2. The Gatineau Conference
…The state of Canadian politics in the 1920s and 1930s can best be described as a constant sensation of utter terror. While Canada had always lived in the shadow of its southern neighbor, their relationship had been generally amicable for decades aside from a few war scares and the occasional noises about annexation from American politicians. Now, Canada was faced with the existence of an undeniable hostile regime. Even if the American Socialist Union had no intention of annexing Canada, there was no question that New York would prefer to see a friendly socialist government in Ottawa. The foreign policy of Canada – and much of its domestic policy – would be dominated by the need to avoid giving the ASU an opportunity to invade…
…Of course, an invasion was not the threat Canada faced. The American and Canadian socialist movements were closely connected, with Canada’s IWW branches integrated into the North American Regional Administration based in Chicago[1]. Many Canadians had gone south to fight for socialism, and those who returned hoped to see Canada throw off its shackles. There had been a proposal to ban the IWW, but it had been shot down out of fear that the Red Army might turn its attention north[2]. The IWW could neither be crushed nor ignored…
…There were also economic concerns. Canada’s economy had been dealt a body blow by the massive disruption of trade caused by the Second American Revolution. This had been mitigated by an early agreement with the GDC to allow cross-border traffic to resume, but the impact had been severe. Despite the sentiments of some on the hard right, Canada could not afford to cut itself off from America…
…Theoretically, Canada’s foreign policy remained under control of Great Britain. However, the issue of how to handle the ASU provided a clear example of Ottawa and London not seeing eye to eye. The mood in Westminster was much more inclined towards confrontation, with a significant lobby (backed by American exiles) arguing against any diplomatic engagement with the ASU. If the ASU could be kept isolated, it would surely collapse…
…Fortunately, Prime Minister David Lloyd George recognized the futility of not recognizing the ASU, particularly after Germany, Austria-Hungary, and the Ottomans had done so. He also doubted that the ASU would collapse any time soon. If anything, isolating them would bring out the more radical elements. Most importantly, he recognized that ignoring Canada’s interests was potentially disastrous. If Canada chose to break with Britain entirely, there was virtually nothing Britain could do to stop it…
…Accordingly, Lloyd George informed Arthur Meighen, who had recently succeeded Robert Borden as Prime Minister of Canada[3], that Britain would support the formal recognition of the ASU if issues such as the IWW and British acquisition of former US colonies could be worked out. Borden in turn reached out to New York and was relieved to find Premier Debs open to the possibility. This led to the Gatineau Conference in August 1920. Hoping to reinforce imperial solidarity (and remind the Americans that they were dealing with the most powerful empire in human history), the British invited Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa to attend as well…
…For all the tension, the Gatineau Conference was a fairly calm affair. To ensure that he could get whatever treaty emerged through the Worker’s Congress, Debs attended in person (as, naturally, did Meighen). The Treaty of Gatineau established formal diplomatic relations between the ASU and Britain (as well as the Dominions). The ASU would renounce any claim to East Samoa and the former Danish West Indies as well as writing off all British debt owed to either the United States government or American citizens…
…The IWW issue was resolved with surprising ease. Both Meighen and Lloyd George had overestimated Debs’ influence on the Canadian IWW. While the American IWW was going through something of an identity crisis, their Canadian comrades had made their decision. Even as the conference was ongoing, representatives of every Canadian branch of the IWW met in Winnipeg and announced their withdrawal from the North American Regional Administration, citing the drastically different issues faced by the Canadian and American working class…
…The Treaty of Gatineau was quickly ratified by the Canadian Parliament and the American Congress. Westminster took a bit longer, but even some who had previously opposed recognition of the ASU now argued in favor of ratification (aided by the farcical splintering of the American exiles into two rival governments-in-exile). Those who persisted, however, were not satisfied. Many found themselves attracted to the ideas promoted by organizations like The Britons[4], the British Empire Union[5], and Arnold Leese’s British Anti-Socialist League[6]…
- From Under the Sword of Damocles: Canada in the Interwar Years by Michael Ignatieff
[1] IOTL, this remains true today.
[2] IOTL, the Canadian government did ban the IWW in 1918.
[3] OTL.
[4] An English anti-Semitic and anti-immigrant society founded in 1919.
[5] A patriotic and anti-socialist organization founded in 1915.
[6] IOTL, Arnold Leese was one of the foremost British fascists and anti-Semites.
…Of course, an invasion was not the threat Canada faced. The American and Canadian socialist movements were closely connected, with Canada’s IWW branches integrated into the North American Regional Administration based in Chicago[1]. Many Canadians had gone south to fight for socialism, and those who returned hoped to see Canada throw off its shackles. There had been a proposal to ban the IWW, but it had been shot down out of fear that the Red Army might turn its attention north[2]. The IWW could neither be crushed nor ignored…
…There were also economic concerns. Canada’s economy had been dealt a body blow by the massive disruption of trade caused by the Second American Revolution. This had been mitigated by an early agreement with the GDC to allow cross-border traffic to resume, but the impact had been severe. Despite the sentiments of some on the hard right, Canada could not afford to cut itself off from America…
…Theoretically, Canada’s foreign policy remained under control of Great Britain. However, the issue of how to handle the ASU provided a clear example of Ottawa and London not seeing eye to eye. The mood in Westminster was much more inclined towards confrontation, with a significant lobby (backed by American exiles) arguing against any diplomatic engagement with the ASU. If the ASU could be kept isolated, it would surely collapse…
…Fortunately, Prime Minister David Lloyd George recognized the futility of not recognizing the ASU, particularly after Germany, Austria-Hungary, and the Ottomans had done so. He also doubted that the ASU would collapse any time soon. If anything, isolating them would bring out the more radical elements. Most importantly, he recognized that ignoring Canada’s interests was potentially disastrous. If Canada chose to break with Britain entirely, there was virtually nothing Britain could do to stop it…
…Accordingly, Lloyd George informed Arthur Meighen, who had recently succeeded Robert Borden as Prime Minister of Canada[3], that Britain would support the formal recognition of the ASU if issues such as the IWW and British acquisition of former US colonies could be worked out. Borden in turn reached out to New York and was relieved to find Premier Debs open to the possibility. This led to the Gatineau Conference in August 1920. Hoping to reinforce imperial solidarity (and remind the Americans that they were dealing with the most powerful empire in human history), the British invited Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa to attend as well…
…For all the tension, the Gatineau Conference was a fairly calm affair. To ensure that he could get whatever treaty emerged through the Worker’s Congress, Debs attended in person (as, naturally, did Meighen). The Treaty of Gatineau established formal diplomatic relations between the ASU and Britain (as well as the Dominions). The ASU would renounce any claim to East Samoa and the former Danish West Indies as well as writing off all British debt owed to either the United States government or American citizens…
…The IWW issue was resolved with surprising ease. Both Meighen and Lloyd George had overestimated Debs’ influence on the Canadian IWW. While the American IWW was going through something of an identity crisis, their Canadian comrades had made their decision. Even as the conference was ongoing, representatives of every Canadian branch of the IWW met in Winnipeg and announced their withdrawal from the North American Regional Administration, citing the drastically different issues faced by the Canadian and American working class…
…The Treaty of Gatineau was quickly ratified by the Canadian Parliament and the American Congress. Westminster took a bit longer, but even some who had previously opposed recognition of the ASU now argued in favor of ratification (aided by the farcical splintering of the American exiles into two rival governments-in-exile). Those who persisted, however, were not satisfied. Many found themselves attracted to the ideas promoted by organizations like The Britons[4], the British Empire Union[5], and Arnold Leese’s British Anti-Socialist League[6]…
- From Under the Sword of Damocles: Canada in the Interwar Years by Michael Ignatieff
[1] IOTL, this remains true today.
[2] IOTL, the Canadian government did ban the IWW in 1918.
[3] OTL.
[4] An English anti-Semitic and anti-immigrant society founded in 1919.
[5] A patriotic and anti-socialist organization founded in 1915.
[6] IOTL, Arnold Leese was one of the foremost British fascists and anti-Semites.
I get you, Mr author.