L’Aigle Triomphant: A Napoleonic Victory TL

The French empire at the economic level considered its allies as mere vassals, which prompted OTL to betray during the fall of the Empire.

Can we envisage with the successors of Napoleon a more balanced approach and the beginning of a common market?
move from continental alliance (military) to continental union (EU)?
 
Napoleon had tried a currency with his effigy and those of his family put on the throne of the satellite States :


Westphalian frank :
Jerome_Napoleon_AV_10_Franken_651166.jpg


Free trade treaties that are not exclusively in favor of France, and a real monetary union like the Latin Union at the end of the 19th century? European Economic Community of traité of Rome ?


 
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move from continental alliance (military) to continental union (EU)?
Possibly. Plenty of trade agreements, at least.
Napoleon had tried a currency with his effigy and those of his family put on the throne of the satellite States :


Westphalian frank :
Jerome_Napoleon_AV_10_Franken_651166.jpg


Free trade treaties that are not exclusively in favor of France, and a real monetary union like the Latin Union at the end of the 19th century? European Economic Community of traité of Rome ?


At what point did currency pegs become a thing?
 
Possibly. Plenty of trade agreements, at least.

At what point did currency pegs become a thing?
1880 when various nations (mainly Western Hemisphere and European nations) pegged their currency to gold reserves. The whole pegging to dollars and euros, and Yuan and what not only started becoming practiced in 1973. All in all, while an idea like this is way ahead of its time, I'm also one to say that economical tech (if I were to use 4X jargon here) hasn't advanced enough for Nappy's satellite states to peg their currencies to the Napoleonic Franc, I'm afraid.
 
Hum... Incorrect :


....On March 26, 1806, he instituted by decree the creation of the lira, moored to the French franc as it was defined on March 28, 1803. The monetary modules are strictly similar to French currencies in terms of weight and dimensions, apart from some notable differences on small divisional parts. The portrait of the king appears, bareheaded, on silver and gold coins, and on some copper coins, with the legend Napoleone imperatore e re. The benchmark financial institution is the Banque de France.
 
Some Damned Thing in the Balkans - Part I
Some Damned Thing in the Balkans - Part I

The Fall of Constantinople in 1453 was, along with Columbus's first voyage to the Americas forty years later, perhaps the most epochal moment of the 15th century and a defining feature in European history. As the Andalusian kingdoms were driven back across the Strait of Gibraltar, Islam found itself a new beachhead in the East, where the Roman Empire was effectively ended and the scramble was on for European monarchs to defend the full legacy of Rome rather than simply claim themselves as being part of it. While the Ottoman advance out of the Balkans had been arrested at Vienna in 1523 and again in 1683, the full expulsion of them from Europe and the reclamation of Constantinople for Christendom had been something of a Holy Grail for many kings and queens and, conversely, the gradually declining Ottomans who never quite recovered from those two peaks became a convenient chip to be played by certain Great Powers against others, most prominently by France, which had enjoyed a longstanding relationship with "Konstantiniyye" which had been one of the backbones of pre-Revolutionary French foreign policy in defending their interests in the Mediterranean Sea.

Napoleon's rise, particularly his campaigns into Egypt, had upended this status quo a fair bit, but the story of the Ottoman implosion in the Balkans is not a French story but rather a Greek and to a lesser extent Serbian one. The Greek people had lived under Ottoman rule since the fall of the Byzantine Empire they had dominated religiously, culturally and linguistically, but their culture had endured as the Ottoman Empire was far too diverse to properly Turkify (let alone Islamize) and, compared to Iberian caliphates of decades past, had taken a considerably more lax approach with Christian and Jewish citizens. This had kept the peace in the Ottoman realms for well over a century and limited disturbances to small uprisings across the Balkans amongst Christian populations that were, on the whole, fairly containable - until they weren't.

Revolutionary nationalism born out of the fires of 1789 and the ambitions of Catherine the Great and Joseph II, the Habsburg Holy Roman Emperor, had brought forth the idea in European courts for the first time that a concerted effort should be made to take advantage of the continued deterioration of the Ottomans and drive them entirely from the continent. This notion had developed so far as to come to have a defined geopolitical proposal attached to it, Catherine's famous "Greek Plan," which proposed a Habsburg absorption of the Danube Basin, Russia's consolidation of Wallachia and Moldavia as a Dacian protectorate, a Venetian-backed (or outright annexation) polity in the Adriatic and Aegean Islands, and a Greek "Neo-Byzantine" kingdom with its capital at Constantinople covering the southern Balkans (thus leaving Greek-majority Smyrna and other parts of Anatolia in Ottoman hands, for the time being), a kingdom which would have the future Tsar Constantine as its ruler, thus conveniently placing a Romanov on the throne in Greece. The plan advanced so far as to see both St. Petersburg and Vienna declare war on the Ottomans, and only disease tearing through the Habsburg armies and claiming Joseph's life helped prevent efforts to pursue it. The French Revolution's simultaneous advancement soon attracted Austrian attention, and the Balkans became a peripheral theater to European concerns for the next thirty years, to the point that there was no representation from Constantinople at the Peace of Aix, because why would there be? Who cared what the Turks thought?

The settlement at Aix had opened the Eastern Question again, though, and not just for Russia and Austria, though once again events in the Balkans naturally saw the two powers of the East (now with neither having to concern themselves about Prussian ambitions ever again) as the chief protagonists of anti-Ottoman intrigue. The former was primarily focused on its push into the Caucasus against Persia but Constantine had always been intrigued by the empire he would have inherited in another life, while the latter as eager to find a new pursuit to reorient its geopolitical goals around after the frustrating conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars in France's favor. The eruption of the Serbian Revolt in 1816 had been the first event that had garnered their attention, with Austrian support for the partisans south of the Drava-Danube frontier becoming increasingly overt (and in favor of the Obrenovic clan, especially after the death of rival Karadorde Petrovic) and Russian sympathy for the Slavic, Cyrillic-using and Orthodox region growing over the next several years.

It was in Greece, however, that the real eruption in 1821 found European attention, and Russia was much more involved in these efforts. Greek intellectuals had settled across Russia during Catherine the Great's reign and had never forgotten the esteem in which she had held them and their central place in her ambitions, and in Alexander Ypsilantis the Greek revolutionary society Fileki Eteria finally had the champion they had always sought. Russian financial and physical support of Ypsilantis was also matched by increasing sympathy for the cause by the Phanariote class of Greeks, who unlike the various scattered bands of brigands in the mountains of Greece who nonetheless enjoyed tangible popular support and were viewed as symbols of anti-Ottoman resistance enjoyed real tangible power. The Phanariotes, after all, composed much of the merchant and bureaucratic cadres in Constantinople, and as a budding Greek intelligentsia they formed the potential backbone of a new Greek political class should Ottoman rule erode further.

It was also the case that while the First and Second Serbian Uprisings had erupted simultaneous with the last War of Coalition and the Peace of Aix, most Germans, French, British and even a great deal of Austrians could have cared less about Serbians. Greece was an entirely different story thanks to its reputation as the cradle of all Western Civilization, and Ypsilantis crossing the Prut into formally Ottoman lands in April of 1821, and the subsequent eruption of planned revolts by the Fileki in tandem with this event was met with applause across Europe, followed by horror as Ottoman soldiers proceeded to begin to commit an escalating chain of atrocities that were eagerly reported on in Western press (of course, atrocities by Greek partisans often went outright ignored). Most infamously were tales of "Greek hunts" in which townspeople were given a head start and then pursued on horseback by Ottoman soldiers akin to a fox hunt. Philhellenism, already on the rise across Europe after the Peace of Aix, burst into overdrive amongst intellectuals and artists, most prominently the British poet Lord Byron.

For governments, the problem initially seemed one that would likely, as most uprisings against the Ottomans eventually did, go away on its own. But that did not happen; in fact, throughout 1821 and well into 1822, the Greek and Serbian revolutionaries enjoyed remarkable staying power and held their own despite numerous setbacks, and it began to seem like the twin uprisings in the Balkans were not just another run-of-the-mill internal issue for the Ottoman Empire but, in fact, a full-blown geopolitical crisis less than a decade after Aix. And no government should ever let a good crisis go to waste, certainly not when there was a new chessboard to play on in the age of Napoleon...
 
If Napoleon is smart he can side the Greeks and Serbs in order to establish two loyal states since he most likely knows that the Ottomans are not long. But at the same time he can’t afford the Ottomans to be overrun by the Russians so there’s that issue.
 
One wonders if a France that isn't starved for prestige like OTL's was in the 1820s is willing to support the Greeks as a way to salve their wounded post-Napoleon pride, especially if they are on the same side as the Brits.
 
If Napoleon is smart he can side the Greeks and Serbs in order to establish two loyal states since he most likely knows that the Ottomans are not long. But at the same time he can’t afford the Ottomans to be overrun by the Russians so there’s that issue.
There is no outcome in the Balkans that works perfectly for everyone, no
One wonders if a France that isn't starved for prestige like OTL's was in the 1820s is willing to support the Greeks as a way to salve their wounded post-Napoleon pride, especially if they are on the same side as the Brits.
How do you mean
 
One wonders if a France that isn't starved for prestige like OTL's was in the 1820s is willing to support the Greeks as a way to salve their wounded post-Napoleon pride, especially if they are on the same side as the Brits.
Meh, even if France goes "perfect time to do Campagne d'Égypte II" it still helps the Greeks.
 
There is no outcome in the Balkans that works perfectly for everyone, no
Meh, France is honestly better off not touching the Balkans powderkeg.

Considering that this is a victorious Napoleon that's been stifled by years of peace however, I find France non-involvement very unlikely.
 
Meh, even if France goes "perfect time to do Campagne d'Égypte II" it still helps the Greeks.
Bingo
Meh, France is honestly better off not touching the Balkans powderkeg.

Considering that this is a victorious Napoleon that's been stifled by years of peace however, I find France non-involvement very unlikely.
And this is precisely the “Napoleon giveth, Napoleon taketh” conundrum for France one must consider - there is no version of the man who is not sticking his nose in an opportunity to “flex his muscles” so to speak
 
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