I'm positing 4 Agano-analogues in 1931 alongside the alt-Mogamis, with two Katoris already budgeted as of 1930, and then two Tones, two Ooyodos, and two more Katoris in 1934. Then at some point rebuild four Kumas into torpedo cruisers.How many hulls is that? My brains been pickled from working out what I think the cruisers and destroyers might be.
The money saved by deleting the Mogami rebuilds and tinkering with the designs on the slips would also saves money to build more larger cruisers.
What you wrote about the slipways at the other yards might well be true. For what it's worth the Tone class was 85ft 3in longer than an Agano at the waterline.
646ft 4in Mogami class649ft 7in Tone class564ft 4in Agano class405ft 2in Katori class
Which still leaves them short of modern destroyers, albeit a great deal less short than IOTL. The total goal was 144 and had been for a long time; they needed at least 64 modern destroyers for the Night Battle and probably would've preferred 96.IOTL the Japanese had 120 surface torpedo craft at the start of the Pacific War. That is 108 new destroyers and 12 torpedo boats. 68 destroyers would be of the Fubuki to Yugumo classes. ITTL they would have had 128 surface torpedo craft consisting of 128 destroyers and no torpedo boats. This would include 88 destroyers of the Fubuki, Asashio, Kagero and Yugumo classes.
Thanks for confirming that. I mentioned the Uraga Dock Company; they and Sasebo were mostly building destroyers at this time, so cruiser slips should be open. Yokohama is busy with the Katoris as OTL.I will only comment that the Japanese are about 8 slips short. They have to build them to build the added cruisers. So where? Sasebo and Yokusuka are maxed out. Kure?
This is for background information only. I have put them into chronological order:Ah, right, forgot about that timing. That said, they are still competing against the battleship rebuilds and the Soryu and Hiryu.
FWIWWhich still leaves them short of modern destroyers, albeit a great deal less short than IOTL. The total goal was 144 and had been for a long time; they needed at least 64 modern destroyers for the Night Battle and probably would've preferred 96.
Yen to dollarDoes anyone know the Pound to Yen exchange rate in the 1930s?
I found those too and like you couldn't be arsed.Yen to dollar
Japan: the Yen 1914-1941 | New World Economics
newworldeconomics.com
Pound to dollar
Graph of £/$ exchange rate (1915 - today)
www.miketodd.net
Too lazy to do the math currently
Not everyone. The U.S. already had a dozen 45,000 (full load) warships UNDER CONSTRUCTION in 1920. The ability was there. The Naval and Private Shipyards were there. Hell the money, more properly the ability to allot the money, was there. Congress had the ability, what it lacked was any reason to spend the money (as can been seen with the Vinson-Trammel Naval Act of 1934 (which authorized the North Carolina and South Dakota classes), followed by the Naval Act of 1936 and 1938, and then the Queen Mother of peacetime military spending, The Two Ocean Navy Act.The Japanese are gonna build 50,000 tonners, the US will counter, the UK will scramble to catch up, and boom everyone is bankrupted from building 50,000 tonners in the worst part of the depression
Not everyone. The U.S. already had a dozen 45,000 (full load) warships UNDER CONSTRUCTION in 1920. The ability was there. The Naval and Private Shipyards were there. Hell the money, more properly the ability to allot the money, was there. Congress had the ability, what it lacked was any reason to spend the money (as can been seen with the Vinson-Trammel Naval Act of 1934 (which authorized the North Carolina and South Dakota classes), followed by the Naval Act of 1936 and 1938, and then the Queen Mother of peacetime military spending, The Two Ocean Navy Act.
Trying to keep up with U.S. construction would undoubtedly have destroyed the Japanese economy, given its relatively small size, even before the 1929 Crash, and very possibly would have been impossible for the Royal Navy. That said the effort would have strengthened to Royal Navy relative to OTL, which might have been handy in 1939-1941.
Oh, in that case, you are well on your way. Throw in a couple clauses about allowing actual island territories (like Hawaii, Guam, Wake, the Philippines, Formosa, etc.) to be fortified to unlimited levels while completely demilitarizing League of Nations Category C Trust Mandates that do not share a land border with any other country/territory that are under the direct administrative control of one of the primary signing Powers, with inspections by third parties (Sweden, Switzerland, The Vatican, etc.) to ensure compliance. That takes away the Japanese basing in the Marshalls, Marianas, Paulas, and the rest of the South Seas Mandate (this, BTW, was actually the original requirement of being granted the Mandates, including the inspections, the Japanese told the LoN to piss off in 1929).The way I see it , it is easily doable by the US, probably doable by the UK with maybe some difficulty and, at best, doable by Japan with extreme difficulty. This is quite a deliberate Japan-screw by me.
UPDATEDoes anyone know the Pound to Yen exchange rate in the 1930s?
Oh, in that case, you are well on your way. Throw in a couple clauses about allowing actual island territories (like Hawaii, Guam, Wake, the Philippines, Formosa, etc.) to be fortified to unlimited levels while completely demilitarizing League of Nations Category C Trust Mandates that do not share a land border with any other country/territory that are under the direct administrative control of one of the primary signing Powers, with inspections by third parties (Sweden, Switzerland, The Vatican, etc.) to ensure compliance. That takes away the Japanese basing in the Marshalls, Marianas, Paulas, and the rest of the South Seas Mandate (this, BTW, was actually the original requirement of being granted the Mandates, including the inspections, the Japanese told the LoN to piss off in 1929).
If Guam had been fully fortified the Japanese would never have had a prayer of taking it with a light brigade (i.e the South Seas Force) especially if the South Sea Mandates were demilitarized. That means no bases in the Marshalls to bomb Wake, no submarine and surface warfare provisioning facilities, no military facilities on Saipan or Tinian, and no Truk (the strongest Japanese naval base beyond Formosa) or other facilities in the Caroline Islands. In a stroke it eliminates about 3/4 of Japanese's planned defensive perimeterHow would it changed things if Guam, the PI , Hawaii, Wake and the other islands it controlled were fortified by the US after 1929 to match the Japanese?
How would it changed things if Guam, the PI , Hawaii, Wake and the other islands it controlled were fortified by the US after 1929 to match the Japanese?
The way I see it , it is easily doable by the US, probably doable by the UK with maybe some difficulty and, at best, doable by Japan with extreme difficulty. This is quite a deliberate Japan-screw by me.
If Guam had been fully fortified the Japanese would never have had a prayer of taking it with a light brigade (i.e the South Seas Force) especially if the South Sea Mandates were demilitarized. That means no bases in the Marshalls to bomb Wake, no submarine and surface warfare provisioning facilities, no military facilities on Saipan or Tinian, and no Truk (the strongest Japanese naval base beyond Formosa) or other facilities in the Caroline Islands. In a stroke it eliminates about 3/4 of Japanese's planned defensive perimeter
Based on the overall era nuttery I've read from all sides? Yes, they denounce the treaties, and the West for being racists/imperislists. They, from their PoV, would not be entirely wrong, either. They were not stupid.One of the things I find interesting is will the Japanese feel screwed? In OTL the Japanese liberals were very pleased with the treaty initially (all considered I think they had good reason to as well) though the militarists would eventually denounce it and start secretly (and soon enough openly) breaking the treaty. But what if Japan gets as good a deal in proportionate terms, but the overall levels are so high that they struggle to build up to their limits. Who do the militarists blame for that? Do they still dislike the treaty if its limits are beyond them?
fasquardon
One of the things I find interesting is will the Japanese feel screwed? In OTL the Japanese liberals were very pleased with the treaty initially (all considered I think they had good reason to as well) though the militarists would eventually denounce it and start secretly (and soon enough openly) breaking the treaty. But what if Japan gets as good a deal in proportionate terms, but the overall levels are so high that they struggle to build up to their limits. Who do the militarists blame for that? Do they still dislike the treaty if its limits are beyond them?
fasquardon