XLII. Homeland
Emperor Nikephoros IV and soldiers, Armenian illustrated manuscript, 13th century
Soldiering Through
It took eight years, at least three of them spent at war, for Emperor
Azus Salucianus to attain sole rulership over the empire of the west. The project was not complete until the death of
Constantine III, the son of Princess Theodora and Azus' bitter enemy Claudius Faventianus, in 1088. Although nominally co-emperors, Azus had never shared power with the unfortunate young man, and like his imperial great-uncle Theodorus he was kept in a gilded cage until his suspicious death. That this death was not the cause of another uprising is presumably only because Azus had suppressed just such a rebellion two years earlier following the death of his adoptive mother Empress Agatha.
Azus had not attained this position by chance and did not keep it by luck. He was, in retrospect, genuinely talented, albeit not in all the same ways his father Alric had been. Despite the shameful episode of Theodorus' death, Alric had always been—or at least portrayed himself as—a man who accepted power only reluctantly. He had justified his actions by allegations of conspiracies and the need to address the very real rot which had beset the court and bureaucracy; even Alric's detractors tended to portray Empress Mathilde and her daughters, Agatha and Theodora, as the ones thirsty for power and blood while Alric hesitated. Alric had not been the most effective governor or administrator but had commanded tremendous respect, defeating the Carolingians abroad and receiving the honors of princes from as far afield as Denmark at home.
Even taking biased accounts with a large helping of skepticism, one cannot escape the conclusion that the rule of Azus was in general a smaller, more squalid, and far less inspiring affair than that of his father. His father had shed little blood to attain his position; Azus had turned Italy herself into a casualty of war in his drawn-out conflicts with the
patriciani. The foreign contacts which had made Pavia a center of the 11th century Latin world under Alric fell away precipitously under Azus, whom the kings of France and Germany felt able to treat as no more than an equal. The country was poorer, the court less grand, and the roads less secure.
Bankrupted by wars and with little enthusiastic support outside the bureaucracy itself, Azus could not impose his will by fiat nor buy his way to absolute compliance. The nobility was more exhausted than loyal, and there were plenty of ex-
patriciani who still held a grudge or had gone to foreign courts and armies (from which they might well return). The men of the
civitates, once political non-entities, were now more important than ever in both the economic and military life of the realm, and matched their growing importance with new self-confidence and a nascent civic consciousness. In contrast to the weakened monarchy, the papacy was more prestigious than it had been in generations; building on the achievements of the "Frankish" popes before him, Pope Lambert had proven able to restrain and unleash the dogs of war on his own, pacifying Sardinia and urging Lombards and Sardo-Normans alike to war against the infidel. Domestically, too, he had shown promise, allying with the Benedictii counts of Sabina
[1] to assert more authority over Rome and working as an advocate for monastic propagation and reform. Although a relation of Azus, Lambert displayed impressive autonomy, even going so far as to work with the exiled
Ptolemy to sent pious soldiers to fight the Turks in Anatolia.
Thus governance, under Azus, was an affair of compromise rather than prestige. He rose to the challenge and maintained his position, but at the cost of the liberation of the papacy from its fetters and the cession of numerous privileges regarding taxation and justice. His apparent favoritism for the
civitates had less to do with any great fondness for burghers than his need for a counterbalance to the Church—the cities were, up to that point, largely provinces of their bishops, and to empower the
popolo was to curb ecclesiastic power in the provinces even as it grew unchecked in Rome.
The Empty Chair
Fortune presented the emperor with an opportunity to arrest the destiny of Saint Peter's successor. Pope
Lambert, who had grown more distant from his cousin Azus since 1083, was well aware of the history of his office and took steps to liberate papal succession from imperial selection. In 1085 or thereabouts he had gathered the
cardinales ecclesiae Romanorum, the chief ecclesiastics of the city and its environs, and made them swear to select one of their own uopn his own death.
[A] As a potential counterbalance to imperial power, he attempted to breath new life into the old concept of popular acclamation of the Pope, in effect dignifying the Roman nobility and their supporters and setting them against the fiat of the emperor. Upon Lambert's death in 1087, the
cardinales and Roman nobility followed his advice. They elected the Benedictii bishop of Sabina as Pope
Demetrius II, the first "Roman" pope of the Salucian era, before word had even reached Azus of Lambert's death.
If they had hoped that the emperor would simply accept this as a
fait accompli, however, they were gravely mistaken. Azus, while in many ways less powerful than his predecessors, was not about to let the selection of the Bishop of Rome be snatched away from him. He had a willing ally in his father-in-law, Duke
Benedict II of Benevento-Capua, who saw the incident as a way to grow the influence of the Crescentii further in central Italy. Against the emperor and the duke, the Romans had no recourse, and surrendered without a fight. Azus was lenient, but insistent as to the matter of the pontiff: he elevated another of his cousins as Pope
Aleramus, hoping this relation would show more loyalty than his predecessor, while Demetrius was confined to a monastery. To add a further safeguard, the emperor appointed Duke Benedict as
castaldus aulae, the castellan of Tusculum.
Aleramus did not prove to be as popular among the Romans as Lambert had been. He was, in the first place, not particularly well educated; it was claimed that he stumbled through the liturgy and "did not know the names of the saints, to say nothing of their works." This was not necessarily disqualifying to the Romans, who had been ruled by plenty of less-than-scholarly popes in the past. Aleramus, however, was an outsider who surrounded himself with outsiders, bringing in Lombard nobles and clergy to fill his court. He was not completely neglectful of his duties, but delegated much to his trusted northern friends and to Duke Benedict, who was determined to leverage his new position as much as he dared.
Ibrahim and the Anatolian Nadir
In Anatolia, the 1080s saw a steady shift in Byzantine strategy. Emperor
Nikephoros IV Bryennios had hoped in the years following his succession to drive the invaders from central and eastern Anatolia in a series of relentless campaigns, but despite skilled generalship the empire could not sustain the force he needed. His state creaked under the financial strain of its constant wars, not only against the eastern Turks but the Pechenegs, Serbs, and the occasional claimant looking to topple Nikephoros himself. Manpower, too, was in short supply; the gap could be bridged in part by mercenary forces, such as those which Ptolemy had been dispatched to recruit in Italy. These Italians and Siclo-Normans who entered Byzantine service after 1083 were certainly noted for fighting ability and arguably tipped the balance in favor of Nikephoros in engagements like the Battle of Gangra in 1085, but they were a further burden on the state treasury and were not always the most trustworthy soldiers.
The death of Alp Arslan in 1079 seemed to promise opportunity for Nikephoros, who had gradually come around to the same strategy in the east which had neutralized the Pechenegs in the west: the sowing of division among enemy leaders with an aim towards co-opting some against the others. This showed some early promise, and by 1086 much of Cappadocia proper had been liberated thanks in part to an alliance with the bey of Melitene, who was more concerned about
Oshin Pahlavuni and his own fellow Turks to the south than Byzantine reconquest. The strain put on the bey of Caesarea by these operations, however, created other openings too. Weakened by the Byzantines, he was overthrown in 1086 by Prince
Ibrahim, a grandson of Qutalmish, who breathed new life into the
ghazi states of Anatolia. He defeated and killed the bey of Melitene and then turned against the Byzantines. Nikephoros gathered a large army to oppose him, but his generalship did not overcome disloyalty— in a battle near Ikonion in 1087 his own Turkish soldiers defected to the enemy, while the Italians were accused of staying behind until it was too late to change the course of battle. Nikephoros was badly beaten and withdrew to Attaleia, while Ibrahim sacked Iconion and made himself master of Cappadocia.
Disaster followed disaster. Nikephoros attempted to conscript the Pechenegs settled in Paristrion into his army to oppose the Turks in Anatolia, but this prompted them to rebel, and soon the empire was fighting a new Pecheneg war in the Balkans. In Macedonia, there was an uprising of Paulician heretics who had been resettled there years before. It was fortunate, at least, that Ibrahim was restrained from further conquests by an obligation to defend against an attack from a rival Seljuk prince in Syria; had he possessed a free hand, western Anatolia would no doubt have been laid to waste by his forces.
Early Retirement
Ptolemy had risen in the esteem of Nikephoros since his return, and although misgivings remained about his association with the foreign mercenaries he was nevertheless entrusted with leading them in Anatolia while simultaneously keeping his old military command in Bucellarion. He was given the court title of
proedros ("president"), and some time after the disaster at Ikonion that of
protospatharios. While the emperor campaigned in Thrace and the Balkans, Ptolemy fought alongside his brother-in-law
John Bryennios, the emperor's brother and
megas domestikos. The two men seem to have worked well together: they recovered Amaseia from a traitorous Byzantine-Armenian general in 1088, and in the following year John and Ptolemy defeated the bey of Coloneia and consequently recovered Trebizond for the empire. The defeated bey came running to Ibrahim, who in exchange for his allegiance foiled the Byzantines from taking Coloneia itself. Ibrahim's attempt to take Amaseia, however, was defied by a stout defense of the city, and Ibrahim was soon after compelled to make a truce in order to deal with the "Ermanshahs," an ascendant family of Turkish warlords who had been installed as governors in Ani, conquered Vaspurakan, and proclaimed themselves to be kings of Armenia under Seljuk tutelage.
Ptolemy was less able as a politician than a general. A rift was steadily widening between the emperor's brother John and his eldest son Prince
Nikephoros, who was concerned that his uncle might challenge him for power in the event of the emperor's death. As John's brother-in-law, Ptolemy was held in suspicion by the prince, and being one of the empire's more capable generals he was likely to be a major opponent if one day the prince and his uncle came to blows. The prince's intrigues against Ptolemy went nowhere at first, but in 1089 the Anatolian general
Romanos Diogenes came under suspicion of conspiring to overthrow the emperor. Romanos had been a strong supporter of the Bryennioi but was said to have grown disillusioned with their leadership after Ikonion. The conspiracy, although it did not progress to a full rebellion, seems to have been real, as Romanos came to the emperor to beg his forgiveness after its discovery. He was granted it, but Romanos was compelled to resign from his military position and enter a monastery.
Rumor had it that Ptolemy, a cousin of Romanos, was a party to the conspiracy or would have joined Romanos once the planned rebellion had been declared. He denied any association with such plots, but was nevertheless sacked as well and kept under house arrest. Eventually John Byrennios, arguing on his behalf, convinced the emperor to release him, and in the following year he was reinstated in command. Nikephoros, however, decided it was safest to put him in a more distant position with fewer forces at his command. He was made
strategos of Calabria in southern Italy, which included jurisdiction over Messina, the last beleaguered Byzantine post in Sicily. Ptolemy retained his court titles and was granted estates with a comfortable income, but it was a substantial step down in terms of real power and authority.
Crescentian Glory
By the last decade of the 11th century, there were signs that things were on the mend in Italy. Despite being often linked to the corruption of the bureaucracy, Azus apparently made efforts to reform it with at least some slight success. The imperial treasury was steadily growing, and Azus had successfully defended his privileges to intervene in the papal election. Unfortunately, what he needed most—time—was denied to him. In August of 1092, after more than a dozen years on the throne, he contracted an intestinal illness and died in Pavia, just shy of 50 years old.
Azus' marriage with
Sergia Crescentius had not produced a male heir, or at least not one who survived the emperor's death. This was clearly a matter of concern for the emperor, who by 1087 had apparently despaired of having a son by his wife. In that year, following the conquest of Rome and the installation of Pope Aleramus, he had made his pontifical cousin crown his illegitimate son
Alexander as co-emperor. His father-in-law Duke Benedict, who had only just aided him in suppressing the Romans, took this action as an insult and plotted his revenge. When Azus died five years later, Benedict wasted little time in launching a palace coup. After ruling for less than three months, the fifteen year old Emperor Alexander was deposed and strangled. The sole legitimate child of Azus was
Agatha II, whom the emperor had named after his adoptive mother, but a nine year old girl could not be sole monarch. It was practically necessary that Benedict should arrange his own coronation as well, which was swiftly accomplished.
Emperor Benedict did not sit securely upon the throne. By the slaying of Alexander he had made enemies of the supporters of the Salucians. He made efforts early on to appeal to the old
patriciani, the adherents of Claudius and Theodora who had long opposed Azus, but by his high-handedness ended up alienating them as well. Benedict was bold and confrontational, a man apparently insensible to the delicate political situation which the elder Azus had navigated so skillfully. Even the Romans, who were at first enamored of an emperor who seemed as if he would restore the
Civitas Aeterna to its rightful dignity after the Lombardy-centered Salucians, found themselves at odds with Benedict. His regime in Rome was dictatorial; he suspected the Benedictii of treachery and had Count
Stephen II of Sabina imprisoned, a particularly gratuitous step since the Benedictii of Sabina had been essentially powerless for decades. He aggrandized Pope Aleramus, who was apparently not terribly offended at the murder of his illegitimate cousin, which only further enraged the Romans.
In November of 1094,
strategos Ptolemy was in Sicily besieging Syracuse. Despite his limited resources in Calabria, Ptolemy had discovered that the Sicilian Muslims were not particularly robust opponents, and he had attracted a small army of Lombard and Siculo-Norman mercenaries (some of whom had raided Sicily in previous years). Slowly he had returned the eastern coast of the island, save Syracuse itself, to Byzantine hands. It was in his camp outside this city where he was, according to legend, approached by a Roman delegation led by the deposed antipope Demetrius II and
Caesar of Sabina (Lat.
Caesarius), the son of the imprisoned Count Stephen of Sabina. As the story is usually told, they implored him to liberate Rome and its empire from the tyranny of Emperor Benedict and claimed that the Italians would flock to his righteous banner.
Ptolemy may not have needed this invitation. It was suggested by Byzantine sources that he had been gathering men in Calabria for some time with a view towards taking the "Frankish" imperial throne, perhaps as early as the death of Azus in 1092 or even his initial arrival in Calabria in 1090 or 1091, and that his campaigns in Sicily were primarily an excuse to explain his recruitment of mercenaries. He could count on the support of the southern Lombards, a number of whom had served with him in the east, as well as a large host of Sardo-Normans. The powerful Siculo-Norman
iudex Ivo de Brasson, the son of
iudex Osmund, promised Ptolemy his support, presumably because he considered it useful to legitimize his own position in Sardinia, and there were others who like the southern Lombards had faith in Ptolemy's abilities after having served under him in Anatolia and the Balkans.
Benedict was indeed preparing for an invasion, but not from the south. Azus' sister
Emilia Saluciana had been married to King
Eberhard of Germany in 1073, and the match had been productive. The death of Azus, the murder of Alexander, and the fact that Azus' "successor" was a mere girl came as manna from heaven to Eberhard and his sons
Conrad and
Hermann, then 19 and 16 years old respectively. Not since the days of Otto the Great had the German king possessed such a strong justification to take the throne of Italy, and Eberhard believed that he and his kingdom were equal to the task. In 1093 and 1094, other obligations at home prevented him from making the attempt, but Benedict did not seem to be growing any stronger. The delay, however, allowed Ptolemy to beat him to the punch.
Ptolemy lifted the siege of Syracuse and retired to Kroton, where he conferred with his lieutenants and mercenaries and announced his intentions to regain his father's crown.
Michael Prodromos, the
catepan of Byzantine Italy—who was apparently no friend of Ptolemy—feared the
strategos was planning to make himself emperor in the east, which was not wholly unreasonable as George Maniakes had managed to do the same from Sicily only a half-century before. By the time Michael marched into Calabria, however, Ptolemy had already departed by sea. He had made an alliance with Duke
Marinus IV of Naples, who had supplied him with both ships and money. Marinus was a Byzantine vassal, but he loathed Benedict; Benedict's father John Parvus had tried (and failed) to conquer Naples from Marinus, and Benedict was widely suspected to have his eye upon it as well. Considering the troubles of the Byzantines in recent decades, relying on distant Constantinople for protection against the newly crowned Emperor Benedict did not seem like the soundest of gambles. For Marinus, he won even if Ptolemy lost; at the very least this claimant might do enough damage to Benedict to delay Italian aggression against Neapolitan territory. If he won, and Marinus could boast of putting Italy's new emperor on his throne, so much the better.
Emperor Benedict soon got wind of this landing and moved quickly to oppose this apparent invasion. Naples was right on the doorstep of Benedict's own familial base of power, Capua and Benevento, and from there it was only a short ride to Rome.
Caserta
Some may doubt the claim of Egidius of Florence that Benedict had 10,000 men compared to Ptolemy's 2,000, but Benedict—who was, after all, ruler of Italy—is universally said to have fielded a much larger force than Ptolemy. The emperor's army, a mixed force of infantry and cavalry, varied widely in origin and quality. There were some contingents—like the Romans—who were clearly not his most enthusiastic supporters, although there were certainly loyal soldiers in this army as well. Perhaps fearing a rebellion in the north in his absence or still wary of a German attack, he had left the Hungarian Guard in Lombardy. Benedict had taken personal command of the army, but he himself had little military experience and the identities of his subordinate captains are not well attested.
In contrast, Ptolemy's army appears to have been made up almost entirely of cavalry, including South-Lombard, Siculo-Norman, and "renegade" Italian
milites along with a unit of 300 Armenian cavalrymen. We can guess that most of these were experienced veterans who had fought Saracens, Turks, and/or Pechenegs, some of them under Ptolemy's own command, and their officers were likewise familiar with combat.
The armies met near the city of Caserta, just southeast of Capua. Ptolemy appeared to fall back before the more numerous imperial army. It was a textbook feigned retreat, quite familiar to men who had been fighting the Turks for decades but totally unexpected by the Italians, whose experience of war since Basel in 1068 was almost entirely siege-craft. In tragically familiar fashion, the imperial cavalry surged forward in pursuit, only for Ptolemy's cavalry to wheel about, envelop their pursuers, and destroy them in a bloody melee which unfolded in full view of the imperial infantry. The Romans, who had held back (or had been held back) from the initial attack, immediately switched sides and attacked Benedict's infantry in the flank. The imperial army collapsed in confusion, and what followed was a perfect rout. In one particularly florid Provencal account, the slaughter was said to have been limited only because Ptolemy's soldiers were so heavily outnumbered by the enemy that their sword-arms became too fatigued from killing to truly finish the job.
Emperor Benedict had been wise enough not to lead the vanguard himself and was able to flee from this ignominious defeat. His great army, however, had ceased to exist. Those who had not been killed or captured had fled back northwards on their own or had joined the enemy's camp. With Ptolemy a stone's throw from Capua and Rome soon to be in open rebellion, Benedict had no choice but to cede central Italy to Ptolemy. He did not stop riding until Tuscany, where he would make another attempt to save his crown. Ptolemy rode into Rome unopposed, but only after stopping at Tusculum and the nearby abbey of Cryptoferrata, where the archimandrite
Gregory showed him the tomb of his father, an unadorned travertine sarcophagus. It was not exactly a burial suitable for an emperor, and the simplicity may have been a result of the little regard in which Theodorus was held by the Salucians and his Frankish relations, but for the humble and pious Theodorus it seems somehow fitting.
Next Time:
Ultramarine
Footnotes (In Character)
[1] The Benedictii were descendants of Benedict of Sabina, a late 10th century Roman nobleman who was made
praefectus urbi by Emperor Octavian in 976 and married Theoderanda, the daughter of John Crescentius. Under the Benedictii the office of prefect in Rome became hereditary, but they were gradually deprived of most temporal power in Rome by Gratian of Praeneste and other forceful ecclesiastics of the 11th century.
Timeline Notes (Out of Character)
[A] The term "cardinal" indeed becomes popular around this time (or slightly later) IOTL, although at first it's strictly an adjective rather than a noun, used to indicate the important prelates of the
patrimonium who composed the Papal Curia and influenced the selection of the new pope. The modern system in which
only cardinals had a role in the selection, however, was still some time in the future, and both imperial approval and popular acclaim were considered to confer legitimacy.