It's a bit confusing since the colors, since the blue lines to show converted lines blend in heavily with the black lines, but it seems that there's a blue line which branches off from Orsha on the Minsk-Smolensk line and goes down to Roslavl.
Nope, regular black line with an x at that branch, which denotes that the bridge was destroyed, so the branch line was useless. So the Orsha branch line was not in use.
Maybe this larger version is easier to see:
No blue lines branching off between Minsk and Smolensk other than the Pripyet one. The Mogilev line is just a thicker black line.
And yet both Quartermaster Staff documentation, 2nd Panzer Group diaries, and 2nd Army diaries state they were drawing from the Gomel railhead at the end of August. At this point, you are claiming that the Germans didn't know where their supplies were coming from. Given that the chaotic central organization of the rail nets is rather well-established while the unreliability of those recording what they received is not, it's more likely that the map was not up to date when it was drafted on August 28th.
Can you tell me where you got that? Gomel might have been the designation for that line and was somewhat operational by August 31st, but was so far from 2nd Panzer Group that it couldn't have been supplying 2nd Panzer Army.
It is extraordinarily unlikely that the rail map was incorrect when drafted given that it came from the AG-Center's general staff.
http://wwii.germandocsinrussia.org/...yu-polka-snabzheniya#page/36/mode/grid/zoom/1
They key was the collapse of the railways. Your denial of this is active historical negationism, but it is clearly outlined in the material and has been endlessely studied in logistical matters. You tried that it wasn't so because there were still occasionally trains reaching the railheads, but then truck columns also occasionally managed to get through the mud so by that logic the mud didn't do anything to German supply state. It's not about whether any trains or trucks got through as it is the number getting through and the trend there from about September 30th onwards is relentlessly down.
You haven't proven that was an issue in August-October, just repeatedly claimed it. Provide some documentation and what you mean by 'collapse' and we can try and come to some sort of agreement. Otherwise we're just talking passed one another. A slow downward trend in train arrival isn't a collapse, it at best is a slowdown, but wasn't the reason for the supply problems in October, as supposedly the train deliveries in November and December were lower than in October, but the Germans were still able to advance through November once the ground hardened. By your logic the Germans would have been totally stopped in November due to the train deliveries...but they weren't.
I said the situation would be the same as following the supply collapse. At the start of the advance, the situation would in fact be considerably worse then at the start of Typhoon: rail-throughput was much lower then at the start of Typhoon and there would be no stockpile for AGC to use in supplying the forces to force the breakthrough and create the pocket. Additionally, the Germans would not benefit from a thousand little planning details they did OTL. Relatively little things like being able to reconnoiter Soviet lines to determine weak points that all add up.
What was 'much lower'? Also by your own claim the stockpile was gone in the first two days, so played virtually no role in the pocket. As it was more resources were necessary to crack open the line because it had been allowed to solidify for months after the Smolensk pocket was wrapped up than would have been required in August due to the fluidity of the situation as Guderian's army group had taken Roslavl and ripped open the lines due to the destruction of the 28th army. The breakthrough was already there in the south, it was a question of exploiting it over the good highway to the East. In the north 3rd Panzer Group would have had a harder time forcing a breakthrough, but they were much closer to Smolensk and the situation in early-mid August was still relatively fluid.
Since the situation changed so much from August-October planning wasn't really all that critical in terms of weak spots, especially given the more fluid situation as of August; as it was it didn't prove to be all that necessary to quickly finding and exploiting the situation around Velyki Luki later in August or Guderian's relentless march south to Kiev IOTL without a period of rest and planning. The Soviets may have needed extensive planning and plotting to make their pockets possible, in 1941 the Germans did not, they were able to improvise on the fly and do extremely well. Smolensk happened on the fly and severely damaged Soviet forces.
Except it was used up creating the breakthrough. The breakthrough finished and exploitation began long before the pocket battles ended. Indeed, the creation of the pockets was a function of exploitation. Without the stocks, AGC's advance collapses before it can even breakthrough.
Maybe necessary as of October given how much the lines had solidified over months by that point, but not so much in August when things were still fluid, especially in the South where Guderian had ripped a big hole in the Soviet lines at Roslavl when the 28th army was destroyed there.
For comparison the situation south of Smolensk on August 1st and 8th during the destruction of the 28th army (and finishing off of the Smolensk pocket):
At least one gap was already achieved through the destruction of not just 1 Soviet army (the 28th), but also the destruction of the Smolensk pocket.
Then the situation on August 15th:
Western and Reserve Fronts getting ready for a major offensive to retake Smolensk, but nice and bunched up on the Vyazma axis, with German mobile divisions on either flank; 3rd Panzer Group pushing toward Belyi in the North and then southeast toward Vyazma had only half the distance to go as Guderian from Roslavl to Vyazma had the choice been made earlier to go east instead of pushing south, as we can see the results of by the 15th. Not nearly as much effort as would be needed on October 1st:
http://armchairgeneral.com/rkkaww2/maps/1941W/Moscow41/Moscow_Sep29_1941.jpg
I cover where the reinforcement divisions came from later in this post. I'll just also point out that the reformed armies in question were only reformed after Typhoon began, with 5th Army only being reformed around October 7th.
Officially the reformation of the army was administratively on the 7th, but the forces were already either there or were previously dispatched from other areas and already on the way before the German offensive began or shortly thereafter like the 32nd Rifles.
Here is what you posted:
I dismissed it as a non-sequitor because actually reading the article the focus is on the Soviet divisions that already existed when the war began which were in Siberia and got transferred westward, as these were the divisions that would count towards the myth of the Siberian divisions being some kind of elite reserve of forces from the pre-war period which is what the article is debunking. The article also briefly touches on the divisions formed in the Siberian District after the war began but it completely ignores the divisions formed in the Central Asian District. Nor does the article discuss the divisions drawn from parts of the Soviet deep rear which would have been on the European side of the Urals, like the Volga and Urals Military District, and were then transferred westward.
It mentions the Central Asian divisions right in the article:
http://www.operationbarbarossa.net/the-siberian-divisions-and-the-battle-for-moscow-in-1941-42/
For the purposes of this discussion, territory in the ‘western’ USSR is defined as west of a line running north/south, 100km west of the Urals. Therefore the following military districts and non-active fronts are included as being east of this line,
- The Urals Military District.
- The Siberia Military District.
- The Central Asia Military District.
- The Transbailkal Military District.
- The Far Eastern Front.
An individual examination of the history of each Red Army division that existed on 22nd June 1941 reveals that from 23rd June to 31st December 1941, a total of 28 divisions were transferred west. This included 18 rifle divisions, one mountain rifle division, three tank divisions, three mechanised divisions and three mountain cavalry divisions. The transfers occurred mainly in June (11 divisions) and October (nine divisions).
In the subsection of the article that talks about the transfers from August to October it lists the 14 divisions transferred of which most were actually Siberian, but does mention at least 1 Central Asian rifle division, the 238th Rifles, which appeared in October with the 49th Army of the Western Front, and 2 Central Asian cavalry divisions showing up in November at Kalinin.
Of these 14 divisions, two were small mountain cavalry divisions from Central Asia, while the three tank and mechanised divisions were very new and had very little (if anything) to do with Siberian personnel. The 58th and 60th tank divisions had only started forming in March-April 1941.
Then the article talks about all those formed during the war:
So the question is; who stopped the Germans in December 1941 if it couldn’t possibly have been hordes of newly arrived Siberian or East Front troops? The answer is a massive number of newly mobilised and deployed divisions and brigades. The Soviet land model shows that 182 rifle divisions, 43 militia rifle divisions, eight tank divisions, three mechanised divisions, 62 tank brigades, 50 cavalry divisions, 55 rifle brigades, 21 naval rifle brigades, 11 naval infantry brigades, 41 armies, 11 fronts and a multitude of other units were newly Mobilised and Deployed (MD) in the second half of 1941. If Mobilized and Not Deployed (MND) units are included then this list is considerably higher.(2) Even if the few Siberian divisions exhibited a higher than average combat proficiency in the winter of 1941/42, their contribution was almost insignificant compared to the mass of newly mobilised units. There is no doubt that the 1941 Soviet mobilisation programme was simply the largest and fastest wartime mobilisation in history. The multitude of average Soviet soldiers from all over the USSR that made up these units saved the day, and definitely not the existing units transferred west after June 1941, or the mostly non-existent and mythical Siberian divisions.
The list is those forces which arrived at Moscow between October 7th began and November 4th. In terms of which ones and from where they were brought in...
Rifle Divisions:
32nd (Volkhov Front)
238th (Central Asia MD)
332nd (Moscow MD)
413th (Far East)
327th (Orel MD)
316th (Central Asia)
93rd (Far East MD)
329th (Orel MD)
185th (???)
78th (Far East MD)
262nd (Moscow MD)
359th (Urals MD)
375th (Urals MD)
371st (Urals MD)
1st Guards Motorized (Southwestern Front)
82nd Motorized (Far East MD)
Ivanovo Militia (self-evident)
2nd Moscow Militia (self-evident)
3rd Moscow Militia (self-evident)
4th Moscow Militia (self-evident)
5th Moscow Militia (self-evident)
Yaroslavl Militia (self-evident)
Cavalry:
24th (Transcaucasus MD)
17th Mountain (Transcaucasus MD)
18th Mountain (Central Asia MD)
20th Mountain (Central Asia MD)
44th Mountain (???)
The last one listed is the 58th Tank Divisions (one of the last such divisions left in the Red Army) which came from the Far Eastern MD. As can be seen from above, of the 27 divisions used to reinforce Moscow during October, 2 I am still uncertain as where they came from, 2 were transferred in from other parts of the frontlines (a feat even more difficult then in shipping in from the deep rear), 8 came from the Moscow Military District, 2 came from an adjacent "frontline" military district (the Orel District), and the remaining 13 came from military districts within the Soviets deep rear.
How about when they arrived? October 7th-November 4th is a LONG time period. Not only that, but all these newly formed units wouldn't be there in August to save Moscow.
Also you're engaging in some padding the numbers. The Moscow militia divisions weren't brought in after October, they were already formed an in the defensive line as of September 1941!
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2nd_Rifle_Division_(Soviet_Union)#2nd_Formation
Formed from the 2nd Moscow Militia Division on 26 September 1941, the second formation served in the
32nd Army. The division received new equipment to supplement the equipment issued by the Moscow
Militia.
With the start of the German offensive against the Western Front at the end of September the division was forced into combat before it was fully brought up to strength. By 10 October 1941 the division had been driven into the 19th Army's and was encircled and destroyed by the Germans in the Vyazma pocket in October 1941.
The same with all the Moscow militia divisions. I can't even find reference to the Yaroslavl militia division either.
The Ivanovo Militia division was formed in August, showed up around Moscow in October, but only entered combat in December:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/332nd_Rifle_Division_(Soviet_Union)
The
332nd Rifle Division was formed in August, 1941, as a standard
Red Army rifle division, based on a militia division that had started forming about two weeks earlier; as a result it was known throughout the war as a "volunteer" division and carried the name "
Ivanovo" after its place of formation.
https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/332-я_стрелковая_дивизия
On October 10, 1941, following the order of the Moscow Military District, the division plunged into echelons and departed to the place of defense of the nearest southwestern approaches of Moscow; by the end of October 24, it took the line of defense of Krasnoye,
Chertanovo ,
Tsaritsyno , Broshlyo.
On November 7, 1941, the division was honored to participate in a
historical parade on Red Square in Moscow.
November 11 is included in the emerging 10th Army.
Participation in hostilities
As part of the 10th Army participated in the Soviet counteroffensive near Moscow. On December 6, the division launched an offensive from the area of Zaraisk to Silver Ponds, which were released the next day, December 7.
From the Russian language article on the November 7th parade it looks like they were also removed from combat several days in advanced to drill for it and prior they were allocated to a zone that didn't see combat IOTL.
Some divisions also only showed up in December 1941 like the 371st Rifles:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/371st_Rifle_Division_(Soviet_Union)#Battle_of_Moscow
On November 29 it was reassigned to
30th Army in
Western Front, arriving under those commands with no antitank battalion and with a signal company so short of training and equipment that it could not manage to advise Army headquarters of its arrival until December 1.
[2]
Disembarkation of the 371st, at
Savelovo station,
took place from December 2-5, after which it was concentrated in its designated area behind the Army's front.
The 348th and 379th Rifle Divisions were also reinforcing 30th Army at this time.
375th Rifles also only appeared arrived at the front in late December:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/375th_Rifle_Division_(Soviet_Union)#Formation
Maj. Gen. Vasilii Grigorevich Vorontsov was assigned to command of the division on September 1, and he would remain in this post until February 27, 1942. The division was briefly assigned to the 28th Reserve Army in November, but when it arrived at the front in late December it came under command of the
29th Army in
Kalinin Front.
[3]
Which in no way contradicts my point: many of the divisions had enough survivors among the fragments you reference to be rapidly reconstituted by using them as cadres around which the divisions were built and put back into battle to stop the Germans. This would still happen IATL.
Except the core of these armies weren't the reconstituted fragments of divisions, especially in October, it was the fresh pre-war divisions that were brought in at the last second coupled with the weather that enhanced their defensive abilities, as their attackers were limited to highway movement along previously fortified defensive zones. As of October their combat abilities were limited, things got better in November and beyond as they had time to get more reinforcements, replacement equipment, and 'gel' as new units.
The divisions I'm talking about were all ones which had yet been assigned to a parent formation. None of those divisions were assigned to the Reserve Front in August, although many were assigned to the Reserve and Western Fronts in September, as were all of the tank brigades.
Which divisions?
Are you sure? Because listening to it I hear him discuss the industrial evacuations and mainly focuses on the question of how much of it was directed centrally and how much was improvised from below... but at no point does he state that the industrial evacuations undermined the reinforcement of the frontline and the shuttling in of reserves or even mentions the latter in relation to the former.
His talking about the jumbled mess of the evacuation, thousands of rail cars jammed up at rail junctions, and improvisation being required due to how poorly planned everything was in practice is the take away. The official narrative did not really fit the reality on the ground when he looked at local records of what was going on. Coupled with the article, which supported what he said with additional info including about the theoretical idea that the evacuations weren't supposed to interfere with military operations, didn't really play out in reality. Things were better by winter as the evacuations were wrapping up, but it tied up a large amount of rolling stock and rail lines.
Total nonsense. Stahel cites no less then 33 sources during the course of that section, many of them about that interpretation and from literature and records from people who were there. Additionally, I noticed you terminated your selection at a highly specific point because from the very next paragraph:
I didn't include that because it was the section of his interpretation that wasn't really backed up and contrasted everything else he was quoting from first person accounts.
He was trying to explain away what the Russian observers were saying.
The first citation is tertiary literature: Bellamy's "Absolute War".
The next is a book called "Marshall Zhukov's Greatest Battles".
The next was Erickson's "Road to Stalingrad" with the interesting footnote:
As John Erickson noted: ‘Too much was often heaped on the populace: civilians were to man the militia, yet keep production going; train in reserve formations, run the administration, yet fulfil a host of paramilitary duties.The women, the youth and the aged had by their extreme exertions to plug gaps left by the failure to plan and failure to forecast. “Popular response” thus became one of the highest priorities of the regime; its counterpart was a direct, and often dramatic relationship between the populace and the “the authorities”, when the latter failed to do their job. The Moscow panic was a prime example of this; the contract of obedience was broken when “the authorities” failed to provide [a] minimum assurance of security’ (Erickson, The Road to Stalingrad, p. 231).
So yes the Soviet regime badly mismanaged the situation as they would here as well, but instead of being bogged down in the mud and stopped by the weather with some help from the 32nd rifles, in August or ever early September there wouldn't be those decisive factors a stop to the German advance.
There are twice as many citations above as in the section you quoted and paging through they seem to be largely the same kind: mostly other detailed academic studies with the occasional personal eyewitness record thrown in.
Number of citations is less important than what the citations are. The citations he uses to support that interpretation of why the panic happened was the result of mismanagement (as if that wouldn't be a problem ITTL) all come from tertiary literature, i.e. other historians opinions of why things happened rather than either first or second person accounts of what happened.
170 kilometers of defenses were completed according to your quote. That's more then enough to guard the western approaches to Moscow.
Read again:
It was planned to perform fortification and construction works of the first phase by October 10–25, 1941, and to complete the construction of the Moscow Mozhaisk line of defense on November 15–25
[27] . Sometimes
divisions of the national militia were involved in building fortifications , which were supposed to defend these lines, but “due to the difficult situation at the front” they were often thrown to the front line, where they were poorly trained and poorly armed, they quickly disappeared under powerful blows of the enemy
[28] .
By the beginning of October 1941 the construction of the line was not completed, the equipment was completed only by 40%. A total of 296
pillboxes , 535
DZOT , 170 km were built.
anti-tank ditches and 95 km.
escarpes [26] . Most of the bunkers were without hatches, armored shields and doors. As a rule, there was no
camouflage and ventilation, electricity was far from everywhere, and there were no surveillance devices
[32] .
AKA they were barely adequate as of mid-October IOTL and ITTL as of mid/late August they'd really not be ready whatsoever. The October mileage of defenses is not the August or even September mileage of defenses.
