Succesful Operation Barbarossa

[Deleted member 1487]

October in general is when the fall raputitsa starts, there is no distinction between the early and late part of the months. In fact, technically the surprising thing is that the raputitsa really began in mid-September. There was a brief interregenum at the end of September before the rains resumed in early-October. The unseasonable aspect was thus in September, not October.​

There were rains in September, but not Rasputitsa levels.

The logistical collapse projected was the exact sort that took place in October, when the railways broke down under the strain of trying to transport forward the supplies needed for the new offensive. This made the existence of mud was irrelevant: it doesn't matter what the state of the tiny end point of the logistical line between the railheads and the front was if the railways themselves, which ferried all the supplies to the railheads and supplied the trucks themselves, could not keep up. It was predicted as a result of an analysis undertaken by the German quartermaster staff on the consequences of the Red Army not cracking like Barbarossa had predicted it would in August. Additionally, a single infantry and a single panzer army was manifestly not going to be enough to take Moscow, it wouldn't even be enough to man the frontline of such an advance, so obviously it was never entertained.

The rail ways didn't break down, they continued to make deliveries throughout the campaign until the cold impacted their locomotives. The weather may have impacted some of the deliveries, but there wasn't a collapse, at most a slight reduction. The only collapse of sorts resulted from trains bursting their boilers in the cold in December-January.

What collapsed in the mud was the ability for wheeled logistical vehicles from being able to move back and from from the supply hubs to the front line. There was some congestion early on in the fighting due to supply and combat units competing for access to the same roads in the Vyazma area (Guderian had to deal with mud in the first week, which really hurt his supply apparatus and even limited his combat elements), but that was largely resolved within the first week; the rains and mud start during the pocket battles and really started limiting the ability to supply trucks to keep up with the advance.

Once the pocket battles happened, the Soviets didn't have enough left in August to stop a 2 armies advancing on Moscow, nor threaten their flanks in the Moscow area.

Yes? What do you think the Soviets reconstituted their forces following the disaster at the start of Typhoon with? You don't think those divisions were summoned out of the ether, do you? They were shipped in from the deep rear and assigned to reconstituted headquarters units. Nothing special about that.

They combined a handful of existing divisions with whatever militia, newly formed reservists, and whatever replacements they could find. The Soviet 5th Army that held the main highway to Moscow from Vyazma was basically a single pre-war division, newly arrived from the Far East after traveling for weeks, combined with a couple of newly formed tank brigades. In total only about 14 division were brought in from the 'deep rear', of which 8 were around Moscow and of those only 4 were available in October:
http://www.operationbarbarossa.net/the-siberian-divisions-and-the-battle-for-moscow-in-1941-42/
Without attacking units being confined to the roads due to the mud they could have been easily bypassed off road, but that was not an option as of early/mid-October. The major reinforcements formed/showed up in November.​

It would be unnecessary for the Soviets to abandon East Ukraine and the Donbass. Kiev may still fall, but with the destruction of the rail bridges over the central and southern D'niepr, the way AGS's logistical bottlenecks after it cross the river means that it won't be able to take all of East Ukraine without the destruction of Soviet forces. The most it could hope is pry the Soviets off the eastern bank of the D'niepr, which would see them just fall back to the minor river lines west-southwest of Poltava, Sumy, and petropavlovka. The bulk of the Southwestern Front's offensive power, which would be enhanced by the manpower and industrial resources of Eastern Ukraine, could thus be directed north while AGS is screened with just enough forces to hold it there and those forces could be joined by many of the offensive forces historically deployed for the December counter-offensive. 2nd Army's combat power would be so diffused trying to hold a front 500 kilometers wide that it would be trivial for even 1941 Soviet forces to punch through it anywhere they damn well please.

Depends, AG-South was still pressing on Southwest Front and did break through on the Dnieper on their own. Central Front was doing their own thing around North Ukraine against AG-Center and ITTL per you and everyone else they'd be focused on AG-Center's flank rather than helping Southwest Front.
Yes their logistics would be worse, significantly so without the 5000 trucks they got from AG-Center before Typhoon started, so would be unlikely to actually take the majority of the Donbass, but they could force evacuation of industry and turn it into the front line. Kharkov is only about 140 miles from Kremenchug where the 1st Panzer army breached the Dniepr, while the Donbass is 130 miles from Dneprepetovsk(sp?). Rostov of course is beyond out of the question, but getting to the Donbass is doable, enough to force an evacuation of industry and limit raw material extraction. Given the penetration of the Dniepr Southwest front can either fall back or hold it's positions, which then limits it's abilities to do much other than hold in place and desperately try to stem the breakout over the Dniepr. Given Stalin's 'no step back' policies it is really hard to see him authorizing a retreat out of Kiev or any part of the Ukraine, which means locking down the large forces in Ukraine in position until either something really bad happens or they can somehow advance.

Southwest front didn't have offensive power, nor did East Ukraine really yield them much in enhanced power from July-September. If they somehow push AG-South back over the Dniepr then yes retaining East Ukraine would be possible and they could benefit from it over the winter, but that is unlikely given how things were playing out IOTL and how much more need there would be around Moscow for reserves than building up Southwest Front. Central Front might get topped off to help threaten the flanks of AG-Center, but that does nothing for Southwest Front's situation vis-a-vis AG-South.

In terms of AG-Center, after Vyazma 2nd Panzer could cover the flank to the south and leave 3rd Panzer Army to continue on to Moscow, while 4th Panzer army, assuming they aren't attacking toward Leningrad in August-September, which ITTL probably wouldn't be the case if Moscow is the priority, will cover the northern flank and divert potential reinforcements from the northern Fronts to Moscow by threatening the Moscow-Leningrad RR.

The problems in question being the sort of logistical collapse that occurred in October. Since much more then two armies were needed to take Moscow, it was obviously inadequate.

Why would more than two armies be needed given the clear weather around Moscow and the lack of reserves in August once the West and Reserve Front are shattered at Vyazma. The rest can cover the flanks. The forces available in October for the last ditch defense weren't in European Russia in August-September.
As to the logistical problems of October, it was the mud more than anything. Other problems existed, but they were surmountable; if you're arguing that the rail situation was worse in October than in September or August, then attacking earlier was better.

AG-Center can't hold the flanks by sitting still, as the flanks are extending forward with the advance. In order to guard the flanks, it must join the advance. Otherwise what happens is the Soviet formations on either side of the line of advance defense simply walk through the gap between the spearheads and the start lines of the advance where the rest of AGC is sitting at and encircles the attacking portion of the German army by default.

The German 2nd army and 6th army were joined up and attacking IOTL as of August 1941, which locks down the Central Front and Kiev forces. 2nd Panzer is covering the area around Roslavl, probably helping the 2nd Army a bit, while the majority of forces attack east toward Vyazma, which pockets the bulk of the Reserve and West Fronts, leaving only a weak portion to the south and east of Central Front (and the elements that became the Bryansk Front after the destruction of Central Front IOTL in August). Since IOTL by mid-August 2nd Army has it's own rail line running through the Pripyet Marshes and wasn't part of the Smolensk line they can be supplied separately from the rest of AG-Center and deal with Central Front mostly on their own. Guderian would have to pull forces out of Yelnya (10th Panzer division on map below) and send them south to Roslavl (29th Motorized/VII Corps on map below) to attack east along the highway toward Vyazma (northeast of the Soviet 24th Army flag on map) as they did historically (10th Panzer closed the Vyazma pocket IOTL in October from Roslavl). 2nd Panzer army (forces on map south of the blue line drawn through Smolensk) could spare forces to help hold the Roslavl area and neuter Central Front, while in sacrificing the bridgehead of Yelyna it could pull out enough forces to push through the highway East of Roslavl to pocket Soviet forces around Yelnya from the south, which leaves the Soviets with very few forces outside the pocket either to the East or South.

The below situation is on August 8th 1941 for 2nd Army and 2nd Panzer Army around Roslavl against Central Front and Reserve Front to illustrate what we are talking about:

And yet Soviet rolling stock also proved more then enough to ship around all the required forces and reserves to finally halt the German advance, moving MILLIONS of men and their equipment and supplies to and around the frontlines, so obviously the rolling stock famine was not enough to actually inhibit it. Additionally, without the German advance into Eastern Ukraine (the necessity of evacuating which after the Kiev catastrophe was why the evacuations lasted all the way into late-September and October instead of terminating after early-September), the evacuations which took place there would not occur, so that rolling stock would be available to ship reinforcements and supplies instead.

Only after the evacuations were wound down and even then with a pretty significant delay. A big reason that is given for the failure of the winter counter offensive to destroy AG-Center was the delays in the rail system moving necessary forces around to attack either simultaneously or in sequence, while also failing to supply ammo and replacements (Rhzev ammo famine). Also, as discussed above, the necessity to evacuate industry in Ukraine may well still happen ITTL, while forces in Ukraine would need to stay put to defend it...and might end up getting destroyed anyway, just more slowly.

The Donbass was the largest single industrial region in the Soviet Union. There is no way that the partial loss (total loss is unrealistic, even if the city of Moscow proper fell the eastern parts of the region would still be retained) of the Moscow region, which occurred OTL anyways, would be a much worse blow in terms of the loss of industrial output and raw resources.

From what I've been able to find that doesn't seem to be the case; for a large region the Urals probably was more important, while for a more contained one the Moscow Oblast was more critical to the armaments industry:
US map of Soviet industry for bombing targets, Moscow is listed as the #1 industrial target, Donbass area targets are surprisingly small in terms of industry (not counting resource extraction I think):
http://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/wp-c...sian-and-Manchurian-Strategic-Urban-Areas.jpg

Edit:
https://books.google.com/books?id=bdG3AAAAQBAJ&pg=PA384&lpg=PA384&dq=moscow+industry+1940&source=bl&ots=mkfff-d2Va&sig=ACfU3U0nCtWg_xYcdxOcTcWb8aX5vcRQrg&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjW_rPr76XiAhVMHqwKHTEgBowQ6AEwFnoECDIQAQ#v=onepage&q=moscow industry 1940&f=false
This states that in 1940 Moscow alone was responsible for 15% of the entire industrial output of the USSR. No other city was remotely close to the output of Moscow.

https://books.google.com/books?id=TA1zVKTTsXUC&pg=PA591&lpg=PA591&dq=donbas+industry+1940&source=bl&ots=X85Zj_2Sso&sig=ACfU3U0W6k_CNbCkCiTUrB1aOM0i46FG8w&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjG2ous8aXiAhUlgK0KHRmDCrMQ6AEwIHoECDIQAQ#v=onepage&q=donbas industry 1940&f=false
This indicates the production of the Donbas relative to the rest of the economy was falling from the late 1920s to 1940. It was the most production coal region because it had been developed since the 1800s, but there were major coal regions also in Moscow and the Urals among others, the latter of which was growing exponentially under the Soviet regime.

Here Moscow is much more important in terms of heavy industry:

The Donbas was important for raw material extraction, but in terms of weapons industry it wasn't nearly as important as Moscow. Kharkov too was pretty important, but wasn't in the Donbas.

And yet much that is precisely what happened in October-November: the initial Soviet divisions were destroyed, the Soviets shipped in replacements that were able to stop the German advance and even move onto the offensive with some success. There is no reason to suppose it would be any different in August/September.

The limited remaining forces only survived October due to the weather impeding German logistics and off road attack mobility, preventing them from bypassing the limited forces in place on the highways. Without the weather problems in August whatever remaining forces could be bypassed and dealt with from the flanks and rear. Plus the divisions like the 32nd Rifles that was the core of 5th Army wasn't even in European Russia and was still several weeks away from arriving, along with the vast majority of the 'Siberians'. Don't think the situation in August is directly comparable to that of October-November; that's the entire advantage of attacking Moscow in August rather than October.

An earlier German offensive would have to hack through these divisions, which would greatly slow and bleed the Germans compared to the OTL Typhoon when those formations had been bled out and stuffed full of hastily raised conscripts, giving the Soviets time and overstretching the already inadequate German logistics past the breaking point. There likely would be a vastly smaller Vyazma pocket, with many more forces escaping, if there was one at all.

The Soviet forces of western and reserve fronts were largely hastily raised in July and August anyway. They similarly lacked heavy weapons and communications equipment, which heavily limited their ability to deal with a mobile threat on their flanks. The time the Soviets got in August-October to build up defenses, move up forces from the deep rear, evacuate industry, build more weapons, etc. wouldn't exist ITTL for them to develop survive a disaster like Vyazma. Plus you're forgetting that Guderian advanced MUCH further over worse roads from August-September out of Russia into Ukraine, drawing supply from Smolensk the entire time, but was able to close a huge pocket and defeat multiple Soviet offensives to stop him, despite having a huge flank being pressed on by Bryansk Front:

Thorough US military studies of Soviet operational art did not begin until the end of Vietnam. Prior to that, they received mentions, but no real effort was undertaken to study them and the whole idea was largely dismissed as an artificial division between strategy and tactics.

It's debatable when the US military started strongly looking into 'operational art'; they certainly were studying Soviet conduct in WW2, hence their effort to pump the Germans to info on Soviet war fighting methods. In the 1940s-50s though there was the nuclear interlude that was thought to make traditional warfighting concepts irrelevant, which was tossed away as a result of Korea. Vietnam also forced a series of diversions in US army attention with increased reliance on nukes for deterrence in Europe, but that doesn't meant there wasn't study of the Soviets and their likely attack methods, it was just competing for attention with the situation in Asia.

Airland Battle and the post-Vietnam reforms certainly marked a major reorientation of US military attention, but was something gestating well before it was officially adopted.
The dismissal of Operational level of war by the US was mostly an interwar issue, but practically speaking it existed and was called strategy. It was only in the 1980s that the US military adopted the term 'operational art', but that doesn't mean they didn't appreciate it, they just used different terminology and considering it a part of strategy:
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army-usawc/modern_operations.pdf

That the Japanese underestimated the rail capacity of the Trans-Siberian Railway is well established but to claim they had managed to carry out their fallback operation successfully is inaccurate: many Japanese formations were still out of place, those which had withdrawn had not yet reached their new (and incomplete) defensive positions yet, and the track record of footbound escaping well-supplied mechanized formations in pursuit while maintaining their combat effectiveness is poor. Whether it would have been successful is fundamentally unknown, as the war ended before further combat could take place.

Not so much that as the Soviets relying on non-rail movement to get forces into position, while also not appreciating how much was being shipped in from the US and stockpiled in the Far East for use against the Japanese:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet–Japanese_War#Background_and_buildup

The Japanese had been monitoring Trans-Siberian Railway traffic and Soviet activity to the east of Manchuria and in conjunction with the Soviet delaying tactics, this suggested to them that the Soviets would not be ready to invade east Manchuria before the end of August. They did not have any real idea, and no confirming evidence, as to when or where any invasion would occur.[11] They had estimated that an attack was not likely in August 1945 or before Spring 1946; but Stakva had planned for a mid-August 1945 offensive and had concealed the buildup of a force of 90 divisions. Many had crossed Siberia in their vehicles to avoid straining the rail link.[31]
Glantz, David M. (1995). When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler. Kansas, USA: University Press of Kansas. p. 278. ISBN 0-7006-0899-0.

Sure, the Japanese didn't achieve their entire fall back plan as envisioned, they were however successful in pulling back forces capable of continued resistance and the Soviets failed to trap and destroy them. But since you're unwilling to accept Japanese estimates about how combat capable they were, we might just have to agree to disagree.

The way I said: he does not even really address it and just moves on to complaining about the historiography. This is all he writes on the issue:

"This, of course, leaves the argument that it was a 'deep battle', where the speed of advance caused surprise effects, which in turn caused psychological effects in the Japanese command & control. The consequences due to the refusal of the 2rd Area Army to follow plans may be seen as such effects. It caused, as a ripple effects, new re-deployment orders which were neither coherent nor realistic for the 4th Army. However, the event that arguably caused the most decisive psychological effect on the Kantogun was the Japanese Emperor's surrender broadcast on 15 August."

As an eagle-eyed reader will note, he doesn't actually provide the slightest argument against it, just making a non-sequitur with the Emperor's surrender message, and actually provides evidence supporting it. This is followed immediately by him moving into the section labelled "Analysis: a critique of a narrative" which is pretty much what I said: him complaining about a Soviet bias in the narrative.

I could use some more context to determine what the point he was trying to make was.
Also, there has been a Soviet bias in talking about the campaign, since most of the narrative has been based on Soviet claims...which we know from their official history claims about what they were achieving in Europe was exaggerated.

Blatantly false. Books published based on the German archival information I am referring too date back to the 1990s, long before that article was written.

Sure, some have, but have those books (which titles BTW?) had nearly as much impact as Glantz and House's publications? If anything the Soviet archives opening has dominated the narrative a lot more than the German ones had, since they had been available for so long.

I said the process was mostly a post-Cold War one. Certainly, the initial steps were taken late in the Cold War, after Vietnam made the US military start seriously reconsidering it's perspective on Operational Art, but without access to Soviet archives there was only so much material to work with and their impact of their efforts were relatively limited when it came to WW2 historiography. The bulk of the work was done after the archives were opened and especially after wall came down.

Western historians were writing WW2 books on the Soviet experience using interviews with Soviet military veterans in the 1960s, like Erickson and Alexander Werth (who was a Russo-British Journalist who spent WW2 in Russia):
https://www.amazon.com/Russia-at-War-1941-1945-History/dp/1510716254
https://www.amazon.com/Soviet-High-Command-Military-Political-Institutions/dp/0415408601
https://www.amazon.com/Road-Staling...coding=UTF8&psc=1&refRID=69PAC0WGME7HNV70Q5X4
https://www.amazon.com/road-Berlin-...coding=UTF8&psc=1&refRID=69PAC0WGME7HNV70Q5X4

Werth even wrote books about the Soviet experience in 1946:
https://books.google.com/books/about/The_Year_of_Stalingrad.html?id=-qAjPQAACAAJ

Sunday Times war-correspondent Werth spent four years in the Soviet Union during WW2. He traveled widely, interviewed Russian officers and enlisted men, civilians and German prisoners. His diary entries and description of why and how the Russians managed to turn back the Nazi invasion make this a fascinating book to read.

During WW2 he published on the Moscow campaign and Leningrad siege:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexander_Werth

• Moscow '41. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1942. Published in USA as Moscow War Diary.

• Leningrad. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1944.

In the 1970s another WW2 journalist published on Stalingrad with a lot of interviewing of Soviet veterans and commanders who were there:
https://www.amazon.com/Secret-Stalingrad-Walter-Boardman-Kerr/dp/0385134592

The interest in the Soviet story during WW2 was really always there and published on extensively. The post-Cold War archive revolution allows gaps to be filled in and more details to emerge about what happened, which allows a post-Soviet narrative to be constructed about the Soviet conduct of the war, warts and all, but it doesn't really produce any startling revelations that up end our understanding of the war, that work had been done during the Cold War.

Yeah, no. One has to be blind in their reading of the development of historiography on this matter in western history as overwhelmingly dominated by the German narrative until very late in the Cold War and the bulk of overturning the narrative occurred in the 90s. Erickson was one of the starters (Alan C Clark was another) in questioning the (original) German narrative, but pointing to the exceptions does not disprove the rule. That the Soviet Union was regarded as enormously powerful from the late-40s on is not the same as the historians and professionals who studied during the early and mid-Cold War regarding it as sophisticated and successful, seeing as most views were based on quantity while putting little stock in quality, and more specifically sophisticated and successful in WW2. As you yourself pointed out, official Soviet narratives were (with a great degree of justice) ignored and none of your links actually back up your assertions. Even your last link is mainly devoted to discussing the opening of the archives that started in the 1987, when the Cold War was already practically over! Actual studies of the historiography are rather specific on this:​

You haven't proven your point that only the German narrative was dominant. It has certainly been asserted, but if you look at the older works on the Eastern Front that include interviews with mostly Soviet veterans and commanders there is a wealth of history out there that dated from at least the 1960s if not even during WW2. The Soviet official history was largely dismissed, though parts of it were useful, but a lot of work was done by American and British journalists who had been in Russia during WW2 to produce histories of the Eastern Front that gave the Soviets a voice to tell their stories. Technology has made it easier to disseminate this information since the end of the Cold War, but it was out there before.

BTW your link is timed out.

Also that quote is frankly BS. The books I cited above prove that there was work done in the middle of the Cold War and even during WW2 that extensive reports on the Soviet experience from interviews with Soviet veterans and leaders.
​

Most of the interest in studying the Eastern Front thoroughly during this period took place in Germany and the USSR:

There was without a doubt more interest in the countries that actually fought on the Eastern Front in studying it first, but that doesn't meant there wasn't english language histories of the Eastern Front being written that were of good quality. I have several of the books I cited and they still hold up even after the Archive Revolution.
And to claim that for the Germans WW2 is still primarily viewed as the Eastern Front is nonsense. I've been to Germany and Austria several times and they really do not think that, nor do books on WW2 they publish focus on that. There are probably more books on the bombing of German cities in WW2, the naval war, the air war, the fighting in France and Italy, etc. than on the Eastern Front. That said they generally have more on the Eastern Front because of the balance in their war time experience, but it's more like 60-40 non-eastern front:eastern front.

You are not going to find a serious article written by a professional historian on the Eastern Front which seriously argues that this is not how the historiographical view of the Eastern Front has developed.

​

Since most modern historians weren't around in the 1960s publishing history, they wouldn't really know for a fact and are relying on received wisdom and marketing by some of the older guys still publishing and focused on Soviet history of the war. After all the guys publishing on the Eastern Front today are trying to squeeze even more interest and money out of the saturated WW2 market, so they do have to present their works as something new and unique.
If you wanted to argue that the US historiography of WW2 was too focused on US contributions and theaters then I wouldn't argue with you at all, the trope about for Americans WW2 being "Pearl Harbor, D-Day, and the Atomic Bomb" has quite a bit of truth to it, which down plays the Eastern Front in general, rather than necessarily giving the German version of the Eastern Front the only hearing.

We can see it today, with you dismissing in just the last couple of pages the success as being entirely to the (debatable) decline of German strength and giving no credit to the improvements in the Soviets own capabilities.

The Soviets had declining capabilities as you yourself claimed in this very post!!! You said the Soviet forces on the Moscow axis in October were weaker in October than in August, which is claiming that the Soviet capabilities were declining, not improving over the course of 1941. Similarly the Germans were also getting weaker over the course of 1941, which no one would deny I'd think, least of all you given how often you've cited Stahel.

I hope you'll remember though that I did cite the Soviets getting stronger in November and December around Moscow, which enabled their successful defense once Typhoon resumed and then their counteroffensive. So they did improve in capabilities by the end of 1941 relative to the Germans and the success they did enjoy was a function of both German weakness and Soviet increased capabilities...which was then frittered away throughout the winter.

 

[Michele]

Could Wallies really just wait 4 years dor the bomb to be ready?

Of course the Western Allies would do other things too. Sweep Africa. But then the Germans, in Europe, would be building up their naval, submarine and air and anti-air strength, whence the mention of a very different war. The Westerners would try to win those wars, first, and the Battle of the Atlantic would become even more difficult with the Germans not having to pour most steel and batteries into tanks. The air war would become even more significant, and therefore even more technological; with the Germans being able to spend more resources in air defense, the Westerners cannot win by sheer numbers or brute force. A peripheral landing operation will probably take place some time, in some place like Sicily or, more likely, the Greek islands, and a slooow offensive will go in from there. But I doubt the Western Allies can keep to the D-Day timetable, with the Germans continuing to be able to redeploy to Europe unneeded troops from the mopping-up operations towards the Urals.
So I do think it will come to the nukes in Europe, yes.

 

[Michele]

So pointing out the facts is now a team cheerleading?

As I said, the problem is not with the facts.
Suppose we were talking about the battle of Arracourt, where in 1944 US troops destroyed a German attack, which included plenty of Panthers, which ended the day as burning hulks on the battlefield.
As we're discussing this, up comes a guy who writes: "Hey, but a Panther's main gun could take out a Sherman's front armor from a km away!".
That fact is a fact. Nobody denies it. Injecting it in that discussion in that way has a tone of team cheerleading, though, yes.

Kesselring is more than a simple 'memorialist' he was the guy who ran the campaign and was trying to salvage his reputation.

Memorialists of course write their memoirs, so yes, they write about the campaigns they were in, and yes, they all try to salvage their reputations. Nobody looks bad in their own memoirs, is the adage. And your remark reminded me of that sort of situation.

Depending on when the alternate offensive happens against Moscow, it would probably only take them a matter of weeks to reach Moscow, which really wasn't defended once the Western and Reserve Fronts were defeated. So if they attack in mid-August they'd be there well before the end of September, probably by early September. There weren't Soviet reserve armies though to put in the city that quickly given the Soviet rail situation.

You don't seem to be considering the German rail situation though. They might decide to attack in that direction by mid-August, yes. Can they apply all the force needed, with all the supplies needed, all the way, at that time? Mmmm.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

As I said, the problem is not with the facts.
Suppose we were talking about the battle of Arracourt, where in 1944 US troops destroyed a German attack, which included plenty of Panthers, which ended the day as burning hulks on the battlefield.
As we're discussing this, up comes a guy who writes: "Hey, but a Panther's main gun could take out a Sherman's front armor from a km away!".
That fact is a fact. Nobody denies it. Injecting it in that discussion in that way has a tone of team cheerleading, though, yes..

K. Where do you feel I did that?

Memorialists of course write their memoirs, so yes, they write about the campaigns they were in, and yes, they all try to salvage their reputations. Nobody looks bad in their own memoirs, is the adage. And your remark reminded me of that sort of situation..

K. Again, where do you feel I did that exactly?

You don't seem to be considering the German rail situation though. They might decide to attack in that direction by mid-August, yes. Can they apply all the force needed, with all the supplies needed, all the way, at that time? Mmmm.

Believe me I have, even going so far as to get books on the subject and look up maps about the advancement of the rail conversion that were in the Russian archives captured from the Germans. It is a debatable situation of course, but based on the historical record at the time of what was done and where the rail conversions were at that it was achievable had the goal been Moscow in July-August 1941 rather than Hitler being obsessed with clearing the flanks first in accordance with his pre-war strategic scheme.

 

[Michele]

Maybe, instead of going back to the endless hypotheses that are behind Stolfi's idea, and which have been trotted out numberless times without ever making a truly convincing case, we might focus on replying to the OP question. Leaving aside that it's a very low-probability scenario, after all in real history we've seen low-probability events actually happening.

Say, Leningrad fell in the fall of 1941 due to some mysterious event, this brought about a domino effect (including politically) and caused the fall of Moscow by the end of the year, the Soviet winter offensive took place but while partially successful did not re-establish the situation, and the 1942 campaign not only pushed the Soviets further back in the center, East of Moscow, but also cleared the unsolved situation in the South (Kiev and farther in), with the campaign ending with the fall of Stalingrad.

The Caucasus and its oilfields are still in Soviet hands, shaky as those are now. On the other hand, the opportunity was too good to pass for the Rikugun, and Vladivostok has fallen, to the Japanese, too. Lend-Lease has stopped, and to reopen that flow the Iran route must be used - if there is the political will, in the West, to support the failing Soviets. The situation in Africa and the Pacific is per OTL.

What next?

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Say, Leningrad fell in the fall of 1941 due to some mysterious event, this brought about a domino effect (including politically) and caused the fall of Moscow by the end of the year, the Soviet winter offensive took place but while partially successful did not re-establish the situation, and the 1942 campaign not only pushed the Soviets further back in the center, East of Moscow, but also cleared the unsolved situation in the South (Kiev and farther in), with the campaign ending with the fall of Stalingrad.

The Caucasus and its oilfields are still in Soviet hands, shaky as those are now. On the other hand, the opportunity was too good to pass for the Rikugun, and Vladivostok has fallen, to the Japanese, too. Lend-Lease has stopped, and to reopen that flow the Iran route must be used - if there is the political will, in the West, to support the failing Soviets. The situation in Africa and the Pacific is per OTL.

What next?

Fall 1941 is too late to affect the necessary change in the Eastern Front. Moscow would need to fall in 1941 and Leningrad falling in autumn isn't going to help that. It was possible, apparently Voroshilov panicked in September and ordered Leningrad to start demolishing the city and scuttle the fleet, but Zhukov showed up in time and countermanded the order. Have Zhukov be delayed for a week or so and Leningrad probably falls due to all the damage Voroshilov's command does to defenses and the ability to sustain the city. Moscow is probably too well defended to be taken directly without pyrrhic level casualties in the process. Plus it prevents Case Blue and Stalingrad from happening due to the level of forces that would have to be focused on Moscow in 1942.

That probably triggers the Japanese to consider some sort of intervention though, but given their own position in the Summer of 1942 they aren't really in a position to do much other than blockade Soviet ports in the Far East and dare them to try something in response.

As to what is next...continued fighting in the USSR into 1943 though with much reduced LL famine is destroying Soviet ability to resist, so the Eastern Front is winding down, but still sucking in a huge part of Wehrmacht strength.

 

[thorr97]

wiking,

One of the more difficult things to portray is the "morale effect" in any sort of ATL scenario. Yet, in reality, its effect can be huge and definitely override the factual advantages / disadvantages on the ground. In this ATL, the months of non-stop German victories and the months of non-stop Soviet defeats combined with the horrendous numbers of Red Army troops slaughtered and the seemingly incompetent "leadership" in Moscow, that could combine into the very sort of "defeatist" mentality which the Soviets were so brutal in suppressing. They new that such talk within their own ranks could make such a defeat even more likely.

In this ATL, I don't think it'd take all that much to change such things. Perhaps some local commanders and troops seeing nothing but slaughter and defeat coming from their previous efforts are just a bit more hesitant about rushing into yet another battle in which the only likely outcome is yet more slaughter and defeat. So, they don't rush in as quickly as they did in OTL and they don't press the fight as hard as they did in OTL. And, as a result, the slaughter and defeat not only continues but gets worse in some key aspects.

The Soviet Army's being able to hold the Germans back along the south of lake Ladoga is one such key aspect. In OTL, the Soviets were able to hold on to that peninsula jutting out from the southern edge of the lake. That allowed them to run supplies across the lake through the winter. Had the Germans driven the Red Army off of that peninsula then the "ice road" would have had to have run an impossible distance and have gone much further out into the lake to avoid German fire. That would've either greatly reduced the amount of supplies that could've been brought across the lake or eliminated them entirely.

That could've caused the city's defenses to have failed.

The Germans wouldn't even have to bother grinding through the city to defeat it. Just keep it cut off and let it starve itself to death.

And with Leningrad cut off and bypassed, the Germans could then have continued east until they reached the rail line running up to Murmansk. Cutting that would have essentially cut off that city from resupply as well.

Again, all of this would then have allowed the Germans to shift forces to apply them in Army Groups Center and South. It also would've been an even greater blow to Russian morale and that too would've had its systemic effect.

 

[Zincwarrior]

Fall 1941 is too late to affect the necessary change in the Eastern Front. Moscow would need to fall in 1941 and Leningrad falling in autumn isn't going to help that. It was possible, apparently Voroshilov panicked in September and ordered Leningrad to start demolishing the city and scuttle the fleet, but Zhukov showed up in time and countermanded the order. Have Zhukov be delayed for a week or so and Leningrad probably falls due to all the damage Voroshilov's command does to defenses and the ability to sustain the city. Moscow is probably too well defended to be taken directly without pyrrhic level casualties in the process. Plus it prevents Case Blue and Stalingrad from happening due to the level of forces that would have to be focused on Moscow in 1942.

That probably triggers the Japanese to consider some sort of intervention though, but given their own position in the Summer of 1942 they aren't really in a position to do much other than blockade Soviet ports in the Far East and dare them to try something in response.

As to what is next...continued fighting in the USSR into 1943 though with much reduced LL famine is destroying Soviet ability to resist, so the Eastern Front is winding down, but still sucking in a huge part of Wehrmacht strength.

Wouldn't the Pacific campaign bleed off Japanese efforts though? In mid 1942 they've lost a major portion of their fleet and are very focused on the Pacific. They're effectively stopped from invading Australia. Guadalcanal starts historically in August. With Japanese forces in Russia where do the Japanese troops come from to fight Guadalacanal and reinforce the islands?

Additionally do the Wallies invade Europe in 1943 then? It relieves the Soviets, and was a serious plan. It would generate substantially higher Wallied casualties.

 

[Post]

Additionally do the Wallies invade Europe in 1943 then? It relieves the Soviets, and was a serious plan. It would generate substantially higher Wallied casualties.

Well, technically they did that in OTL, Sicily and Italy are in Europe. I would expect them to do that in this ATL as well. Invading France in 1943 is not really feasible, I think. They need to build up experience. Although it might work, since there will be less fortifications.

Maybe alyternatively they will provide a BEF and/or AEF in Russia, if Russia doesn't surrender, because they would really want to keep Russia in the war.

And as @Michele said, at a certain point the bomb will hit a german city.

 

[Zincwarrior]

They could focus all their efforts and invade France in September 1943 instead of Italy (Operation Roundup and Sledgehammer). As noted, it causes higher Wallied casualties, but if the USSR begins to actually falter, then it becomes more of a pressing option. If the USSR falls or settles, then the Germans are able to redeploy major formations earlier, thus potentially eliminated the European Theater (aka they win).

 

[ObssesedNuker]

Ah god damn it, I come back to save what I had into a more permanent word format. And it was almost done!

 

[Deleted member 1487]

wiking,

One of the more difficult things to portray is the "morale effect" in any sort of ATL scenario. Yet, in reality, its effect can be huge and definitely override the factual advantages / disadvantages on the ground. In this ATL, the months of non-stop German victories and the months of non-stop Soviet defeats combined with the horrendous numbers of Red Army troops slaughtered and the seemingly incompetent "leadership" in Moscow, that could combine into the very sort of "defeatist" mentality which the Soviets were so brutal in suppressing. They new that such talk within their own ranks could make such a defeat even more likely.

In this ATL, I don't think it'd take all that much to change such things. Perhaps some local commanders and troops seeing nothing but slaughter and defeat coming from their previous efforts are just a bit more hesitant about rushing into yet another battle in which the only likely outcome is yet more slaughter and defeat. So, they don't rush in as quickly as they did in OTL and they don't press the fight as hard as they did in OTL. And, as a result, the slaughter and defeat not only continues but gets worse in some key aspects.

The Soviet Army's being able to hold the Germans back along the south of lake Ladoga is one such key aspect. In OTL, the Soviets were able to hold on to that peninsula jutting out from the southern edge of the lake. That allowed them to run supplies across the lake through the winter. Had the Germans driven the Red Army off of that peninsula then the "ice road" would have had to have run an impossible distance and have gone much further out into the lake to avoid German fire. That would've either greatly reduced the amount of supplies that could've been brought across the lake or eliminated them entirely.

That could've caused the city's defenses to have failed.

The Germans wouldn't even have to bother grinding through the city to defeat it. Just keep it cut off and let it starve itself to death.

And with Leningrad cut off and bypassed, the Germans could then have continued east until they reached the rail line running up to Murmansk. Cutting that would have essentially cut off that city from resupply as well.

Again, all of this would then have allowed the Germans to shift forces to apply them in Army Groups Center and South. It also would've been an even greater blow to Russian morale and that too would've had its systemic effect.

Not sure about the morale effect, the Soviets were willing to keep throwing men into the meat grinder regardless of cost and even perceived utility. Once it was clear IOTL that Moscow was successfully held, the Soviet commanders were willing to fight it out regardless and use whatever means to keep the men fighting on. As has been pointed out in other threads though, the Soviet soldier was willing to keep fighting on beyond even just the terror their own side imposed on them, so they did have a willingness to keep fighting for their country even in the most suicidal situations beyond what was forced on them by commissars or military 'justice'.

As to what you're proposing for Leningrad, I've actually posted a few threads on just that scenario, so I agree with your assessment. But that is a 1942 result, not something happening in 1941 per OP. There were several situations where it could potentially have fallen in 1941, which would have had a greater impact than a 1942 defeat.

Wouldn't the Pacific campaign bleed off Japanese efforts though? In mid 1942 they've lost a major portion of their fleet and are very focused on the Pacific. They're effectively stopped from invading Australia. Guadalcanal starts historically in August. With Japanese forces in Russia where do the Japanese troops come from to fight Guadalacanal and reinforce the islands?

Additionally do the Wallies invade Europe in 1943 then? It relieves the Soviets, and was a serious plan. It would generate substantially higher Wallied casualties.

I think it would. They still have a much stronger navy than the Soviets do in the Far East, so it shouldn't be any significantly greater strain to stop Soviet shipping into the Far East, since nearly all of it came into Vladivostok and was very bottlenecked. They don't need to invade the Far East, just make the Soviets' lives harder by stopping US shipping. The Soviets are even worse off on the ground than the Kwantung Army was in terms of being able to project forces across the border.

I think you have a point about the Wallies invading France in 1943 (or even late 1942) ITTL. That probably precludes Torch, as the Wallies would need everything to get ready ASAP to help the Soviets if they had already lost Leningrad in 1941, lose Moscow in 1942, and potentially face a Japanese blockade of the Far East in 1942 as well.

Ah god damn it, I come back to save what I had into a more permanent word format. And it was almost done!

Sorry, that really sucks.

Mainly because you simply look at what tracks were converted and give completely no regard to throughput.

We've covered that too, as did the German phd thesis on the role of rail during Barbarossa that I got my hands on and was quoted by van Creveld. Where the rail hubs were at different points in the campaign as well as throughput both mattered, plus of course what was happening at the time. Such as Guderian's thrust south toward Ukraine from the area south of Smolensk in August; where the rail lines he was supplied from matter, as did the throughput, as did who else was drawing from that same link and what they were dealing with.

Well, technically they did that in OTL, Sicily and Italy are in Europe. I would expect them to do that in this ATL as well. Invading France in 1943 is not really feasible, I think. They need to build up experience. Although it might work, since there will be less fortifications.

Maybe alyternatively they will provide a BEF and/or AEF in Russia, if Russia doesn't surrender, because they would really want to keep Russia in the war.

And as @Michele said, at a certain point the bomb will hit a german city.

They didn't really need to build up experience to try an invasion if they were desperate, though there would be a blood price for not doing so. That is why the Brits were reluctant to try it if not absolutely necessary, since they'd be bearing a disproportionate share of the price in 1942-43 due to the lack of US forces at that point capable of being used. But if the USSR is really one the ropes, more than IOTL, they may well not have a choice. Stalin wanted a 2nd Front in France ASAP, so he'd probably prevent any sort of Wallied commitment to the Eastern Front to force that (so no BEF/AEF in Russia) as per OTL.

Depending on how the rest of the war plays out a peace deal potentially could be reached before the A-bomb is ready.

 

[thaddeus]

Fall 1941 is too late to affect the necessary change in the Eastern Front. Moscow would need to fall in 1941 and Leningrad falling in autumn isn't going to help that. It was possible, apparently Voroshilov panicked in September and ordered Leningrad to start demolishing the city and scuttle the fleet, but Zhukov showed up in time and countermanded the order. Have Zhukov be delayed for a week or so and Leningrad probably falls due to all the damage Voroshilov's command does to defenses and the ability to sustain the city. Moscow is probably too well defended to be taken directly without pyrrhic level casualties in the process. Plus it prevents Case Blue and Stalingrad from happening due to the level of forces that would have to be focused on Moscow in 1942.

still think they let the capture of Leningrad slip away with the Soviet fleet from Talinn https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_evacuation_of_Tallinn and later at Hanko (nearly 30,000 Soviet troops evacuated to Leningrad) but those evacuations did not occur until August and later.

do you think they could have reshuffled and made more of an effort at Rostov for the remainder of 1941, eclipsing the historical Typhoon?

 

[ObssesedNuker]

We've covered that too, as did the German phd thesis on the role of rail during Barbarossa that I got my hands on and was quoted by van Creveld. Where the rail hubs were at different points in the campaign as well as throughput both mattered, plus of course what was happening at the time. Such as Guderian's thrust south toward Ukraine from the area south of Smolensk in August; where the rail lines he was supplied from matter, as did the throughput, as did who else was drawing from that same link and what they were dealing with.

And they showed that throughput was quite inadequate for AGC to conduct an advance on Moscow in August 1941. Guderian, contrary to your claims, was not drawing from AGC, but from the same source as 2nd Army: the rail lines you mentioned running through Pripyat. His railheads were much closer. The throughput data also shows rather conclusively that only a 14-17 divisions could be supported in an advance eastward on the Moscow axis and that is simply not going to be enough to breakthrough the Soviet lines, pull off the Vyazma encirclement, and then advance all the way, even in 1941. They can't even hold the front. You know this, because something I noticed with your spiel, and one of the points I was going to try to make on your recent post, is you keep trying to have it both ways: somehow AGC advances with it's near-full strength so as to pull off the Vyazma encirclement and adequately secure the flanks and yet the Germans only have to logistically support two armies advancing on the Moscow Axis. These are mutually contradictory: either the bulk of AGC advances and thus puts unacceptable strain on that quickly brings it back to a halt October, or only two armies advance and that is quite insufficient to take a Moscow defended by some 10 Soviet armies and able to call upon a potential reinforcement pool of up to 96 divisions from the strategic reserves if necessary as of the end of August.

 

[Michele]

Wouldn't the Pacific campaign bleed off Japanese efforts though? In mid 1942 they've lost a major portion of their fleet and are very focused on the Pacific. They're effectively stopped from invading Australia. Guadalcanal starts historically in August. With Japanese forces in Russia where do the Japanese troops come from to fight Guadalacanal and reinforce the islands?

From China. Remember, Japan is two states and two armed forces in one, fighting two wars. The Rikugun is forced in OTL to suspend its plans, but in this ATL the imminent (or even actual) collapse of the Soviets makes them win the objections in Tokio.
Then of course they are in difficulty as to manpower, with the Pacific operations going on as you say; but they will rather reduce their own things in China than to admit with the Kaigun they can't supply regiments.

Additionally do the Wallies invade Europe in 1943 then? It relieves the Soviets, and was a serious plan. It would generate substantially higher Wallied casualties.

Of course they'll do something, but the Germans, while still committed to taking the oilfields in the Caucasus, can redeploy significant air assets, first, and then ground assets, to fortress Europe. Additionally, by 1942 they'll be increasing the U-Boat production and the Battle of the Atlantic is no mean feat.

At the very least, the Westerners take many more casualties in Sicily and probably do not achieve the flipping of Italy. Or, possibly, Husky is a colossal failure. Even more casualties.
Alternatively, the Westerners seek something even more peripheral (and way less significant), say Greek islands. There they can succeed, but it's not much.
But none of these are going to provide real relief to the Soviets, who are anyway losing ground everywhere in 1943.

 

[Michele]

They could focus all their efforts and invade France in September 1943 instead of Italy (Operation Roundup and Sledgehammer).

Sorry to disagree. By 1942, the Germans will be building more U-Boote than in OTL, by late 1942 they'll be redeploying significant air assets from Russia to the Med and France, and by early 1943 veteran ground troops too.
It's a daring Western leadership the one who goes ahead with Husky here, and I wouldn't rule out they do even less than that.

 

[liomarcus]

Hello,
i was planning to make a timeline on this topic (HOI4 AAR with bitter peace new order mod) but i lost the 10 pages from 1930 to 1943, now it's time to rewrite it.

I will use this time to make a more indeep and more realistic timeline for this period.
And of course every timeline for WW2 have his barbarossa part. I must say that it s not working well everytime i try on HOI 1, 2, 3 or even 4. But sometime i win with the germans.

My question is :

Is it realistic that a major change of plan can occur (like for the offenssive in France) before the attack. Everytime i try a full attack on 3 axe like the historical one i failed. But when I make Lenigrad the first and only objective ( with landing 4 DIV and paratroopers 2DIV at the right moment) in a first phase then from there Moscou (using better roads than in the south) with a finsh on the black sea (where the south group meet the the central group). I capture most of Soviet Units in a big (vey big) trap.

After that i can advance east without difficulty i call that strat the swing door strategy.

But is it realistic ?

 

[Michele]

Hello,
i was planning to make a timeline on this topic (HOI4 AAR with bitter peace new order mod) but i lost the 10 pages from 1930 to 1943, now it's time to rewrite it.

I will use this time to make a more indeep and more realistic timeline for this period.
And of course every timeline for WW2 have his barbarossa part. I must say that it s not working well everytime i try on HOI 1, 2, 3 or even 4. But sometime i win with the germans.

My question is :

Is it realistic that a major change of plan can occur (like for the offenssive in France) before the attack. Everytime i try a full attack on 3 axe like the historical one i failed. But when I make Lenigrad the first and only objective ( with landing 4 DIV and paratroopers 2DIV at the right moment) in a first phase then from there Moscou (using better roads than in the south) with a finsh on the black sea (where the south group meet the the central group). I capture most of Soviet Units in a big (vey big) trap.

After that i can advance east without difficulty i call that strat the swing door strategy.

But is it realistic ?

Define "realistic" and the timetable of changes.
If it's really a change of plan at the last moment, like for Fall Gelb, then the first and most obvious question would be, where do you find two paratrooper divisions. I also doubt the Germans could carry out a naval and landing operation with four infanty divisions at this time.

If, on the other hand, the change takes place earlier, then the Germans might be able to build up the paratroopers, Ju 52s, and naval assets needed - then the question would be, what else they don't build, what happens with Crete (which is where historically those paratroopers were spent), etc.

 

[thaddeus]

still think they let the capture of Leningrad slip away with the Soviet fleet from Talinn and later at Hanko but those evacuations did not occur until August and later.

... they could have reshuffled and made more of an effort at Rostov for the remainder of 1941, eclipsing the historical Typhoon?

... either the bulk of AGC advances and thus puts unacceptable strain on that quickly brings it back to a halt October, or only two armies advance and that is quite insufficient to take a Moscow defended by some 10 Soviet armies

Rostov and Leningrad as far as they could advance and possibly be supplied by sea? (and they reached both in 1941 while not capturing either)

if no headlong rush for Moscow, there are still 10 Soviet armies (tied down there) and political settlement remains possible? (albeit remote)

 

[liomarcus]

my timeline was base on a HOI game, so in an alternate history perspective we can say that it s not realistic at all (ASAB limit at this point, it is just a game).

the POD is 1933, in the german state administration system first. (Better planification, change of research priorities, change in naval goals, better diplomacy, more Infantry units, etc...)

For example the only goal assign to kriegsmarine in 1941 is to destroy the soviet fleet of the baltic, destroy the Swedish fleet, organise landing operation in Norvege and sweden and near leningrad. that s all.
The Uboot have of course are not be forgotten but plans are made to develop the kriegsmarine after 1944 (no plan Z, oil from caucasus, soviests ressources at disposal) and with new tech only.
In short the navy is the poor parent exept for landing operation and have planes to compensate.

Develop landing troops and materials; AND paratroopers take lot of time and ressources and i use them only in area where i have air and naval supremacy (Baltic sea) and nowhere else (no crete operation*). the all point was to take lenigrad as fast as possible and use the port to have a better acces to soviet roads (and train lines at a point of the campaign)

* (for crete usually i don't care before 1944 when defenses there are use somewhere else like to stop germans in Turkey)

The all goal of the swing door strat is to not go east too far before destroy as much units as possible, and not focus on grabbing land (in a first stage of the campaign).

But i get now the motivation to rewrite it after founding a paper version of it to help.
It was fun tu put in it all the crazy ideas i use to make a fun gameplay like
Burgondy in the west and Deutscher Orden in ostland for example.

The POD was an heartattack of AH leading to changes and reorganisation in the inner circle of the germans leadership. From there everything was possible.
And it s make me working my english wich is not my natural language.

here the mod i use : Bitter Peace - New World Order
https://steamcommunity.com/sharedfiles/filedetails/?id=858460802

a VERY successful BARBAROSSA

credits for the mod :
Vestov ; MavercK. spöKEЛД, Pisiu369, German, 898zero898 and Robo_Warrior etc..