The problem would be the massive loss of face in admitting that they couldn't build up to the limit while the West can. I don't see them doing that.
London Naval Treaties have larger limits
- Thread starter Johnrankins
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The problem would be the massive loss of face in admitting that they couldn't build up to the limit while the West can. I don't see them doing that.
McPherson
Banned
"Loss of face" is not just an east Asian cultural meme and overhyped trope. Remember that at the Versailles treaty conference, a clause about racial equality, vetoed by that racist rat-bastard, Woodrow Wilson, was a clause that the Japanese govt. really wanted in the League of Nations proposed charter. That along with the Western interference in the 21 Demands, which to Tokyo, was no worse than the Stuff the British pulled on China after the Opium Wars, sets the stage and tone for going into the Washington Naval Treaty talks.
There was a lot of hate, based on fear of embarrassment in front of world peers, round-robining in that era. Nobody wanted "to lose face" by being one upped.
I know that losing face is not just an East Asian meme as I have yet to meet an American who enjoys being humiliated. That said I think admitting you can't keep up is a no go, it would be seen as a sign of weakness by pretty much everyone.
This is the table in Post 147 converted into a bar chart. Note that in common with the table in that post and the bar chart in Post 148 it does not include the following.
IMHO the marginal cost of providing the IJN with its TTL treaty allowances of underage warships by 1938 instead of the OTL allowances isn't excessive when compared to what Japan spent on defence in the six financial yeas to 31st March 1938 IOTL.
- 1938-39 and 1939-40 are the estimated expenditure. The other financial years are closed accounts.
- The figures given above refer to the defence expenditure in the general account only. No details regarding the special accounts are available.
- The figures do not include the special extraordinary credits occasioned by the North China events, amounting for 1937-38 to 2,560 million yen, 1938-39 to 4,850 million yen and 1939-40 to 4,605 million yen, which are covered by the yield of supplementary taxes, by the proceeds of loans, and for 1938-39 and 1939-40 by transfers from the general budget (Ministry of Finance, 351.9 and 535.2 million yen respectively).
- Military pensions are not included in the above figures.
IMHO the marginal cost of providing the IJN with its TTL treaty allowances of underage warships by 1938 instead of the OTL allowances isn't excessive when compared to what Japan spent on defence in the six financial yeas to 31st March 1938 IOTL.
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They had a maximum speed of 18 knots which is within Treaty's limits. However, they were armed with six guns above 3 inch (four 5.5 inch and two 5 inch) and four 21 inch torpedo tubes. The 5 inch guns will have to be replaced by 3 inch and the torpedo tubes will have to go. However, there would be nothing to stop the Japanese rearming them after 31st December 1936.
That allows them to have another 4 Agano class out of their cruiser quota. That is if the Japanese lie (as usual) and say that the Agano class displaces 5,890 tons instead of their actual displacement of 6,652 tons.
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The Japanese should be able to say that the Katoris as ships that were exempt from limitation under Article 3(c) of the Treaty.They had a maximum speed of 18 knots which is within Treaty's limits. However, they were armed with six guns above 3 inch (four 5.5 inch and two 5 inch) and four 21 inch torpedo tubes. The 5 inch guns will have to be replaced by 3 inch and the torpedo tubes will have to go. However, there would be nothing to stop the Japanese rearming them after 31st December 1936.
That allows them to have another 4 Agano class out of their cruiser quota. That is if the Japanese lie (as usual) and say that the Agano class displaces 5,890 tons instead of their actual displacement of 6,652 tons.
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To be considered a frontline warship, like the article specified, a ship had to fullfill all these requirements and not only a few like the Katori class trainingship did. Appart from speed, which was below the minimum requirements, they also were build by merchantship yards and no protection at all was build in the vessel as such, making them legimate auxiliaries by treaty rules, unlike the misinformation given by the Allies in wartime, crediting these ships the role of a combatant, which they were certainly not. Compared to a true cruiser design, with a heavy training role, like the French Jean d'Arc and Argentina class of Argentina, which were also faster, with some protection built into them and more heavily armed to start with, the Katori's were more like their counterpart tenders and depotships built in the same period for the IJN, which all had some armament, but absolutely no offensive combatsystems or equipment installed. The Katori class was designed follwing the lines of the preceeding Taigai and Jingei classes of submarine depot ships, whihc were of simmilar size and layout.
I tend to agree , the highest rank on a Katori Class Ship was midshipman, which hardly sounds like a front line warship. Reading about it it seems to have been used for training and transport not combat.
I agree with your assessment.
However, they were armed with torpedoes, had an armoured deck and mounted six guns above 3 inch calibre. Therefore, under the terms of the 1930 Treaty they were a warship that fell into the cruiser category on account of their displacement. But as Japan left the treaty system before they were built that is academic.
Earlier in the thread a possible reason for the British and Americans being willing to spend more on their navies ITTL from 1930 was a more aggressive Japan.
Why would Japan be more aggressive ITTL? Maybe they had a stronger economy, which gave the Japanese Government the confidence to act more aggressively.
Increasing Japanese economic growth by one per cent from 1st January 1900 would because of compound interest give Japan an economy 25% larger than OTL at the end of 1921, 36% larger than OTL at the end of 1929; and 43% larger than OTL at the end of 1934. That is on the eve of the Washington, First London and Second London Naval Conferences. If the Japanese economy continued to grow at this rate it would be 53% larger than OTL at the end of 1941.
This would give the Japanese a larger merchant marine and a legitimate reason to ask for more cruisers and destroyers to protect it at the 1930 Conference. I know that trade protection was at the bottom of the IJN's list of priorities, but there's nothing to stop the Japanese saying that the extra tonnage is for trade protection ships and to use the ships for feet work.
The stronger economy gives Japan the financial and industrial resources to build the extra ships.
This strengthens the Admiralty's hand when negotiating with the Cabinet and Treasury to gain permission to negotiate for the 70 cruisers and 200,000 tons of destroyers that it wanted at the 1930 Conference.
It also means that the Americans are willing to accept larger tonnage quotas because the USN wanted parity with the British in all classes of warships and to maintain a 5:3 superiority over the Japanese in all types of warship. IOTL they didn't want as many cruisers as the British which in combination with HMG's desire to control spending meant the British Commonwealth was given enough tonnage for 50 cruisers.
Meanwhile, the Japanese wanted 70% of the American strength. In the Washington Treaty of OTL they got 60% for aircraft carriers and capital ships, i.e. the 5:5:3 ratio. In the OTL 1930 London Treaty they got 100% for submarines, 65% for cruisers and 70% for destroyers.
But, why would their economic growth be one percent more than OTL?
PS.
If the growth from the beginning of 1900 had been two percent more than OTL, the corresponding figures would have been 57%, 84%, 104% and 134% because of compound interest.
Why would Japan be more aggressive ITTL? Maybe they had a stronger economy, which gave the Japanese Government the confidence to act more aggressively.
Increasing Japanese economic growth by one per cent from 1st January 1900 would because of compound interest give Japan an economy 25% larger than OTL at the end of 1921, 36% larger than OTL at the end of 1929; and 43% larger than OTL at the end of 1934. That is on the eve of the Washington, First London and Second London Naval Conferences. If the Japanese economy continued to grow at this rate it would be 53% larger than OTL at the end of 1941.
This would give the Japanese a larger merchant marine and a legitimate reason to ask for more cruisers and destroyers to protect it at the 1930 Conference. I know that trade protection was at the bottom of the IJN's list of priorities, but there's nothing to stop the Japanese saying that the extra tonnage is for trade protection ships and to use the ships for feet work.
The stronger economy gives Japan the financial and industrial resources to build the extra ships.
This strengthens the Admiralty's hand when negotiating with the Cabinet and Treasury to gain permission to negotiate for the 70 cruisers and 200,000 tons of destroyers that it wanted at the 1930 Conference.
It also means that the Americans are willing to accept larger tonnage quotas because the USN wanted parity with the British in all classes of warships and to maintain a 5:3 superiority over the Japanese in all types of warship. IOTL they didn't want as many cruisers as the British which in combination with HMG's desire to control spending meant the British Commonwealth was given enough tonnage for 50 cruisers.
Meanwhile, the Japanese wanted 70% of the American strength. In the Washington Treaty of OTL they got 60% for aircraft carriers and capital ships, i.e. the 5:5:3 ratio. In the OTL 1930 London Treaty they got 100% for submarines, 65% for cruisers and 70% for destroyers.
But, why would their economic growth be one percent more than OTL?
PS.
If the growth from the beginning of 1900 had been two percent more than OTL, the corresponding figures would have been 57%, 84%, 104% and 134% because of compound interest.
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My assumption was that the Chinese warring parties were even more incompetent than OTL and the Japanese did even better.
I can see a few major options to improve the japanese economy
Let's say Japan gets some small financial reparations in the Russo Japanese war which is invested.
Or that a deal is done where the UK and France place more orders from Japanese industry in the early years of ww1 (investing a lot of capital). This could be in return for greater Japanese particiption in thw war or just to keep orders with allies. Historically UK and French orders for war materials only had a noticeable effect on the japanese economy in 1918.
Or you do something about the zaibatsu. Not surw qhat a good way to do something here would be. These were the japanese conglomorates that controlled the banking system. If a zaibatsu owned a a car maker and you wanted to make cars you couldn't get business finance.
McPherson
Banned
I will comment on this thesis to show where I think it is very interesting with unforeseen consequences. This is based on RTL factors and I hope will compliment your excellent analysis and treatments I have read so far. Do be aware that I might suggest some differences based on Japanese agriculture conditions, population pressures and economic policies.
The Japanese government had, for assorted reasons, modeled their economic development on what they thought was best European practices. They had evolved a type of Wilhelmine Germanic economic model with a twin economic "noble" class that paralleled their traditional samurai classes. The comparison to the British model of Edwardian constitutional monarchy is not appropriate though British historians make that obvious mistake. These Zaibatsu merely translated Japanese social feudalism into the industrial sphere as it did somewhat in the German example, when the German guilds and trades associations morphed into the great German industrial combines pre-WWI. As a winner of WWI the Japanese were not compelled to change their version of industrial feudalism at all, like Germany did post Versaiies. THAT is important, because the Japanese Zaibatsus had thoroughly bought into the British model of imperialism, captive markets and a closed empire economic system. THAT horrendous economic mistake, they regrettably did directly imitate from the British. It drove the Japanese government's fundamental economic policies pre-WWII and explains a lot of the China War and their reactions and choices of allies and enemies going into WWII.
A Japan with more economic freedom of action will therefore be more interested in a more defensive and accommodationist naval policy and be far more aggressive in their land warfare options in China, which they regard as their India. China, they hope to turn into a closed dump market for their goods and as a siphon for surplus capital and frankly population.
Agriculture, in Japan, because of limited arable land and high population density was incredibly manpower intensive, very efficient, and unusually, at least in east Asian terms, much a yeomanry/family owned type setup. These guys were truck farmers. GOOD ONES. They also, as land owners, were the back-born 5% eligible to vote of the electorate. They were also THE ARMY as to recruited membership. While the Zaibatsus were the political class that backed THE NAVY for their obvious reasons, the Zaibatsus could not marshal much political voting power when it came to national policy. That came bottom up through the Japanese yeoman farmers, and the army that they were the infantry for.
This has consequences politically if the money is there for more spending. Since the two main opposing viewpoints do agree on the imperialist system and agree that CHINA is the objective of that imperialist policy, they will want to split that money (the baby) according to the way they see the THREAT to their view of how to coral China.
The Army and the farmer yeomen class will voie in Anti-Russia politicians and push the Army view of the China situation. Drive north. The Zaibatsus and whatever votes, politicians they can buy and influence they wield will argue anti-American, anti-British and drive SOUTH for the resources they need for their industries and of course for the NAVY.
If one increases the money and industrial base and subsequent RESOURCE shortages and puts more pressure on the Japanese government to do something about it, then one does not get a bigger navy. One gets a TANK ARMY in China. The farmers' sons, who actually control the Army politics, set the tone, the even more increased birth rate sets the policy and the need for China as a dumping ground for both to keep society stable will swing even the Zaibatsu that way. Mitsubishi will be cranking out Chin Hotos and Zeros. NTG if one is in MOSCOW.
Add 1% infant survival improvement rate. 1 MILLION more Japanese soldiers and in a society where girl births historically outnumber boy births, make that FRUSTRATED soldiers. The Japanese government was not stupid until the crazies took over in 1933-1935. They will want to free their hand in China. They will be EAGER to negotiate the strictest terms and smallest navies they can get the west to accept on the 10-7-5 formula they can at Washington and London. They want that tank army as a casualty and adventure and frustration reliever in CHINA as a siphon off valve for all those rambunctious teenagers. Look at the RTL problems they had as it was?
They may change the shape of their navy somewhat, but as the IJN (for historical reasons and experience) was always an all offense, decisive battle, short and limited war instrument of military use and national policy, trade protection was not only at the bottom of the list, it DID NOT EXIST, as far the IJN was concerned, since they were prepared to sacrifice up to half the Japanese merchant fleet in a short war context by deliberate planning and in context. The IJN admirals actually thought that the postwar need to replace all the merchant ships would be an economic and naval boon!
Conversely and thusly, any additional naval spending would go into the BATTLE FLEET and not into convoy protection or trade defense. Whatever the IJN is allowed will have money poured into anti-ship effectors such as guns/torpedoes, their platforms, both allowed ships and PLANES, and especially RIKKOs which are not treaty limited or subjected to either Western understanding or awareness as an acute naval danger.
They laid down 2 of 4 battleships and about 6 cruisers post LNT walkout, built 2 RIKKOs (equivalent to an air division) from scratch and 8 flattops, shadowed, prior to 1941. Shortage of money to buy ALUMINUM and gasoline limited their pilot training program, but if you give them 50% more money, that is 4 RIKKOS and 12 flattops in their shadow program and 10,000 farm-boy pilots, (not RTL 3,000.), trained up to 600 hours in type and blooded in China. (Zaibatsus would love this!)
Now London and Washington should be brown-staining themselves.
The admiralty would be pressuring the Japanese diplomats to argue for lower cruiser limits on the 10-7-5 formula and to restrict tonnage to about 8,000 tonnes, by the LNT, because the IJN really believed they had torpedo advantage and that favors THEM as to naval geography and east Asian coastal waters where before Yamamoto went Pearl Harbor nuts on them, their admirals thought the fighting would occur.
The Americans want large cruisers because they need large cruisers to cross the Pacific. Maybe the Anglophobes in the USN want to parity the RN, but the professionals who had to operate in the real world, knew the RN was finished in the Pacific as of 1900. (The RN did not realize this fact and that is astonishing to me.). The naval problem was Japan. The Japanese wanted 10-7 based on an obsolete naval defense theory that the USN gun club still accepted (Square root of the number of main armament similar sized barrels to enemy = combat power of own surface fleet versus enemy in battle.). Once that formula was defunct by operational experience, but not before, it became obvious that airpower was the measure of SEAPOWER and in 1941, it was IJN first by 2X over the 2nd place navy, the RN was that distant second and USN a close 3rd to the RN.
Moffett argued those %s and he WON... fortunately. The USN negotiators at the LNC 1930 were not as good, but they still got the State Department fools to cap the cruisers to handicap IJN fleet command ship slots, thereby surface action groups available, and hobble IJN aviation at sea with weak fleet screens for CTFs, (Fleet Problem XIV lesson learned), thereby. Nobody in the west, paid any attention to fleet trains and that mistake was an early war-killer for the Americans. The British, of course, did not REALIZE you needed those fleet trains for fast task forces fighting in a NAVAL CAMPAIGN. The RN will pay for that mistake throughout WWII and pay DEARLY.
More development of Manchukuo earlier. Barely possible IF the Zaibatsus make the correct decisions by 1922.
The Pacific War would have lasted 6 years and it would have been an atomic war the last 2 years.
Some background on RN plans and thinking and boy does Drachinifel and his guest expert GET SO MUCH WRONG. See above my comments.
To paraphrase Arte Johnson, "Very interesting and not stupid."
I'm not going to try to comment in detail, because I agree with most of what you wrote.
You seem to be suggesting that a more prosperous Japan would want a navy that was the same size as OTL or weaker so that resources can be concentrated on the Army for the war in China and to fight the USSR.
However, a Japan with an economy that large than OTL has the resources to maintain a larger Army and Navy. OTOH that approach might be falling between two stools.
I agree that Japan would still loose. That is unless they can develop their own bomb along with an effective delivery system and/or an effective means of shooting down the B-29s and B-36s. Or the strike north results in the defeat of the USSR in 1941 or 1942.
I've had a TL called Rolls! Rolls! Rolls! at the back of my mind for years. It was about Japan in World War II where the the POD was the Meiji Restoration and Japan had an economy that was double the size of OTL from 1868. Japan still lost and lost badly.
I thought that the wording of my last phrase in my final sentence could have been better immediately after typing it, but what you wrote is effectively what I wrote. They would say that the extra tonnage was for trade protection cruisers and destroyers, but use it to build more fleet cruisers and destroyers.
There is no way Japan could survive 2 years of atomic war. The US would have had at least 4 or 5 bombs in 1945 to drop (They removed the cores of at least two of them after Japan surrendered as a more efficient one was invented and the bombs weren't needed at the moment) and at least 12 in 1946 and this is pretty conservative. The US was winding down defense spending OTL since late 1944. If it actually goes tougher defense spending does not go down but increases even further and the US speeds up atomic bomb production compared to OTL after Japan does not surrender after Nagasaki. So you talking at least 16 or 17 bombs by the end of 1946. I doubt Japan can survive that.
McPherson
Banned
As fast as the Japanese ramped up radar from nothing to about 2x the British effort in 1940, and put that into their calendar year 1943 context (RTL). Ranp up 1944 island fortification to 1943 calendar year using @NOMISYRRUC thesis points; such as to an improved Japanese merchant fleet (9 million tonnes instead of 7 million tonnes DWT). And suggest that the Raiden and other Japanese interceptors come a year earlier, because now the Japanese government can fund the work just pre WWII. The B-29s will have a SERIOUS as in suicidally motivated and directed air defense to fight with well-motivated Japanese pilots willing to die as ramming agents to stop any American bomber. The Americans will be atomic bombing their way from Peleliu forward. They have to get within B-29 range. I could even see a bypass the Philippine Islands and nuke Taiwan just to get bombers in range outcome; as a function of the naval geography and the unfolding campaign. That is about 30 bombs just to get that far.
2 years is if everything goes right for the Americans.
Only if huffing lead paint is the newest thing in the US post 1943. Between 1944-1945 canceled
11 CV (including 3 Midway class)
7 BB (2 Iowa, 5 Montana)
4 CB
6 CA
13 CL
73 DD
448 DDE
16 CVE
113 SS
which will be built in TTL if Japan is that much stronger (In addition to all the additional ships the US builds prior to ww2 in TTL), there would be even more built in 1946 if need be. No way in hell is Japan going to hold all that off from the range of Japan for that much longer than OTL.
McPherson
Banned
You have to spend marines to get into bomber range. MEN. That is why atomic bombs on every damned island assaulted, and that is why the campaign changes. Ships deliver marines to islands and the marines dig those tough Japanese farm-boys out of one atom bombed Iwo Jima after another. A richer Japan means more farm boys, more caves, and more concreted in machine gun and mortar emplacements.
It is a very narrow window of time (about 18 months for the US in 1943 and 1944) that "easy" amphibious assaults' are possible.
It is a very narrow window of time (about 18 months for the US in 1943 and 1944) that "easy" amphibious assaults' are possible.
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And? It isn't like the Japanese could stop said men. It might not be "easy" but it could and would be done and with more and more ships and planes coming on line it would become easier and easier. The Japanese on those islands will run out of supplies a few weeks or months after the USN starts prowling the area.
McPherson
Banned
With the weak Japan the Americans faced in our RTL, each landing became progressively harder and harder to accomplish and each island delousing took longer and longer as the Japanese decided on a defense in depth and a casualty infliction attrition application to exhaust the American will to fight. All they needed were those farm-boys and some artillery and machine guns and it worked! Now with a 50% stronger Japan, figure the added time needed and expected casualty increases the Americans will face. The ETO troops who had a bellyful of Germans who were being shipped from Europe to the Philippine Islands and thence to smoking ruined Okinawa to participate in the Kanto Kombat that was expected denouement for DOWNFALL were not eager to march on Tokyo. They read the newspapers and being veterans themselves, had a rather realistic assessment of what Olympic and Coronet could cost. Bombs can get you ashore, but the dug in farm-boys still have to be routed out on that runway real estate needed to project airpower forward.
That is the whole point.