Mossadegh
"...unfairly poor reputation from landing between two modernizing, enterprising Shahs who transformed Persia (later Iran) both politically as well as socially and economically. Nonetheless, Nosrat al-Din's brief reign deserves its own note for its events. Contrary to expectations of a considerable rollback of the constitutional rights afforded Persians in the Revolution of 1907, Nosrat al-Din consolidated the role of the Majlis, even as the cabinets he appointed were typically dominated by the nobility and gentry (in particular his family members). Due to the important position of Persia between Russia and India and the emphasis the British placed upon their port (and, increasingly, oil plays in Bandar Abbas), the number of railroad kilometers built in Persia between 1910 and 1919 more than doubled, all while military academies, medical clinics, and clean modern prisons were established with the best knowledge of the West adapted to conservative Shiite Persia's traditional culture.

This was the aspect of Nosrat al-Din's rule that was perhaps regretted more than anything by Mossadegh, in that while he did not arrest the reformism of the day, he also seemed content to leave it fully to its own devices when facing down the opposition of the conservative ulema, which often ended new ideas before they were even presented. A campaign to end the veiling of women was stillborn in the Majlis, blocked not only by aristocrats but directly-elected parliamentarians from devout, rural parts of the country. Proposals to introduce Western schooling and literacy programs went nowhere, out of fear that it would interfere with traditional Persian values. That said, it would also be unfair to purely lay the failures of many reformist strands in the 1910s on the clergy - it was not (or not only) the ulema who were the reason why efforts to combat nomadism (and the frequent violent instability that sedentary Iranic peoples, particularly across the west and south of Persia, caused) did not succeed, and regional tribal leaders were fully and openly hostile to any attempts by Tehran to centralize its rule, supported occasionally by sympathetic local British businessmen or envoys who enjoyed having their own fiefdoms free of the view of the Persian government as well as their own Colonial Office. In that sense, that was the largest missed opportunity of Nosrat al-Din, that of ending the fragmented governance of Persia that only served to empower not only enemies of the monarchy but also the British, who while not opposed to him nonetheless were ambivalent about him as a Shah compared to his long-serving father..."

- Mossadegh
 
"...unfairly poor reputation from landing between two modernizing, enterprising Shahs who transformed Persia (later Iran) both politically as well as socially and economically. Nonetheless, Nosrat al-Din's brief reign deserves its own note for its events. Contrary to expectations of a considerable rollback of the constitutional rights afforded Persians in the Revolution of 1907, Nosrat al-Din consolidated the role of the Majlis, even as the cabinets he appointed were typically dominated by the nobility and gentry (in particular his family members). Due to the important position of Persia between Russia and India and the emphasis the British placed upon their port (and, increasingly, oil plays in Bandar Abbas), the number of railroad kilometers built in Persia between 1910 and 1919 more than doubled, all while military academies, medical clinics, and clean modern prisons were established with the best knowledge of the West adapted to conservative Shiite Persia's traditional culture.

This was the aspect of Nosrat al-Din's rule that was perhaps regretted more than anything by Mossadegh, in that while he did not arrest the reformism of the day, he also seemed content to leave it fully to its own devices when facing down the opposition of the conservative ulema, which often ended new ideas before they were even presented. A campaign to end the veiling of women was stillborn in the Majlis, blocked not only by aristocrats but directly-elected parliamentarians from devout, rural parts of the country. Proposals to introduce Western schooling and literacy programs went nowhere, out of fear that it would interfere with traditional Persian values. That said, it would also be unfair to purely lay the failures of many reformist strands in the 1910s on the clergy - it was not (or not only) the ulema who were the reason why efforts to combat nomadism (and the frequent violent instability that sedentary Iranic peoples, particularly across the west and south of Persia, caused) did not succeed, and regional tribal leaders were fully and openly hostile to any attempts by Tehran to centralize its rule, supported occasionally by sympathetic local British businessmen or envoys who enjoyed having their own fiefdoms free of the view of the Persian government as well as their own Colonial Office. In that sense, that was the largest missed opportunity of Nosrat al-Din, that of ending the fragmented governance of Persia that only served to empower not only enemies of the monarchy but also the British, who while not opposed to him nonetheless were ambivalent about him as a Shah compared to his long-serving father..."

- Mossadegh
This sounds like Mossadegh is planning out a future nationalist movement to centralize power in the kingdom, one that’s much more successful thanks to an earlier British retreat in the region.
 
The Little Welshman: Billy Hughes and the Founding of Australia's Labor Dynasty
"...Hughes' first solitary year as Prime Minister remains oft-forgotten and in some ways little more than a historical curiosity. Between Fisher's resignation in November 1915 and Hughes' subsequent election as his long-awaited successor, and the elections in May of 1916, little policy of note passed thanks to the narrow and difficult parliamentary math that confronted Hughes, but it nonetheless was an important if brief episode for Hughes to promote allies to key positions within the party, scope out talent (such as a young Jack Lang in New South Wales, with whom he would form an increasingly important partnership) and begin mapping out a manifesto.

The 1916 elections marked one of the most bizarre occurrences in Australian political history, as the liberal-conservative Liberals and agrarian-populist Reform parties both won 30 seats in Parliament and Labor took 33. Both Joe Cook's Liberals and Bill Massey's Reformers refused to support another Hughes ministry, either via confidence or in coalition, and at the new Parliament's first sitting that July Hughes was defeated on the first motion, denying him a return as Prime Minister. How Cook and Massey were to work together, though, was an open question, considering the wide differences between the two and their own personal ambitions; the longstanding failure of the Australian center and right to unite behind one common party can, in many ways, trace its genesis to Cook and Massey squabbling in the winter of 1916. Eventually, the Governor-General Ronald Munro Ferguson - who was quite close with Hughes - interceded to negotiate Massey's appointment in a minority government with Cook providing supply provided that Massey did not pass certain protectionist policies to which the Liberals were opposed.

Of course, despite Cook being a fairly economically right-wing Liberal (and in some ways Massey's social conservatism giving him more in common with Hughes), this coalition was not built to last, and the Massey government was characterized by its instability, in no small part because of "mainland" opposition to a New Zealander, in particular a staunchly conservative one, being named Prime Minister. It also impressed upon Hughes the importance of an electoral system that could deliver clear majorities, and perhaps holding elections less frequently than every three years and thus in his view exacerbated the fractiousness of the Commonwealth's politics; many of the reforms that would follow the one-year interregnum of the Hughes era can, like the enduring contempt of the Liberal and National (the successor to Reform) parties to one another, be seen in the contours of Australian parliamentary politics in 1916-17..."

- The Little Welshman: Billy Hughes and the Founding of Australia's Labor Dynasty
 
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This sounds like Mossadegh is planning out a future nationalist movement to centralize power in the kingdom, one that’s much more successful thanks to an earlier British retreat in the region.
Sorta, yeah. That’s more or less the end goal. Mossadegh strikes me as somebody with some strong parallels to Ataturk or Nehru and he’ll be a key figure in Persian/Iranian history as a result, especially as the Qajars (of whom he was a minor relative) stay in power
 
Given that Persia seems to be "rolling" better, I really wonder which of the Ottoman's neighbors *aren't* going to be in the war in the 1930s. (And yes, for all I know the Ottomans could manage to keep things together through the 21st century without a war)
 
Given that Persia seems to be "rolling" better, I really wonder which of the Ottoman's neighbors *aren't* going to be in the war in the 1930s. (And yes, for all I know the Ottomans could manage to keep things together through the 21st century without a war)
Persia probably (famous last words) wouldn’t be drifting into such a confrontation, but we shall see
Hmmm.... interesting.

So Australia ends up extending its parliamentary terms?
Correct - it’ll eventually go from 3 to 4 years

And yes, Lang is very interesting. Between him and Hughes you’ve got a real monkey’s paw situation brewing in Oz as far as “make ALP the natural party of government rather than Coalition”
 
Persia probably (famous last words) wouldn’t be drifting into such a confrontation, but we shall see

Correct - it’ll eventually go from 3 to 4 years

And yes, Lang is very interesting. Between him and Hughes you’ve got a real monkey’s paw situation brewing in Oz as far as “make ALP the natural party of government rather than Coalition”
I think it is probably closer to the idea that if Italy (&Greece, etc) is at war with the Ottomans across the entire Mediterranean coast, the Persians could probably take Baghdad as well as several other areas on the border fairly easily. They don't *want* Baghdad, but they'll take it so that if the Ottomans *do* survive, they can trade it for just about everything else they want. :)

Hmm. Italy, Russia, Persia , Maybe we get a string of wars in 1930, 1950 and 1953 for the "Partitions of the Ottomans". (and then 123 years after 1953 (2076), an independent Ottoman State is restored???
 
I think it is probably closer to the idea that if Italy (&Greece, etc) is at war with the Ottomans across the entire Mediterranean coast, the Persians could probably take Baghdad as well as several other areas on the border fairly easily. They don't *want* Baghdad, but they'll take it so that if the Ottomans *do* survive, they can trade it for just about everything else they want. :)

Hmm. Italy, Russia, Persia , Maybe we get a string of wars in 1930, 1950 and 1953 for the "Partitions of the Ottomans". (and then 123 years after 1953 (2076), an independent Ottoman State is restored???
An Arab Shia state under Qajar Iranian influence via the clerics in Najaf would probably be a major goal of such an operation
 
An Arab Shia state under Qajar Iranian influence via the clerics in Najaf would probably be a major goal of such an operation
Absolutely, the southern third of OTL Iraq would be a target. I don't think in a evisceration of the Ottoman Empire that Persia could acquire Jerusalem, but the other three holy cities to all of Islam (Mecca, Medina and Damascus are *possible*). For the Shia specific locations, Najaf is a given, Qom is inside Persia and the question is "Can they gain Karbala without gaining a *lot* of Sunni Muslims in Damascus?"

Anyone seen a TL with a Persia gaining quite a bit from a Ottoman Collapse?
 
Absolutely, the southern third of OTL Iraq would be a target. I don't think in a evisceration of the Ottoman Empire that Persia could acquire Jerusalem, but the other three holy cities to all of Islam (Mecca, Medina and Damascus are *possible*). For the Shia specific locations, Najaf is a given, Qom is inside Persia and the question is "Can they gain Karbala without gaining a *lot* of Sunni Muslims in Damascus?"

Anyone seen a TL with a Persia gaining quite a bit from an Ottoman Collapse?
Karbala is not in Syria so I’m not sure what this means?
Here i wonder who that is?
Is he this guy?
Yes - Naser al-Din Shah’s third son, who by virtue of his father living to 1910 is next in line as Mozaffar al-Din is dead by then
 
So is DC going to be rebuilt at all after the war? The mention of plans to have the Federal University be built there being scrapped makes me wonder.... IIRC, someone suggested that the whole city be turned into a gigantic war memorial....
 
So why is his reign called brief? Iotl he lived until 1954 iirc...
🤐🤐🤐
Sorry, that should have been gain Karbala without gaining Baghdad...
Ahh yes yes that Makes sense

Baghdad and its prestige, dimmed though it may have been by then, would probably nonetheless be a prerequisite for such a state’s viability. Besides, a not-Iraq containing only the Basra and Baghdad Vilayets is still hypermajority Shia, and with minimal Kurdish minority, either
So is DC going to be rebuilt at all after the war? The mention of plans to have the Federal University be built there being scrapped makes me wonder.... IIRC, someone suggested that the whole city be turned into a gigantic war memorial....
Guess we shall see, but your interpretation of that mention is largely correct
 
Other than France and Brazil, what are other countries where integralist movements will come to power or develop into something beyond absolute political irrelevance?
 
Pre-GAW, the second most powerful country on the planet with an elected Head of State was the confederacy. Is Argentina in the second spot now? What countries in Europe currently have elected head of state other than Switzerland?
 
Pre-GAW, the second most powerful country on the planet with an elected Head of State was the confederacy. Is Argentina in the second spot now? What countries in Europe currently have elected head of state other than Switzerland?
Yeah, probably. Depends on your view on how powerful China is
 
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