsides with fantastic views of everything happening down below in the valleys?
 
I still think, even if the British - and French - armour runs riot with the Germans (which frankly isn't likely, they're better than OTL but that's a small compliment), it'll take a miracle to save France.

The Armee de l'Air basically sat out the Battle of France for fear of losing their strength in the fighting... much doublethink. Someone needs to shoot their officer corps.
 
Quick question from the neophyte in the group.....

Why didn't France have operatives in South Belgium and Luxembourg with radios monitoring all the main roadways? I have to imagine in such mountainous terrain there had to have been many cabins high up on the mountainsides with fantastic views of everything happening down below in the valleys?
Because they were neutral countries and 1940 radios weren't exactly small and inconspicuous.
 
Quick question from the neophyte in the group.....

Why didn't France have operatives in South Belgium and Luxembourg with radios monitoring all the main roadways? I have to imagine in such mountainous terrain there had to have been many cabins high up on the mountainsides with fantastic views of everything happening down below in the valleys?
They had capable military intelligence networks in place. The French informants correctly alarmed GHG about the planned German offensive dates. But since the offensives were postponed twice, Gamelin concluded that the military intelligence was unreliable, and ignored their correct third early warning.
 
There were also warnings from the Dutch, from various diplomats and other sources, again all ignored by Gamelin. This seemed to be his normal reaction to any reports - ignore them.
 
I still think, even if the British - and French - armour runs riot with the Germans (which frankly isn't likely, they're better than OTL but that's a small compliment), it'll take a miracle to save France.

The Armee de l'Air basically sat out the Battle of France for fear of losing their strength in the fighting... much doublethink. Someone needs to shoot their officer corps.
Not entirely fair - most of their land based bomber squadrons were moving across to new planes at the same time. This is, of course, criminally incompetent but it's hard to criticise the pilots for not carrying out missions they literally had no planes fit to do so.

Plus even by Abbeville on the 4th June the General commanding 10th Army, Altmayer, refused to delay the dawn (4 am) attack by an hour to permit an air attack to proceed saying "What shall I do with this aviation? I already have such an abundance of artillery that I can hardly deploy it".

And the officer commanding the L'Armee de l'Air in the North, Vigerie, had to phone round the army commanders each evening in May and June pleading for work for his aircraft.

I'm not saying the L'Armee de l'Air was blameless in the Battle for France but the lack of coordination between the services was a huge mitigating factor.

Having said that it is a telling fact that whilst the British were desperately trying to maintain machine gun ammo supplies with an expenditure running to 14 million rounds per week the cannon armed French fighter expended a total of 80,000 rounds in the whole 6 week campaign. This is despite a million rounds a month being supplied.
 
Fall Gelb Holland 1
10th May 1940 - Holland

At 0500 28 Heinkel III bombers took off for an attack on Holland. Turning to port over the Frisian Islands, they followed the Dutch coast in a long arc, ending by turning again and running in to attack the airport of Waalhaven near Rotterdam. This attempt at an evasive course failed to confuse the Dutch defences, and they were attacked by Dutch fighters, in the first air battle over Holland. Despite this, the German squadron bombed with great accuracy, destroying hangers and killing more than 200 troops of the Dutch Queen's regiment who had been billeted inside.

This was just the first attack from the air, as multiple attacks were being launched against the Dutch airfields, designed to neutralise the Dutch Air Force and divert its attention from the vulnerable Ju52's. The first of these followed the attack on Waalhaven, dropping its cargo of airborne troops around the airfield. Despite the earlier attack the Dutch anti-aircraft defences were still responding, but their best efforts couldn't stop the landings and within 30 minutes the airfield was in German hands.

Once the airfield had been secured, the Luftwaffe commenced to land a stream of Ju52 transports to reinforce the paratroop force. It was a similar story at the Valkenburg and Ypenburg airfields. Although in general the Luftwaffe enjoyed air superiority, there were losses to desperate attacks by Dutch fighters, as well as to two raids by RAF Blenheim bombers operating out of England. Flak was also causing losses, and the first wave of Ju52's at Ypenburg had been almost wiped out, 11 of the 13 aircraft destroyed. The Dutch fighters were having success attacking the troops who had landed on the beach north of The Hague. These actions and those of the Dutch troops had, by nightfall, rendered the German invasion force ineffective.

Lieutenant-General Graf Sponeck, the commander of the airborne forces, realized that his main objective — an assault on The Hague, the seat of the Dutch Government and the royal family — was now impossible. At 1900, with no sign of any improvement in the situation, he established radio contact with Field Marshal Kesselring, commanding Luftflotte 2, and requested further instructions. Kesselring ordered him to forget about the assault on The Hague and try to group his men for an attack on Rotterdam. Sponeck promised to do what he could but he was sceptical about his chances of success.

This was not the only obstacle to the speedy occupation of Holland, intended to secure the northern flank of the invasion. The main obstacles in the Germans’ path were the Rivers Maas and Rhine, whose wide estuaries formed a great natural barrier over which there were only four major crossing-points: the bridges in the centre of Rotterdam, Moerdijk and Dordrecht.

The aim had been for these to be captured by airborne forces, then held until the 9th Panzer fougt its way through to relieve them.

Before this could be attempted, however, the bridges at Maastricht had to be secured.

The task of capturing the Maastricht bridges was assigned to a sub-unit known as the Bau and Lehr-Kompanie Brandenburg (Construction and Training Company Brandenburg) a commando unit formed specifically for this task in October 1939 and operating under the direct control of German Military Intelligence. In the early hours of 10 May, a party of Brandenburgers led by a Lieutenant Hocke and dressed in Dutch uniforms, with sub-machine-guns under their greatcoats, marched up to the Maastricht bridge masquerading as a party of Dutch troops who had captured some infiltrating Germans. The Dutch defenders of the bridge, however, were wide awake, and opened up with small arms fire. In the ensuing exchange, several Brandenburgers, including Lieutenant Hocke, were killed; the remainder scattered and were pinned down. A short while later, the Dutch blew up both bridges at Maastricht, with the result that the advance units of the German Sixth Army became hopelessly bogged down on the east bank of the Maas. A similar attempt to capture a bridge at Arnhem also ended in failure, but a third party of Brandenburgers did succeed in capturing a secondary bridge over the Maas at Gennep by means of an armoured train followed by a troop train. As a result the Peel-Ram line was already penetrated..

The capture of this bridge allowed 9th Panzer to push on and move into the gap between the Dutch Army and the reconnaissance forces of the advancing 16 Corps. These had pushed on ahead of the defensive line the Corps was expecting to hold, in an attempt to locate the German advance and give warning. Meanwhile engineers worked hard to repair the damage to the bridges at Maastricht.

The Dutch defence strategy was to fight a delaying action behind a series of defensive lines, eventually retreating into an area west of the New Hollandic Water Line, called Fortress Holland. The eastern flank of this area was covered by Lake Ijssel, and its southern flank by three broad rivers, two sections of the Rhine and one of the Maas (Meuse). The most optimistic predictions were that this could hold for up to three months even without any allied assistance.

Although airborne troops had attained some lodgements, their most important task, the capture of the bridges leading into Holland, failed due to the defenders blowing them up. The bridge at Dordrecht had been captured, although the garrison in the city still held out, but the long Moerdjik bridges over the Hollands Diep had been blown as soon as German forces were seen. Fortunately the original idea of holding them while French reinforcements arrived had been abandoned when the Dutch had been informed that the Allies would not initially advance further than Antwerp.

Even before the armoured train arrived, the Dutch 3rd Army Corps had already been planned to be withdrawn from behind the Peel-Raam Position, taking with it nearly all their artillery. Each of its six regiments was to leave a battalion behind to serve as a covering force, together with fourteen "border battalions". This withdrawal was originally planned for the first night after the invasion, under cover of darkness, but due to the rapid German advance an immediate retreat was ordered at 0645, to avoid the 3rd Army Corps becoming entangled with enemy troops. The corps joined the six battalions already occupying the Waal-Linge line.

The Light Division, was the only manoeuvre force the Dutch Army possessed. Its planned withdrawal had been similarly executed a day early. Its regiments had biked over the Maas and Waal bridges and then turned left through the Alblasserwaald when it was decided in the afternoon to use it to counterattack the German airborne landing on IJsselmonde. It reached the Noord, the river separating the Alblasserwaard from IJsselmonde, in the evening. There they discovered that the sector near the only bridge, built in 1939, was not strongly occupied by the airborne troops, as the Germans simply had not known of its existence because of outdated maps.

The main threat was now seen as the German control of the Dordrecht bridge, which gave the advancing army a route with which to relieve the paratroops and break into Holland. The Dutch Air force had no suitable force available - what planes they had were already fully committed against the airborne troops - so they begged the Allies to attack the bridge. The closest suitable force belonged to the British AASF, tasked with supporting the BEF from its bases in northern France. The BEF and 16 Corps were not yet in contact with the enemy, so a squadron of Battle bombers took off late that afternoon on a hastily-prepared mission. So quickly improvised that they had no proper maps, and were dependent on using Michelin maps of that area of Holland. Fortunately the experienced peacetime-trained crews were able to cope.

At around 1700 the 10 planes reached the bridge, fortunately without encountering any enemy fighters. The bridge was in constant use, and given its importance as the only current crossing point, was already covered by AA. Two of the Battles were hit on the approach, one of them falling in flames, but the other plane carried on. Expecting a level attack on the bridge, the AA crews were caught by surprise as the Battles turned into steep dives, with the clear intention of delivering a dive-bombing attack. The defenders hadn't realised that the Battle force had this capability, and the steep rate of descent meant it was in any case very difficult to get a hit on the planes.

Even so, they managed to kill one of the attackers before they could drop their bombs, the other seven releasing two 500lb bombs each. The attack was accurate. Two bombs hit the bridge itself, and the others caused casualties to the troops busy scattering for cover, before the planes levelled out and headed west a full throttle. Despite this one more plane was hit, but its armour and self-sealing tanks allowed it to continue for long enough to make a crash landing, where the shaken crew were helped by the local Dutch police.

While the bridge was repairable, it would be at least a day before vehicles could cross it. The Airborne attack could not expect any serious relief until that was possible.
 
Well, FJ have really gone a bridge to far, they hold an island in the middle of Holland, but I don't think that 9th Pz division can reach them in time. Most people don't realize that at Moerdijk the river is over 900 to 2.000 meters wide and has tides. It behaves more like an sea inlet than a river. It is not something the german pioneers have a lot of experience with
 
Bet you thought I'd forgotten about those Battles :D
The Airborne attack on Holland rolled a succession of 6's in OTL, it was the only way it was likely to succeed. It made Market Garden look pessimistic. It anything went wrong, they simply dont have the supplies and equipment to hold for long.
It does mean the Dutch can retreat into Fortress Holland much more efficiently.
 
A few maps to help my fellow readers. They are from the excellent book of Amersfoort and Kamphuis, "May 1940: The Battle for the Netherlands"

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As you see without the bridge of Moerdijk, the airlanding parties are totally screwed. Moerdijk was the key.
 
Its in so many respects A Bridge Too Far on steroids. Everything works IF you capture all the bridges you need in time. If you only get some, the timetable starts to fall apart, fail on too many and the paratroops are isolated and cant be relieved in time.
You do have to wonder what the Germans were thinking.
 
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