The thing is, the longer Peter rules, the tougher it is for Catherine to pull off a coup, and the more likely she is to get sidelined by Peter.

Which is my way of saying, keep Peter in power.
 
An Anglo-French war in the 1760's will also throw massive butterflies at British North America.

Presumably that depends on how that war ends up. But that does bring up a good point, which is the fate of the Thirteen Colonies. I'm presently of the opinion that the underlying causes of the American rebellion are not much changed - yes, the recent war was less costly for Britain than OTL and thus presumably the tax burden on the colonials is lower, but the problem of representation still exists, Britain is presumably still limiting colonial settlement in its westward territories, and British mercantilism is still irksome to American traders. Another Anglo-Bourbon war, if it comes, will only increase the financial pressure regardless of who the victor is.

I suspect the key element to all this is timing. By the late 1770s France had recovered sufficiently from the SYW (or at least they thought they had) to support the colonials and take on Britain. If they lose another war in the late 60s/early 70s, however, they may not be in a position to support an American rebellion just a few years later. If the rebellion is not delayed, it may simply be crushed for lack of foreign support. On the other hand, if the coming Anglo-Bourbon war is sufficiently delayed, it's possible that the rebellion happens first and actually triggers that war - after all, there is no reason why Anglo-American relations had to break down in 1775 and not earlier. Tensions had built and dissipated over taxes several times before then, and much depends on the leadership in Parliament.
 
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That would be an awesome butterfly effect feature that a rebellion's success in a tiny Mediterranean island would prevent the birth of the biggest power in our world.
Theodore von Neuhoff, George Washington's nemesis without him knowing.
 
I suspect the key element to all this is timing. By the late 1770s France had recovered sufficiently from the SYW (or at least they thought they had) to support the colonials and take on Britain. If they lose another war in the late 60s/early 70s, however, they may not be in a position to support an American rebellion just a few years later. If the rebellion is not delayed, it may simply be crushed for lack of foreign support. On the other hand, if the coming Anglo-Bourbon war is sufficiently delayed, it's possible that the rebellion happens first and actually triggers that war - after all, there is no reason why Anglo-American relations had to break down in 1775 and not earlier. Tensions had built and dissipated over taxes several times before then, and much depends on the leadership in Parliament.

Hi! This is my first time posting in this thread (though I've regularly read every new update for the past 2 years) and while reading this paragraph I decided to comment for the first time to say that I'd like you to go for the second option, even just for the novelty factor. I've seen many types of American revolutions on this site-- failed American revolutions, two-round American revolutions, radical French-style American revolutions, no American revolution at all-- but I can't remember a TL which featured an earlier War of Independence.
 
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Hi! This is my first time posting in this thread (though I've regularly read every new update for the past 2 years) and while reading this paragraph I decided to comment for the first time to say that I'd like you to go for the second option, even just for the novelty factor. I've seen many types of American revolutions on this site-- failed American revolutions, two-round American revolutions, radical French-style American revolutions, no American revolution at all-- but I can't remember a TL which featured an earlier War of Independence.
However, the setup ITTL so far does not favour an earlier ARW.
The Americans are less burdened by taxation and more spooked by the remaining French presence in North America. If, IOTL, it took A LOT for a large enough proportion of colonists to renounce their British allegiance, the process is probably going to take longer in a context where colonial grievances, though still very real, are somewhat lessened. This, of course, barring some egregious blunder by Whitehall, which remains a distinct possibility.
 
However, the setup ITTL so far does not favour an earlier ARW.
The Americans are less burdened by taxation and more spooked by the remaining French presence in North America. If, IOTL, it took A LOT for a large enough proportion of colonists to renounce their British allegiance, the process is probably going to take longer in a context where colonial grievances, though still very real, are somewhat lessened. This, of course, barring some egregious blunder by Whitehall, which remains a distinct possibility.

A possibility Carp himself doesn't exclude, if I interpret that final "and much depends on the leadership in Parliament" correctly.

I agree that there are factors at work which help defuse tensions between the Motherland and the Colonies, but if Carp's King Theodore has managed to beat the odds for three decades and counting and everything is still within the realms of plausibility ITTL, I have faith there's a reasonable way to make the relationship between the UK and the Thirteen Colonies go pear-shaped even in this scenario.
 
The timeline is about Corsica, I'd be wary of taking the focus too far away from that. The author might need to have an idea in his head about what's happening elsewhere but I don't see the need for that to be written in the timeline. Do we ever need to see what happens in the USA?
 
The timeline is about Corsica, I'd be wary of taking the focus too far away from that. The author might need to have an idea in his head about what's happening elsewhere but I don't see the need for that to be written in the timeline. Do we ever need to see what happens in the USA?
Perhaps not in close detail, but Corsica rippled out quite dramatically, especially thanks to Browne's different career and the different outcome of the Austro-Prussian rematch. I think it is interesting to explore the aftereffects of that as they diverge from OTL on the global level (which is starting to be quite dramatically the case).
I DO like the TL to keep the focus on Corsica but I think @Carp is right in examining the wider consequences which he has do admirably so far.
Obviously, it will get harder and harder to project the future here, especially as the TL gets closer to the *Napoleonic period, which will obviously not happen in anything like a recognizable form.
 
The Albany Plan/Galloway's Plan might have a chance of being successful ITTL if tensions haven't built up enough for full-blown revolution and the colonists are still freaked out about the French.
While it was the Continental Congress that ultimately rejected that plan, I would not bet much on the chances of any such scheme in Westminster. I understand that England was very reluctant to give ultimate power to any Colonial body outside its effective purview at this time.
While I am not an expert on this period, I am under the impression that colonial representation in London's Parliament itself is more likely (though less satisfactory for the Americans).
 
Rest assured, there will be no chapter on the alt-American Revolution. That would be a big and ambitious project that I don’t really want to tackle for this TL. But the question of whether there is an American Revolution is important enough for world history that it does need to be answered, and I ought to justify that decision sufficiently for it to seem plausible.

Anway, two thoughts on American stuff:

1. It seems to me that American fears about France are not likely to be significant ITTL. France’s holdings in North America now consist only of the Louisiana territory, which is very sparsely populated, and Ile Saint-Jean (PIE), which is a good fishing base (and probably flooded with Acadian exiles right now) but is probably indefensible. Everything else, including the contested territories of the Ohio Valley, is in British hands. Given this situation, it’s hard to see France posing any threat to the Thirteen Colonies at all. If an Anglo-Bourbon war did break out, I suspect France’s focus would not be on trying to reclaim Canada, but on making gains in more profitable theaters like the West Indies, the Mediterranean, and India - in other words, exactly those places they targeted during the OTL American Revolution.

2. Speaking of an Anglo-Bourbon War, on further consideration I think I may be wrong about the prospect of such a war breaking out in the late 60s/early 70s. It’s true that both Spain and France are in a better position than they were during OTL’s 1770 Falklands Crisis, and Carlos in particular is really eager for war. The problem is that, in the end, it’s all up to one man - Louis XV - who was decidedly not a warmonger. The argument that France will be more likely to go to war because of its better financial situation holds water only if France’s finances are the reason Louis declined to go to war over the Falklands Crisis. If, on the other hand, the king’s reasons for avoiding war were personal, religious, moral, or something else, then the precise amount of outstanding French debt is of no consequence.
 
Rest assured, there will be no chapter on the alt-American Revolution.
I think it's worth noting that, even if the War for Independence is largely unaffected, the manner in which the continentals bound themselves together (the Federalist Constitution, etc) are very much open to butterflies; even OTL, monarchism (not pro-George III, but a desire for an American Monarchy) was a not insignificant element of politics in the time of the founders, even if the *republicans* (and the Democratic-Republicans as well) won out in the end.
 
The example of Corsica is likely going to have influence on whatever happens in the American colonies. The example of an unfairly taxed population throwing off the yoke of an overseas (the Ligurian Sea counts) colonial overlord has some strong parallels there. Now whether this will prompt a reconsideration on the UK's part to avoid policies that would give them 13 Corsicas or inflame the passions of the Americans as a clarion call is an open question.


I think it's worth noting that, even if the War for Independence is largely unaffected, the manner in which the continentals bound themselves together (the Federalist Constitution, etc) are very much open to butterflies; even OTL, monarchism (not pro-George III, but a desire for an American Monarchy) was a not insignificant element of politics in the time of the founders, even if the *republicans* (and the Democratic-Republicans as well) won out in the end.

I agree with the example of Theodore, perhaps a stronger monarchist faction would arise, though its success might be muted by the colonies' dislike of centralized power.
 
Personally, I'd be interested in seeing the ramifications of fewer colonies rebelling. The less populous Canadian provinces stayed loyal, but what if Maine and the rather new Georgia also stayed with the crown? The initial changes would be small, but there could be interesting side effects. In particular, a black-freedmen-majority British colony next to the OTL slave states would be a vector for future conflicts between the USA and the British Empire.

However, this would probably make more sense as the topic of a timeline of it's own.
 
I think the idea of being unfairly taxed is a tad overrepresented in American history. It's less that the taxes were too high or unfair but more lack of say of the colonial elite in how the money was spent.
Without the distraction of the French you'd probably see at least an increase in the colonial office of the U.K. parliament to include American representatives.
But as Carp has said a lot depends on personalities with regards to response and counter response.
 
the american revolution and declaration of independence were a very unlikely chain of events. it would require a skyscraper sized butterfly net to replicate ITTL.
compared to what a british citizen had to pay in the home isles, the colonials were paying nothing (and the colonists rarely paid anyway)

(side note on representation: a lot of people in the british isles were not represented either at this point in time.)
 
It was more about the return of colonial administration, especially law enforcement. During the century of neglect before, much of the local government had slipped into the hands of smugglers, land speculants and other crooks and local crimelords. Any attempt by London to tighten their control will result in those local strongmen trying to foment rebellion to save their necks. Hang together, or they'll hang separately.
 
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