The Congress of Aix - Part III
The most difficult settlement of all, of course, would be that of the matter of Britain. Napoleon's entire government, even Talleyrand, as well as the preponderance of his allies had come around to the position that whatever terms were imposed at Aix must in the case of the British be incredibly harsh; in his notes, Metternich described the attitudes of the French, Spanish and even most German delegates as "fanatical and lusting for vengeance; there was no reason nor logic that could be applied to their aims to exclude entirely from the Continent, and if possible the world, the British state."
Talleyrand had designed most of the articles of the Congress to this point but when December turned to January and attention turned from the European continent to Britain, Napoleon took over personally, as he had done at Potsdam (best seen in the bizarre Oder River border that bisected Breslau). In famous (or, to some, infamous) remarks, the Emperor of France laid out a lengthy, robust case not for a general peace with Britain but his view that London must be punished: "Every coalition assembled against France in these last twenty-five years since the Republic's first creation was financed and directed by London; every peace that was struck was brief because it was broken at the instigation of London; every drop of blood shed to attempt to destroy France during a quarter-century, regardless of blade or gun that may have shed it, was at the end fired at the behest of London. If this Peace that emerges from this Congress is to last, it must be Westphalian; it must thus enjoy guarantees of sovereignty and independence for all signatories from interference and intrigue by the anti-Continental power who has performed all such interferences and intrigues in the past!" Another Amiens would certainly not be good enough for France now, with that peace's collapse laid wholly at British feet.
The issue of course was that France had no way to enforce terms on Britain. Thanks to Trafalgar, the Royal Navy dominated the high seas and could interdict shipping at will with little pushback; Napoleon's brilliance as a tactician and strategic thinker on land did him little good when Britain sat behind "the world's greatest moat." Talleyrand as much as anyone was aware that Britain had taken a hard line at the aborted peace agreements at Wismar precisely for that reason, and suspected they would endeavor to do so again. The Britain of Aix, however, was a much less hard-edged one than four years past. The period 1810-14 had, after all, seen a concentrated run of foreign policy and domestic disasters for Britain that had badly eroded her hand. The Fernandine Gambit in Spanish America and pursuant expeditions to various colonial holdings in the New World had been not dismal failures but utter fiascos that had left thousands of British soldiers dead; similar intrusions into the Netherlands and Italy had outraged potential allies and ended in either total rout or deliberate retreat. Other than the Sardinian Savoyards and Sicilian Bourbons, Britain lacked any friends on the European continent whatsoever; their increasingly thinly-spread blockades had denied them access to European markets while France consolidated overland and short-haul coastal routes and the Baltic became, commercially, a Russo-Danish lake. Spain was perhaps even more bloodthirsty than France, Portugal was now under a puppet boy king, and Austria exhausted after reversal after reversal, while Russia - last seen fighting a war against Britain in 1809 - was fat and happy with its considerable gains for little effort even as it kept a skeptical eye on semi-independent Warsaw. There was no path for a British resurgence.
Domestically, too, the situation was even more dire. Food riots had begun as early as 1811 and the Prime Minister had been assassinated the next year; Canning's brief tenure as successor had been calamitous. Unrest had spread from England to Scotland and now Ireland, where Anglophobic sentiment was running higher than ever. The finances of both the state and the banking establishment were thin, the resources of the Royal Navy scattered (that war scares in 1812 and 1814 with the United States had forced considerable military assets, including thousands of soldiers, be deployed to the Colony of Canada did not help matters) and the economy of Britain in deep depression. The Cabinet learned of mutinies on four Royal Navy vessels occurring independently in the lead-up and early months of Aix; there was nothing left to fight for. Britain, unmolested at home and at sea since 1805, had been defeated in the only theater that counted.
It was for that reason that Bathurst, aware that he would need to give imprimatur to a Congress that would be extremely unpopular in Britain, sent Castlereagh to Aix to treat with Talleyrand, and Talleyrand alone, to develop a settlement that Britain could stomach but which France would accept. The alternative was economic collapse and the potential exclusion from Europe for a generation. London would pay indemnities to Spain and France (the former would receive a larger one) and return the Cape Colony to the Netherlands (though not the East Indies) while acceding to the commercial terms of the Rome System; France would see her African, Indian and Caribbean outposts returned, with the exception of French Guyana, which would remain on paper in the hands of Brazil. Britain would also deliver the acquiescence of Sicily and Sardinia to the conventions of Aix, stand by the same agreements made by Austria and Russia not to interfere in the internal politics of states that had accepted the Napoleonic Code even while not adopting any such measures themselves, guaranteed the territorial integrity of all states of Europe, and agreed to compensate Denmark for the terrorism of Copenhagen by transferring a number of warships to be used exclusively by the Danish Navy. Confiscated vessels would be returned to their rightful owners or a small indemnity paid. Britain's position in Gibraltar and Malta would remain uncontested, and no permanent solution to the "two Portugals" was found, which seemed to suit Talleyrand just fine.
Spain in particular was furious over the generosity of the terms, and Napoleon deeply skeptical himself, but Talleyrand aggressively Napoleon's brothers Louis, Jerome and Joseph to accepted on their own behalf these terms and form a "pro-compromise" lobby. Austria, Russia and, to little surprise, Denmark also leapt at these terms; Napoleon begrudgingly accepted the Castlereagh Compromise, aware that France had little recourse and that the people were restive after so many years of endless war, and with that the final pieces of the Peace of Aix came together, hideously unpopular as these last articles were in London, Paris
and Madrid.
It was a frustrating, unfulfilling peace struck for many of the parties at Aix - but it was a peace.