New Deal Coalition Retained: A Sixth Party System Wikibox Timeline
A powerless, purely symbolic monarchy, appointed by a legislature the citizens of Germany elect, which in turn handles the business of government while the monarch sits there and looks pretty.
Why would you want that symbol though? The history of monarchy in Germany is absolutist. This is an opinion which may look good to someone from Britain, but not someone from a country who had their own autocratic monarchs not so far back.
They're being given a national symbol with links to a time in Germany's past when they were powerful but not fascist, but by making the monarch a mere figurehead, they show their commitment to democracy and the future.
At least, that's my interpretation.
Except the German "shame" doesn't stop at Hitler. They don't want to be compared or reminded of the old German Empire, just like they don't want to be associated with the third Reich. This is not a symbol most of them should want to get behind. And especially not an ideology founded on opposing their past autocracy (though I'm starting to doubt they're sincere).
It doesn't matter that the monarch's position will only be symbolic because the symbol he presents is already overwhelmingly negative.
Good comparisons would be a post soviet Russia bringing back a Romanov Tsar or modern Austria putting a Habsburg on the throne. It just doesn't make sense because there is no material advantage and the symbolism is all wrong.
Genuine concern is not the same thing as harping. So far he has given sufficient evidence on how Germans would not like monarchy
If Germany annexes parts of Poland and Kaliningrad concessions wouldn't just be made to Poland in terms of territory
France would want some territory out of this to preserve the balance of power in Europe and other countries like Italy (which is under freyist governance last I checked) would demand "historic territory" like Dalmatia and then Europe would devolve into a quagmire of land claims.
Also I don't know what you mean by "maybe the Germans know something we don't " but unless it's "600 thousand Russians reveal they were German the whole time in some m night Shyamalan super secret plot twisf" then it ain't gonna happen. There were fewer than 10 thousand Germans there at the time according to the census data from Wikipedia.
Annexing any part of Poland or Kaliningrad would cause a rift so great between France and Germany that not even a mutual hatred of the Soviets could offset it.
France would want some territory out of this to preserve the balance of power in Europe and other countries like Italy (which is under freyist governance last I checked) would demand "historic territory" like Dalmatia and then Europe would devolve into a quagmire of land claims.
Also I don't know what you mean by "maybe the Germans know something we don't " but unless it's "600 thousand Russians reveal they were German the whole time in some m night Shyamalan super secret plot twisf" then it ain't gonna happen. There were fewer than 10 thousand Germans there at the time according to the census data from Wikipedia.
Annexing any part of Poland or Kaliningrad would cause a rift so great between France and Germany that not even a mutual hatred of the Soviets could offset it.
Look, I get the argument you are trying to make here.
The problem is that it is not tenable in the current political environment outside of West Germany. You already have established that it took quite the effort on the part of Frey to convince their allies that they were not National Socialists under a different banner, and that there still remains a measure of skepticism in some quarters on this front. Shortly after having made these gains they then issue a declaration on the issue of their eastern border which, while admittedly being a return to the norm in some respects from twenty years prior under the CDU, would come across as an overtly belligerent move on Frey's part. It would provide ammunition to his worst critics, and I can't imagine they would have to look far for those within the Liberty Party who continue to advocate for a return to the Pre-Versaille borders (as such voices did and almost certainly here would exist). It may not have been Frey's intention, but it would serve as a validation of all those who remain paranoid about Germany "being on the march again", especially when combined with the increased military spending of the Liberty government; it's a public relations disaster.
Hence why I've argue for a softer position, vis-a-vis "We seek a return of the eastern border between the German and Polish nations as existed before our nation fell to despotism, and we seek to negotiate a settlement between our two nations that will amicably resolve the status of the eastern territories to the benefit of both Germany and Poland, and a Treaty to confirm the resulting borders of those negotiations in perpetuity."
At least in that case there would be no alarm on the part of the West (among the main leadership anyway, skeptics aside), and Frey would have the same leeway he would otherwise.
The problem is that it is not tenable in the current political environment outside of West Germany. You already have established that it took quite the effort on the part of Frey to convince their allies that they were not National Socialists under a different banner, and that there still remains a measure of skepticism in some quarters on this front. Shortly after having made these gains they then issue a declaration on the issue of their eastern border which, while admittedly being a return to the norm in some respects from twenty years prior under the CDU, would come across as an overtly belligerent move on Frey's part. It would provide ammunition to his worst critics, and I can't imagine they would have to look far for those within the Liberty Party who continue to advocate for a return to the Pre-Versaille borders (as such voices did and almost certainly here would exist). It may not have been Frey's intention, but it would serve as a validation of all those who remain paranoid about Germany "being on the march again", especially when combined with the increased military spending of the Liberty government; it's a public relations disaster.
Hence why I've argue for a softer position, vis-a-vis "We seek a return of the eastern border between the German and Polish nations as existed before our nation fell to despotism, and we seek to negotiate a settlement between our two nations that will amicably resolve the status of the eastern territories to the benefit of both Germany and Poland, and a Treaty to confirm the resulting borders of those negotiations in perpetuity."
At least in that case there would be no alarm on the part of the West (among the main leadership anyway, skeptics aside), and Frey would have the same leeway he would otherwise.
That's what Frey is saying, seeking a negotiated settlement with the Polish people, whom he sees as the victims of both Hitler and Stalin. The military spending is an obvious reaction to the December Coup, which every NATO nation has been doing and mirrors a plan put together by the SPD government only larger.
Italy was never the victim of any ethnic cleansing, so they don't see the need to make any demands such as these. And while the French don't see the new German government as a threat, there will be a rift that I will explore further after the end of the Cold War.
And regarding the thing that Germany knows that no one else does, essentially it involves either the Soviets being in no position to make demands or the Germans not being in any position.
I'm sorry but the French would see this government as a threat for so many reasons namely the history of the French and German peoples. To simply wave a magic wand and say this tension doesn't exist is so lazy and asinine you'd be hard pressed to find a dumber excuse than "it isn't happening".
Also if this whole mysterious thing you have going on about what will make the Soviets give up Kaliningrad is annoying. It seems like youre biding time as you struggke to come up with a decent answer. Even if the Soviet government were to collapse 600 thousand Russians would not willingly leave their homeland and would not willingly become part of Germany.
Granted the Italians were never the victims of ethnic cleansing but they have as much of a precedent for a claim on Dalmatia as Germany does on Kaliningrad. I swear in the next update you'll have Germany searching for colonies
since we're on ASB solutions to issues why not have Germany carve up some polish territory and create a Romani homeland as an apology for having ethnically cleansed their people. I realize this last bit is dumb and doesn't have much to do with what everyone is arguing about but it seemed like a cool suggestion if we're tossing plausibility out the window
If your question is if the German government is viewed unfavorably by the French people and leadership, the answer is yes. Frey is not popular, and Germany is only topped by the USSR, Libya, Communist Poland, and East Germany as the most unfavorable country to the French people. However, Paris is not stupid, and they can see the obvious and know Germany is not itching to go to war with them at all. There are no threats of German tanks racing down the Champs Elysees, while everyone is afraid of Soviet tanks in that position. If the USSR could have allied with the capitalist US and the imperialist UK in WWII, then it is more than plausible for the French to ally with a Freyist Germany (if only for a little while) to combat a greater threat. They are not friends, not by a long shot, but they still are allies.
The Germans don't want colonies. They want all vestiges of Hitler eliminated, however hard it may be. That is what Freyism in the German form dictates, turning the post-Nazi guilt from self-loathing into a proactive zeal to eliminate vestiges of the past and prevent anything of that sort from happening again. They see Poland as a greater victim, and want to rectify the historical evil.
Some of the most radical Freyists would probably be in favor of that idea to give the Romani a homeland of their own.
It all depends on how the Soviet government collapses.
I see this as a WWII like situation - I mean, neither Britain, France, the US trusted the USSR at the time, but be damned if we were going to do anything to antagonise them in any way. We needed their support. Just like right now, with rising tension with the USSR, nobody wants to push Germany's buttons, because they need them as allies against the USSR.
Oh man. You realise this is a work of fiction, with the author having full creative control? The Congressmen has been alluding to an event like these happening for a number of updates now and has set the tone of the series beginning, with a number of characters having different political beliefs and almost 30 years passing since this TL's POD. A number of people on this TL love to whinge that "this update is ASB", but the thing is, the events that have occurred in this TL are no less ASB than real life. A real estate billionaire with no prior political experience being seen as a man of the people and being elected - plenty said it wasn't possible. Just because you don't personally believe it would have happened doesn't mean it wouldn't have.
On the topic of France (I would keep from commenting on Germany), it feels like latent Germanophobia is underestimated, even though you do point at it.
As I see it, if France and its people are almost evenly despising the Communist bloc and Freyist Germany, and counting that other French habit of despising NATO (it led to rejection of European Defence Community in 1955, development of independent nuclear arsenal and eventually under de Gaulle, withdrawal from NATO), I would say that a logical conclusion is 'Splendid Isolation', except that France doesn't have a sea around.
However, France does have a particular nuclear doctrine made by de Gaulle that roughly says, 'if you invade our national territory, we nuke you' (well, I may be oversimplifying, but that's the spirit).
On that, I was surprised to learn in a recent article (Guerre&Histoire, no 38, pp48-49), about the impact of French nuclear strategical doctrine on Soviet strategic doctrine that appeared in the Vorochilov Lectures (IOTL, documents from a Soviet military academy leaked by an Afghan officer who defected after his country invasion in 1979). In that article, I read that the Soviets considered the French and their doctrine an element so independent that they adapted their war strategy from an all out nuclear war in case of WWIII to a more conventional one. I lack enough knowledge of the subject so I can't elaborate, but that says about how the Soviets may consider France on the diplomatic stage, and if Gorbachev (as Foreign minister) has enough wisedom, he might use that to instill a schism within NATO and create enough uncertainty on the western back of Freyist Germany to calm it down (Frey may use German taxpayer money to hire best public relation firms in the world, that wouldn't help him with century long Franco-German grudge).
As I see it, if France and its people are almost evenly despising the Communist bloc and Freyist Germany, and counting that other French habit of despising NATO (it led to rejection of European Defence Community in 1955, development of independent nuclear arsenal and eventually under de Gaulle, withdrawal from NATO), I would say that a logical conclusion is 'Splendid Isolation', except that France doesn't have a sea around.
However, France does have a particular nuclear doctrine made by de Gaulle that roughly says, 'if you invade our national territory, we nuke you' (well, I may be oversimplifying, but that's the spirit).
On that, I was surprised to learn in a recent article (Guerre&Histoire, no 38, pp48-49), about the impact of French nuclear strategical doctrine on Soviet strategic doctrine that appeared in the Vorochilov Lectures (IOTL, documents from a Soviet military academy leaked by an Afghan officer who defected after his country invasion in 1979). In that article, I read that the Soviets considered the French and their doctrine an element so independent that they adapted their war strategy from an all out nuclear war in case of WWIII to a more conventional one. I lack enough knowledge of the subject so I can't elaborate, but that says about how the Soviets may consider France on the diplomatic stage, and if Gorbachev (as Foreign minister) has enough wisedom, he might use that to instill a schism within NATO and create enough uncertainty on the western back of Freyist Germany to calm it down (Frey may use German taxpayer money to hire best public relation firms in the world, that wouldn't help him with century long Franco-German grudge).