editing suggestions are welcome... thanks. I was thinking of General Martin (who was also relieved and sent to obscurity after Pearl Harbor in OTL)
The Battle at Dawn: The first battle between the United States and Japan December 7-10, 1941
- Thread starter galveston bay
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editing suggestions are welcome... thanks. I was thinking of General Martin (who was also relieved and sent to obscurity after Pearl Harbor in OTL)
American Prepare their Defense
Command and Plan changes September – October 1941
Admiral Yamamoto meets with Genda and after reviewing the initial plan overrules some of the assumptions made. He points out that with the American Fleet Problem XXIII and the likely American reaction to that means that surprise can be in no way be assured. The attack must be prepared to fight its way in from the start, and that means that Genda's original plan is less likely to meet with the needed success. Genda meets his rebuff professionally and goes back to work on a revised plan.
In Hawaii, General Harmon takes charge and after inspecting dispositions and plans, asks for a new commander for the 14th Fighter Wing, as well as a corps commander for the ground forces to take charge of their training. He also orders his fighter group and squadron commanders to review the points made by Claire Chennault in his visit in July and insists that his squadrons begin operational training using those tactics. He requests Brigadier John McConnell, who had experience in Hawaii as a fighter squadron commander in 1938, as a new commander for the Hawaiian Air Force and although Hap Arnold had other plans for him, the embarrassment of Fleet Problem XXIII means General Marshall is inclined to give Harmon what he wants.
By the middle of October General Harmon has persuaded Admiral Richardson to create a joint air defense command headquarters, which will have authority over all fighters stationed in Hawaii as well as visiting units while their carriers are in port. Instead of intensive alerts that wear out crews and aircraft, a longer term rotating schedule of retaining 25% of fighters (one flight per squadron), another 25% on 30 minute alert, the third flight of each squadron on 1 hour alert, and the fourth flight (the remaining 25%) on maintenance stand down. He also gives the 72nd Pursuit Squadron, which currently lacks aircraft, all of the 14 P26 Peashooters on the island, and assigns them the mission of point defense for the harbor, while the P36 squadrons are given point defense missions, along with the Marine Corps squadron at Ewa for defending airfields and the P40 squadrons given the general interception mission. General McConnell will head Hawaiian Interceptor Command. His first act is to ignore Department of Interior protests and places his 5 radar sets at locations to best optimize their performance. He is also given carte blanche to obtain the personnel he needs from them, and several dozen men are flown to Hawaii from the United States on a priority basis to help train and man the air defense command center and the radar stations and the communications network to make them work.
Harmon and Richardson also set up a combined air search and patrol headquarters which will have control of all Navy reconnaissance aircraft, as well as 18th Bomb Wing with its force of 33 B18 and 12 B17D aircraft for medium and long range missions. The 13th Bombardment squadron, with its 13 A20 Havoc aircraft, begins practicing low altitude attacks against shipping as General Harmon is unimpressed with their proficiency in that mission. Admiral Bellinger is given command of this force.
Admiral Richardson, happier now that the air defense and air search issues are being addressed, looks closer at the deployment of the Fleet. He organizes Task Force 9, giving that command to Rear Admiral Draemel, and issues orders that 9 4 stack destroyers (now operating as minesweepers and minelayers), as well as several S boat submarines he orders moved from the West Coast, be on station at all times to maintain a picket line 300 miles north and northwest of Hawaii, the approach he considers the most likely Japanese approach to Hawaii in the event of a carrier strike. The carriers will exercise primary to the south and southwest of Oahu, with the Army bombers covering the west and southwest in support. This allows the Navy Patrol Wings, with their 77 long range PBYs to cover the north, northwest and west along with Task Force 9. The 12 PBYs out of Midway will also support this mission. He also moves the seaplane tenders Avocet, Swan, Hulbert and Thornton on rotating duty at Kure Atoll and French Frigate Shoals on a rotating basis, along with a destroyer at each location as an escort. Assigned to them are detachments from 2 utility seaplane squadrons from Ford Island, and while the J2F Ducks have only a patrol range of just under 300 miles, they provide local patrol capability and allow the Catalina's to patrol other areas.
These American preparations are nearly complete as October comes to an end and the Japanese 1st Air Fleet is practicing in the Kuriles for their planned strike.
Admiral Yamamoto meets with Genda and after reviewing the initial plan overrules some of the assumptions made. He points out that with the American Fleet Problem XXIII and the likely American reaction to that means that surprise can be in no way be assured. The attack must be prepared to fight its way in from the start, and that means that Genda's original plan is less likely to meet with the needed success. Genda meets his rebuff professionally and goes back to work on a revised plan.
In Hawaii, General Harmon takes charge and after inspecting dispositions and plans, asks for a new commander for the 14th Fighter Wing, as well as a corps commander for the ground forces to take charge of their training. He also orders his fighter group and squadron commanders to review the points made by Claire Chennault in his visit in July and insists that his squadrons begin operational training using those tactics. He requests Brigadier John McConnell, who had experience in Hawaii as a fighter squadron commander in 1938, as a new commander for the Hawaiian Air Force and although Hap Arnold had other plans for him, the embarrassment of Fleet Problem XXIII means General Marshall is inclined to give Harmon what he wants.
By the middle of October General Harmon has persuaded Admiral Richardson to create a joint air defense command headquarters, which will have authority over all fighters stationed in Hawaii as well as visiting units while their carriers are in port. Instead of intensive alerts that wear out crews and aircraft, a longer term rotating schedule of retaining 25% of fighters (one flight per squadron), another 25% on 30 minute alert, the third flight of each squadron on 1 hour alert, and the fourth flight (the remaining 25%) on maintenance stand down. He also gives the 72nd Pursuit Squadron, which currently lacks aircraft, all of the 14 P26 Peashooters on the island, and assigns them the mission of point defense for the harbor, while the P36 squadrons are given point defense missions, along with the Marine Corps squadron at Ewa for defending airfields and the P40 squadrons given the general interception mission. General McConnell will head Hawaiian Interceptor Command. His first act is to ignore Department of Interior protests and places his 5 radar sets at locations to best optimize their performance. He is also given carte blanche to obtain the personnel he needs from them, and several dozen men are flown to Hawaii from the United States on a priority basis to help train and man the air defense command center and the radar stations and the communications network to make them work.
Harmon and Richardson also set up a combined air search and patrol headquarters which will have control of all Navy reconnaissance aircraft, as well as 18th Bomb Wing with its force of 33 B18 and 12 B17D aircraft for medium and long range missions. The 13th Bombardment squadron, with its 13 A20 Havoc aircraft, begins practicing low altitude attacks against shipping as General Harmon is unimpressed with their proficiency in that mission. Admiral Bellinger is given command of this force.
Admiral Richardson, happier now that the air defense and air search issues are being addressed, looks closer at the deployment of the Fleet. He organizes Task Force 9, giving that command to Rear Admiral Draemel, and issues orders that 9 4 stack destroyers (now operating as minesweepers and minelayers), as well as several S boat submarines he orders moved from the West Coast, be on station at all times to maintain a picket line 300 miles north and northwest of Hawaii, the approach he considers the most likely Japanese approach to Hawaii in the event of a carrier strike. The carriers will exercise primary to the south and southwest of Oahu, with the Army bombers covering the west and southwest in support. This allows the Navy Patrol Wings, with their 77 long range PBYs to cover the north, northwest and west along with Task Force 9. The 12 PBYs out of Midway will also support this mission. He also moves the seaplane tenders Avocet, Swan, Hulbert and Thornton on rotating duty at Kure Atoll and French Frigate Shoals on a rotating basis, along with a destroyer at each location as an escort. Assigned to them are detachments from 2 utility seaplane squadrons from Ford Island, and while the J2F Ducks have only a patrol range of just under 300 miles, they provide local patrol capability and allow the Catalina's to patrol other areas.
These American preparations are nearly complete as October comes to an end and the Japanese 1st Air Fleet is practicing in the Kuriles for their planned strike.
authors notes:
Claire Chennault did visit Wheeler Airfield on his way to Washington in July 1941 and did get a lot of attention. He also delivered several formal reports specifically regarding the A6M, as did the US Naval Attache to Japan who actually was allowed in the cockpit of one prewar.
Regarding Pilots
American pilots in Hawaii had between 1,200 to 600 hours flying time as of OTL Pearl Harbor raid, much of this in type (the aircraft they were flying). While there were some new pilots, most had been assigned there for some time and had at least a year or more out of Advanced Flight School. Contrary to myth, according https://www.amazon.com/Attack-Pearl-Harbor-Strategy-Deceptions/dp/1612001971/ref=pd_sim_14_14?_encoding=UTF8&pd_rd_i=1612001971&pd_rd_r=CVKY1EW46XHGYYSMDH7J&pd_rd_w=795v4&pd_rd_wg=NR2rV&psc=1&refRID=CVKY1EW46XHGYYSMDH7J
The Japanese pilots were not greatly superior in quality to the America pilots at Pearl Harbor. This was a much better trained group than most of the American squadrons in the Philippines, as many of those squadrons were relatively newly formed and those pilots lost a lot of flight training time as they traveled by ship to Manila.
Only the air groups of the 4 older Japanese carriers had that kind of experience, while the airgroups of the Shokaku and Zuikaku had far less experience than either the Army pilots or the American carrier pilots (which is why in OTL they were assigned airfield strike missions, not targets at Pearl Harbor itself). Most of the elite combat veterans were squadron and formation leaders, or flying twin engine bombers or assigned to Navy fighter squadrons elsewhere. The Carriers did not conduct that many strikes against the Chinese, it was the land based force that carried that load.
Regarding commanders
Genda is sharply criticized in the book cited above. The book covers point by point the planning and the attack and the weaknesses in it. Yamamoto was the first to point out that surprise could not be guaranteed and he did force Genda to take that into account. There were two backup plans, one of which involved a preliminary fighter sweep (such as was practiced over China) and of course the plan Fuchida accidently triggered when he fired off two plans (having the dive bombers go in first).
General John McConnell became the 6th Air Force Chief of Staff, and thus is definitely a 'comer' in 1941 and did spend 1938 as a fighter squadron commander at Wheeler Field.
Air and sea search
Although none of the American picket submarines and 4 Stack destroyers (of which there over a dozen available) have radar, they do have radios. Think of them as a trip wire force more than anything else, as well as a reaction force should a Catalina find something odd. The reason that the American Fleet problems used the northern approach as did the Japanese is that the commercial shipping lanes are south of Hawaii as the storms are less frequent. The Americans are using that commercial shipping traffic from the south and west as part of their picket line as well, assuming that the Japanese will trigger at least some kind of radio warning if they attack a merchant ship. The effectiveness of a picket line like this can be observed when a Japanese one was bumped into by the Doolittle Raid, forcing that strike to be launched much further east than planned.
Other stuff
The J2F Duck is a neat aircraft. You can see it in the 1960s era Peter O'Toole movie "Murphys War" Like most float planes it is slow but it does have a decent range for its type, and saw considerable service as an ASW and inshore patrol aircraft during the war. There were two squadrons of these available. Any shortages of aircrew could have been made up by taking aircrew from the floatplanes assigned to the battleships and cruisers of the Pacific Fleet.
Basically the Americans had plenty of air search resources, if you add all the B17s and Catalinas together, that is almost 100 long range and with the B18s and the Ducks, that is another 50 medium range patrol aircraft. It isn't the 250 that Bellinger wanted, but as the Americans only used the Catalinas in OTL and did not conduct long range searches for the most part, this is a major change and thus one of the more important command decisions in this timeline
The other of course is a better organized air defense system. One reason that the Americans were caught so flat footed and that over half of the aircraft on the island were down for maintenance on December 7 is because they had literally been on alert for weeks. In short, they had been on a surge for weeks, and when you surge maintenance problems develop. An extended alert like I posted in the story would give more time for routine maintenance, crew and mechanics to rest, and thus ensure a higher availability on the day of the attack.
Claire Chennault did visit Wheeler Airfield on his way to Washington in July 1941 and did get a lot of attention. He also delivered several formal reports specifically regarding the A6M, as did the US Naval Attache to Japan who actually was allowed in the cockpit of one prewar.
Regarding Pilots
American pilots in Hawaii had between 1,200 to 600 hours flying time as of OTL Pearl Harbor raid, much of this in type (the aircraft they were flying). While there were some new pilots, most had been assigned there for some time and had at least a year or more out of Advanced Flight School. Contrary to myth, according https://www.amazon.com/Attack-Pearl-Harbor-Strategy-Deceptions/dp/1612001971/ref=pd_sim_14_14?_encoding=UTF8&pd_rd_i=1612001971&pd_rd_r=CVKY1EW46XHGYYSMDH7J&pd_rd_w=795v4&pd_rd_wg=NR2rV&psc=1&refRID=CVKY1EW46XHGYYSMDH7J
The Japanese pilots were not greatly superior in quality to the America pilots at Pearl Harbor. This was a much better trained group than most of the American squadrons in the Philippines, as many of those squadrons were relatively newly formed and those pilots lost a lot of flight training time as they traveled by ship to Manila.
Only the air groups of the 4 older Japanese carriers had that kind of experience, while the airgroups of the Shokaku and Zuikaku had far less experience than either the Army pilots or the American carrier pilots (which is why in OTL they were assigned airfield strike missions, not targets at Pearl Harbor itself). Most of the elite combat veterans were squadron and formation leaders, or flying twin engine bombers or assigned to Navy fighter squadrons elsewhere. The Carriers did not conduct that many strikes against the Chinese, it was the land based force that carried that load.
Regarding commanders
Genda is sharply criticized in the book cited above. The book covers point by point the planning and the attack and the weaknesses in it. Yamamoto was the first to point out that surprise could not be guaranteed and he did force Genda to take that into account. There were two backup plans, one of which involved a preliminary fighter sweep (such as was practiced over China) and of course the plan Fuchida accidently triggered when he fired off two plans (having the dive bombers go in first).
General John McConnell became the 6th Air Force Chief of Staff, and thus is definitely a 'comer' in 1941 and did spend 1938 as a fighter squadron commander at Wheeler Field.
Air and sea search
Although none of the American picket submarines and 4 Stack destroyers (of which there over a dozen available) have radar, they do have radios. Think of them as a trip wire force more than anything else, as well as a reaction force should a Catalina find something odd. The reason that the American Fleet problems used the northern approach as did the Japanese is that the commercial shipping lanes are south of Hawaii as the storms are less frequent. The Americans are using that commercial shipping traffic from the south and west as part of their picket line as well, assuming that the Japanese will trigger at least some kind of radio warning if they attack a merchant ship. The effectiveness of a picket line like this can be observed when a Japanese one was bumped into by the Doolittle Raid, forcing that strike to be launched much further east than planned.
Other stuff
The J2F Duck is a neat aircraft. You can see it in the 1960s era Peter O'Toole movie "Murphys War" Like most float planes it is slow but it does have a decent range for its type, and saw considerable service as an ASW and inshore patrol aircraft during the war. There were two squadrons of these available. Any shortages of aircrew could have been made up by taking aircrew from the floatplanes assigned to the battleships and cruisers of the Pacific Fleet.
Basically the Americans had plenty of air search resources, if you add all the B17s and Catalinas together, that is almost 100 long range and with the B18s and the Ducks, that is another 50 medium range patrol aircraft. It isn't the 250 that Bellinger wanted, but as the Americans only used the Catalinas in OTL and did not conduct long range searches for the most part, this is a major change and thus one of the more important command decisions in this timeline
The other of course is a better organized air defense system. One reason that the Americans were caught so flat footed and that over half of the aircraft on the island were down for maintenance on December 7 is because they had literally been on alert for weeks. In short, they had been on a surge for weeks, and when you surge maintenance problems develop. An extended alert like I posted in the story would give more time for routine maintenance, crew and mechanics to rest, and thus ensure a higher availability on the day of the attack.
a useful map
Army installations and airfields on Oahu
http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/Guard-US/maps/map2.htm
page 169 demonstrates the Army problems with their AAA defenses. Even manned and ready, the shortages of ammunition have limited practice and all units are well below (half strength or less in some cases) from their establishment strength. What should be noted, until just a few days before the OTL raid on Pearl Harbor, the mobile units were deployed either at or near their planned wartime locations. After weeks of alerts, General Short sent them to base to rest and do maintenance, so of course they were completely useless the day of the attack. Only the fixed positions near Pearl Harbor itself got any rounds off (claiming 2 attackers).
Just having them deployed will make the targets harder. They are not going to be nearly as effective as the AAA aboard the ships, but since the strafing and bombing attacks on the Army, Marine and Navy fields faced only what flak they got from the ships in the harbor, every little bit is going to matter.
http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/Guard-US/ch6.htm
Army installations and airfields on Oahu
http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/Guard-US/maps/map2.htm
page 169 demonstrates the Army problems with their AAA defenses. Even manned and ready, the shortages of ammunition have limited practice and all units are well below (half strength or less in some cases) from their establishment strength. What should be noted, until just a few days before the OTL raid on Pearl Harbor, the mobile units were deployed either at or near their planned wartime locations. After weeks of alerts, General Short sent them to base to rest and do maintenance, so of course they were completely useless the day of the attack. Only the fixed positions near Pearl Harbor itself got any rounds off (claiming 2 attackers).
Just having them deployed will make the targets harder. They are not going to be nearly as effective as the AAA aboard the ships, but since the strafing and bombing attacks on the Army, Marine and Navy fields faced only what flak they got from the ships in the harbor, every little bit is going to matter.
http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/Guard-US/ch6.htm
Thanks for the update and the extra information. It really helps me to re-put into perspective what the American defenders faced with the stretched out forces and bases. The picket line may well be tripped, and hopefully they can get off their alerts before being sunk/shot down. The various search lanes and the split in the forces will help, but once battle starts it is a whole new ball game. The different shifts in alerts will help with keeping pilots awake and not drained from the continuous duty and allow for maintenance and overhauls as needed.
These new set ups will modify the Japanese planes as you have written, and I will look forward to how much they will deviate from the OTL attack.
These new set ups will modify the Japanese planes as you have written, and I will look forward to how much they will deviate from the OTL attack.
Countdown to War
Warnings and countdown to War
In early November, General Harmon finally gets a deputy commander in the form of General “Vinegar Joe” Stilwell who takes command of the newly organized I Corps. Although the corps lacks any significant support units, it does have 2 infantry divisions (the newly organized 24th and 25th Infantry Divisions that formed from the Hawaiian Division), a Coast Artillery Command, and a Anti Aircraft Command. He and General Harmon both urgently request additional engineer units, feeling that a couple of regiments would not be underused, but none are yet available. General Stilwell ends some of the peacetime practices that still remain, such as the emphasis on athletics over readiness, and backs his division commanders as they get rid of deadwood.
In the Kuriles, the Japanese First Air Fleet finishes its training regime by the middle of November and makes final preparations for their mission. Meanwhile the Midway Island Invasion force leaves port in Formosa and begins its voyage toward the Marshal Islands which will be their jumping off point.
November 17, 1941
Lewis Clark Grew, the U.S. ambassador to Japan, sends a message to U.S. secretary of state Cordell Hull. He emphasizes the need "for guarding against sudden military or naval actions by Japan in areas not at present involved in the China conflict."
November 20, 1941
Japan issues an ultimatum to the United States, demanding American noninterference in Japanese relations in Indochina and China.
November 25, 1941
The Axis renews the Anti-Comintern Pact for five years. Signatories include Italy, Japan, Spain, Croatia, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, Denmark, Finland, Manchukuo, and Japan's puppet government in Nanking.
Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, sends a war warning to all Pacific Commands, as does General Marshall. Admiral Richardson orders a steady stream of air raid drills for the Pacific Fleet while they are in Pearl Harbor itself. Although it disrupts the routine of maintenance, he continues them over the next few days until he is satisfied that even in port the Fleet can prepare for combat within at least 15 minutes. He also orders the Yorktown task force (TF 16) to see to patrol the southwestern approaches to Midway and Hawaii. Standing orders are now that at least one carrier task force will be at sea at all times.
The Japanese Carrier Striking Force leaves the Kurile Islands steaming east.
November 27, 1941
In Washington, Secretary Knox issues a general warning to all naval commanders in the Pacific telling them to expect an “aggressive move'' probably aimed at “the Philippines, Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo”. Admiral Richardson decides this should also include the possibility of a strike at Hawaii as well.
November 28, 1941
From a Magic intercept originally sent November 19th: "In case of emergency...the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short-wave news broadcast:
1. In case of Japan-U.S. relations in danger: EAST WIND RAIN.
2. Japan-USSR relations: NORTH WIND CLOUDY.
3. Japan-British relations: WEST WIND CLEAR.
when this is heard, please destroy all code papers, etc."
In Washington, President Roosevelt convenes another "War Council". The implications of a large Japanese naval force sailing through the South China Sea towards British Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, and the Philippines are discussed. It is agreed that Roosevelt should send a message to Emperor Hirohito urging peace and address Congress about Japan' aggressive actions. However, it is also added that unless Congress should previously declare war, the U.S. cannot attack this Japanese force.
November 30, 1941:
From a Magic intercept of a cable from Tokyo to the Japanese ambassador in Berlin:
"The conversations between Tokyo and Washington now stand ruptured. In the face of this, our Empire faces a grave situation and must act with determination. Therefore, immediately interview Chancellor Hitler...and confidentially communicate to [him] a summary of the developments. Say to [him] that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms and
that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams."
December 1, 1941:
In a Magic message, Japan's Foreign Minister advises his ambassador to prevent the U.S.
"from becoming unduly suspicious" and emphasizes to them that it is important to give the impression that "negotiations are continuing." Meanwhile, Japan's ambassador in Berlin has reported Hitler's assurance that "should Japan become engaged in a war against the U.S., Germany, of course, would join the war immediately." Japanese Prime Minister Tojo, then tells the ambassador to inform Hitler that "this war may come quicker than anyone dreams." At sea Admiral Yamamoto receives his orders to attack ("Climb Mount Nitaka!")
December 2, 1941:
Additional Magic messages indicate that Japan is still preparing for war, probably in Southeast Asia. Admiral Richardson discovers that naval intelligence has no real idea where the Japanese aircraft carriers are and is displeased. The Lexington Task Force (TF 2) leaves Pearl Harbor on a mission to deliver a Marine fighter squadron and scout bomber squadron to Midway Island. Orders are sent to Task Force 16 to link up with the Lexington and its task force and once the aircraft are delivered, Admiral Brown is ordered to scout the area between Midway and the Japanese Mandates. Admiral Halsey is sent orders to link up and take command of all three task forces once he completes his mission of delivering fighters to Wake Island. Richardson has orders not start a war with Japan, but he wants his fleet to be as concentrated as possible.
December 3, 1941 (Wednesday):
In Washington, an old Magic intercept, dated November 15th, is finally translated. It urges the Japanese consulate in Hawaii to make twice-weekly reports on the location of American warships in Pearl Harbor. No particular significance is attached to the message in Washington as it is assumed that the Japanese are merely updating their intelligence files on the U.S. Navy. However Admiral Richardson sees this entirely differently, and he persuades the Territorial Governor Poindexter and General Harmon to pressure the FBI to keep closer tabs on Japanese diplomatic personnel. A couple of days later, Lieutenant Commander Yoshikawa of the Imperial Japanese Navy, who is posing as diplomat, suffers a serious car accident and is hospitalized, where he remains until his internment once the war begins. Task Force 9, consisting of 4 oilers and 4 destroyers is ordered to sea where it is to link up with heavy cruiser Minneapolis and Rear Admiral Frank Fletcher will will lead this service group and escorts to rendezvous with Halsey and the carriers as Richardson wants them at sea longer.
December 4, 1941 (Thursday):
In Washington, the available Magic intercepts give a clear indication of Japanese intentions to go to war. For example, they urge Ambassador Nomura to destroy one of his special code machines. Admiral Halsey and the Enterprise task force (TF 3) delivers 12 F4F Wildcats to Wake Island. The American carriers and their supporting ships are moving toward a rendezvous.
(authors note: historical timeline with alterations)
In early November, General Harmon finally gets a deputy commander in the form of General “Vinegar Joe” Stilwell who takes command of the newly organized I Corps. Although the corps lacks any significant support units, it does have 2 infantry divisions (the newly organized 24th and 25th Infantry Divisions that formed from the Hawaiian Division), a Coast Artillery Command, and a Anti Aircraft Command. He and General Harmon both urgently request additional engineer units, feeling that a couple of regiments would not be underused, but none are yet available. General Stilwell ends some of the peacetime practices that still remain, such as the emphasis on athletics over readiness, and backs his division commanders as they get rid of deadwood.
In the Kuriles, the Japanese First Air Fleet finishes its training regime by the middle of November and makes final preparations for their mission. Meanwhile the Midway Island Invasion force leaves port in Formosa and begins its voyage toward the Marshal Islands which will be their jumping off point.
November 17, 1941
Lewis Clark Grew, the U.S. ambassador to Japan, sends a message to U.S. secretary of state Cordell Hull. He emphasizes the need "for guarding against sudden military or naval actions by Japan in areas not at present involved in the China conflict."
November 20, 1941
Japan issues an ultimatum to the United States, demanding American noninterference in Japanese relations in Indochina and China.
November 25, 1941
The Axis renews the Anti-Comintern Pact for five years. Signatories include Italy, Japan, Spain, Croatia, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, Denmark, Finland, Manchukuo, and Japan's puppet government in Nanking.
Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, sends a war warning to all Pacific Commands, as does General Marshall. Admiral Richardson orders a steady stream of air raid drills for the Pacific Fleet while they are in Pearl Harbor itself. Although it disrupts the routine of maintenance, he continues them over the next few days until he is satisfied that even in port the Fleet can prepare for combat within at least 15 minutes. He also orders the Yorktown task force (TF 16) to see to patrol the southwestern approaches to Midway and Hawaii. Standing orders are now that at least one carrier task force will be at sea at all times.
The Japanese Carrier Striking Force leaves the Kurile Islands steaming east.
November 27, 1941
In Washington, Secretary Knox issues a general warning to all naval commanders in the Pacific telling them to expect an “aggressive move'' probably aimed at “the Philippines, Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo”. Admiral Richardson decides this should also include the possibility of a strike at Hawaii as well.
November 28, 1941
From a Magic intercept originally sent November 19th: "In case of emergency...the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short-wave news broadcast:
1. In case of Japan-U.S. relations in danger: EAST WIND RAIN.
2. Japan-USSR relations: NORTH WIND CLOUDY.
3. Japan-British relations: WEST WIND CLEAR.
when this is heard, please destroy all code papers, etc."
In Washington, President Roosevelt convenes another "War Council". The implications of a large Japanese naval force sailing through the South China Sea towards British Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, and the Philippines are discussed. It is agreed that Roosevelt should send a message to Emperor Hirohito urging peace and address Congress about Japan' aggressive actions. However, it is also added that unless Congress should previously declare war, the U.S. cannot attack this Japanese force.
November 30, 1941:
From a Magic intercept of a cable from Tokyo to the Japanese ambassador in Berlin:
"The conversations between Tokyo and Washington now stand ruptured. In the face of this, our Empire faces a grave situation and must act with determination. Therefore, immediately interview Chancellor Hitler...and confidentially communicate to [him] a summary of the developments. Say to [him] that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms and
that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams."
December 1, 1941:
In a Magic message, Japan's Foreign Minister advises his ambassador to prevent the U.S.
"from becoming unduly suspicious" and emphasizes to them that it is important to give the impression that "negotiations are continuing." Meanwhile, Japan's ambassador in Berlin has reported Hitler's assurance that "should Japan become engaged in a war against the U.S., Germany, of course, would join the war immediately." Japanese Prime Minister Tojo, then tells the ambassador to inform Hitler that "this war may come quicker than anyone dreams." At sea Admiral Yamamoto receives his orders to attack ("Climb Mount Nitaka!")
December 2, 1941:
Additional Magic messages indicate that Japan is still preparing for war, probably in Southeast Asia. Admiral Richardson discovers that naval intelligence has no real idea where the Japanese aircraft carriers are and is displeased. The Lexington Task Force (TF 2) leaves Pearl Harbor on a mission to deliver a Marine fighter squadron and scout bomber squadron to Midway Island. Orders are sent to Task Force 16 to link up with the Lexington and its task force and once the aircraft are delivered, Admiral Brown is ordered to scout the area between Midway and the Japanese Mandates. Admiral Halsey is sent orders to link up and take command of all three task forces once he completes his mission of delivering fighters to Wake Island. Richardson has orders not start a war with Japan, but he wants his fleet to be as concentrated as possible.
December 3, 1941 (Wednesday):
In Washington, an old Magic intercept, dated November 15th, is finally translated. It urges the Japanese consulate in Hawaii to make twice-weekly reports on the location of American warships in Pearl Harbor. No particular significance is attached to the message in Washington as it is assumed that the Japanese are merely updating their intelligence files on the U.S. Navy. However Admiral Richardson sees this entirely differently, and he persuades the Territorial Governor Poindexter and General Harmon to pressure the FBI to keep closer tabs on Japanese diplomatic personnel. A couple of days later, Lieutenant Commander Yoshikawa of the Imperial Japanese Navy, who is posing as diplomat, suffers a serious car accident and is hospitalized, where he remains until his internment once the war begins. Task Force 9, consisting of 4 oilers and 4 destroyers is ordered to sea where it is to link up with heavy cruiser Minneapolis and Rear Admiral Frank Fletcher will will lead this service group and escorts to rendezvous with Halsey and the carriers as Richardson wants them at sea longer.
December 4, 1941 (Thursday):
In Washington, the available Magic intercepts give a clear indication of Japanese intentions to go to war. For example, they urge Ambassador Nomura to destroy one of his special code machines. Admiral Halsey and the Enterprise task force (TF 3) delivers 12 F4F Wildcats to Wake Island. The American carriers and their supporting ships are moving toward a rendezvous.
(authors note: historical timeline with alterations)
Last edited:
authors note: Stilwell had just completed forming the 7th Infantry Division, is senior, is available, and well regarded. He is a natural choice for a ground forces commander.
more tomorrow... when the shooting starts....
another excellent source on the USN in 1941
http://www.fleetorganization.com/1941intro.html
the main page talks about the RN and USN in other time periods as well
another excellent source on the USN in 1941
http://www.fleetorganization.com/1941intro.html
the main page talks about the RN and USN in other time periods as well
Again the extra informational links are appreciated. The crap is about to hit.
It looks like the US will be in a position to intercept, or at least attack, the Japanese striking force aimed at Midway. This may help to pull the Japanese carriers from any follow up attacks against Hawaii. Just how well the defenses of Pearl Harbor and Oahu will be against the first Japanese attacks will have to be seen. The more planes that can be eliminated by damage or shot down by the US forces will be that much less available if/when the carrier forces engage one another.
It might also help, belatedly, just how crappy the Mark XIV torpedoes are.
It looks like the US will be in a position to intercept, or at least attack, the Japanese striking force aimed at Midway. This may help to pull the Japanese carriers from any follow up attacks against Hawaii. Just how well the defenses of Pearl Harbor and Oahu will be against the first Japanese attacks will have to be seen. The more planes that can be eliminated by damage or shot down by the US forces will be that much less available if/when the carrier forces engage one another.
It might also help, belatedly, just how crappy the Mark XIV torpedoes are.
The stiffest breeze could have had knock on effects on their plans for the Pacific Campaign, given how tight a schedule they were on.
Galveston Bay, another question on the Omaha's. Raleigh is assigned as Flotilla Leader, will it be replaced by one of the larger Destroyer Leaders, or have one of the early CLAA's asigned?
A comment on aircraft available from ships in port. In addition to using carrier airgroups this way, will you also use the scout planes from the Battleships and Cruisers, for closer in and Anti Submarine patrol? There is a photo from Pearl Harbor attack, showing a large number, just sitting on Ford Island. I believe a NJ umber of Cruisers sorted either without or with fewer then assigned scout planes.
Lost Freeway
Banned
I have a feeling the end of the Pacific War will be much nastier for Japan than IOTL.
for now the flotilla commander is based aboard a tender in port, aboard one of the destroyers at sea
regarding the float plane question... some of the float planes you have seen in pictures are the Ducks that are being sent out to Kure and French Frigate Shoals, the remainder are indeed conducting local patrol missions (looking for submarines mainly)
Driftless
Donor
By the end of 1941, I believe the OS2u Kingfisher was the floatplane for both Battleships and Cruisers, replacing the Curtis SOC Seagull (which would reappear back in action later in the war). Still, the J2F Ducks served well all over the place, in spite of being obsolete.
Just rember this is 1941,American torpedoes don't explode! The Mk14 has a failure rate of around 90% ,the destroyer's MK15 has a 100% failure rate (no records exist of one successfully detonating)while the MK13 for torpedo planes has around a 95% failure rate.
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