Sir John Valentine Carden Survives. Part 2.

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El Pip

HPM said:
HM Treasury would totally approve. It is the spending departments that bleat on about sunk costs. One speaks from close if second hand experience.
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I admire the effort but the meme is too strongly established at this point. It is far easier for the fanboys to blame HM Treasury rather than admit the War Office/British Rail/Whoever-else actually made the really critical mistakes.
 

ArtosStark

El Pip said:
I admire the effort but the meme is too strongly established at this point. It is far easier for the fanboys to blame HM Treasury rather than admit the War Office/British Rail/Whoever-else actually made the really critical mistakes.
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The two are not mutually exclusive. The Treasury’s position as possibly the most powerful Ministry in Cabinet at many times in British history and the occasionally near fanatical drive for economical government did lead to quite a few decisions that could be considered penny wise and pound foolish. That can be true even when many decisions they failed to support were better not supported.

No one has monopoly on poor decisions, is what I am getting at. Sometimes the Treasury were actually short sighted, or just plain wrong. Sometimes they, intentionally or otherwise, saved a lot of pain and heartache. It’s not always obvious even with hindsight which situations were which.
 

Look More Closely Later

Dan said:
Unless someone decides it would be cute to feed the Abwehr the details of the failed designs as the successful ones, leaving the Germans to develop their tanks to counter the wrong threat?
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Nah. You feed them details of the successful ones framed with a lot of 'my sources claimed' and 'I can hardly believe it!', as if it's exaggeration. That way the Germans get complacent, until they get a really nasty surprise, but after the surprise, they value the agent a lot more.
 

Mark1878

Donor
El Pip said:
I admire the effort but the meme is too strongly established at this point. It is far easier for the fanboys to blame HM Treasury rather than admit the War Office/British Rail/Whoever-else actually made the really critical mistakes.
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It is not just the meme.

I have people in a discussion here saying that they did not understand statistics (or even simpler figures) whilst in an argument about resources.

People do proudly admit being innumerate whilst they would hide not being literary.

Back to memes here like civil servants who did Classics.
 

Major Major

MattII said:

Dan said:
Unless someone decides it would be cute to feed the Abwehr the details of the failed designs as the successful ones, leaving the Germans to develop their tanks to counter the wrong threat?
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Look More Closely Later said:
Nah. You feed them details of the successful ones framed with a lot of 'my sources claimed' and 'I can hardly believe it!', as if it's exaggeration. That way the Germans get complacent, until they get a really nasty surprise, but after the surprise, they value the agent a lot more.
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Feed everything back through Garbo.
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How about Tricycle describing how some officers dropped hints over a bottle of good port?
 

JWilly48519

duckie said:
Given the greater threat of heavy armoured allied tanks, I think that the work on the Marders will be rushed forward as fast as possible.
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Major Becker didn't have the assignment, facility (Hotchkiss factory near Paris), other resources (Alkett contract to fabricate the light-armor superstructures per his designs), refurbished vehicles (from the salvage-command of the Wehrmacht) and specialized personnel (his pre-war metalworkers almost all had been drafted and sent to the Eastern Front as infantrymen, and he had to "buy them back" by off-the-books trading of the first Marders to divisional commanders in return for re-assignment of his men to his special unit) until late Spring 1942.
duckie said:
However the small nature of the re-purposed tanks limits the size of the gun that can be fitted.
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None of the Marders ever mounted a gun in an existing, or new, turret. All of them used only the chassis of the converted AFV, as a self-propelled-gun platform.
duckie said:
I think that the Germans will go for more Nashorn instead. The 88mm gun has no problems as yet with the british tanks other than its hight and mobility. The Nashorn takes care of the mobility and an good crew takes care of the hight problem
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The economics of the Marder program worked only because the converted platforms were (relatively) free; over half of the guns were (relatively) free, being re-purposed Russian 76mm artillery pieces; and the other half of the guns were entirely free, being existing PaK 40s or equivalent, sent to Becker by field units to be converted to SPGs and returned to the same units.

By comparison, Nashorns were very expensive, requiring manufacturing a new chassis and a new and quite expensive gun.

Becker never had much of a budget. Most of what he did was by scrounging and horsetrading. Nothing that he did competed with manufacture of new tanks or guns, except relatively late in his manufacturing period when he was recognized as a key asset and was allocated new production of PaK 40s and similar 75s. Germany wouldn't have decided to not build Marders and instead build Nashorns, because their creation processes were fully independent of each other. If Germany wanted more Nashorns, they'd have had to find a way to pay for them, and facilities with additional capacity to build them. That wouldn't have been Baukommando Becker in any case.
 
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Logan2879

Logan2879

allanpcameron said:
30 May 1942. Maryland, USA.

Aberdeen Proving Ground, the Headquarters of the US Ordnance Department, was well used to visitors from Great Britain. Major-General Charles Wessen, Chief of Ordnance, had visited England the previous September and there was a reciprocal visit from a delegation led by Oliver Lucas, the Controller-General of Research and Development (CGRD) from the Ministry of Supply. Lucas’ opposite number in the supply of munitions from the Ministry of Supply, Sir Graham Cunningham, Controller-General of Munitions Production (CGMP) was part of the group. From Wessen’s perspective, having separate Research and Development and Supply controllers, both within the Ministry of Supply seemed problematic, especially when considering that one of the other members of the British delegation was Brigadier John Bond, Deputy Director of Armoured Fighting Vehicles (DDAFV) from the War Office. The British had one group who developed, another group then dealt with supply and then ‘users’, the Army seemed to have less input that would have been thought normal. The American system wasn’t entirely without its own problems, a few ideas for different types of tanks from the Ordnance Department by been rejected by the Army Ground Forces, the ‘users’ who liked the M3 and M4 Medium tanks, and were happy to concentrate on the M4.

The issue that both the British and Americans were dealing with was the follow on to the US M4 (which the British were calling Sherman), and the British Victor. The reality was that at some point in possibly 1943 or 1944 the combined allied forces would have to invade Europe and take on the Germans. The experience of the British and of the Soviets was that the Panzer III and IV were good, but did not outclass the Allied tanks in themselves. It was clear that the Panzer Divisions probably had better training and tactics, but putting an M4 up against the current Pz III would be pretty much a match, each having some things that were better or worse than the other.

The Soviets had lost huge numbers of tanks, but were confident that their T34 Medium and KV1 Heavy were generally a match for the panzers. There was no doubt that the Germans would be working on improvements to the current Panzer III and IVs, probably up-gunning and increasing armour, and would be developing along the same lines as everyone else. Some kind of new Medium Tank to replace the Panzer III and Heavy Tank to replace the Panzer IV. Speculation about what these would be like was much debated.

The British felt that their Victor, with the HV 75mm gun, would be a match for whatever replaced the Panzer III. They were less sure that the Sherman with the current 75mm would be able to deal with a tank with better protection than the current German tanks. They were therefore keen on the Americans building a Heavy Tank, preferably with a big enough gun to deal with the kind of armour the next generation of German panzers were likely to carry, about four inches, possibly even five inches on the heavy. Their own work on a successor to the Churchill Infantry Tank, and if possible, also the Victor, was likely to be about 50 tons, with a maximum of six inches of armour, carrying at least the 17-pdr, but more likely something based on the 3.7-inch (94mm) AA gun.

Wessen remained to be convinced that a Heavy Tank was the way forward. Part of the purpose of the British visit was to look at what the Americans were developing. Wessen was of the firm opinion that the British were trying to avoid using American tanks as much as possible. The Australians and Indians, facing the Japanese, would likely be the main users of American tanks, just as at the moment with the M3 Light and Medium tanks (Stuart and Grant to the British). The Canadian and Australian Cruiser, with the 25-pdr gun, would likely complement rather than replace the American tanks. From what Wessen had seen the previous summer, the move towards replacing all Valiant work with Victors, and the cancellation of the Crusader as a gun tank, made it look like the British were trying for a ‘universal tank’. One tank that could do what the Cruiser and Infantry Tanks had been doing.

Wessen was also aware that the British were hoping that the Americans would provide the bulk of Lend Lease tank deliveries to the Soviet Union. The Valiant tanks being built in Canada were all going to Murmansk, if the British wanted at least six armoured Divisions equipped with Victors to invade France, they couldn’t afford to be building anything other than Victors. Wessen wasn’t sure that the Soviets would be happy with Grants and Shermans, so far, all the feedback was that they were pretty unhappy with the Grant.

What the British did want was to have a look at what was under development. The M3 Light (Stuart) was being upgraded to the M3A3 model, all welded with improved storage, and therefore range. Cadillac had built a successor to the M3, which was designated the M5, using Cadillac engines and transmission. Alongside this, the T7 program was looking at something in the 16 ton range, possibly using a 57mm gun, or even the same M3 75mm gun on the Grant and Sherman. Wessen thought it was heading into Medium Tank territory and would prefer to stick with the M4 Sherman, though that decision had yet been taken.

Another Light Tank under development by Marmon-Herrington was the T9E1 which was envisaged to be used by airborne forces. The British Tetrarch was being developed for the same role, and the British delegation expressed an interest in putting the two up against one another to test which was the better bet. Marmon-Herrington also had a four ton tank designated the T16 which they had designed for China and the Netherlands East Indies. Armed only with a .30 calibre machine gun, it didn’t hold any interest for either the American or British armies.

Regarding the M3 Medium tank, production was due to finish in December, with over 6000 expected to be built between August 1941 and December 1942, something that the British could only wonder at. 450 Grant tanks were on their way to Australia and India to equip the new Armoured Divisions, with a further 150 following by October, though the majority of these would be the standard American M3, called the Lee by the British.

Production of the M4 Medium tank, the Sherman to the British, was to built in eleven plants in America, with a brand new factory opened by Fisher in Grand Blanc, Michigan expected to be open in July. By fall (or Autumn as the British called it) those eleven plants would be in full production, with thousands to be available by the end of the year. There were four types, the M4 with the Continental R-975 engine; the M4A1 with a cast hull rather than welded like the M4. The M4A2 with twin General Motors 6-71 diesel engines and the M4A3 with the new Ford 500HP GAA V-8 gasoline engine. This latter version was earmarked for the American Army, the diesel M4A2 would be going to the US Marines, and probably Russia. The M4, despite being the first named, wouldn’t start production at Pressed Steel until July. Production of the M4A1 was underway at the Lima, Pressed Steel and Pacific Car & Foundry. The short M2 75mm was being used on these early production models, and still had the twin fixed machine guns in the hull. Fisher, had already begun producing the M4A2 in April, as had Pullman. Ford were expecting to begin production of M4A3 from June. Wessen had only a few days ago been given the go-ahead from Supply Services to begin working on designing and procuring a pilot model for an improved medium tank, provisionally designated M4X. Broadly it was to be about 32 tons, with an automatic 75mm gun, four inches of frontal armour and a top speed of 25mph. The Vickers Victor was basically the M4X, but with a much more powerful 75mm HV gun.

Knowing that the British were keen on a more powerful gun than the M2 and M3 75mm, work on a 76mm gun was being discussed, though it was understood that the current turret of the M4 would be too small. American doctrine was for tanks to do most jobs, but for tank destroyers to stalk enemy tanks. Therefore, the T35E1 (M10 GMC) was soon to be tested. Based on the M4A3 chassis and carrying the 3-inch M7 gun in an open turret, it was hoped that this would provide the Tank Destroyer Command a suitable replacement for the current half-track M3 (T12) and M3A1 armed with the M1897A 75mm gun. This approach was quite different from the British and, although they requested a few for trials, Wessen didn’t believe that they would show any more interest.

The fact that the British were talking about their next tank having something based on their 3.7-inch gun, got some of Wessen’s staff considering whether the 90mm American AA gun could be adapted to a tank. The use of the German 88mm AA gun in the anti-tank role in North Africa had been something of a wakeup call. If the Germans managed to build a tank around the 88mm gun, then three or four inches of frontal armour wasn’t going to do too well against it.

What Lucas and the British were keen to see was what had started off as the T1 Heavy Tank. This was to be 50 tons, about three inches of armour, a 75mm and a 37mm gun mounted coaxially, with four machine guns, a Wright 925HP engine, Hydra-matic transmission, and a top speed of 25mph. The T1E2 pilot was built by Baldwin, and after some modifications was standardised as the M6 Heavy Tank. The Armored Force were already talking about it being too heavy, undergunned, and needing too many improvements, and so would rather have more M4 Mediums that any M6 Heavy Tanks. The British delegation having had a chance to see the T1E2 pilot on trials, couldn’t help but think that it wasn’t really that much of an advance.

A second Heavy Tank had been discussed between the British and Americans previously, which had been designated T14 by the Americans. Partly this was a British gamble against the failure of the Churchill, with the hope the Americans might build an assault tank. Work so far on the T14 was minimal, and the British were now happy enough with the Churchill. The M6, from Wessen’s point of view, was adequate for the job of a heavy tank, and he didn’t have that many resources to throw into yet another tank. The British mentioned that Sir John Carden was working on a replacement for the Victor Cruiser Tank, which would also take over the role of the Churchill Infantry Tank. While the American tank designs didn’t seem to be as advanced, the delegation couldn’t help but gasp as the sheer scale of the American tank building factories. If the phrase, ‘quantity has a quality all of its own’ was ever coined, it could well have been in the minds of those gazing on the huge plants dedicated to the mass production of American tanks.

(The information for this update came primarily from 'British and American Tanks of World War Two' Peter Chamberlain & Chris Ellis, 2000 edition, Cassel & Co, London.)
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JWilly48519

diestormlie said:
...Do you know of any good books on the Marder program? Because (absent the fact that, well, feeding the Nazi war machine) that sounds like something of a lark.
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I don't, but I haven't done formal research. I've seen in the past citations to an apparently extensive series of articles published in a German-language military-history magazine, but I don't know the title or how long ago that was, and in any case I don't fully read German.

I however have accumulated some knowledge of Major Becker over the years, here and there.

My favorite aspect of his story is his military beginnings. He was an engineer for a manufacturing-machinery maker, and also owned a small equipment-fabrication company as a side business, in the between-war years, after graduating in the 1920s (after his brief end-of-WWI artillery service) with an engineering degree, but not with especially good grades and not from a fancy school. Before and while he was going to college, I believe he worked locally as an auto mechanic to pay for his tuition, books and room and board, so he had a lot of understanding of how motor vehicles worked. When WWII began, persons like him were expected to join the Army, and because of his engineering degree he was made a junior officer in the artillery. But, because he was pretty much a nobody, he was assigned to an artillery element of an infantry division that garrisoned a portion of the French coastline. In his free time, he wandered around his part of France, and observed that all the junkyards and old French military facilities were filled with broken and otherwise junked French and British military vehicles...leftovers from Wehrmacht evaluations of what they could readily fix, which had already been taken away to be used in Russia, or by security forces in conquered areas, or in North Africa, or to be provided to their European allies. His artillery unit, like the entire German army's artillery forces at the time, had recently been only horse-drawn, and then was using captured Belgian trucks...itself rare among German forces...to pull their towed guns. Using his own money and time, he found enough broken British and French tanks, removed their turrets and other functionality he didn't need, and got them running with adequate reliability. Then, using an arc welder and oxy cutting torch (from his division or maybe corps?) plus junkyard materials, he built motorized, light-armor-shielded SPG platforms for his division's twelve 105mm howitzers, set on top with their wheels removed and bolted in place. These were on converted British Mark VI tank chassis's. He also built armored ammo haulers on Mark VI and Universal Carrier chassis's, and spacious, unarmed artillery observation/command tanks, I think using French tanks. He had the approval of his commanders, but only on the condition that if his creations didn't work out, he'd put the guns back together into horse-drawn configuration. Everything worked excellently. This was the German army's first armored self propelled artillery pieces in infantry divisions, which was noteworthy among artillery units that previously had relied mostly on horses.

36 sIG33 SP 150mm infantry howitzers...6 companies of 6 each...on PzKpfW I chassis's had been built by the small military fabricator Alkett in late 1940 for eastern front panzer divisions, but they broke down frequently due to the chassis being unsuitable for the gun weight, and were generally poorly designed. Among other problems, they had limited elevation so weren't fully useful as artillery. So, no more had been built.

Becker's SPGs having been built essentially at no cost to the Wehrmacht, and for an obscure infantry division when the panzer divisions got the big budgets and resource allocations, got him a lot of regional attention, with progressively higher Wehrmacht officers arriving to see his division's new capability. And, it was noted that his conversions functioned as they should, and were much more reliable than the sIG33s. As a result of that, he was transferred from the artillery to a materials-command unit and assigned to Alkett. There, he was made the manager of the sub-department that had done the sIG33 conversions, which was centered at a small workshop near Paris. There he proceeded to build larger numbers of self propelled artillery pieces, still using junked, passed-over-once French tanks as platforms. That's when he began to systematically accumulate broken French equipment and sort it into repairable and parts-only categories, so that in addition to operating a fabrication service, he also could build up a central repository of used-but-workable spare parts so that end user mechanics could request needed items to repair his vehicles in the field.

It was while he was operating his first Alkett workshop, putting motorized platforms under artillery pieces that various divisions sent him, that he was first asked to similarly motorize towed AT guns. That also was the period when, needing more-skilled personnel, he tracked down which eastern front divisions had his prewar employees, and arranged to "trade" some SPG artillery pieces in return for those men being re-assigned to his workshop as metalworkers again.

I'm guessing his workshop had pretty good morale, productivity and creativity, being staffed with guys that were brought back from the Eastern Front morass and essentially returned to their civilian jobs, living near Paris and helping do interesting stuff that lots of visiting senior officers thought was pretty amazing.
 
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Look More Closely Later

JWilly48519 said:
I don't, but I haven't done formal research. I've seen in the past citations to an apparently extensive series of articles published in a German-language military-history magazine, but I don't know the title or how long ago that was, and in any case I don't fully read German.

I however have accumulated some knowledge of Major Becker over the years, here and there.

My favorite aspect of his story is his military beginnings. He operated (managed, I think, not owned) a small equipment-fabrication company in the prewar years, after graduating with an engineering degree, but not with especially good grades and not from a fancy school. Before and while he was going to college, I believe he worked locally as an auto mechanic to pay for his tuition, books and room and board. When the war began, persons like him were expected to join the Army, and because of his engineering degree he was made a junior officer. But, because he was pretty much a nobody, he was assigned to an artillery element of an infantry division that garrisoned a portion of the French coastline. In his free time, he wandered around his part of France, and observed that all the junkyards and old French military facilities were filled with broken and otherwise junked French and British military vehicles...leftovers from Wehrmacht evaluations of what they could readily fix, which had already been taken away to be used in Russia, or by security forces in conquered areas, or in North Africa, or to be provided to their European allies. His artillery unit, like the entire German army's artillery forces at the time, was horse-drawn. Using his own money and time, and with help only from acquaintances, he found six broken French tanks, removed their turrets and got them running with adequate reliability. Then, personally using an arc welder and oxy cutting torch (from his division or maybe corps?) plus junkyard materials that he personally bought, he built motorized, light-armor-shielded SPG platforms for his division's six 105mm howitzers, set on top with their wheels removed and just bolted in place. He had the approval of his commanders, but only on the condition that if his creations didn't work out, he'd put the guns back together into horse-drawn configuration. Those worked excellently, and may have been the German army's first six armored self propelled artillery pieces, or in any case were noteworthy and unique among artillery units that relied entirely on horses.

That got him a lot of regional attention, with progressively higher artillery officers arriving to see his division's new capability. As a result of that process, he was transferred from the artillery to a materials-command assignment with the machinery-fabrication company Alkett, and given command of a small workshop near Paris. There he built larger numbers of self propelled artillery pieces, still using junked, passed-over-once French tanks as platforms. That's when he began to systematically accumulate broken French equipment and sort it into repairable and parts-only categories, so that in addition to operating a fabrication service, he also could build up a central repository of used-but-workable spare parts so that end user mechanics could request needed items to repair his vehicles in the field.

It was while he was operating his first Alkett workshop, putting motorized platforms under artillery pieces that various divisions sent him, that he was first asked to similarly motorize towed AT guns. That also was the period when, needing more-skilled personnel, he tracked down which eastern front divisions had his prewar employees, and arranged to "trade" some SPG artillery pieces in return for those men being re-assigned to his workshop as metalworkers again.

I'm guessing his workshop had pretty good morale, productivity and creativity, being staffed with guys that were brought back from the Eastern Front morass and essentially returned to their civilian jobs, living near Paris and helping do interesting stuff that lots of visiting senior officers thought was pretty amazing.
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Maybe there's a book here that you could research and write! :)
 

Perky50

498277.jpeg


If our American cousins need to get the 90 mm into service fast, all they need to do is what they did when they ran short on M-10 chassis to use for the M-36 ... they dropped the M-36 turret on an M-4 chassis .... the M36B1
 

JWilly48519

Regarding 90mm options...the T26 turret would have brought power traverse, a turret-face MG and much better armor to the party.

The US problem had to do with their organizational and doctrinal goofiness. US tanks weren't supposed to engage Axis tanks, they were supposed to pull back and call for Tank Destroyers. So, it was bad enough when some Shermans got 76.2mm guns, same as the M10 tank destroyers. But it really put the Tank Destroyer Command's nose out of joint when it was proposed that tanks should have 90mm guns. Outrageous! Don't they know the proper doctrine?

Anyway, that's why the M36 existed in the first place. Sensible field commanders were yelling that, whatever their theoretical performance, 76.2mm and three inch guns in the field weren't penetrating newer German tanks' armor, but the Tank Destroyer command was putting up roadblocks to putting 90s in tanks, so the M36 at least got 90s in the field as tank destroyers.

Whatever senior US officers originally OKed the doctrine of "tanks support infantry, tank destroyers fight tanks", screwed up big time.
 
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