Sir John Valentine Carden Survives. Part 2.
- Thread starter allanpcameron
- Start date
Or make use of the soldiers own slang:
sergeanttombstoneshistory.wordpress.com
This is just a sample. There is much more.
Tommy Talk: British Army Slang
Background The speech of the ordinary British soldier has always been quite colorful, never more so than during World War II. Soldier’s slang could be nearly undecipherable to civilians, Alli…
sergeanttombstoneshistory.wordpress.com
This is just a sample. There is much more.
Falkland islanders where called Bennys
When they found out who that was based on and complained the Army told the troops to stops calling them that
They became Stills
as in they were Still Bennys
It’s be like the Punch cartoon from 1914, with a German HQ trying to understand the new British shells, as a Tommy was heard referencing the barrage with the phrase “we gave them W.O.T.4 not A.R.F.”
Nah just bung the local kids a bob or 2 and its unlikely any tank will be harmed
I understand you have a permit?Now I know that the above is pretty much a weird idea. The two issues are real - training levels being inconsistent and aid to the civilian powers interrupting training schedules. The other difference is that the numbers and quality of British Armoured Divisions in the UK are in a better condition that OTL. Hence having the space and time to think through confronting the Germans in due course. So, anyway, its my story and I'll continue making it up as we go along!
Allan
16 March 1942. Canberra, Australia.
allanpcameron
Donor
16 March 1942. Canberra, Australia.
John Curtin, Prime Minister and Minister for Defence Coordination, had greeted General Claude Auchinleck at the door of the Lodge (official residence of the Australian PM). Auchinleck had been delayed, so when he walked into the meeting room, Peter Fraser, the New Zealand Prime Minister, rose and shook his hand and that of Auchinleck’s deputy, Lieutenant General George Brett USAAF.
As well as the Prime Ministers, the Chief of the General Staffs of Australia and New Zealand, Vernon Sturdee and Edward Puttock, were also present. Later there would be a larger meeting involving staff members and other interested parties, but this meeting, ostensibly drinks before lunch, was in fact a chance to hammer out the main point of the agenda before the official meeting after lunch.
The focus of attention for both Australia and New Zealand had become the Pacific and South China Sea since the Japanese declaration of war. While strengthening Malaya with Australia’s 6, 8 and 9 Infantry Divisions, 7 Australian and 2nd New Zealand Infantry Divisions were still in the Middle East. The New Zealanders had played an important part in the defeat of Italian North Africa, and were currently underemployed. Although 7 Division was preparing to go into action in Rhodes, the New Zealanders were now back up to full strength in men and equipment, were sitting around keeping an eye on the Vichy French.
It was becoming very difficult politically to keep such strong and important forces in the Middle East when they could be doing something to knock out the Japanese threat. Curtin and Fraser wanted Auchinleck’s thoughts on how things were going, and particularly, what the end of American resistance on the Philippines meant.
Feelers had been put out to Washington DC to ask about American plans. The gathering of the infantry force on New Caledonia, and the build up of the USAAF in Australia and on Java were concrete signs that the Americans were starting to get onto a war footing. It was only a few months since the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour, and while no one expected miracles of the Americans, the resources of the allies in the area weren’t going to be anywhere near enough until the Americans were fully deployed.
Strategically, the Americans would naturally want the Philippines back, but getting to it, needed the Netherlands East Indies secured. If the war had to be taken all the way back to Japan, there would either have to be an island-hopping exercise across the vastness of the Pacific, or, possibly, go through China, for which French Indo-China would need to be taken, and that would involve seizing Thailand.
If Churchill would agree to release the ANZACs from Wavell’s command to Auchinleck, ABDA would have an extra battle-hardened Corps to play with. The fact that 7 Division was trained for amphibious warfare was another desirable skill set. Coupled with the British reinforcements heading for Burma and Malaya, then the Japanese enterprise would be thrown off the rails completely.
The problem for both Australia and New Zealand was that they were just about at their maximum available manpower. Curtin and Sturdee were conscious that the Civilian Military Force (CMF) consisted on paper of five Infantry and two Cavalry Divisions. As these units were made up by conscripts, under the Defence Act, they were precluded from serving outside Australia or Australian territory. They were also undertrained and underequipped, while not at the same level as the Home Guard in Britain, garrison duties were about all that could be expected of them. Maintaining four AIF Infantry Divisions in the field and an Armoured Division about to join them, didn’t give Australia much leeway.
The New Zealand Army was looking at forming a second Expeditionary Force for the Pacific. They had increased the numbers of Battalions defending Fiji, creating two Brigades. There had been discussions about creating a third Infantry Brigade to augment the two on Fiji and create 3rd Infantry Division. The problem was that Fiji needed to be defended. If the Americans would take over that responsibility, then New Zealand could provide another strong force to the fight. In addition to the two Infantry Brigades, New Zealand had formed its 1st Army Tank Brigade, the previous October. So far, they had received thirty Valiant I tanks from Britain for training. Without more tanks the three Battalions weren’t anywhere near ready for deployment. If they were fully equipped, adding them to the two Infantry Brigades would provide a strong punch. The fighting in Malaya had shown the Infantry tank to be a potent weapon.
From Auchinleck’s point of view the idea of having the ANZACs in his area of responsibility would be an excellent addition, especially if 7 Division arrived with the Royal Navy’s amphibious capability. While that wasn’t likely, the Japanese had shown that amphibious assets didn’t have to be too sophisticated. It also wasn’t an immediate priority. First and foremost, the Japanese had to be stopped dead, and with the fall of the Americans in the Philippines, the Japanese would have more men to put into their efforts to gain the resource rich Netherlands East Indies.
Auchinleck asked Brett to give his assessment of the situation regarding the Philippines. Brett noted that the garrison on Corregidor still held out, and that there were other American forces spread over some of the other islands. However, for all intents and purposes, the Philippines were now under Japanese control. The question was how long it would take the Japanese to regroup and move their main force to somewhere else.
The best Intelligence evaluations suggested that, unless something happened to the Japanese navy’s ability to control the sea lanes, then one or possibly two Japanese Divisions would be available to expand their conquests. The American Pacific Fleet, without the battleships lost at Pearl Harbour, consisted of a few Task Forces based around their aircraft carriers. The British fleet was still in the Indian Ocean while awaiting the arrival of another couple of carriers. The good news was that the submarine forces of both fleets were being strengthened and that Japanese losses in its merchant fleet continued to grow.
Brett’s assessment of the American build up was that by the middle of the year, the USAAF would be a potent force for both offensive and defensive actions. The USN would continue to do its best to jab at the Japanese, while keeping itself intact until the ship building program got into its stride. The US Army and Marine Corps would continue to build itself up in the Pacific and Australia, and hopefully be in a position to go on the offensive in another few months. Curtin and Fraser knew most of this already, but the idea of another two Japanese Divisions being let loose on the overstretched Dutch and allied holdings was frightening.
Auchinleck was more sanguine about the situation. It had become clear that the Japanese had gambled on a fast and furious campaign, trying to take advantage of the general weakness of the European colonies, just as they had with French Indo-China. As far as he could see, they planned to gain the resource rich area to allow them to finally finish off the Chinese. Knowing that it would take time for the allies to gather strength, the Japanese would have time to fortify themselves and make the task of defeating them too expensive to contemplate. That gamble had failed. They had been stopped in Malaya, Burma, Celebes, and unable to take Java. Yes, they had captured Rabaul, the Philippines and Borneo, but had paid a heavy price for it.
While that part of the Japanese gamble had failed, the other thing that they hadn’t taken account of was how long it would take the allies to gather reinforcements on land, sea and air. If indeed Auchinleck got the ANZACs from the Middle East, and the Americans continued to send troops and aircraft at the same rate, then taking back what had been lost wouldn’t be too long delayed.
Waiting for the Americans to build up their forces to go on the offensive would mean it would likely be 1943 before anything concrete could happen. The other problem that the Australians and New Zealanders had identified was a concern about what the long-term cost would be for the American help. They were aware that there was some kind of unspoken animosity towards the British Empire in America, and while New Zealand was more concerned than Australia, it was worrying. The reinforcements to Singapore before the Japanese invasion, had reassured them that they weren’t just being used by Britain. The Australians were particularly pleased with the growing links with Canada and felt that there was still something to be said for the Sterling Zone.
There were other issues to be discussed after lunch, but for the moment, there was a general agreement that the ANZACs would be best placed support the Dutch forces and hopefully stop any more Japanese expansion. Having two, preferably three experienced, some would say ‘crack’, Divisions in theatre would give real stability to the situation. The two Prime Ministers, with Auchinleck’s approval, would cable London and make their request for the ANZACs to be released, but were prepared to allow Australian 7 Division to remain until Rhodes had been liberated.
John Curtin, Prime Minister and Minister for Defence Coordination, had greeted General Claude Auchinleck at the door of the Lodge (official residence of the Australian PM). Auchinleck had been delayed, so when he walked into the meeting room, Peter Fraser, the New Zealand Prime Minister, rose and shook his hand and that of Auchinleck’s deputy, Lieutenant General George Brett USAAF.
As well as the Prime Ministers, the Chief of the General Staffs of Australia and New Zealand, Vernon Sturdee and Edward Puttock, were also present. Later there would be a larger meeting involving staff members and other interested parties, but this meeting, ostensibly drinks before lunch, was in fact a chance to hammer out the main point of the agenda before the official meeting after lunch.
The focus of attention for both Australia and New Zealand had become the Pacific and South China Sea since the Japanese declaration of war. While strengthening Malaya with Australia’s 6, 8 and 9 Infantry Divisions, 7 Australian and 2nd New Zealand Infantry Divisions were still in the Middle East. The New Zealanders had played an important part in the defeat of Italian North Africa, and were currently underemployed. Although 7 Division was preparing to go into action in Rhodes, the New Zealanders were now back up to full strength in men and equipment, were sitting around keeping an eye on the Vichy French.
It was becoming very difficult politically to keep such strong and important forces in the Middle East when they could be doing something to knock out the Japanese threat. Curtin and Fraser wanted Auchinleck’s thoughts on how things were going, and particularly, what the end of American resistance on the Philippines meant.
Feelers had been put out to Washington DC to ask about American plans. The gathering of the infantry force on New Caledonia, and the build up of the USAAF in Australia and on Java were concrete signs that the Americans were starting to get onto a war footing. It was only a few months since the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour, and while no one expected miracles of the Americans, the resources of the allies in the area weren’t going to be anywhere near enough until the Americans were fully deployed.
Strategically, the Americans would naturally want the Philippines back, but getting to it, needed the Netherlands East Indies secured. If the war had to be taken all the way back to Japan, there would either have to be an island-hopping exercise across the vastness of the Pacific, or, possibly, go through China, for which French Indo-China would need to be taken, and that would involve seizing Thailand.
If Churchill would agree to release the ANZACs from Wavell’s command to Auchinleck, ABDA would have an extra battle-hardened Corps to play with. The fact that 7 Division was trained for amphibious warfare was another desirable skill set. Coupled with the British reinforcements heading for Burma and Malaya, then the Japanese enterprise would be thrown off the rails completely.
The problem for both Australia and New Zealand was that they were just about at their maximum available manpower. Curtin and Sturdee were conscious that the Civilian Military Force (CMF) consisted on paper of five Infantry and two Cavalry Divisions. As these units were made up by conscripts, under the Defence Act, they were precluded from serving outside Australia or Australian territory. They were also undertrained and underequipped, while not at the same level as the Home Guard in Britain, garrison duties were about all that could be expected of them. Maintaining four AIF Infantry Divisions in the field and an Armoured Division about to join them, didn’t give Australia much leeway.
The New Zealand Army was looking at forming a second Expeditionary Force for the Pacific. They had increased the numbers of Battalions defending Fiji, creating two Brigades. There had been discussions about creating a third Infantry Brigade to augment the two on Fiji and create 3rd Infantry Division. The problem was that Fiji needed to be defended. If the Americans would take over that responsibility, then New Zealand could provide another strong force to the fight. In addition to the two Infantry Brigades, New Zealand had formed its 1st Army Tank Brigade, the previous October. So far, they had received thirty Valiant I tanks from Britain for training. Without more tanks the three Battalions weren’t anywhere near ready for deployment. If they were fully equipped, adding them to the two Infantry Brigades would provide a strong punch. The fighting in Malaya had shown the Infantry tank to be a potent weapon.
From Auchinleck’s point of view the idea of having the ANZACs in his area of responsibility would be an excellent addition, especially if 7 Division arrived with the Royal Navy’s amphibious capability. While that wasn’t likely, the Japanese had shown that amphibious assets didn’t have to be too sophisticated. It also wasn’t an immediate priority. First and foremost, the Japanese had to be stopped dead, and with the fall of the Americans in the Philippines, the Japanese would have more men to put into their efforts to gain the resource rich Netherlands East Indies.
Auchinleck asked Brett to give his assessment of the situation regarding the Philippines. Brett noted that the garrison on Corregidor still held out, and that there were other American forces spread over some of the other islands. However, for all intents and purposes, the Philippines were now under Japanese control. The question was how long it would take the Japanese to regroup and move their main force to somewhere else.
The best Intelligence evaluations suggested that, unless something happened to the Japanese navy’s ability to control the sea lanes, then one or possibly two Japanese Divisions would be available to expand their conquests. The American Pacific Fleet, without the battleships lost at Pearl Harbour, consisted of a few Task Forces based around their aircraft carriers. The British fleet was still in the Indian Ocean while awaiting the arrival of another couple of carriers. The good news was that the submarine forces of both fleets were being strengthened and that Japanese losses in its merchant fleet continued to grow.
Brett’s assessment of the American build up was that by the middle of the year, the USAAF would be a potent force for both offensive and defensive actions. The USN would continue to do its best to jab at the Japanese, while keeping itself intact until the ship building program got into its stride. The US Army and Marine Corps would continue to build itself up in the Pacific and Australia, and hopefully be in a position to go on the offensive in another few months. Curtin and Fraser knew most of this already, but the idea of another two Japanese Divisions being let loose on the overstretched Dutch and allied holdings was frightening.
Auchinleck was more sanguine about the situation. It had become clear that the Japanese had gambled on a fast and furious campaign, trying to take advantage of the general weakness of the European colonies, just as they had with French Indo-China. As far as he could see, they planned to gain the resource rich area to allow them to finally finish off the Chinese. Knowing that it would take time for the allies to gather strength, the Japanese would have time to fortify themselves and make the task of defeating them too expensive to contemplate. That gamble had failed. They had been stopped in Malaya, Burma, Celebes, and unable to take Java. Yes, they had captured Rabaul, the Philippines and Borneo, but had paid a heavy price for it.
While that part of the Japanese gamble had failed, the other thing that they hadn’t taken account of was how long it would take the allies to gather reinforcements on land, sea and air. If indeed Auchinleck got the ANZACs from the Middle East, and the Americans continued to send troops and aircraft at the same rate, then taking back what had been lost wouldn’t be too long delayed.
Waiting for the Americans to build up their forces to go on the offensive would mean it would likely be 1943 before anything concrete could happen. The other problem that the Australians and New Zealanders had identified was a concern about what the long-term cost would be for the American help. They were aware that there was some kind of unspoken animosity towards the British Empire in America, and while New Zealand was more concerned than Australia, it was worrying. The reinforcements to Singapore before the Japanese invasion, had reassured them that they weren’t just being used by Britain. The Australians were particularly pleased with the growing links with Canada and felt that there was still something to be said for the Sterling Zone.
There were other issues to be discussed after lunch, but for the moment, there was a general agreement that the ANZACs would be best placed support the Dutch forces and hopefully stop any more Japanese expansion. Having two, preferably three experienced, some would say ‘crack’, Divisions in theatre would give real stability to the situation. The two Prime Ministers, with Auchinleck’s approval, would cable London and make their request for the ANZACs to be released, but were prepared to allow Australian 7 Division to remain until Rhodes had been liberated.
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I thought 6th Australian had already been shipped east and broken up to garrison islands and strengthen 8th & 9th Australian?
Hopefully they send the NZ division asap, but hopefully 7th Australian stays. Their amphibious training and soon-to-be experience is more immediately important in Europe. Auchinleck just need a strong defense on Java. It might be better to have more British units get combat experience before the invasion of Europe.
Lot of gold and scrambled egg in that meeting though Brett feels like the Junior partner sat in that room and I feel like he knows it and until more US forces make their way Downunder he will still stay in that role.
Good point here right now they are just sat there the Rhodes and any other Greek Island operation is highly important but after it is over they should go east for any sort of amphibious operation as well since right now other than border sitting there is really not a lot to do in North Africa and keeping Japan out of vital territories.
Those two Japanese Divisions what could happen here is they could get penny-packed out to various areas which will hurt them or there is an argument with the various generals on who goes where. That or they get seen by a British or Dutch sub when in transport in that case the Two Divisions will get gutted or worse what passes for their supply chain will get sent to the bottom in which case they are in trouble.
Keeping Malaya, Burma, Celebes open will mean they will continue to send resources and supplies and with Java still contested it will do more to help the War effort than any thing else. However you slice it the Japanese committed a major strategic blunder for the Axis they dragged the USA into the war right now for very little gain.
In OTL Curtin had demanded the return of ALL Australian Forces from the Middle-East by the middle of December 1941. They were initially intended to go to the NEI but as the situation worsened they were diverted to Australia itself, except for BLACKFORCE their advance party. The problem this was done at such a hurry, none of the transports were tactically loaded, something Churchill did not know or understand when he diverted them to Rangoon. When it was pointed out to him he had to concede defeat and accede to the Australian demands.
Given the way things have shifted I imagine his talking points have changed to a degree since North Africa is won and not being a manpower sink and more of the East holding strong with thr only major loses for the Commonwealth being Borneo and Rabul.
Plus Britain has sent a strong force and that has contributed to the good position the British and Empire forces are in. As it says in the latest post, that has been noticed and Australia and New Zealand don't feel abandoned.
Ayup and America militarily and rep wise is in a much weaker postion compared with OTL since North Africa is effectively over, British are holding key areas and haven't been driven back as OTL in Asia. As well as ongoing offensive operations in Thailand, Malaysia and the Med. So the US really can't play a saviour role like it liked to present OTL. Also no MacArthur beating the same drums.
TBF post war as you said l I imagine Britian rep with Australia and New Zealand will be somewhat better compared with OTL given the Victories and the fact units of the AIF will bw frees up to head home or for operations against Imperial Japan.
allanpcameron
Donor
Well spotted, don't know how I managed to miss that! Anyway, I've edited the post, so it really is just the 2nd NZ Div that could be returned, at least till after Rhodes.
Allan.
Probably not. OTL Churchill had a massive blind spot when it came to the USA. He trusted that they would keep their word re: sharing nuclear technology based in large part on the British Tube Alloys project, spoiler: they didn't. Then there were the incredibly restrictive trade clauses the US inserted into Lend-Lease. While ITTL, the Brits won't be quite so desperate as to sign the exact same treaty, Churchill is the same man, the one who truly thought that the 'Special Relationship' was an agreement between equals and not the surrender of world leadership that it really was.
Meanwhile IOTL, both Australia and New Zealand were very wary of US expansion into what was very literally their backyard. There were several not-quite-so-diplomatic notes asking the US what their post-war intentions towards the South Pacific Islands that the US had occupied and garrisoned. Those notes were sent because there were quite a few signs that they were planning on staying in some of them. Both Australia and New Zealand were also concerned that they, and the other minor nations, would be shut out of discussions concerning both the conduct of the war and of its aftermath. These concerns were proven right when the US froze out the ANZACS from the direction of the Pacific War following those notes and again when the "Big 5" granted themselves veto rights over the newly formed United Nations. London looked the other way and sided with Washington.
For its part, despite its public position as an "anti-colonialist power", the USA was anything but. Their experiences with their own territories and the Philipines led them to misunderstand the differences between colonies and Dominions within the British Empire, hence they often expressed exasperation to London re: Australia & New Zealand, demanding that Britain reign in its colonies, only to express some confusion when reminded that Dominions were not colonies but self-ruling nations with the same monarch and thus allies, if minor ones. Which was why Britain could not stop Australia recalling its armies from North Africa and why Freyberg had that very annoying letter from the New Zealand government authorising him to withdraw his division from combat whenever he deemed it necessary in order to prevent the unnecessary loss of New Zealand life.
Meanwhile IOTL, both Australia and New Zealand were very wary of US expansion into what was very literally their backyard. There were several not-quite-so-diplomatic notes asking the US what their post-war intentions towards the South Pacific Islands that the US had occupied and garrisoned. Those notes were sent because there were quite a few signs that they were planning on staying in some of them. Both Australia and New Zealand were also concerned that they, and the other minor nations, would be shut out of discussions concerning both the conduct of the war and of its aftermath. These concerns were proven right when the US froze out the ANZACS from the direction of the Pacific War following those notes and again when the "Big 5" granted themselves veto rights over the newly formed United Nations. London looked the other way and sided with Washington.
For its part, despite its public position as an "anti-colonialist power", the USA was anything but. Their experiences with their own territories and the Philipines led them to misunderstand the differences between colonies and Dominions within the British Empire, hence they often expressed exasperation to London re: Australia & New Zealand, demanding that Britain reign in its colonies, only to express some confusion when reminded that Dominions were not colonies but self-ruling nations with the same monarch and thus allies, if minor ones. Which was why Britain could not stop Australia recalling its armies from North Africa and why Freyberg had that very annoying letter from the New Zealand government authorising him to withdraw his division from combat whenever he deemed it necessary in order to prevent the unnecessary loss of New Zealand life.
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Australia was far from being an unwilling ally to the British. In September 1939 they negotiated an agreement with London as to the terms they were going to commit forces to the British cause in wartime. Basically, they demanded that the AIF be commanded by an Australian - Tom Blamey and that their forces operate in a cohesive force within the British command structure and if necessary, because of a threat to their homeland be redeployed back to Australia if they wished. London agreed, however Churchill obviously felt that Australia was a colony, rather than a Dominion in the way he treated the AIF, breaking it up. Blamey, the fool allowed it to happen. The AIF was broken up into individual divisions and operated as such. The Americans believed the Australians were under the command of London rather than Canberra and were just as surprised as London was after the Cairo Conference to have the South Pacific Dominions conclude the ANZAC Pact, a completely separate agreement concluded between Canberra and Wellington which set out how the Dominions saw the post-war world was to be ordered. This was what made Washington concluded that the Dominions' forces were a liability rather than an asset and sidelined them.