Not sure of the Marks but the torpedoes of the 4 piper destroyers worked, at least part of the time, with the Asiatic Fleet, as well as the torpedoes of the Shoah boats.
The Battle at Dawn: The first battle between the United States and Japan December 7-10, 1941
- Thread starter galveston bay
- Start date
- Status
the submarine version was the Mark X used by the S-boats, and sometimes by fleet boats during periods of torpedo shortages...not sure what the surface version was...
Well if some Submarine fires off its entire warload short a torpedo or Two at Kido Butai and gets a half dozen confirmed hits on separate targets, with no explosions... well I'd like to thing some of the Ordinance boys are getting dragged off to the Gallows for treason if they try to play any games.
Lost Freeway
Banned
They received no comeuppance for their stupidity IOTL-what makes you think they'll be punished ITTL?
First Blood
December 5, 1941
Richardson sends orders to Halsey and Brown to conduct maneuvers in the area south of Midway, with the Enterprise task group as a Red Force, and the Lexington/Yorktown task group as the Blue Force. Halsey is to simulate an attack on Midway from the North, while Brown is to move to simulate an attack on Red Force. As part of the exercise the Marine dive bomber squadron (equipped with 18SBU2 Vindicator dive bombers) will deploy to the island where it joins 12 PBY patrol bombers and 6 float planes that are already present. Heavy seas and rain prevent Halsey from conducting operations that day and the exercise is postponed for 48 hours. Brown orders his air groups to do a maintenance stand down aside from routine submarine patrols, air searches and fighter patrols.
Yamamoto and his fleet are battling these high seas as well but continue to encounter no traffic. Yamamoto is disappointed that a final report he was expecting from the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu is not transmitted. His best information is that two carriers, 8 battleships, 14 cruisers, and over 100 other warships are in Pearl Harbor. American air search aircraft, which are ranging 1,000 miles from Pearl Harbor, fail to spot the Japanese force in the gloom. The Japanese also fail to hear or spot the American B17D as it flies overhead in the late afternoon.
President Roosevelt—convinced on the basis of intelligence reports that the Japanese fleet is headed for Thailand, not the United States—telegrams Emperor Hirohito with the request that “for the sake of humanity,” the emperor intervene “to prevent further death and destruction in the world.”
The Royal Australian Air Force had sighted Japanese escorts, cruisers, and destroyers on patrol near the Malayan coast, south of Cape Cambodia. An Aussie pilot managed to radio that it looked as if the Japanese warships were headed for Thailand—just before he was shot down by the Japanese. Back in England, Prime Minister Churchill called a meeting of his chiefs of staff to discuss the crisis. While reports were coming in describing Thailand as the Japanese destination, they began to question whether it could have been a diversion. British intelligence had intercepted the Japanese code “Raffles,” a warning to the Japanese fleet to be on alert—but for what?
Britain was already preparing Operation Matador, the launching of their 11th Indian Division into Thailand to meet the presumed Japanese invasion force. But at the last minute, Air Marshall Brooke-Popham received word not to cross the Thai border for fear that it would provoke a Japanese attack if, in fact, the warship movement was merely a bluff.
Meanwhile, 600 miles northwest of Hawaii, Admiral Yamamoto, commander of the Japanese fleet, announced to his men: “The rise or fall of the empire depends upon this battle. Everyone will do his duty with utmost efforts.”
“The son of man has just sent his final message to the son of God,” FDR joked to Eleanor after sending off his telegram to Hirohito, who in the Shinto tradition of Japan was deemed a god. As he enjoyed his stamp collection and chatted with Harry Hopkins, his personal adviser, news reached him of Japan’s formal rejection of America’s 10-point proposals for peace and an end to economic sanctions and the oil embargo placed on the Axis power. “This means war,” the president declared. Hopkins recommended an American first strike. “No, we can’t do that,” Roosevelt countered. “We are a democracy and a peaceful people.”
from
http://www.history.com/this-day-in-...emperor-prevent-further-death-and-destruction
Japanese submarines are now in position in their patrol areas, with the special attack submarines moving into position to launch their mini-submarines. There are seven I-boats deployed in a semicircle southwest to southeast of Oahu. Another 3 are deployed in a line to the northeast of the island, one is due north, 3 are deployed in the waters between Oahu and Kaui, with two more deployed south of them and 5 boats are approaching the entrance of Pearl Harbor to launch their attack craft.
First Blood 1538 Hours December 6, 1941
A PBY piloted by Ensign G. Whitman is on its inbound track returning to base 530 miles north northeast of Oahu when the starboard waist gunner spots what he thinks are a fleet of ships 20 miles of to his starboard (right for you non mariner types). The PBY turns toward the sighting and at that moment is jumped by a flight of 3 Zeroes who blast the aircraft out of the sky. The radioman gets a partial distress call but is cut off in mid sentence and the signal is garbled. Kaneohe Naval Air Station is only able to determine that the aircraft is in trouble but does not identify why. Ensign Whitman and the 9 other men of his crew are determined to be the first American deaths in the Pacific Theater in World War II.
The destroyer mine layers Gamble, Ramsey and Montgomery are deployed in an arc 400 miles north of Oahu, and at 1600 hours report of an aircraft in distress reaches Admiral Richardson, who orders Fleet Operations to send the nearest, the Gamble, to the last reported position to look for survivors. It is at least 3 hours before the ship can reach the crash site however. Still uncertain as to what happened, Kaneohe is prepared to send another PBY out on a search and rescue mission, but it will be dark (sundown is 1719 hours) and the soonest the aircraft would reach the site would be 2 hours past twilight.
Aboard the Soryu, the fighter pilots land and make their report, and a signal is sent to the Akagi (Nagumo's flagship) and Tone (Yamamoto's flag). Yamamoto is forced to decide that the risk that the Americans got off a radio message is simply too high to assume that they did not. He orders Admiral Sentaro aboard the Abumkumo, a Nagara class light cruiser, and 4 of his destroyers (the Urakaze, Isokaze, Tanikaze, and Hamikaze) to steam further ahead of the fleet to a position of 20 miles in their van. They are to engage and sink any ships that they see.
December 7 1941
The first clash 0230 Hours 375 miles northwest of Oahu
The destroyer mine layer Gamble (D.A Crandell commanding) has his crew set to battle stations, boats ready to put over the side, extra lookouts ready and is steaming north at 25 knots with his recognition lights on and he and his crew are prepared to conduct what they hope will be a successful rescue but fear will be a hopeless search. His ship is plowing through heavy seas (heavy enough that the planned launch of the air strike by the Japanese will be delayed later that morning).
Meanwhile the Japanese advance screen picks up a series of radio exchanges between the Gamble and Pearl Harbor and moves to engage, spotting the American ship at 15,000 yards in the dark. The superbly trained Japanese lookouts with the best available binoculars and excellent doctrine have little trouble finding the American ship still running with recognition lights. A spread of torpedoes is fired by the destroyer Isokaze quickly races through the water and one detonates in her engine room spaces and nearly blows her in half right then. A frantic radio message from the Gamble reporting her position and that she has been torpedoed is all that her radio manages to get off before the ship is smothered in 6 inch and 5 inch shells, blasting her superstructure apart and a second spread from the Urukaze puts two more torpedoes into her, blasting the Gamble apart. Only a few dozen of her crew manage to get over the side as she goes down literally under them. Only six survivors, none of them officers or senior enlisted men, manage to survive until rescue on December 9.
Well within his 24 hour decision point to continue the attack whether discovered or not, Yamamoto orders the fleet by signal lamp to proceed to the launch point as planned.
Pacific Fleet prepares for action
Meanwhile, the report that the Gamble has been torpedoed, in light of the loss of a PBY at the same time, convinces Richardson that an attack is imminent. He sends an urgent cable to Washington at 0330 hours (where it is 830 Sunday morning and efforts to decode the 14th part of the Japanese message are already occurring). Richardson issues a string of orders.
First the entire fleet is put on alert, and all officers and men are to be ordered to their ships at once. A string of phone calls begins to ship commanders from base operations, followed by more calls to other officers and men. The Army is immediately notified and the Air Search Center is ordered to get every available plane in the air at dawn, while Harmon, concerned that the a bombing raid may be coming to support that evident Japanese submarine attacks offshore, orders that all squadrons are to be prepared for combat no later than dawn.
In the harbor, the outboard battleships of battleship row are moved while destroyers are moved alongside the battleships West Virginia (which is herself moved by tug), Tennessee, Maryland and Nevada. All ships are to go to general quarters right away, and if no sign of submarine activity occurs in the harbor in the next few hours can go to lower readiness. He is concerned that submarines may be trying to break into harbor, much like the Germans pulled off when the sank the Royal Oak, and orders the alert destroyers to reinforce the Ward.
Richardson also decides to send a task group to sea to reinforce the picket line, just in case that the Gamble met something other than a submarine which with the loss of a PBY seems not unlikely. He orders Admiral Leary to take the cruisers Phoenix and Helena, along with some destroyers, north to the position where the Gamble was lost to search for survivors and investigate the situation first hand.
By 0400 hours the harbor is a flurry of activity and meanwhile General Harmon is requesting an appointment with the Territorial Governor for 0800 hours, while Richardson schedules a conference between himself, Admiral Pye and Admiral Kidd aboard the Arizona at the same time.
Richardson sends orders to Halsey and Brown to conduct maneuvers in the area south of Midway, with the Enterprise task group as a Red Force, and the Lexington/Yorktown task group as the Blue Force. Halsey is to simulate an attack on Midway from the North, while Brown is to move to simulate an attack on Red Force. As part of the exercise the Marine dive bomber squadron (equipped with 18SBU2 Vindicator dive bombers) will deploy to the island where it joins 12 PBY patrol bombers and 6 float planes that are already present. Heavy seas and rain prevent Halsey from conducting operations that day and the exercise is postponed for 48 hours. Brown orders his air groups to do a maintenance stand down aside from routine submarine patrols, air searches and fighter patrols.
Yamamoto and his fleet are battling these high seas as well but continue to encounter no traffic. Yamamoto is disappointed that a final report he was expecting from the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu is not transmitted. His best information is that two carriers, 8 battleships, 14 cruisers, and over 100 other warships are in Pearl Harbor. American air search aircraft, which are ranging 1,000 miles from Pearl Harbor, fail to spot the Japanese force in the gloom. The Japanese also fail to hear or spot the American B17D as it flies overhead in the late afternoon.
President Roosevelt—convinced on the basis of intelligence reports that the Japanese fleet is headed for Thailand, not the United States—telegrams Emperor Hirohito with the request that “for the sake of humanity,” the emperor intervene “to prevent further death and destruction in the world.”
The Royal Australian Air Force had sighted Japanese escorts, cruisers, and destroyers on patrol near the Malayan coast, south of Cape Cambodia. An Aussie pilot managed to radio that it looked as if the Japanese warships were headed for Thailand—just before he was shot down by the Japanese. Back in England, Prime Minister Churchill called a meeting of his chiefs of staff to discuss the crisis. While reports were coming in describing Thailand as the Japanese destination, they began to question whether it could have been a diversion. British intelligence had intercepted the Japanese code “Raffles,” a warning to the Japanese fleet to be on alert—but for what?
Britain was already preparing Operation Matador, the launching of their 11th Indian Division into Thailand to meet the presumed Japanese invasion force. But at the last minute, Air Marshall Brooke-Popham received word not to cross the Thai border for fear that it would provoke a Japanese attack if, in fact, the warship movement was merely a bluff.
Meanwhile, 600 miles northwest of Hawaii, Admiral Yamamoto, commander of the Japanese fleet, announced to his men: “The rise or fall of the empire depends upon this battle. Everyone will do his duty with utmost efforts.”
“The son of man has just sent his final message to the son of God,” FDR joked to Eleanor after sending off his telegram to Hirohito, who in the Shinto tradition of Japan was deemed a god. As he enjoyed his stamp collection and chatted with Harry Hopkins, his personal adviser, news reached him of Japan’s formal rejection of America’s 10-point proposals for peace and an end to economic sanctions and the oil embargo placed on the Axis power. “This means war,” the president declared. Hopkins recommended an American first strike. “No, we can’t do that,” Roosevelt countered. “We are a democracy and a peaceful people.”
from
http://www.history.com/this-day-in-...emperor-prevent-further-death-and-destruction
Japanese submarines are now in position in their patrol areas, with the special attack submarines moving into position to launch their mini-submarines. There are seven I-boats deployed in a semicircle southwest to southeast of Oahu. Another 3 are deployed in a line to the northeast of the island, one is due north, 3 are deployed in the waters between Oahu and Kaui, with two more deployed south of them and 5 boats are approaching the entrance of Pearl Harbor to launch their attack craft.
First Blood 1538 Hours December 6, 1941
A PBY piloted by Ensign G. Whitman is on its inbound track returning to base 530 miles north northeast of Oahu when the starboard waist gunner spots what he thinks are a fleet of ships 20 miles of to his starboard (right for you non mariner types). The PBY turns toward the sighting and at that moment is jumped by a flight of 3 Zeroes who blast the aircraft out of the sky. The radioman gets a partial distress call but is cut off in mid sentence and the signal is garbled. Kaneohe Naval Air Station is only able to determine that the aircraft is in trouble but does not identify why. Ensign Whitman and the 9 other men of his crew are determined to be the first American deaths in the Pacific Theater in World War II.
The destroyer mine layers Gamble, Ramsey and Montgomery are deployed in an arc 400 miles north of Oahu, and at 1600 hours report of an aircraft in distress reaches Admiral Richardson, who orders Fleet Operations to send the nearest, the Gamble, to the last reported position to look for survivors. It is at least 3 hours before the ship can reach the crash site however. Still uncertain as to what happened, Kaneohe is prepared to send another PBY out on a search and rescue mission, but it will be dark (sundown is 1719 hours) and the soonest the aircraft would reach the site would be 2 hours past twilight.
Aboard the Soryu, the fighter pilots land and make their report, and a signal is sent to the Akagi (Nagumo's flagship) and Tone (Yamamoto's flag). Yamamoto is forced to decide that the risk that the Americans got off a radio message is simply too high to assume that they did not. He orders Admiral Sentaro aboard the Abumkumo, a Nagara class light cruiser, and 4 of his destroyers (the Urakaze, Isokaze, Tanikaze, and Hamikaze) to steam further ahead of the fleet to a position of 20 miles in their van. They are to engage and sink any ships that they see.
December 7 1941
The first clash 0230 Hours 375 miles northwest of Oahu
The destroyer mine layer Gamble (D.A Crandell commanding) has his crew set to battle stations, boats ready to put over the side, extra lookouts ready and is steaming north at 25 knots with his recognition lights on and he and his crew are prepared to conduct what they hope will be a successful rescue but fear will be a hopeless search. His ship is plowing through heavy seas (heavy enough that the planned launch of the air strike by the Japanese will be delayed later that morning).
Meanwhile the Japanese advance screen picks up a series of radio exchanges between the Gamble and Pearl Harbor and moves to engage, spotting the American ship at 15,000 yards in the dark. The superbly trained Japanese lookouts with the best available binoculars and excellent doctrine have little trouble finding the American ship still running with recognition lights. A spread of torpedoes is fired by the destroyer Isokaze quickly races through the water and one detonates in her engine room spaces and nearly blows her in half right then. A frantic radio message from the Gamble reporting her position and that she has been torpedoed is all that her radio manages to get off before the ship is smothered in 6 inch and 5 inch shells, blasting her superstructure apart and a second spread from the Urukaze puts two more torpedoes into her, blasting the Gamble apart. Only a few dozen of her crew manage to get over the side as she goes down literally under them. Only six survivors, none of them officers or senior enlisted men, manage to survive until rescue on December 9.
Well within his 24 hour decision point to continue the attack whether discovered or not, Yamamoto orders the fleet by signal lamp to proceed to the launch point as planned.
Pacific Fleet prepares for action
Meanwhile, the report that the Gamble has been torpedoed, in light of the loss of a PBY at the same time, convinces Richardson that an attack is imminent. He sends an urgent cable to Washington at 0330 hours (where it is 830 Sunday morning and efforts to decode the 14th part of the Japanese message are already occurring). Richardson issues a string of orders.
First the entire fleet is put on alert, and all officers and men are to be ordered to their ships at once. A string of phone calls begins to ship commanders from base operations, followed by more calls to other officers and men. The Army is immediately notified and the Air Search Center is ordered to get every available plane in the air at dawn, while Harmon, concerned that the a bombing raid may be coming to support that evident Japanese submarine attacks offshore, orders that all squadrons are to be prepared for combat no later than dawn.
In the harbor, the outboard battleships of battleship row are moved while destroyers are moved alongside the battleships West Virginia (which is herself moved by tug), Tennessee, Maryland and Nevada. All ships are to go to general quarters right away, and if no sign of submarine activity occurs in the harbor in the next few hours can go to lower readiness. He is concerned that submarines may be trying to break into harbor, much like the Germans pulled off when the sank the Royal Oak, and orders the alert destroyers to reinforce the Ward.
Richardson also decides to send a task group to sea to reinforce the picket line, just in case that the Gamble met something other than a submarine which with the loss of a PBY seems not unlikely. He orders Admiral Leary to take the cruisers Phoenix and Helena, along with some destroyers, north to the position where the Gamble was lost to search for survivors and investigate the situation first hand.
By 0400 hours the harbor is a flurry of activity and meanwhile General Harmon is requesting an appointment with the Territorial Governor for 0800 hours, while Richardson schedules a conference between himself, Admiral Pye and Admiral Kidd aboard the Arizona at the same time.
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American Fleet December 6 1941
the best map I can find of the fleet as of December 7 in OTL
http://swmaps.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Pearl_Harbor_swmaps.jpg
US Navy Hawaiian area December 6, 1941
Task Force 9 Picket force
Destroyer minelayers Gamble, Ramsey, Montgomery, Pruitt, Tracy
submarines S-18, S-23, S-34, Gudgeon, Plunger, Tambor, Thresher
Air Search (North sector)
Navy VP11, VP12, VP14, VP21, VP22, VP23, VP24 (69 PBY, 53 available), Army RS 23, RS 31 (12 B17D, 8 available)
Air Search (South sector)
Army 18th Bomb Wing (33 B18, 21 available), Navy VJ1 (9 JRF Goose, 9 J2F Duck, 6 of each available) plus 8 SOC Seagull float planes from the battleships assigned to local patrol off the harbor entrance.
Scouting Force (Halsey)
Task Force 2 (Brown) carrier Lexington (w 37 Dauntless dive bombers, 18 Devastator torpedo bombers, 17 Buffalo fighters), carrier Yorktown (36 Dauntless dive bombers, 18 Devastator torpedo bombers, 18 Wildcat fighters) heavy cruisers Chicago, Portland, Astoria destroyers Porter, Drayton, Flusser, Lamson, Mahan, Cummings, Case, Tucker,
Task Force 3 (Halsey) carrier Enterprise (37 Dauntless dive bombers, 18 Vindicator Dive bombers,18 Devastator torpedo bombers, 14 Wildcat fighters), heavy cruisers Northampton, Chester, Salt Lake City, destroyers Blach, Maury, Craven, Gridley, McCall, Dunlap, Benham, Fanning, Ellet
Task Force 8 (Fletcher) heavy cruiser Minneapolis, destroyers Farragut, Aylwin, Monaghan, Farragut, destroyer minesweepers Chandler, Hovey, Boggs, Lamberton, fleet oilers Platte, Tippacanoe, Santee, Sangamon
French Frigate Shoals
Passing nearby: (returning from Midway) Seaplane Tender Wright (civilians aboard), Tranport Burrows (en route to Wake Island),
station: small seaplane tender Swan, Destroyer minelayer Sicard, patrol gunboat Sacramento
Kure:
small seaplane tender Avocet, destroyer minelayer Breese,
assembling off Honolulu harbor (as of 0600 hours)
TF 15 Light Cruiser (Rear Admiral Fairfax Leary) Helena, Phoenix, destroyers MacDonough, Phelps, Chew, Allen
In port Pearl Harbor
110 Dock: battleships Oklahoma (moved 0400 hours) target ship Utah (outboard)
California (inboard, moved 0400 hours), minelayer Oglala (outboard)(moved 0400 hours)
submarine Cachelot
Drydock: battleship Pennyslvania, destroyers Cassin, Downes
Floating drydock: destroyer Shaw
Naval Station docks: heavy cruisers San Francisco, New Orleans, St Louis, light cruiser Honolulu destroyers Jarvis, Mugford, Bagley, Cummings, minesweeper Greebe, destroyer minesweeper Trever, Zane, Perry Wasmuth, destroyer minelayer Breese, oiler Ramapo, repair ship Argonne, Rigel,
Southeast Loch (submarine base) docks: submarine tender Pelias, rescue ship Widgeon, repair ship Sumner, stores ship Castor, submarines Narwhal, Dolphin, Tautog,
Carrier Row: Seaplane Tenders Tangiers, Curtis (historic location of Utah), seaplane tenders (converted destroyers) Thornton (OTL location of Raleigh), Hulbert (OTL location of Detroit)
Middle loch: repair ship Medusa, hospital ship Solace (moved 0400 hours)
Battleship Row
battleship Nevada (inboard), destroyer Dobbin (moved 0400 hours)
battleship Arizona (inboard), repair ship Vestal (outboard)
battleship Tennessee (inboard), destroyer Hull (outboard)
battleship Maryland (inboard), destroyer Dewey (outboard)
tied to Ford Island dock: Oiler Neosho
battleship West Virginia (inboard), destroyer Worden (outboard)
East Loch
destroyers: Henley, Patterson, Ralph Talbot
destroyer tender: Whitney, destroyers Conyngham, Reid, Tucker, Case, Selfridge
harbor entrance
destroyers Blue, Ward, Helm, 4 minesweepers
http://swmaps.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Pearl_Harbor_swmaps.jpg
US Navy Hawaiian area December 6, 1941
Task Force 9 Picket force
Destroyer minelayers Gamble, Ramsey, Montgomery, Pruitt, Tracy
submarines S-18, S-23, S-34, Gudgeon, Plunger, Tambor, Thresher
Air Search (North sector)
Navy VP11, VP12, VP14, VP21, VP22, VP23, VP24 (69 PBY, 53 available), Army RS 23, RS 31 (12 B17D, 8 available)
Air Search (South sector)
Army 18th Bomb Wing (33 B18, 21 available), Navy VJ1 (9 JRF Goose, 9 J2F Duck, 6 of each available) plus 8 SOC Seagull float planes from the battleships assigned to local patrol off the harbor entrance.
Scouting Force (Halsey)
Task Force 2 (Brown) carrier Lexington (w 37 Dauntless dive bombers, 18 Devastator torpedo bombers, 17 Buffalo fighters), carrier Yorktown (36 Dauntless dive bombers, 18 Devastator torpedo bombers, 18 Wildcat fighters) heavy cruisers Chicago, Portland, Astoria destroyers Porter, Drayton, Flusser, Lamson, Mahan, Cummings, Case, Tucker,
Task Force 3 (Halsey) carrier Enterprise (37 Dauntless dive bombers, 18 Vindicator Dive bombers,18 Devastator torpedo bombers, 14 Wildcat fighters), heavy cruisers Northampton, Chester, Salt Lake City, destroyers Blach, Maury, Craven, Gridley, McCall, Dunlap, Benham, Fanning, Ellet
Task Force 8 (Fletcher) heavy cruiser Minneapolis, destroyers Farragut, Aylwin, Monaghan, Farragut, destroyer minesweepers Chandler, Hovey, Boggs, Lamberton, fleet oilers Platte, Tippacanoe, Santee, Sangamon
French Frigate Shoals
Passing nearby: (returning from Midway) Seaplane Tender Wright (civilians aboard), Tranport Burrows (en route to Wake Island),
station: small seaplane tender Swan, Destroyer minelayer Sicard, patrol gunboat Sacramento
Kure:
small seaplane tender Avocet, destroyer minelayer Breese,
assembling off Honolulu harbor (as of 0600 hours)
TF 15 Light Cruiser (Rear Admiral Fairfax Leary) Helena, Phoenix, destroyers MacDonough, Phelps, Chew, Allen
In port Pearl Harbor
110 Dock: battleships Oklahoma (moved 0400 hours) target ship Utah (outboard)
California (inboard, moved 0400 hours), minelayer Oglala (outboard)(moved 0400 hours)
submarine Cachelot
Drydock: battleship Pennyslvania, destroyers Cassin, Downes
Floating drydock: destroyer Shaw
Naval Station docks: heavy cruisers San Francisco, New Orleans, St Louis, light cruiser Honolulu destroyers Jarvis, Mugford, Bagley, Cummings, minesweeper Greebe, destroyer minesweeper Trever, Zane, Perry Wasmuth, destroyer minelayer Breese, oiler Ramapo, repair ship Argonne, Rigel,
Southeast Loch (submarine base) docks: submarine tender Pelias, rescue ship Widgeon, repair ship Sumner, stores ship Castor, submarines Narwhal, Dolphin, Tautog,
Carrier Row: Seaplane Tenders Tangiers, Curtis (historic location of Utah), seaplane tenders (converted destroyers) Thornton (OTL location of Raleigh), Hulbert (OTL location of Detroit)
Middle loch: repair ship Medusa, hospital ship Solace (moved 0400 hours)
Battleship Row
battleship Nevada (inboard), destroyer Dobbin (moved 0400 hours)
battleship Arizona (inboard), repair ship Vestal (outboard)
battleship Tennessee (inboard), destroyer Hull (outboard)
battleship Maryland (inboard), destroyer Dewey (outboard)
tied to Ford Island dock: Oiler Neosho
battleship West Virginia (inboard), destroyer Worden (outboard)
East Loch
destroyers: Henley, Patterson, Ralph Talbot
destroyer tender: Whitney, destroyers Conyngham, Reid, Tucker, Case, Selfridge
harbor entrance
destroyers Blue, Ward, Helm, 4 minesweepers
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that is it for today... more over the next week
outboard ships are being used literally as shields in case of submarine, which was discussed as an option historically. Rigging torpedo nets is not considered an option as it will take hours of daylight to deploy them and at this point there is no time. There is still considerable belief that the Japanese cannot conduct an aerial torpedo attack on Pearl Harbor (when you drop a torpedo it does drop a number of feet, up to 75 feet, before coming back up to the surface. The Japanese solved this issue but the Americans obviously do not know that.
A full scale sortie is not considered advisable because of the submarine threat offshore, clearly evidenced, and if it isn't submarines, better to remain under Army fighter cover in an anchorage where torpedo planes cannot operate.
outboard ships are being used literally as shields in case of submarine, which was discussed as an option historically. Rigging torpedo nets is not considered an option as it will take hours of daylight to deploy them and at this point there is no time. There is still considerable belief that the Japanese cannot conduct an aerial torpedo attack on Pearl Harbor (when you drop a torpedo it does drop a number of feet, up to 75 feet, before coming back up to the surface. The Japanese solved this issue but the Americans obviously do not know that.
A full scale sortie is not considered advisable because of the submarine threat offshore, clearly evidenced, and if it isn't submarines, better to remain under Army fighter cover in an anchorage where torpedo planes cannot operate.
historically the South Seas force came to a quick end but Halsey does have to react to an attack on Pearl Harbor as well
not that I can find.. they assumed competence on the American part, but also assumed that in OTL they would have surprise
an excellent source is the official report of the Attack on Pearl Harbor
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/narrative/33.html
authors note: the USS Gamble was lost during the Battle of Iwo Jima after an air attack wrecked her beyond economical repair and she was scuttled
Ensign (then Lieutenant JG) and his aircraft were shot down in the Battle of Midway and he and several of his crew were killed in action.
Ensign (then Lieutenant JG) and his aircraft were shot down in the Battle of Midway and he and several of his crew were killed in action.
Thanks for the update. The first shots have been fired, both in the air and on the sea. The US is scrambling through the night and the crap will be hitting the fan when dawn comes. Just how well will the defenders do when the air attacks start will have to be seen. The US carriers will be in a position to try to take out some of the invaders, but as can be seen, the Japanese have many a sharp trap ready to be sprung on any ship that may come across an IJN sub.
Interesting thing to have the destroyers acting as possible torpedo shields to the battleships. Will they be enough to absorb any torpedoes that Japan is able to launch at them or could the torpedoes just run underneath the destroyers to reach their targets?
Look forward to the next updates when you are able to share them.
One thing I seem have to have missed, where is the Utah stationed after these new deployments? Just well might her AA guns do if fully manned?
Interesting thing to have the destroyers acting as possible torpedo shields to the battleships. Will they be enough to absorb any torpedoes that Japan is able to launch at them or could the torpedoes just run underneath the destroyers to reach their targets?
Look forward to the next updates when you are able to share them.
One thing I seem have to have missed, where is the Utah stationed after these new deployments? Just well might her AA guns do if fully manned?
I forgot to write in the Utah... she is outboard of the Oklahoma
torpedoes have to be preset for target depth when they are loaded on the aircraft... the best information the Japanese have is that they do not have to worry about that
Which will potentially be very rough on the outboard ships
Hopefully the Utah will have all personnel evacuated after they close all watertight doors as she has no active defenses. With condition zebra set on all ships, and guns manned and ready, the torpedo planes will be in for a very bad time indeed, and the damage will be limited. Of course OTL it was a dive bomber that did for the Arizona, so that still could happen. If the air wing takes the beating it looks like it will, the carriers will be in trouble if and when the surface fleet shows up...as well as any air.
- Status