What I quoted was the plan from 1936-37, which was after the tonnage quotas had been abolished.
London Naval Treaties have larger limits
- Thread starter Johnrankins
- Start date
McPherson
Banned
But the rational question is; "Why not extrapolate from the known into the possible?" Those plans could be a start for this ITTL planning, at least for the RN. I had to figure American Congressional restrictions as start points for my speculations for USN reactions..
True enough, I just wanted to be clear the quotas haven't been abolished in TTL. That needs to be accounted in the planning as well.
You didn't say that the tonnage quotas continued after 1936 ITTL in the OP.
If they do then what I wrote in my posts about cruisers and destroyers ITTL won't be possible.
Extract Post 36 (Point Nine)
Extract Post 78
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OK, I guess we can get rid of them then. I don't want you to start over.
FWIW it's very unlikely that the tonnage quotas would have been retained.
British Commonwealth Submarines 1922-39 ITTL
Submarine Construction 1922-29 and the London Naval Treaty
Submarine construction 1922-29 ITTL was exactly the same as OTL because it was before the POD.
The 80 underage submarines in Ten Year Programme of 1924 had still been reduced to 60 underage submarines by 1929.
The 1930 London Naval Treaty of TTL allowed the British Commonwealth to have 70,000 tons of submarines instead of the 52,700 tons of OTL, which was an increase of 33%. It also increased the service life of a submarine from 10 to 12 years ITTL, instead for from 10 to 13 years IOTL.
In both timelines, "The keels of replacement tonnage shall not be laid down more than three years before the year in which the vessel to be replaced becomes "over-age"; but this period is reduced to two years in the case of any replacement surface vessel not exceeding 3,000 tons (3,048 metric tons) standards displacement."
Submarine Construction 1929-36
The situation at the end of 1929 was similar to OTL.
The British Commonwealth still had 56 submarines of 46,709 tons at the end of 1929. There were still 49 old submarines completed 1917-26, displacing 36,800 tons and 7 new submarines of the O class completed 1927-29, displacing 9,909 tons. However, because the TTL Treaty allowed 70,000 tons of submarines the total was nearly 23,300 tons below the limit instead of nearly 6,000 tons.
The submarines Royalist and Rupert weren't deleted from the 1928-39 building programme, which increased the number of O, P and R class patrol submarines that were under construction from 12 of 17,700 tons to 14 of 20,650 tons which would complete 1930-31.
According to Freidman the British Commonwealth would have 34,009 tons of underage submarines on 31st December 1936 IOTL, which allowed it to lay down 18,691 tons of replacement tonnage in the 1929-30 to 1933-34 building programmes. However, I calculated that there would be 33,085 tons of underage submarines at the end of 1936 and that would allow 18,735 tons of replacement tonnage to be laid down.
However, only 15 submarines of 15,825 tons were built in the 1929-30 to 1933-34 Navy Estimates, which was nearly 3,000 tons less than was allowed. 6 submarines of 6,100 tons were ordered in the 1934-35 and 1935-36 Navy Estimates to replace boats that became overage in 1937 and 1938. This brought the total ordered in the 7 financial years 1929-30 to 1935-36 to 21 submarines of 21,925 tons. That was about 1,500 tons less than the 47 submarines of 23,571 tons that became overage between 1st January 1930 and 31st December 1938.
ITTL the British Commonwealth could lay down 34,690 tons of submarines in the 1929-30 to 1933-34 building programmes and another 4,751 tons could be laid down in the 1934-35 and 1935-36 programmes for a total of 39,441 tons of submarines over 7 financial years.
What I want to do is double the number of submarines build 42 submarines (6 per year) consisting of 24 S, 2 T, 6 Thames and 10 Porpoise class mine laying submarines. However, that would come to 42,850 tons, which is about 3,500 tons more than the TTL Treaty allowed. Not that it would have mattered as the last 12 would be completed after the tonnage quotas had expired, but the British naval planners of the early 1930s couldn't know how dramatically things would change between the Abyssinian Crisis and the Second London Naval Conference. My replacement tonnage calculations for both timelines haven't included the "new" submarine Poseidon which was lost in June 1931. That would increase the tonnage available to 40,916 tons, but that was still 2,000.
Therefore, the 42 submarines ordered in the 7 Navy Estimates from 1929-30 to 1935-36 consisted of 24 S, 9 T, 3 Thames and 6 Porpoise class. Their combined displacement was 40,065 tons, which after deducting Poseidon, which left 851 tons to spare.
The Situation before the Second London Naval Conference
63 submarines of 70,624 tons had been ordered in the 12 Navy Estimates from 1923-24 to 1935-36. 45 boats of 53,544 tons were completed between April 1927 and June 1935. The other 18 boats of 17,080 tons would be completed between February 1936 and November 1938. However, HMS/M Poseidon was lost in June 1931 which reduced the total number of new submarines at the end for 1938 to 62 of 69,149 tons.
There were 18 old submarines. They had been completed before October 1926 and were to be discarded 1936-38 to make tonnage available for the 18 boats ordered in the 1933-34 to 1935-36 Estimates.
The first 3 O class submarines (the prototype and 2 Australian boats) would become overage in 1939. No submarines were ordered in the 1925-26 Estimates because the then Chancellor of the Exchequer (Winston Churchill) vetoed the planned order of 6 O class as a cost cutting measure. Therefore, no submarines were completed in 1928 to become overage in 1940. The 17 surviving production O, P & R class submarines would become overage 1941-43. The first Porpoise, S and Thames class boats would become overage in 1944.
The 20 surviving submarines of the O, P & R classes had a combined displacement of 29,084 tons, which with the 851 spare tons made a total of 29,935 tons which was enough to build 27 T class boats at an average of 5 submarines a year. That would have produced a fleet of 69 submarines at the end of 1943 displacing just under 70,000 tons. However, the plan was to order 22 T class and 3 Porpoise class at an average rate of 5 submarines a year in the 1936-37 to 1940-41 Estimates, which would create a force of 67 submarines at the end of 1943.
The Situation after the Second London Naval Conference
The Second London Naval Treaty didn't have any tonnage quotas and those of its predecessors expired at the end of 1936. Submarines still became overage 12 years after their date of completion.
The new requirement was for 82 submarines. The number that could be overage increased from 7 IOTL to 10 ITTL because submarines became overage after 13 years IOTL and 12 years ITTL. This was compatible with the building rate of 6 submarines a year which had been maintained since the 1926-27 Estimates.
As already explained the existing submarine force consisted of 63 boats plus 18 due to be completed by the end of 1938. If the boats that were due to be scrapped 1936-38 were retained the Royal Navy would have 81 submarines at the end of 1938 including 18 that were overage. If the building rate of 6 boats a year was maintained there would be 82 boats at the end of 1942 including 10 that were overage.
Therefore, it was decided to build 24 submarines (21 T and 3 Porpoise class) at the rate of 6 per year in the 1936-37 to 1939-40 Estimates, instead of the OTL plan for 29 submarines to be built 8-7-7-7. No U class training submarines were to be built ITTL because some of the extra S class boats built ITTL were used for training.
Only 18 of the 29 submarines planned were ordered IOTL. This is because the economic problems that rearmament created resulted in 4 boats being cut from the 1937-38 Estimates and 3 from the 1939-40 Estimates. The 4 remaining submarines in the 1939-40 Estimates hadn't been ordered before the outbreak of war IOTL and were probably replaced by 4 of the 7 T class ordered under the War Emergency Programme.
IOTL the economic problems of rearmament ITTL were less severe because the armaments industry was larger in the middle of the 1930s and was therefore able to cope with the sudden increase in demand with less difficulty than OTL. It also helped that the increase in demand was not as big as OTL. For example the submarine builders had to cope with an increase from 3 boats per year to 7 boats per year. However, ITTL they had been building 6 submarines a year for a decade by the middle of the 1930s and were being asked to continue building 6 per year. Therefore, no submarines were cut from the building programme ITTL and the 6 boats planned for 1939-40 were ordered before war broke out.
The Situation at 3rd September 1939
IOTL the Royal Navy had 59 submarines displacing 61,509 tons against a requirement for 82 boats. 12 submarines were overage instead of the 7 overage boats that were allowed. The 12 old submarines consisted of 9 H laid down 1917-18 and completed 1919-20 and 3 L class laid down 1918-19, but not completed until 1924-26. The 47 new boats consisted of 9 O, 5 P, 4 R, 12 S, 5 T, 3 U, 3 Thames and 6 Porpoise class completed 1927-39. Under construction were 10 T class boats displacing 10,090 tons. They would complete between October 1939 and January 1941.
ITTL the Royal Navy had 81 submarines displacing 86,309 tons against a requirement for 82 boats. 15 submarines were overage instead of the 10 overage boats that were allowed. The 15 old boats consisted of 12 L class completed 1919-26 and the 3 oldest O class boats completed in 1927. The 66 new boats consisted of 6 O, 5 P, 6 R, 24 S, 15 T, 3 Thames and 7 Porpoise class completed 1929-39. Under construction were 15 T class and 2 Porpoise class displacing 19,350 tons. They would complete between October 1939 and October 1941.
The 17 submarines that were under construction included the 6 T class boats ordered in the 1939-40 Estimates. They took the place of the first 6 T class boats ordered in the OTL War Emergency Programme. They carried the same names as these ships and were built in the same yards, but because they were ordered 6 months earlier than OTL they were laid down, launched and completed 6 months earlier as well. That is they were laid down between May 1939 and September 1939 instead of between November 1939 and March 1940 IOTL and the completion dates were advanced from between May 1941 and April 1942 to between November 1940 and October 1941.
IOTL 58 submarines of 67,914 tons were ordered between 1923 and the outbreak of World War II. ITTL 87 submarines of 98,014 tons were ordered over the same period. That is a 50% increase in hulls and a 44% increase in tonnage.
Mobilisation
IOTL 24 submarines were ordered in the War Emergency Programme. They consisted of 5 S, 7 T and 12 U class boats. They were laid down between October 1939 and July 1940 and were completed between August 1940 and April 1943.
ITTL 18 submarines were ordered in the War Emergency Programme. They consisted of 18 S class boats. They were laid down between October 1939 and July 1940 and completed between August 1940 and April 1943. No T class were ordered because 6 had been ordered ITTL's ordinary Navy Estimates for 1939-40 and they took the place of the first 6 T class ordered IOTL's War Emergency Programme. There wasn't a U class ITTL because more S class had been built before the war. Therefore, it was decided to build all 18 boats ordered ITTL's War Emergency Programme as S class submarines.
It is interesting to consider what the British could have done with 150% of OTL's submarine strength.
Would it have made a big difference to the German attack on Norway? To the Japanese attack on Malaysia? (Of course, assuming that WW2 followed its OTL timing and course, which it probably wouldn't.)
fasquardon
Would it have made a big difference to the German attack on Norway? To the Japanese attack on Malaysia? (Of course, assuming that WW2 followed its OTL timing and course, which it probably wouldn't.)
fasquardon
McPherson
Banned
If the British had not pulled their submarine flotilla out of the China station in 1938, (about a dozen boats.) the South China Sea might have been "interesting" in December 1941.
OTL the RN had to send O, P and R class submarines to the Mediterranean in 1940 where they suffered heavy losses for little result. ITTL they would be able to send some of the extra S and T class boats that had been built to the Mediterranean where they aught to sink more Axis ships that the 1,500 ton types did IOTL and hopefully at a lower cost to themselves.
Meanwhile the 20 O, P & R class boats and the 3 Thames class would be sent to the Far East and baring accidents they would all be based at Singapore on 8th December 1941.
However, there is also the effect of the extra cruisers and destroyers that I wrote about in earlier posts and the changes to capital ships and aircraft carriers if I get that far.
Unlikely. Such a shipbuilding programme would be a limited stimulus.
Economics is more complicated than that.
The scale of stimulus is greater than you think given the numbers potentially employed in the programme. Plus knock on impacts on industries like steel. And Keynesian multiplier effects.
Economics Is indeed more complex than many think.
Yes I understand the Multiplier Effect, but unless you're building a vast fleet (i.e. USN WW2 levels) the effects are small.
To take US figures, as they're in my notes, the cost of an Iowa (a reasonable 50kt/16" battleship) was somewhat less than US$95M each, over two years with two ships under construction in parallel. Call it US$200M over two years.
The two main planks of the public works of Roosevelt's Hew Deal, the Public Works Administration¹ and Works Progress Administration, spent US3,300M and US$4,900M respectively in their first two years of operations. Additionally they employed vastly more people than the shipbuilding and associate industries.
¹ Including of course a substantial amount of new naval construction.
Would it pull either country out of the depression instantly? No, but it would help mitigate within a year or so IMO.
I never thought that, by themselves, they would pull the US out of the Great Depression. What I think is that they would lessen it.
Even assuming a massive fleet increase, many times that of the historical USN expansion acts of 1934/36/38, such spending will be small. The cost of the New Deal was over forty billion contemporary US dollars, which included sixty USN ships and about a hundred for the USCG (plus around six hundred million dollars of yard expansion and upgrades).
Military spending alone will not buy a country out of the Depression without doing serious economic harm (as happened in Germany for example); you'd need balanced economic spending including infrastructure, agriculture et cetera.