Justinian's Romanov Ascendant TL: Introduction
Justinian
Banned
The world in which we live today has been nearly completely and totally shaped by two transient events that occurred both in the 20th century, the first obviously being the period of the world wars and the second being the collapse of the Soviet Union. The world war's importance to the direction of modern history is obvious to anyone, not only would they dictate the fates of nations and of millions of people, but the ideological and philosophical direction said nations and individuals would take, it would be nearly impossible to ruminate over the thousands of possible different directions we could have been pulled in or on. The collapse did not result in the same scale of death or destruction (Although certainly millions did die or have their life quality considerably altered, for better or for worse by it) but it ultimately cleared the way for a world in which capitalism and to a lesser extent (a far lesser extent than what western intellectuals in the 1990s thought) liberal democracy could be the only legitimate ideologies.
It would be the end of history, at least as we know it. However, it is very clear this notion was born of some kind of hubristic naivety created from a feeling of victory from watching the wall get knocked down and rockstars parade around in Moscow. This of course raised a question in me, what if the Soviets didn't collapse? That global capitalism and liberalism did not receive it's catharsis in 1989 and 1991? How would history progress in the midst of an unending cold war. This then of course led me to consider what exactly went wrong in the Soviet Union, that had led to its collapse in the first place. It is very obvious, especially when we have the real life comparison of the PRC, that Gorbachev's naive idealism to create an open political system combined with open market reforms both fed off each other resulting in the modern breadline photos taken from (1988-1991) that are often touted as examples of life in the Soviet Union during the 80s, which it was not in fact like, so I would rather argue that Gorbachev's personality, approach to reform and overall incompetence at a time of political, ideological and economic crisis created the conditions necessary for the collapse.
However clearly there were other systemic issues at play, sapping away the Soviet Union's economic capabilities, these being runaway military spending, some of the inherent inefficiencies of planned economics and corruption. Obviously I cannot account for the actions of someone who did not actually take power, but Grigory Romanov was Gorbachev's rival to take power, he was a hardliner and very much styled himself after Andropov. For the purposes of this timeline I essentially continue a Soviet Union ran under Andropov esque policy, but taken to it's logical ends. Anti corruption purges, pseudo-technocratic imposition of an intranet necessary to create a cross referencing checking system for the economy; of course the subsequent technological development which would result from concentration in that sector. Our departure from the original timeline posits a slightly healthier Andropov manages to hand off control of the Soviet Union to a competent hardliner, skipping Chernenko entirely, either due to his health taking a turn for the worse earlier, or even his consent or both.
Romanov's Acescent
Moscow, 1985
It had become clear by the mid 1980's that the Politburo's leadership was woefully incapable of keeping up with the United State's and the West's dynamic economy and aggressive foreign policy. The Star Wars project was believed by some in the Aerospace and Air Forces that the delicate equilibrium of MAD was being threatened. Others felt that the Soviet Union was stagnating, this was overwelmingly clear to both the economists and the politburo. General Secretary Andropov was highly effective during his tenure. He demonstrated that strong leadership from the center could in fact deal with corruption at least to some extent, and counter balance the west. But his tenure was a short one, his kidney failed and worsened several of his other health conditions, and he died at the age of 71. Before this, it had become clear that a successor would be needed soon. Andropov intended to retire from his post (the first Soviet leader to do this) and hand off power to his chosen successor.
Yet there was contention between the hardliners and reformers, and this had set off a leadership struggle within the Politburo, with Gorbachev backed by senior figures like Andrei Gromyko and other reformists. Grigory Romanov was the 2nd youngest member of the Politburo, he was very close to Andropov and who became something of a mentor and a friend, they would often play chess while Andropov underwent dialysis. With Andropov's unwavering support Romanov courted Viktor Grishin and the conservatives. At the March 1985 meeting of the Central Committee, Grishin nominated Romanov. However Gromyko nominated Gorbachev, creating an extremely tense situation unseen in the history of the CPSU, which had almost always nominated candidates unanimously. Chernenko voted for Romanov, despite his own aspirations, he understood that his own health was at risk and decided to pass the torch. Gromyko withdrew his bid and Romanov was elected unanimously. Gromyko subsequently "retired" and Gorbachev was later removed and given a pension and a regional position in the Kuril Islands.
Romanov by acclimation by first the Politburo, Central Committee and finally the Supreme Soviet, as 6th General Secretary of the Communist Party. It wasn't long until Romanov had embarked an ambitious campaign of reform, something that he had ambitiously formulated in his head for years prior and had refined in bedside discussions with Andropov. Andropov saw in Romanov a vehicle to continue his attempts to save the revolution and country from failure and collapse. His (relative) youth gave him the dynamism and energy to see it through, despite the difficulty of dealing with the immense byzantine soviet bureaucracy. Romanov, acting with the legitimacy of his mandate, made a move that would later be recounted by historians as having changed the direction of Soviet history. Advised to do this by Andropov, as Romanov did not have the benefit of having risen in the KGB. His first serious decisive action was reforming the party oversight of the KGB, making it almost only accountable only to the General Secretary. In plainer terms, this essentially gave him the power to not only control the upper echelons of the KGB himself, but to investigate those who had previously held "immunity". This move was at first seen as bizarre, radical break with tradition. Brezhnev would have never considered such a borderline Stalinist move. The reformists in the party reacted with dissension and spread dissent in the party. Previously, the KGB was accountable to the party leadership in the spirit of 'collective leadership', a move made by Khrushchev and held by Brezhnev, this however had the effect of allowing the lower party ranks to become more corrupt, as they could use their political connections or influence to enrich themselves. Andropov, a KGB man, had imparted in Romanov his hatred of corruption and his fervent belief in the importance of the KGB in safeguarding Lenin's revolution and more importantly the state.
The rank and file of the Committee of State Security (KGB) had no problem transferring their loyalty for Andropov to Romanov, especially with their increased authority, pay and stature in society. He used them as his party vanguard to eliminate those enemies wherever they stood, cleaning house on the basis of what was called the "revolutionary anti corruption campaign". Many western leaders denounced the move, highlighted by several defectors. The Soviets simply responded "Do you not punish criminals in your own country, comrade ambassador? These men we are prosecuting steal without regard." The 'Anti Corruption Campaign' became a massive propaganda stunt that helped Romanov mobilize the younger student elements of the party and the more radical elements. Under the cover and fervor of the public trials, he cleared out many his own opponents in the party or general society, but the the biggest victims were in fact corrupt officials. With the KGB untethered, acting with what they felt was righteous indignation, they manage to seriously damage, destroy or roll back the largest and most overt corruption and black market efforts. With the students and Komosols motivated, he also continued the (admittedly humorous) Andropov policy of 'labour discipline', eager communist students were recruited (and promised easier party membership) to force workers to actually go back to their jobs, rather than being absent from work and getting drunk, which had become common during the Brezhnev years.
In the following years:
Edit: I am now posting a final rewrite, that is in the latest pages.
It would be the end of history, at least as we know it. However, it is very clear this notion was born of some kind of hubristic naivety created from a feeling of victory from watching the wall get knocked down and rockstars parade around in Moscow. This of course raised a question in me, what if the Soviets didn't collapse? That global capitalism and liberalism did not receive it's catharsis in 1989 and 1991? How would history progress in the midst of an unending cold war. This then of course led me to consider what exactly went wrong in the Soviet Union, that had led to its collapse in the first place. It is very obvious, especially when we have the real life comparison of the PRC, that Gorbachev's naive idealism to create an open political system combined with open market reforms both fed off each other resulting in the modern breadline photos taken from (1988-1991) that are often touted as examples of life in the Soviet Union during the 80s, which it was not in fact like, so I would rather argue that Gorbachev's personality, approach to reform and overall incompetence at a time of political, ideological and economic crisis created the conditions necessary for the collapse.
However clearly there were other systemic issues at play, sapping away the Soviet Union's economic capabilities, these being runaway military spending, some of the inherent inefficiencies of planned economics and corruption. Obviously I cannot account for the actions of someone who did not actually take power, but Grigory Romanov was Gorbachev's rival to take power, he was a hardliner and very much styled himself after Andropov. For the purposes of this timeline I essentially continue a Soviet Union ran under Andropov esque policy, but taken to it's logical ends. Anti corruption purges, pseudo-technocratic imposition of an intranet necessary to create a cross referencing checking system for the economy; of course the subsequent technological development which would result from concentration in that sector. Our departure from the original timeline posits a slightly healthier Andropov manages to hand off control of the Soviet Union to a competent hardliner, skipping Chernenko entirely, either due to his health taking a turn for the worse earlier, or even his consent or both.
Romanov's Acescent
Moscow, 1985
It had become clear by the mid 1980's that the Politburo's leadership was woefully incapable of keeping up with the United State's and the West's dynamic economy and aggressive foreign policy. The Star Wars project was believed by some in the Aerospace and Air Forces that the delicate equilibrium of MAD was being threatened. Others felt that the Soviet Union was stagnating, this was overwelmingly clear to both the economists and the politburo. General Secretary Andropov was highly effective during his tenure. He demonstrated that strong leadership from the center could in fact deal with corruption at least to some extent, and counter balance the west. But his tenure was a short one, his kidney failed and worsened several of his other health conditions, and he died at the age of 71. Before this, it had become clear that a successor would be needed soon. Andropov intended to retire from his post (the first Soviet leader to do this) and hand off power to his chosen successor.
Yet there was contention between the hardliners and reformers, and this had set off a leadership struggle within the Politburo, with Gorbachev backed by senior figures like Andrei Gromyko and other reformists. Grigory Romanov was the 2nd youngest member of the Politburo, he was very close to Andropov and who became something of a mentor and a friend, they would often play chess while Andropov underwent dialysis. With Andropov's unwavering support Romanov courted Viktor Grishin and the conservatives. At the March 1985 meeting of the Central Committee, Grishin nominated Romanov. However Gromyko nominated Gorbachev, creating an extremely tense situation unseen in the history of the CPSU, which had almost always nominated candidates unanimously. Chernenko voted for Romanov, despite his own aspirations, he understood that his own health was at risk and decided to pass the torch. Gromyko withdrew his bid and Romanov was elected unanimously. Gromyko subsequently "retired" and Gorbachev was later removed and given a pension and a regional position in the Kuril Islands.
Romanov by acclimation by first the Politburo, Central Committee and finally the Supreme Soviet, as 6th General Secretary of the Communist Party. It wasn't long until Romanov had embarked an ambitious campaign of reform, something that he had ambitiously formulated in his head for years prior and had refined in bedside discussions with Andropov. Andropov saw in Romanov a vehicle to continue his attempts to save the revolution and country from failure and collapse. His (relative) youth gave him the dynamism and energy to see it through, despite the difficulty of dealing with the immense byzantine soviet bureaucracy. Romanov, acting with the legitimacy of his mandate, made a move that would later be recounted by historians as having changed the direction of Soviet history. Advised to do this by Andropov, as Romanov did not have the benefit of having risen in the KGB. His first serious decisive action was reforming the party oversight of the KGB, making it almost only accountable only to the General Secretary. In plainer terms, this essentially gave him the power to not only control the upper echelons of the KGB himself, but to investigate those who had previously held "immunity". This move was at first seen as bizarre, radical break with tradition. Brezhnev would have never considered such a borderline Stalinist move. The reformists in the party reacted with dissension and spread dissent in the party. Previously, the KGB was accountable to the party leadership in the spirit of 'collective leadership', a move made by Khrushchev and held by Brezhnev, this however had the effect of allowing the lower party ranks to become more corrupt, as they could use their political connections or influence to enrich themselves. Andropov, a KGB man, had imparted in Romanov his hatred of corruption and his fervent belief in the importance of the KGB in safeguarding Lenin's revolution and more importantly the state.
The rank and file of the Committee of State Security (KGB) had no problem transferring their loyalty for Andropov to Romanov, especially with their increased authority, pay and stature in society. He used them as his party vanguard to eliminate those enemies wherever they stood, cleaning house on the basis of what was called the "revolutionary anti corruption campaign". Many western leaders denounced the move, highlighted by several defectors. The Soviets simply responded "Do you not punish criminals in your own country, comrade ambassador? These men we are prosecuting steal without regard." The 'Anti Corruption Campaign' became a massive propaganda stunt that helped Romanov mobilize the younger student elements of the party and the more radical elements. Under the cover and fervor of the public trials, he cleared out many his own opponents in the party or general society, but the the biggest victims were in fact corrupt officials. With the KGB untethered, acting with what they felt was righteous indignation, they manage to seriously damage, destroy or roll back the largest and most overt corruption and black market efforts. With the students and Komosols motivated, he also continued the (admittedly humorous) Andropov policy of 'labour discipline', eager communist students were recruited (and promised easier party membership) to force workers to actually go back to their jobs, rather than being absent from work and getting drunk, which had become common during the Brezhnev years.
In the following years:
- Romanov's ideological premise was that what was determined in the confines of Marxist Leninism as 'developed socialism' had not yet been established in the Soviet Union or in its allied states. It had yet to achieve the same level of economic and technological output as it's western rivals, and without achieving this desired state of evolution, they would be constantly sprinting to catch up to the last obstacle the west had already crossed. He stated in full terms that the country had languished under the lethargy of Breznevisim. Dismissing Brezhnev's legacy was a bold political move that already contributed to antipathy from some, but was overwelmingly regarded as correct, both by the higher elements of the KGB, the Party and even the general population, who had come to perceive Brezhnev as an idiot and overwhelming incompetent. This openness and honesty, despite it's clear cynical reality of blaming all of the problems on the last leader did in fact improve his image. Using his hold on the KGB, he could also remove those he saw as Breznevists at will. This allowed Romanov to rebuild the conservative and hardline faction at his own discretion, removing old magnates and putting his own men in. In public he made the caveat to save some supporters of Brezhnev political face, that he did do his best for the fraternal brotherhood of peoples in the Soviet Union, but had failed in his duties in allowing stagnation to take hold.
- He said that his ambitious program would correct the problems in the state, and made public speeches to this effect. This being in effect the first time a public figure in the Soviet Union had acknowledged the problems plaguing the country. He kept it short and to the point, and of course downplayed the scale of it, blaming it on a handful of criminals. But this move shook up the party, and created a general interest in the population, which had generally had an antipathy towards politicians. He seemed a little more 'honest' than most. This had led to dissent in some of the conservative factions, but he assuaged them privately, arguing that such self reflection was a Marxist Leninist principal and that they needed to gain credibility to defeat the reformers. The vast majority ultimately got behind the leader who appeared to be dealing with the problems in the country, acting as the strongman that many conservatives felt that the Soviet Union needed again. The overall program was announced and called Uprochneniye (Consolidation). It proscribed economic reforms including stricter administration, consolidation of state industries and some elements of self management and was added to the twelfth 5 year plan. After weeks of consultation with the Soviet Union's best minds in computers, economics, political science and engineering, they came to a conclusion that the Soviet Union needed an electronic system to ease and make more efficient it's economic planning system. The system would later be called EGSVT and was inspired by the to the Chilean Cybersyn project. Romanov despite not comprehending or knowing much about computers, was so impressed by this, that he was swayed to support the emerging Soviet computer and electronics industry, something he had taken a personal interest in, he also elevated several younger technology experts in the party on a track to Politburo membership. This system once implemented could help deal with some of the inherent problems of a planned economy. Uprochneniye would be forced onto the various Warsaw pact member states with varying degrees of success.
- By 1988, the foundational infrastructure for EGSVT had been finished, and two new manufacturing complexes for electronics and computers were finished, one near Leningrad and the other near Minsk. Three more were slated to be finished by '89, one near Moscow, another near Vilnius and the other at Vladivostok. The increasing use of computers in administration and economic management as well the increased authoritarian methods had resulted in economic growth. The system's grand opening in late 1988 and early 1989 was plagued by glitches and technical problems, but overall proved to massively improve efficiency. Previously, it was normal for entire trains of produce to be left to rot before it would even begin to be distributed to stores, but the improvements had led to better distribution. Now it was possible to actually procure meat or coffee from a store. For example Instead of waiting for 7-10 years to receive a lada you had already paid for with low production qualities, the wait shrank to 2 to 4 years for a somewhat better lada or skoda. Televisions were no longer had a tendency to catch on fire or bust from simple normal use (from higher production standards). Quality control was increasingly forced and factory heads held accountable. Self management in some industries improved their productive capacity, and led to increasing standards in agriculture. People no longer used prada as toilet paper because they could actually get (toilet paper) it from a government store. Because consumer good quality was improving, the Soviets could now export some of it's goods, instead of relying exclusively on oil and natural resource sales. Reductions to the military budget, and mainly to bloat that Romanov had seen while being head of the military industrial complex (in 1983, an actual fact) also helped. In summary, the quality of life was improving in the mid to late 1980s in a similar way, that life seemed to be improving in the 70s to the immediate post war generation of the Soviet Union.
- Romanov was unwilling to back down in Afghanistan, the war continued at an increased pace, the Americans increased their support but the Soviets also increased their troops numbers and began using even more unsavory tactics and techniques, including mass deportations to more easily controlled camps and cities and rumored use of chemical and biological weapons. Forcible urbanization in the most problematic regions heavily damaged the support base for the mujahedeen, forcing them to take refuge in their mountain fortresses on the borders of Pakistan. When a MiG-27 on a bombing run was shot down by a Pakistani F-16 in 1986, Andropov ordered retaliation. The Soviets lost a MiG-25 after downing 3 F-16s and then began a short but decisive air campaign on the North of Pakistan, targeting their training camps in 1987. Several more Pakistani fighters were shot down, and the US reacted very sternly, stating that a Soviet invasion of Pakistan was a redline, and the US would defend Pakistani territorial integrity. It was considered one of the closest cold war flashpoints since Able Archer. Despite Reagan's grand standing, the Soviets had no intention of expanding the war to another country and instead simply issued a warning that overt support for terrorists targeting their countrymen would be met likewise. By 89 the Pakistanis continued their support, but improvements in Soviet combat techniques and technology reduced the mujahedeens effectiveness to an even lesser degree. Forced into staging night raids on the Afghanis themselves or planting mines. Whenever the Soviets would find a cave system or mountain fortress, they would obliterate it through massive artillery bombardment, or in some selective cases, chemical weapons. By the 1990s, The Soviets withdrew the majority of their forces from Afghanistan after overwelmingly gutting the opposition through the aforementioned methods and agreed to some reforms with the moderate opposition, while maintaining a supply line to the Afghan communists and advisors to help fight the continuing but less escalated insurgency.
- General Secretary Romanov became increasingly paranoid as well as openly ruthless. He also appeared to becoming more narcissistic. Soviet Propaganda began depicting him by the end of 1986 as one of the great socialists and personal defender of the revolution in propaganda. He had also massively curtailed the autonomy of many of the constituent republics of the USSR. Which provoked unrest, but the increased power of the KGB had managed to control it, at least at that point. Despite maintaining the Khrushchev line on Stalin, Romanov gradually reintroduced the cult of personality.
- The benefits of the economic development and increased use of electronics had led to the Soviets managing to actually produce surpluses in goods and food that were transferred to the other member states of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). This actively reduced unrest in the general population in the Warsaw Pact states, yet there were still strong liberal movements operating in East Germany, Poland and to a lesser extent Czechoslovakia. Bulgaria had a stronger and more entrenched population of loyalists, but Romania was increasingly destabilized by the erratic leadership style of Ceausescu. The Soviets gradually assisted in paying the debts incurred by each state with its profits, especially with Poland in near crisis. The Soviets and East Germans, energized by the recent success increasingly pushed for increased economic integration, gladly accepted by all except Romania. However increasing instability would later force Ceausescu to accept it, but it worked for the best in conjunction with his completion of his austerity policy.
Edit: I am now posting a final rewrite, that is in the latest pages.
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