Ming Dynasty defeats Esen Choros in the Tumu Crisis
The entire expedition had been unnecessary, ill-conceived and poorly commanded. I know it’s usual for Chinese historians to blame a specific individual for defeats, in this case they chose to blame Wang Zhen who had a huge influence on the Emperor, instead of blaming the Emperor himself. His courtiers tried to stop him but he insisted on leading the army despite having no military experience.
I think that this explanation is too simple, historians have identified the emperor’s failure in military actions, political institutions, and international relationships as major factors in the Tumu Crisis. I think we can also blame the low quality of the military personnel caused by the army family system, war-weariness and the inefficient supply system as reasons for losing the battle.
First of all, this expedition was decided, planned and assembled in two days. It’s unusual and not a good start.
This map is interesting.
You can see the moves made by the Ming Army, especially the strange decision to move back to Xianfu Garrisons, instead of continuing to Yuzhou. Historical records do blame Wang Zhen for this change, as he didn’t wish to see his farmyards trampled by soldiers. Actually, it does make sense if you consider that Juyongguan Pass was more heavily guarded than Zijingguan Pass and closer to potential reinforcements coming from Beijing.
They do also blame the decision of stopping at Tumu Forteress on him. Tumu Fortress sits on a high land with no water source, except a nearby river quickly cut off by the Oirat army. The fortress is only six days away from Beijing. The decision to stop there can be explained by the necessity to wait for the overextended rear guard and carts (impedimenta). The Mongols were also a day behind Ming troops, exhausting troops with forced marches would have been a dangerous decision.
Let’s think as a military historian and consider the fact that the 500’000 Ming Army wasn’t only made of soldiers, but also included retinues and logistics. We can thus consider that the armed forces were at best a 60-70% of that huge half a million procession. The core fighting units were defeated before the final battle, indeed during this ill fated march two separate vanguard armies engaged the Mongols to protect the retreat, and both were badly defeated. Those 100,000 professional cavalrymen were probably the main fighting forces of the army.
Most of the soldiers in the Tumu Crisis were from the Army Families. Beside the few soldiers from the Five Military Camp around Beijing, most of them were just conscripted farmers. Lacking military training and experience, they were even terrified when they passed a gorge although there was no enemy at all. When the Ming army was attacked by the Oirats in Tumu Bao, the remaining soldiers threw all their amours and ran away without any resistance.
It should be noted that the Ming actually had other troops in garrisons in the region and that the Mongols more or less walked into a pocket surrounded by Ming troops and didn't appear too worried, even accounting for Wang's ridiculous incompetence this seems odd. It led some Chinese historians to suspect that at least a couple of the other border generals were at least passively in league with the Mongols, which wouldn't be strange given that they were long time neighbors often with many personal connections. Those border troops were also badly supplied and equipped.
In historical records, we learn that soldiers were walking like zombies before reaching Datong and that many soldiers could barely walk due to exhaustion, thirst or hunger. If you do add the fact that when the Oirats Army latter attacked the Beijing, the government couldn’t find enough food for the soldiers guarding Beijing, you can clearly establish the existence of logistics deficiencies. The new government had to transport food supplies from Hubei, Nanjing and Guangdong, far away from Beijing. I do wonder why the northern depots were empty.
The quality of the military officials was also not good. Among many generals, only few persons as Zhang Fu Zhu Yong, Wu Kezhong and Chen Huai, had the experience of war, but they were old at this time. Most generals who took part in the expedition, like Chen Ying or Jin Yuanshun, were in the army just because they inherited their jobs and statues from their fathers or brothers. A lot of official figures who followed the army were merely advisors without military experience.
In the Ming government, comparatively to civil servants, the military personnel always had the lower status, a reason was that the civil servants who were selected by the Imperial Examinations always regarded the military personnel with contempt or condescension. In the early years of Ming, the position of commander-in-chief was abolished by the Hongwu Emperor because he feared the political influence of such a position .
Since then, there was no senior position offered for the military personnel in the bureaucracy system. The highest military officials were Generals who were located in 83 military districts all over the country. These Generals had to obey to the Beijing cabinet and the Defense Minister which were controlled by the civil servants. The military officials even had no right to dispatch their soldiers without the agreement of local civil servants and the supplies for the army were also provided by the local governments. This decentralized system weakened the Ming in the long run (similarly to the Qing).
During his reign, Hongwu Emperor instituted the border kings systems (king in the north...) and his sons took position at the northern border with their own armies to protect the country. But after the Jingnan campaign, the Yongle Emperor was afraid about the military power of these kings and put them under his control as he exiled them away from the borders. This decision weakened the military system. During Hongxi and Yuande reigns, the wars between nomadic tribes diverted the government from military issues. In order to diminish military expenses, the Hongxi Emperor even gave up a lot of land and forts, which modified the northern security network and set the future war zones closer to Beijing. Unfortunately, in the early years of Zhengtong Emperor’s reign, the Oirats united the tribes and began to invade China.
At first I taught that not launching this expedition would have been better, but it means keeping a bad emperor in power and not improving the imperial military and economy (Great Canal) as there is no defeat and no temporary change of emperor/administration.
Sometimes you have to badly lose in order to win later.
EDIT : I hope it helps a little. I will try to answer more properly to your question tomorrow.
I think that this explanation is too simple, historians have identified the emperor’s failure in military actions, political institutions, and international relationships as major factors in the Tumu Crisis. I think we can also blame the low quality of the military personnel caused by the army family system, war-weariness and the inefficient supply system as reasons for losing the battle.
First of all, this expedition was decided, planned and assembled in two days. It’s unusual and not a good start.
This map is interesting.
You can see the moves made by the Ming Army, especially the strange decision to move back to Xianfu Garrisons, instead of continuing to Yuzhou. Historical records do blame Wang Zhen for this change, as he didn’t wish to see his farmyards trampled by soldiers. Actually, it does make sense if you consider that Juyongguan Pass was more heavily guarded than Zijingguan Pass and closer to potential reinforcements coming from Beijing.
They do also blame the decision of stopping at Tumu Forteress on him. Tumu Fortress sits on a high land with no water source, except a nearby river quickly cut off by the Oirat army. The fortress is only six days away from Beijing. The decision to stop there can be explained by the necessity to wait for the overextended rear guard and carts (impedimenta). The Mongols were also a day behind Ming troops, exhausting troops with forced marches would have been a dangerous decision.
Let’s think as a military historian and consider the fact that the 500’000 Ming Army wasn’t only made of soldiers, but also included retinues and logistics. We can thus consider that the armed forces were at best a 60-70% of that huge half a million procession. The core fighting units were defeated before the final battle, indeed during this ill fated march two separate vanguard armies engaged the Mongols to protect the retreat, and both were badly defeated. Those 100,000 professional cavalrymen were probably the main fighting forces of the army.
Most of the soldiers in the Tumu Crisis were from the Army Families. Beside the few soldiers from the Five Military Camp around Beijing, most of them were just conscripted farmers. Lacking military training and experience, they were even terrified when they passed a gorge although there was no enemy at all. When the Ming army was attacked by the Oirats in Tumu Bao, the remaining soldiers threw all their amours and ran away without any resistance.
It should be noted that the Ming actually had other troops in garrisons in the region and that the Mongols more or less walked into a pocket surrounded by Ming troops and didn't appear too worried, even accounting for Wang's ridiculous incompetence this seems odd. It led some Chinese historians to suspect that at least a couple of the other border generals were at least passively in league with the Mongols, which wouldn't be strange given that they were long time neighbors often with many personal connections. Those border troops were also badly supplied and equipped.
In historical records, we learn that soldiers were walking like zombies before reaching Datong and that many soldiers could barely walk due to exhaustion, thirst or hunger. If you do add the fact that when the Oirats Army latter attacked the Beijing, the government couldn’t find enough food for the soldiers guarding Beijing, you can clearly establish the existence of logistics deficiencies. The new government had to transport food supplies from Hubei, Nanjing and Guangdong, far away from Beijing. I do wonder why the northern depots were empty.
The quality of the military officials was also not good. Among many generals, only few persons as Zhang Fu Zhu Yong, Wu Kezhong and Chen Huai, had the experience of war, but they were old at this time. Most generals who took part in the expedition, like Chen Ying or Jin Yuanshun, were in the army just because they inherited their jobs and statues from their fathers or brothers. A lot of official figures who followed the army were merely advisors without military experience.
In the Ming government, comparatively to civil servants, the military personnel always had the lower status, a reason was that the civil servants who were selected by the Imperial Examinations always regarded the military personnel with contempt or condescension. In the early years of Ming, the position of commander-in-chief was abolished by the Hongwu Emperor because he feared the political influence of such a position .
Since then, there was no senior position offered for the military personnel in the bureaucracy system. The highest military officials were Generals who were located in 83 military districts all over the country. These Generals had to obey to the Beijing cabinet and the Defense Minister which were controlled by the civil servants. The military officials even had no right to dispatch their soldiers without the agreement of local civil servants and the supplies for the army were also provided by the local governments. This decentralized system weakened the Ming in the long run (similarly to the Qing).
During his reign, Hongwu Emperor instituted the border kings systems (king in the north...) and his sons took position at the northern border with their own armies to protect the country. But after the Jingnan campaign, the Yongle Emperor was afraid about the military power of these kings and put them under his control as he exiled them away from the borders. This decision weakened the military system. During Hongxi and Yuande reigns, the wars between nomadic tribes diverted the government from military issues. In order to diminish military expenses, the Hongxi Emperor even gave up a lot of land and forts, which modified the northern security network and set the future war zones closer to Beijing. Unfortunately, in the early years of Zhengtong Emperor’s reign, the Oirats united the tribes and began to invade China.
At first I taught that not launching this expedition would have been better, but it means keeping a bad emperor in power and not improving the imperial military and economy (Great Canal) as there is no defeat and no temporary change of emperor/administration.
Sometimes you have to badly lose in order to win later.
EDIT : I hope it helps a little. I will try to answer more properly to your question tomorrow.
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