Peter of Russia made a lot of short lived liberal reforms in his breif reign; here he is contunuing with them? Russia's fate could change for the better.
 
Peter of Russia made a lot of short lived liberal reforms in his breif reign; here he is contunuing with them? Russia's fate could change for the better.

Not as short lived as you'd think. Peter enacted decrees against the Church that Catherine denounced after the coup as impious and heterodox, but Catherine ratified most of those decrees within a few months. Catherine denounced Peter for betraying Russia and handing back Russian conquests to Prussia, but nevertheless Catherine did not re-enter the war and eventually made her own alliance with Frederick. Catherine promised that her government would have "its limits and its laws" in contrast to Peter's supposed autocracy, but Catherine's support for such limited government was purely theoretical; Catherine was hardly a constitutional monarch. As far as I can tell, the current scholarly consensus is that Catherine continued most of Peter's foreign and domestic policies (with the obvious exception of Peter's interest in his familial rights in Holstein), while Peter himself was often just elaborating upon already-existing trends in 18th century Russian statecraft (like the secularization of church lands).

This is not to say there were no differences between Peter and Catherine, but rather that the reputation of Peter as an incautious radical reformer was crafted deliberately by Catherine to justify her coup and portray herself as a restorer of tradition and order. In fact there was a lot more continuity between their policies than Catherine was willing to admit at the time.
 
Not as short lived as you'd think. Peter enacted decrees against the Church that Catherine denounced after the coup as impious and heterodox, but Catherine ratified most of those decrees within a few months. Catherine denounced Peter for betraying Russia and handing back Russian conquests to Prussia, but nevertheless Catherine did not re-enter the war and eventually made her own alliance with Frederick. Catherine promised that her government would have "its limits and its laws" in contrast to Peter's supposed autocracy, but Catherine's support for such limited government was purely theoretical; Catherine was hardly a constitutional monarch. As far as I can tell, the current scholarly consensus is that Catherine continued most of Peter's foreign and domestic policies (with the obvious exception of Peter's interest in his familial rights in Holstein), while Peter himself was often just elaborating upon already-existing trends in 18th century Russian statecraft (like the secularization of church lands).

This is not to say there were no differences between Peter and Catherine, but rather that the reputation of Peter as an incautious radical reformer was crafted deliberately by Catherine to justify her coup and portray herself as a restorer of tradition and order. In fact there was a lot more continuity between their policies than Catherine was willing to admit at the time.

Which Catherine THEN turned around and frequently used to create the impression of herself as a liberal ruler bringing enlightenment to backwards Russia abroad.

One has to admire the woman's chutzpah.
 
At present, the only big lingering question for me on the continent is the fate of Russia. Peter III will at least be around long enough to get us a little Russo-Danish war, but I'm still debating whether I want Catherine to still coup him eventually or leave Peter on the throne. The former, being closer to OTL, will presumably be easier for me to deal with, particularly since I am not at all well-versed in Russian politics and history. That said, we're already well and truly off the rails here with Prussia's defeat and Poland's consolidation, so it's not as if Catherine's reign will be the same even if she attains her historical place.
Not commenting on the subject of Catherine’s coup (which can easily be butterflied away or happen as per OTL), I would like to give my 5 cents about Poland.

I don’t really think that PLC is that consolidated ITTL: while Augustus (and Saxony’s) position is stronger I don’t really think it can be translated to PLC as a whole. IOTL by 1764 PLC was effectively a Russian protectorate (or at least it is safe to claim that Russia’s influence on PLC internal politics was extremely strong; militarily Russia effectively used PLC’s territory as its own since Peter the Great) and I don’t think it is changed ITTL (while Polish king personally is of couse better of).

What would probably be butterflied away is events of 1764-1772. IOTL Catherine used her influence to make Stanislaw Poniatowski the PLC king. While he was pro-Russian, he was also an ardent reformer and although his reforms were not able to save the Commonwealth, they were perhaps the best chance for Poland to transform into a viable state.
ITTL I think chances for Russia to push for Stanislaw are much lower. Indeed, Saxony has just played a pivotal role in exchange of territory that benefited Russia in a big way (and thus can be seen as a proper vessel of Russian interests) while simultaneously strengthening its power within PLC. Even in case Catherine’s coup is not butterflied away, I think there is high chance that she will prefer to continue a profitable relationship her predecessors had with Saxon monarchs (if Peter retains his throne, there is of course almost no chance Russia will try to install Poniatowski).

If indeed in 1764 Russia (whoever its monarch is at this point) supports Frederick Christian (or in case his death of smallpox is not butterflied away, his son Frederick Augustus), PLC history is changed completely. Unlike IOTL Polish monarchy does not seem to be completely subjugated by Russian interests, thus all events preceding First Partition are probably butterflied away (Repnin Sejm, Confederations of Sluck, Radom and Bar and Koliyivshchyna all seem implausible with Saxon as a monarch). In the same time, I don’t see Saxon monarch trying to implement Poniatowski’s internal reforms that were meant to strengthen the power of Polish government and institutes: the Saxon powerbase lies elsewhere and thus they have much less incentive to thwart the status quo within PLC. In fact, I am not even sure that reforms that IOTL were implemented during Convocation Sejm of 1764 would be introduced in case foreign monarchs continue to rule PLC and thus it continues to “enjoy” liberum veto, private tariffs and other peculiar relics of the past.

If this is the case, the Commonwealth remains roughly as it was before 1764: an extremely week state under heavy influence of foreign powers (chiefly Russia) and with little hope for reform. On the other hand, this status quo is something that most PLC neighbors are very comfortable with, thus the threat to destroy the Polish state completely is probably much smaller in such a case, than it was IOTL in 1770s-1790s.
 
If indeed in 1764 Russia (whoever its monarch is at this point) supports Frederick Christian (or in case his death of smallpox is not butterflied away, his son Frederick Augustus)

My understanding was that Frederick Augustus was ineligible for election due to his minority. From what I've read, the "Saxon candidate" after Frederick Christian's death was not his son, but Frederick Christian's brother Francis Xavier, who initially sought election but backed down once he realized that Austria and France would not offer him any meaningful support. That suggests to me that if Frederick Christian does die as OTL, there is a very real possibility of Saxony and Poland being split between Wettin branches, with the kingdom going to Francis Xavier and the electorate to his nephew.

If such a division occurred, the status of (East) Prussia would be critically important. I suggested in an earlier post that it would become a hereditary possession of the Wettins and not united to Poland, but I'm not so sure now. I can't imagine the Polish nobility (or any Pole, really) would have welcomed ceding all that eastern land to Russia in exchange for East Prussia, if East Prussia was destined to be a mere transient acquisition that would be lost again as soon a non-Wettin (or different Wettin) won the election. It also might not be in Russia's interest to allow East Prussia to remain a hereditary German duchy rather than a part of the weak and readily-influenced Polish state.

In any case, I am not so sure that Peter would automatically favor a Saxon succession. IOTL he seems to have sided with Prussia in favoring the election of a "Piast" (that is, a native Pole). It's true that Augustus ceded land to Russia in the recent treaty, but Augustus is dead and Peter didn't sign that treaty. After the TTL Four Years' War, Austria is more dominant than ever, Prussia is humbled, and the Saxons are perceived as Austria's close allies. It stands to reason that Peter might still prefer a Piast to maintain Poland's clientage and limit the influence of Austria. The question is how far he's willing to go to achieve that end. Austria and France didn't contest Catherine's heavy-handed Polish intervention IOTL, which was also supported by Frederick. ITTL, however, Austria is considerably stronger and Prussia is a nonentity (at least for now - they're hardly dead, but they're not about to fight a war over Poland just a few years after losing in 1760). Peter's brief OTL reign suggests he wasn't afraid of making some bold moves, but he's fairly isolated here and might not want to risk a showdown.

In the same time, I don’t see Saxon monarch trying to implement Poniatowski’s internal reforms that were meant to strengthen the power of Polish government and institutes: the Saxon powerbase lies elsewhere and thus they have much less incentive to thwart the status quo within PLC. In fact, I am not even sure that reforms that IOTL were implemented during Convocation Sejm of 1764 would be introduced in case foreign monarchs continue to rule PLC and thus it continues to “enjoy” liberum veto, private tariffs and other peculiar relics of the past.

Even without Poniatowski, however, the Czartoryskis had been pursuing such reforms before 1764. The Czartoryski program drawn up in 1762-63 apparently included the abolition of the veto, the transformation of the Sejm into a permanently standing body with regular elections, a drastic reduction in the number of delegates, and various economic and administrative reforms. They had been preparing to make Augustus accept their demands by force, but were convinced to stand down once Catherine took power, as she preferred to wait for the ailing Augustus to die naturally (as he did shortly thereafter) rather than risking a civil war. It's possible the Saxon candidate ITTL (whoever it might be) might support some of these reforms, for although the Czartoryskis wanted to weaken the monarchy many of their reforms were intended to make the kingdom more governable and would not necessarily have been to the king's disadvantage (particularly if that king is Frederick Christian, who apparently was very interested in financial and administrative reform in Saxony during his brief reign there). The Saxon candidate might accept some reforms just as a means to reconcile the Familia, or to try and avoid provoking Russia (as the Czartoryskis seem likely to appeal to Russia for military support if things don't go well for them, just as they were prepared to do historically).

Or at least, that's my reading based on some research on JSTOR. What's your take on that?
 
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Not as short lived as you'd think. Peter enacted decrees against the Church that Catherine denounced after the coup as impious and heterodox, but Catherine ratified most of those decrees within a few months. Catherine denounced Peter for betraying Russia and handing back Russian conquests to Prussia, but nevertheless Catherine did not re-enter the war and eventually made her own alliance with Frederick. Catherine promised that her government would have "its limits and its laws" in contrast to Peter's supposed autocracy, but Catherine's support for such limited government was purely theoretical; Catherine was hardly a constitutional monarch. As far as I can tell, the current scholarly consensus is that Catherine continued most of Peter's foreign and domestic policies (with the obvious exception of Peter's interest in his familial rights in Holstein), while Peter himself was often just elaborating upon already-existing trends in 18th century Russian statecraft (like the secularization of church lands).

This is not to say there were no differences between Peter and Catherine, but rather that the reputation of Peter as an incautious radical reformer was crafted deliberately by Catherine to justify her coup and portray herself as a restorer of tradition and order. In fact there was a lot more continuity between their policies than Catherine was willing to admit at the time.
Peter was not incautious, he was a true reformer and liberal-minded; Catherine was a reformer of the Louis XIV kind.
 
The Royal Corsican Army
The Royal Corsican Army
Excerpts from Merganser Publishing's "Lace Warriors" Series #53: The Corsican Army


Almost everywhere mountainous, not terribly fertile and, for that very reason, sparsely populated, this island is nevertheless distinguished by four precious gifts from nature: Horses small in size and slender in shape, but tireless at work and almost made of iron; very generous wines, highly prized at the tables of great men, who make them their delights; very famous guard dogs; but above all, valiant, impetuous men, born for fighting, enemies of repose, so much so that Corsican soldiers have always been held in great honor in Italy and among other nations.

- Inscribed upon a 16th century map of Corsica in the Vatican by Ignazio Danti


Atypically for an 18th century monarch, King Theodore was sceptical of the value of a standing army for his kingdom. Certainly he required a modest royal guard, and he had supported the creation of the Royal Dragoons in 1754 to clamp down on vendetta killings and enforce the law in the rugged interior. He had personally pushed for the reestablishment of a navy, believing that an armed squadron was necessary to protect trade and fight the corsairs. When it came to a true army however - an armed force which existed not to defend the royal household, mete out justice, or guard commerce, but simply to defend the country - the king had always been dismissive. He scoffed at the idea that a few battalions of infantry could offer any meaningful protection against the intervention of a great power, and felt that an army would be a deplorable diversion of money and manpower from the economic development of the country. The kingdom’s independence could only be protected in the same manner in which it had been gained: with nationalist militia forces in the mountains.

Theodore’s beliefs were generally uncontroversial in the years immediately following independence, and in any case the kingdom’s strained finances and considerable debt made the maintenance of any such force impractical. The French occupation, however, changed some minds. “A few battalions of infantry” might not have driven the French from the country, but some argued that the kingdom’s complete lack of an army had encouraged the French to take greater liberties with Corsican property and sovereignty. Even before the end of the Four Years’ War, a “pro-military” faction began to emerge which did not share Theodore’s view of the essential uselessness of a standing army. They offered various practical arguments, but shared above all a conviction that a national army was a matter of national pride and status, without which Corsica would not be taken seriously by foreign powers.

The turning point came in 1764, when the “Saporiti Conspiracy” threatened to bring Corsica and Genoa to the brink of war. Although neither the king nor his ministers were interested in conflict with the Republic, the episode underlined just how powerless the kingdom actually was. Even if the Corsicans could never hope to field a regular army capable of deterring the likes of France, they might yet deter (or threaten) Corsica’s less formidable neighbors, the Republic included. The pro-military faction began to gain more traction and found prominent supporters in the cabinet and even the royal household, with the crown prince himself urging Theodore to consider some move towards a standing force.[1]

In early 1766 the king finally agreed to a compromise with the “militarists” by authorizing the creation of a royal military commission, staffed by ex-officers and foreign veterans, to study the matter and offer recommendations. To signal that the committee would be taken seriously, Theodore appointed Count Marcantonio Giappiconi, who had retired from the cabinet in 1762 after 25 years as minister of war, as its chair. After months of work, the commission ultimately compiled its recommendations as the Piano Generale del Militare Corso and submitted them to the government. Although Theodore made some revisions, he surprised many by signing off on the majority of the proposals. The revised plan was subsequently adopted by the new minister of war, Count Innocenzo di Mari, as the “1767 Establishment” of the Royal Corsican Army.[2]



Corsican Uniforms around 1770 (click to expand)

The 1767 Establishment

The Piano Generale generally agreed with Theodore’s assessment that the militia was the bedrock of national defense, and offered various reforms to the militia system. But the plan also recommended the creation of a “model regiment” of regular infantry which could garrison the presidi, train officers, provide marine detachments to the navy, and serve as a professional core for the militia in the event of an attack. For reasons both political and practical, Giappiconi’s commission suggested that the “model regiment” be organized on Austrian doctrine.

The “Austrian” the ministry hired to assist them with this task was Baron Jakob von Lockhart, a well-traveled soldier of fortune. A Scotsman, James Lockhart had joined the Jacobite uprising in 1745 at the age of twenty. After the uprising’s failure, Lockhart managed to escape capture and fled all the way to Persia, where he enlisted in the army of Nader Shah. He did not remain long in Persian service, however, as in 1748 he enlisted in the Austrian army just in time to see the last few months of the War of Austrian Succession. By the outbreak of the Four Years’ War he was a captain of grenadiers, and so impressed his superiors with his energy and courage that by war’s end he had been promoted to lieutenant-colonel and made a baron by Maria Theresa.[3][A]

Baron Lockhart seems to have been a bit loose with his own qualifications - he either told the Corsicans or allowed them to believe that he was a former “officer” in the Persian army (he was not), an Austrian “general” (he was not that either), and that he had been recommended to them by the Austrian high command (also not true). Nevertheless, he was serious about his offer to “teach the Corsicans to be proper soldiers,” and was given wide latitude to assemble, organize, and drill the regiment as he saw fit. Baron Lockhart served in Corsica for just two years before returning to the Austrian army, but his specifications for the regiment formed the basis for the Regolamento del 1769 per la Fanteria Corsa, which would remain the official reference for drill and procedures in the Royal Corsican Army for decades.

Esercito Reale Corsa (Royal Corsican Army)[4]
Guardia Reale, 150 men:
Guardia Nobile del Corpo, 30 men in one squadron​
Guardia Trabanti del Corpo, 120 men in one company​
Truppe Regolati, 960 men:
Reggimento Dragoni Reali, 360 men in three squadrons of two companies​
Reggimento di Piede, 600 men in one battalion of six companies​
Truppe Ausiliarie, 480 men:
Bombardieri, 120 men in three companies​
Dragoni Presidiali, 360 men in nine companies​

Guardia Nobile del Corpo. The Noble Life Guard or Adligen-Leibgarde, frequently referred to as the Guardia Nobile (“Noble Guard”) or the Guardia Nera (“Black Guard”), originated in the early 1760s as a part of the royal household but little is known about the unit before the 1767 Establishment. Ostensibly this was an independent company of heavy cavalry, but the Noble Guard was principally a ceremonial household guard which acted as the sovereign’s personal escort. Troopers were required to be native-born Corsicans under the age of 30 from noble families who professed the Catholic faith. Aside from merely adding to the prestige of the crown, this showpiece guard unit was intended to teach military skills to - and cultivate the loyalty of - the sons of noble families who served as the king’s honored companions.

Troopers were to ride a black cavalry horse and to be armed with a carbine, a pair of pistols, and a pallasch (broadsword). Owing to the lack of cavalry horses on Corsica and the expense of importing them, it seems more likely that they rode the native horse or paganacciu (which, though not much of a warhorse, was indeed available in black). The king himself was the ex officio captain of the squadron, and his own military uniform was essentially a fancier version of theirs. Actual command was exercised by a tenente capitano (“lieutenant-captain”).

Guardia Trabanti del Corpo. The Trabant Life Guard or Trabanten-Leibgarde, variously known as the Guardia Verde (“Green Guard”), Guardia dei Granatieri (“Grenadier Guard”), or simply I Trabanti (“the Trabants”),[5] was an independent grenadier company which evolved from the king’s old foreign regiment. Although Theodore’s foreign troops during the revolution had been mainly German, in the 50s and 60s they were joined by increasing numbers of Scots, Irishmen, and (non-Corsican) Italians. The company rolls of this extremely eclectic unit also included Dutch, Englishmen, Spaniards, Frenchmen, Swiss, and one Courlander. While the Noble Guard served as a ceremonial escort the Trabants were the crown’s day-to-day security force, standing guard at the royal residences and providing bodyguards for the extended royal family.

The Trabants were to be armed with a musket, a bayonet, and a saber. The captain of this company was styled as comandante and ranked as a major. By tradition, all orders in the company were given in German. Enlisted men were required to wear mustaches.

Dragoni Reali. The Royal Dragoons were a national gendarmerie created to combat banditry and enforce justice. Although not part of the Royal Guard, the dragoons gained a reputation as an elite unit and recruiting was highly selective. The Piano Generale advised that prospective troopers should display superior initiative, moral integrity, marksmanship, and physical fitness. They were certainly the most active unit of the army during peacetime, as they were continually employed in patrolling Corsica’s rugged terrain and hunting down outlaws and bandits. They received only the most rudimentary cavalry training, as it was assumed that in wartime they would serve as “mounted light infantry” rather than cavalry.

Theoretically, dragoons were to be armed with a carbine, a brace of pistols, and a cavalry saber. In practice they were given considerable latitude to equip themselves how they (or their captain) wished. Carbines were popular but not always available, and troopers might instead carry an infantry musket or cispra (a very long, small-caliber musket). Cavalry sabers were rarely worn and probably not issued to most dragoons, who preferred more practical tools like knives, hatchets, or hangers. The mount of choice was the small but surefooted paganacciu, the native Corsican horse.[6] In contrast to the clean-shaven infantry and the mustachioed Trabants, the Royal Dragoons were permitted to grow full beards, which probably began as a practical concession but quickly became a jealously guarded privilege.

Reggimento di Piede. The Regiment of Foot was assembled in 1767 under the supervision of Baron Lockhart as a “model regiment” organized and trained to Austrian standards. The regiment consisted of one battalion with six companies, five of fusiliers and one of grenadiers. Grenadiers received a slightly higher salary than fusiliers and were exempt from certain menial duties. The infantry’s peacetime duties were primarily to garrison the presidi, maintain public order, and provide marine detachments to the Corsican Navy.

All infantrymen were issued a musket and bayonet. Grenadiers also carried a short saber or “hanger.”

Bombardieri. Formed in 1764 after the near-loss of the Capraia to corsairs demonstrated the acute need for trained garrison artillerymen, the bombardieri were citizen-gunners based on the Genoese model. They were typically recruited from the ranks of urban tradesmen, preferably those with relevant skills (e.g. carpenters, smiths, wheelwrights, coopers). Though they were part-timers, the bombardieri were under army jurisdiction and subject to military justice while on duty. They were required to pass a technical exam and were placed on active duty for a portion of every year to make sure their skills didn’t get too rusty. Bombardieri were paid while on active duty and received a number of perks, including exemption from militia duty and the right to wear a sword with civilian clothes. The 1767 Establishment organized them into three companies based out of Bastia, Calvi, and Ajaccio, each headed by a capo bombardiere.

Bombardiers were issued a linstock and a short saber. The linstock had a spearhead on the end and could theoretically be used as a half-pike, but the saber was a more practical weapon of self-defense. The bombardieri companies frequently marched with their full panoply in civic parades and celebrations.

Dragoni Presidiali. The “presidials” were auxiliaries who served as a provincial constabulary. They were raised by and reported to the royal luogotenenti and were not formally part of the army. These part-time gendarmes were required to undergo periodic training and show up for active duty for a portion of every month on a rotating calendar, although inactive men might be called up in an emergency. Their duties were to patrol the roads, carry out the acts of the luogotenente, enforce local justice, and assist the army with maintaining the general peace. Although established as 40-man companies on paper, in reality their numbers varied widely according to the needs and resources of the individual luogotenente. Like the bombardieri, they were exempt from militia duty and allowed to carry a sword in civilian dress.

Presidials were expected to provide their own horse and musket, and many carried pistols or swords as well. As a consequence, most presidials were local proprietari and notabili with sufficient means to own a riding horse, although a luogotenente could subsidize his presidials from his own pockets if he so desired.

Recruitment and Lifestyle

The Corsican government always had more recruits than it could afford to enlist, and not just because of the traditional prestige of military service in Corsican society. Because of the scarcity of arable land and the Corsican tradition of dividing land between sons, there were many young men of respectable families who nevertheless found themselves without enough land to support themselves adequately. For such downwardly-mobile peasants, wearing the king’s uniform was seen as an honorable and stable alternative to working another man’s land as a farm laborer or sharecropper. This abundance of volunteers allowed the army to maintain some standards. Certainly its soldiers were usually poor and often illiterate - they were Corsicans, after all - but unlike many of its continental counterparts, the Corsican army never stooped so low as to dredge up indigents, vagabonds, or petty criminals to fill its ranks.

During peacetime, a Corsican soldier was required to be on patrol duty only 60 hours per month - ten six-hour shifts. At most other times he was permitted to wear civilian clothes. He lived in the barracks, but the barracks was open and families were allowed to visit regularly. Women and children were common sights in Corsican garrisons. Their substantial amount of off-duty time meant that many soldiers also held down part-time jobs with local artisans and tradesmen, which supplemented their rather modest army salary. A soldier might occasionally be called away from this routine for special tasks, most notably marine duty on a warship, but this was relatively uncommon.

This is not to say that a soldier’s job was a lark. Penalties for desertion or being absent from patrol were severe, and discipline was not forgotten in peacetime. Drill was rigorous, and inspections of uniforms and arms were frequent. Soldiering was a somewhat dangerous profession even during peacetime, for the close quarters of men in the barracks meant that they died from outbreaks of contagious disease at a significantly higher rate than the rest of the population. Yet such hazards were not unique to the Corsican army, and the status and perks of soldiering were considered by many to be worth the risks.

Uniforms

The 1767 infantry uniform was designed to accommodate the ministry’s demand for the strictest economy. It was shorter and tighter than coats of the Revolutionary era so as to save money on fabric, in keeping with the general trend in European military fashion away from the long tails and voluminous sleeves which had been popular in the early 18th century. Other cost-saving features included the narrow false cuffs, the small front lapel, the use of undyed wool ("natural black" for the coat, plain white for the waistcoat and breeches), and a lack of any dyed inner coat lining. Only the cuffs, lapels, and collar of the coat required dye (although sometimes the "natural black" coat was further darkened with an inexpensive gall dye).

This rather conventional and austere uniform was mainly notable for the choice of headgear. The tricorne had been the dominant military hat on the continent since the late 17th century, but in the mid-1760s the Austrians had officially adopted the kaskett, a round leather cap with a false front, as the standard headgear for all line infantry. Baron Lockhart assured the skeptical ministry that while the leather kaskett was more expensive than a cloth tricorne, it symbolized a “modern” army and would actually save money in the long run as it would not need to be replaced as often. The Corsican caschetto bore a tombac plate embossed with the royal cipher (“TR” for Theodorus Rex surrounded by laurel branches and surmounted by a crown). Tricornes continued to be worn by commissioned officers.[7]

The uniforms of the royal guard units retained a somewhat more “French” look with larger cuffs and no lapels, but some changes were made under the influence of the 1767 uniform (including a shorter coat). The Royal Dragoons were compelled to adopt the 1767 uniform but resisted the caschetto, which they deemed both impractical and demeaning (as it was “infantry” headgear). They retained their French-style dragoon forage caps.


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Spanish M1757 Infantry Musket


Weaponry

The arms ordinances of the 1767 Establishment must be seen as highly aspirational. Although the Corsican government had a substantial hoard of smuggled and captured small arms on hand at the end of the Revolution, a survey of government arsenals in the wake of the French occupation painted a grim picture - the small arms were of obsolete designs and mismatched calibers, and many were unsafe or inoperable owing to poor maintenance, heavy wear, or missing parts. The best specimens were given to the royal guard, while the dragoons not infrequently had to - or preferred to - use their own personal firearms.

Such was the inadequacy of this stockpile that the navy felt it necessary to purchase 300 “reconditioned” Dutch muskets in 1763 to equip its sailors. These were older surplus muskets from government arsenals which were purchased by private gunsmiths and refurbished for export. This particular batch had barrels which were reinforced with brass bands and cut down by several inches to make them more durable and less awkward to use on a ship. Another purchase of reconditioned Dutch weapons was made by the army in 1767, but this shipment seems to have been less than satisfactory given a complaint by Minister di Mari that the Dutch vendors had sent them the same quality of guns “which I am told they trade to the Africans.”

“Modern” weaponry was introduced only in 1769, when the ministry purchased 250 brand new muskets from the Spanish government. The Spanish “M1757” musket was heavily influenced by French muskets, which had always been held in high esteem by the naziunali and comprised some of the best pieces in Corsican arsenals. The M1757 had a somewhat fragile lock, but was otherwise considered to be well-engineered, reliable, and accurate (for a musket). Initially intended only for the royal guard and the infantry grenadiers, these weapons proved so popular that the ministry soon began “manufacturing” them domestically. This involved importing barrels and locks from abroad and contracting Corsican gunsmiths to assemble the finished product. The result, known to modern firearms historians as a “Bastia musket” (as they were proofed and marked at the royal armory in Bastia), was a virtual clone of the M1757 albeit with a beech stock instead of the more expensive walnut. No carbine version was produced in this period, as the M1757 was already somewhat short for an infantry musket and the army deemed it suitable for dragoon use.

Footnotes
[1] Prince Federico’s militarism went further than most; he was inclined to see Corsica’s military tradition as a resource no less valuable than olives, wine, or timber, which might be profitably employed in the manner of the “mercenary” principalities of Germany. This was not on the table in the 1760s, but it served Federico’s interest to support the creation of an army which he might one day utilize as Theodore’s successor.
[2] Count Innocenzo was appointed to the ministry in 1762 at the age of 45. His father, Brandimarte “Brandone” di Mari, was a notable from the Castagniccian village of Taglio who served as one of the Dodici (the advisory council of Corsica under Genoese rule). When the rebellion broke out Brandimarte defected to the insurgents almost immediately, and was one of the leaders of the first rebel attack on Bastia in 1730. Upon Theodore’s arrival in 1736, Brandimarte rallied to the king’s banner and was made a hereditary knight and a colonel. Theodore later elevated him to the dignity of count and awarded him with the Order of the Redemption. His son Innocenzo, who was 19 years old at the time of Theodore’s coronation, fought at Borgo and San Pellegrino and led a company of Tavagnese militiamen at the final siege of Bastia.
[3] It is unclear exactly how Lockhart came to the attention of the Corsican war ministry, but the influence of the “Jacobite network” seems likely. Scottish and Irish exiles, most of them either Jacobites or descendants of Jacobite families, were prominent in both the Austrian army and Theodore’s royal guard.
[4] It must be emphasized that the troop numbers used by the 1767 Establishment were on paper only. All 18th century armies were under-strength in peacetime, and the Corsican army was no exception, although its numbers were limited more by available funds than problems recruiting. The actual strength of the regiment of infantry seems to have hovered around 400 soldiers.
[5] A “trabant,” meaning “satellite” or “companion,” was a bodyguard of a landsknecht officer. From the 16th century the name began to be applied to the bodyguards of princes, most famously the Swedish Drabanten of Gustav Vasa. In the 18th century certain ceremonial palace guard units of Sweden, Bavaria, Saxony, and various small German states still retained the name. The Grand Dukes of Tuscany were protected by a unit of German/Swiss Trabanti until the end of Medici rule in 1737.
[6] Small and inelegant, the native paganacciu would have been laughably out of place in a continental cavalry unit but was well-suited to the duties of the Royal Dragoons. The short and plain-looking Corsican horse did not impress many foreign observers, but the Corsicans appreciated their strong, compact frames, their resistance to fatigue, their “valorous” character, and their incredible surefootedness. This last trait is best illustrated by the accounts of French officers during the First Intervention. “The Corsicans atop their ponies,” one officer wrote after an encounter with some mounted naziunali, “charged at us across terrain we could not even walk over.” Another marvelled at a Corsican horse which “galloped down a steep hill on which one of our own horses would have killed itself a hundred times over.”
[7] Another “Austrianism” introduced by Lockhart was the feldzeichen (“field sign”), a sprig of leaves (for the Austrians, oak in summer and fir in winter) affixed to the hats of Austrian soldiers to distinguish their own troops from those of other white-coated armies. This was not really a problem for the black-coated Corsicans, but nevertheless Lockhart had his regiment wear a feldzeichen of laurel during field exercises (possibly as a nod to the “laurel crown” of King Theodore). This “rametto d’alloro” caught on and became something of a symbol of the infantry.

Timeline Notes
[A] James Lockhart was a real person who apparently did go all the way from Scotland to Persia, enlisted in the army of Nader Shah, and then came back to Europe to start a very successful career in the Austrian army. “Jakob von Lockhart” was eventually made a major general and a count of the empire, and died in 1790. He was the possessor of the “Lee Penny,” a magical amulet acquired by an ancestor while crusading in Spain which was said to have phenomenal healing powers, and kept it in a golden snuffbox given to him by Maria Theresa. Among other exploits, he is claimed to have held a fake funeral for his (still living) brother in order to cheat British inheritance laws; the casket was full of stones.
 
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[1] Prince Federico’s militarism went further than most; he was inclined to see Corsica’s military tradition as a resource no less valuable than olives, wine, or timber, which might be profitably employed in the manner of the “mercenary” principalities of Germany. This was not on the table in the 1760s, but it served Federico’s interest to support the creation of an army which he might one day utilize as Theodore’s successor.
Corsican mercenary units? I wonder how that might work out in later conflicts...
 
Might make a nice little earner. On the home front, maybe promote literacy by ensuring soldiers can read and write as part of their training? Purely to ensure they can follow written orders, natch. Might also add to the prestige of joining up.
 
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This was quite the pleasure to read, great update, have to love the research that goes into a piece like this with so much detail on just military organization.
 
Awesome to see the traditions forming. I wonder if this could mean that, should the Kingdom of Corsica persist into the modern age, I Trabanti will remain a foreign legion? And if in a more modern Corsica, 'Dragoni' might be the title of SWAT teams or suchlike?

It's been 30 years now.
 
I always love seeing a good breakdown of the uniforms and such!

What can I say, I'm a sucker for 18th century uniforms. I should probably add that my own uniforms are based on templates from Not by Appointment, a resource for uniforms and standards of the Seven Years War.

Awesome to see the traditions forming. I wonder if this could mean that, should the Kingdom of Corsica persist into the modern age, I Trabanti will remain a foreign legion?

This is one of those things that, historically, didn't survive the advent of nationalism. Foreign guards (particularly Swiss) were very common in the 18th century, and nobody really took issue with them; having a professional guard of disinterested foreigners was both practical and a symbol of royal status. In the post-Napoleonic era, however, foreign guards began to seem tyrannical and unpatriotic. If our king loves us, why doesn't he trust us with his life? Does the think these foreigners are better than us? Is he afraid of his own people? Over the course of the 19th century, most of these foreign regiments either disappeared or were opened to non-foreigners and transformed into "native" units. AFAIK the Pontifical Swiss Guard is the only remaining example (Yes, the French Foreign Legion exists, but they're not a guard unit).

The Corsicans were clearly typical for their era; the 1736 constitution insisted on an all-Corsican army but specifically made an exception for the "guard of the king." I suspect that they simply saw this as a normal part of 18th century kingship; of course a king has a foreign guard, that's just how kings roll. If history is any guide, however, that attitude is unlikely to last forever. It is possible that the "Trabants" survive as a unit - Sweden still has a ceremonial Trabant Guard today - but they are much less likely to remain a foreign unit.
 
The Corsicans were clearly typical for their era; the 1736 constitution insisted on an all-Corsican army but specifically made an exception for the "guard of the king." I suspect that they simply saw this as a normal part of 18th century kingship; of course a king has a foreign guard, that's just how kings roll. If history is any guide, however, that attitude is unlikely to last forever. It is possible that the "Trabants" survive as a unit - Sweden still has a ceremonial Trabant Guard today - but they are much less likely to remain a foreign unit.
So, no chance for a Corsican Foreign Legion?

Though considering the fact that Napoleon's been butterflied away, surely the post-Napoleonic era is changed enough that such a change might not happen. Especially if the clannish politics persist in Corsica, the foreign guard units might stay...
 
I don't know the exact order of the next few updates yet, but one of them is going to be another "survey of European politics" chapter as we careen towards another Anglo-Bourbon war. Such a conflict seems highly likely to me by the end of the 1760s. Carlos III is worried about Britain, and - unlike in OTL - Spain was neutral and left untouched by the most recent European war. Historically Louis XV was very reluctant to get involved in another conflict with Britain, which is why he backed away from the Falklands Crisis in 1770 - but because the Four Years' War was shorter than OTL's Seven Years' War, presumably France's finances are in better shape and Louis might be more easily persuaded to help his Spanish cousin. I have not, however, settled on a precise trigger yet - the Falklands would be the traditional choice, but there were plenty of other colonial disputes that could have gone hot in this time period. Corsica is going to have to watch out.

At present, the only big lingering question for me on the continent is the fate of Russia. Peter III will at least be around long enough to get us a little Russo-Danish war, but I'm still debating whether I want Catherine to still coup him eventually or leave Peter on the throne. The former, being closer to OTL, will presumably be easier for me to deal with, particularly since I am not at all well-versed in Russian politics and history. That said, we're already well and truly off the rails here with Prussia's defeat and Poland's consolidation, so it's not as if Catherine's reign will be the same even if she attains her historical place.

Having reread the timeline (it was great), my thoughts about a potential Danish-Russian War would be something like this.

Offer Brandenburg Nørrejylland (North Jutland) and Funen this would serve the Prussians as a replacement for East Prussia (population roughly 500.000) and would be a territory outside Germany, which they could claim as a sovereign state/kingdom, bring the Swedes aboard by offering them Norway.

In general I expect the Swedes to be rather useless at this point in history, but it forces Denmark to keep more soldiers in Norway. Brandenburg would on the other hand be a far greater danger for Denmark.

I expect that Denmark will economic support and military advisers from France and UK (as neither have a interest in a Russian victory), but I expect neither want to join the war.

Military the Danish navy will dominate, but united the Russian-Brandenburgian armies will outmatch Denmark, Denmark could likely take on Brandenburg on it own, while Russia suffer from horrible logistic in waging war against Denmark, but together they will be very problematic. Denmark will likely rent the Hessian armies, de facto making them Danish allies. Austria have no interest in either alienate Russia or letting them win. So the question is whether they can find someone to serve as a Austrian proxy in helping the Danes (maybe Charles Theodore elector of Palatinate and later elector of Bavaria, against him being promised the Hohenzollern possessions in Westphalia and the Rhineland).
 
Having reread the timeline (it was great), my thoughts about a potential Danish-Russian War would be something like this.

Interesting thoughts. The involvement of Brandenburg and Sweden, I think, is the key issue. Although they seem like plausible Russian partners, neither is in a very good strategic or political situation at the moment.

As I recall, Peter III did try to interest Sweden in his war and offered them Norway, but the Swedes were not in a position to accept. The "Pomeranian War" with Prussia had just come to a ruinous end, leaving Sweden with nothing to show for a huge amount of money spent and thousands of lives lost. The government was broke and facing a crisis of confidence at home. TTL's Pomeranian war was shorter, presumably less costly, and was actually "successful" in a strict sense (the Swedes performed rather poorly but managed to get Usedom and Wollin in the peace treaty), so one could argue that they are in a better position to fight another war. This actually makes war less likely, however, because a "success" in Pomerania will presumably bolster the Hats party then in power, which was pro-French and anti-Russian. Under such leadership, an alliance with Peter intended to expand Russian power in the Baltic seems very unlikely, even if Norway is offered as an inducement.

With Brandenburg, the issue is how long the postwar recovery is going to be. While the electorate remains in the top tier of German states, its core territories have been ravaged, its army is presumably in a shambles, and the state itself is under a minority regency. A Russo-Brandenburger defensive alliance is an eminently sensible idea, but it may be some years before Brandenburg is really prepared to launch another major offensive war. Your scenario seems more plausible a bit further in the future, after Brandenburg recovers its strength, but I'm not sure if Peter has that kind of patience. Additionally, we're making an assumption here that Brandenburg's leadership will continue to be ambitious and aggressive. Frederick's campaign of aggrandizement came to a disastrous and ignoble end ITTL, and his young successor might not be too eager to follow in his footsteps with a war of naked conquest against a neighbor. Not every Hohenzollern is Frederick, after all.

As a side note, I think Britain is very unlikely to offer any help to Denmark beyond diplomatic support. Britain's foreign policy is in a severe crisis right now, as with Austria's defection and Prussia's defeat they are left without any significant continental ally. Russia is their great hope for a new friend on the continent (as it was historically), and I suspect the British are unlikely to do anything that might damage prospects for an alliance. Giving material aid to Russia's enemy definitely qualifies.
 
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