Not Whip, but in 81 he became Chair of the GOP Conference. We’ll get caught up on leadership elections soon though!
All right then, well if they're ends up being any major shake-ups in the GOP leadership, here are some suggestions:

Arlan Stangeland from Minnesota
Bud Shuster from Pennsylvania
Ed Derwinski from Illinois
Thomas B. Evans Jr. from Delaware
Gene Snyder from Kentucky
Don Young from Alaska
Dan Quayle from Indiana
Stewart McKinney from Connecticut
Joel Pritchard from Washington
Floyd Spence from South Carolina
Marjorie Holt from Maryland
Bill Young from Florida
Henson Moore from Louisiana
 

Deleted member 145219

Agreed. I miss the author of of Spirit of ‘76 and his TL’s.
In Spirit of 76 and a couple of Rouge Beavers RFK timelines, RFK takes Bill Clinton under his wing. Carter in some ways attempted to move the Democrats towards something similar to what RFK wanted, or at least an interpretation of it. So here Carter, the ideological successor to RFKs movement has taken Clinton under his wing.
 
In Spirit of 76 and a couple of Rouge Beavers RFK timelines, RFK takes Bill Clinton under his wing. Carter in some ways attempted to move the Democrats towards something similar to what RFK wanted, or at least an interpretation of it. So here Carter, the ideological successor to RFKs movement has taken Clinton under his wing.
I don’t know much about RFK but I was under the impression he was far more economically liberal than Carter. Social issues they seem similar
 
I don’t know much about RFK but I was under the impression he was far more economically liberal than Carter. Social issues they seem similar
Yeah, from the way I’ve heard it, RFK in 1968 was campaigning on the first indicators of what we now know as neoliberalism. Of course, it wasn’t as destructive as the Reagan/GOP kind, but it presented a break with the then standard liberal economics.

There’s a reason that some people considere Nixon to be the last (small l) liberal President.
 
WHITE SMOKE

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“The difference between Carter and Kennedy: Carter has this vague religion which he believes in strongly, while Kennedy has this strong religion which he believes in vaguely.”
-Gene McCarthy​


April 2, 1981
A few miles outside San Diego, CA


He might have looked out of place in a suit if it weren’t for the fact that the president never travels alone. Jody Powell was there, also in jacket and tie, trailing behind the president, donning aviators and looking down with annoyance as the grass brushed against his recently-shined shoes. They were in the middle of a field in southern California to make an announcement.

Carter thought it was going to be the peak of his presidency — a chance to shift the debate. Powell wasn’t as sure. That’s what he thought about putting them on the roof of the White House.

Carter had chosen a vast empty field as his setting to address the nation. The advance men had brought out a podium carrying the presidential seal. Reporters crowded around. Carter was flanked by members of Congress and that ever elusive Jerry Brown. He was going to explain the importance of solar energy to the American people, and he was going to prove that he’d been right last year when he fought Congress and won the windfall profits tax.

“In my first term,” Carter began, “I said that our confrontation with energy consumption was the ‘moral equivalent of war.’ Some in the press mocked the idea. I believe that the incidents of the last twelve months have proven I was correct in my assessment.

“A year ago today, I signed the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980. The tax served multiple purposes. It will help us balance our budget before I leave office in 1985, and it will also help us to invest in the renewable energies that will be needed to reduce our dependence on oil and protect our environment.

“You’re probably wondering why I’m standing in a big empty field.” Carter laughed at his own joke. Some in the press cohort chuckled, too. Most of them were just sweating in the South California heat.

“I’m here because over the next year-and-a-half these many acres will be converted from an empty to field to a solar farm. Private companies, supported by the revenue generated through the windfall profit tax, will begin installing solar panels as far as we can see from our vantage point here, and that production will create jobs, and once its completed, this farm will produce energy, and that energy will not only lower the electricity costs for those here in Southern California, it will also reduce our nation’s dependence on foreign oil.

“This is the potential that our country has. It is incumbent upon all of us to help us reach it.” Carter nodded and thanked everyone for coming out. No questions. Charles Duncan, the Energy Secretary, standing behind Carter, applauded. So did the gaggle of White House staffers. The reporters folded up their notebooks, the cameramen broke down their tripods, and together they trudged back to the vans.

• • •​

One of the crowning accomplishments of Carter’s first term in office was the National Energy Act. The legislation had undergone many forms, but the final bill, which passed in October 1978 by a single vote in the U.S. House of Representatives, altered the way the nation approached energy. Not only did it create a cabinet-level Department of Energy, but it also sought to reduce the nation’s dependence on oil. It implemented penalties on the production of fuel inefficient vehicles, it raised the efficiency standards for home appliances, it gave tax incentives to the wind and solar power industries, and it included the Power Plant and Industrial Fuel Use Act, which prohibited new power plants that were powered by oil or natural gas, and it was this provision that sparked the most controversy.

President Carter often faced policy dilemmas that acted against his values. His compassion and Christianity led him to support government programs that helped the poor and improved the quality of life for all Americans, but the realities of inflation superseded these tendencies. Instead, he was committed (detractors would say obsessed) with balancing the budget instead of implementing liberal spending programs to help the needy. In a similar vein, his environmentalism was challenged by the nation’s dependence on oil, which Carter believed to be a national security threat and an economic one. And so, the Power Plant and Industrial Fuel Use Act, had the unintended consequence of biasing new power plants towards coal as opposed to alternative energy sources favored by environmentalists.

Carter did not concern himself with such matters in his first term. He understood that coal was not ideal for the environment, but at the time the National Energy Act became law it was the most logical choice to get the nation to curb its dependence on oil. As he saw it, there was no choice. He had to kick the country’s addiction to oil, and coal was the easiest way to do that.

Now, with four more years in the White House, environmentalists, who believed they had a friend in Carter, approached the administration about moving beyond coal.

Jordan was unconcerned with their demands. The National Energy Act had already provided tax incentives to wind and solar power, and they were using the money from the windfall profits tax to expand research and development for these alternative energies. Carter’s trip to San Diego had helped to underscore the point.

Eizenstat had been intimately involved in the back-and-forth over Carter’s energy bill in the first term, and soon enough Anne Wexler went to him and reported what she was hearing from the environmentalists. Now that Carter had a second term, they expected the White House to push beyond coal. Politically, Eizenstat found the entire issue untenable. West Virginia was one of the Democratic Party’s most reliable states in the Electoral College and Robert Byrd, its Senator, led the Senate Democratic Caucus. A War on Coal would go nowhere politically and only burn bridges. Wexler understood the politics, but she also believed that environmentalists represented an important tenet of the Democratic voting bloc. If they sat home, it could mean the difference between winning and losing states like California.

In the early months of 1981, appeasing the environmentalists aligned with another duty of the Carter White House: helping Democratic members of Congress who didn’t survive the 1980 elections. One of them was Mike McCormack, who narrowly lost his Washington seat. McCormack, who looked every bit the professorial sort who would be a leading voice on nuclear energy, came asking for a job, but unlike others who needed political appointments, he had a title and job description prepared: White House Nuclear Energy Czar.

McCormack was focused on the energy crisis and was building a pro-fusion caucus in the Congress that was focused on steering resources to a new type of nuclear energy development, fusion instead of fission. McCormack thought that fusion energy, safer than the current fission technology, was the next frontier in sustainable energy development, and he believed that if the White House deputized someone to steer money and other resources that way, the United States could become a global leader on the issue.

It helped that he was already a White House ally. In the 1970s, he’d led the effort to convert the United States to the metric system, which President Ford signed into law. Carter had supported the issue as well and overseen the conversion of road signs to include distance in kilometers.

After several meetings, Eizenstat drafted a memorandum for the president in which he laid out the case for research and development support for the fusion energy effort. Carter, a nuclear engineer in his earlier life, believed in the promise of the technology, and, reading through the memo in his private study, checked off the line next to “Yes” — he wanted to appoint McCormack as his Nuclear Energy Czar in hopes of directing resources towards fusion development. [1]

• • •​

In December of 1980, Carter signed one of the most important pieces of environmental legislation ever passed in American history, the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act. The new law resolved one of the greatest dramas of the president’s first term in office.

A law passed during the Nixon administration to address oil exploration and production in Alaska was set to expire in 1978. When the bill lapsed, some 45 million acres of the Last Frontier would be opened for oil development. The state’s senators Ted Stevens and Mike Gravel blocked bipartisan legislation that passed the House of Representatives to protect the land. Carter moved forward with a controversial but legal employ of executive power. Using the Antiquities Act, he declared the land a National Park and prevented it from being opened for development.

The executive order had been a major blow to oil and gas companies that hoped to use the land for production.

After Carter’s decision, Alaska Senator Ted Stevens began negotiations with the White House to open much of the state up for oil and gas development while preserving the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge and other areas of the state. Carter was not wholly opposed to oil and gas development in Alaska, but he opposed any expansions that jeopardized key environmental areas, such as ANWR.

The final legislation, which Carter signed, protected 157 million acres of land while opening oil and gas exploration along the Alaskan coast and some 90 percent of state land. [2]


April 14, 1981
The White House — Washington, DC


If the president wanted a meeting, it was important to go. Russell Long believed in this, as he did a long list of maxims that governed Washington, DC. He knew that the president was considering taking up the mantle of healthcare reform, and he knew that the president was going to ask him for his help. Long believed that the agreement they came to in 1979 was a good framework for universal coverage and the kind of sensible legislation that would help everyday Americans. He was not eager to spend the next year ahead of the midterm elections re-hashing a freshly-scabbed wound. In fact, he thought it would only lead to an electoral disaster that would resolve itself only with a Republican-controlled Senate.

He intended to say as much to the president.

When he arrived in the Oval Office, he stuck out his arm and shook the president’s hand. “It’s good to see you, Mister President. Good to see you.”

“Senator, come in,” the president said. He was on a first-name basis with some members, like his friend Joe Biden, but he was always deferential to Long.

They took their seats on opposite sofas, and Carter explained that Kennedy had come back to the White House with encouraging news about taking up healthcare reform. He mentioned Kennedy’s comment that labor was now willing to negotiate.

“I hear ya, Mister President, and I understand your desire to get a bill passed, but we have to consider the electoral ramifications here,” Long said. “You are asking us to take on an issue that has never been easy —”

“Before you go any further,” Carter interrupted, “I am not asking you to do anything other than share your opinion about the viability of passing a health insurance reform package in this Congress.”

“Well, thank you for that, Mister President, because that’s what I want to say. If we take this on, we are going to spend eight months fighting with one another and very likely not passing anything. I am unsure that this is the right moment for this kind of legislation.”

Carter nodded, but he also didn’t have any more elections to win. He decided to reframe the issue from one of a dragged-out process to a speedy reform.

“I’ve indicated to Senator Kennedy that I am not willing to craft a plan different from the one proposed in the summer of 1979. Stu has explained to him all of the work that went into that bill — the work you and I did with Abe and others. We’re not going back to square one. I’m willing to make adjustments as needed, particularly to the timetable for phased expansion, but I am not willing to start from scratch. Ted knows that.”

Long nodded. “Mister President, it is still healthcare reform. We cannot get it done in less than six months.”

“I would like to see it done by Thanksgiving.”

Long nodded. He’d expected as much. “If labor is going to —”

“Senator, I agree with you. I’m not interested in rehashing the same talking points from every special interest group. But if I can get an assurance from Kennedy and labor that they will come to the table in earnest, and I can get Stu here to hammer out a framework for discussions, are you willing to join us?”

Long paused as he considered the question, and so Carter continued, “Senator, we cannot pass this reform without you. It’s that simple.” The president stood up from his sofa, and Long hastily scrambled to his feet. When the president stood, nobody sat. “I think we may have our chance at last. My reelection, and Kennedy’s performance in the primary, has underscored where the electorate is on this issue, and Kennedy knows that the deal we presented him is the best chance at reform.

“I understand your hesitations,” the president continued. “I have them, too. Our economy is in a precarious position, and I’m loathe to prolong the kind of deficit spending that has produced inflation. But I also know that this may be the Democratic Party’s last opportunity to deliver on this issue for twenty or thirty years.”

Long nodded. “I understand, Mister President. I am not willing to go down this road unless we know for certain that Senator Kennedy is acting in good faith. We cannot afford another expense of political capital that yields nothing but bad headlines.”

“And I agree,” Carter said, smiling. He put his arm around Long as they walked back towards the door. “But it’s good to know that if we can get some kind of a framework together —”

“I will get the votes from my wing of the Party if Kennedy gets them from his. And he better tell labor to sit down.”

“And I agree,” the president repeated.

Long thanked the president for his time and left. Back in the Oval Office, Carter and Eizenstat talked more about what the president wanted to see in the final package.

“Go back to Kennedy and get him to the table,” the president said.


April 22, 1981
Russell Senate Office Building — Washington, DC


Carter may have pushed Senator Long towards the table, but his position was nearly identical to the senator’s. He, too, was not willing to wager such political capital only to see another attempt at healthcare legislation go down in defeat. Eizenstat well understood Carter’s hesitancies about the politics of pushing for reform. He also understood that the president was just as influenced by the economic conditions and the federal budget. If healthcare legislation was going to pass, Eizenstat needed to establish a set of basic understandings with Kennedy, and that was his goal as he headed to the Hill to meet with the Bay State Senator.

Eizenstat began the meeting with a run-down of the president’s meeting with Long. The Finance Chairman, Eizenstat explained, was willing to come to the table, but he also insisted that the conversations center on the 1979 proposal and build out from there. Kennedy agreed, and he insisted that he’d been clear about that in his conversation with labor.

“I think if we can get concessions from the White House on the manner in which universal coverage is phased-in, we can come to an agreement on this,” the Senator said optimistically.

Eizenstat understood, but he also reiterated the president’s insistence on a hospital cost containment bill. Carter believed excessive medical costs were one of the foundational causes of the current stagflation crisis, and he was not willing to pass any kind of reform of the insurance industry if Congress did not first pass a cost containment bill.

Kennedy did not agree with the president’s priority of the cost containment bill, but he also knew that there was no hope for reform without it. Nor did he harbor any ideological objections to it.

The hospital industry successfully killed Carter’s bill for cost containment in 1979 under the promise of a voluntary effort, but the hospitals had largely abandoned serious action to curb costs since the bill died. Kennedy believed that those realities had changed the calculations in Washington, and he hoped that they may be able to get more support for the cost containment legislation now that time had passed.

Kennedy lamented that the hospital bill would still face issues in the House, where the Ways and Means Committee had been notoriously unhelpful during the first term. Eizenstat explained that the politics of that were changing as well. One of the key vote last time had been Wyche Fowler, a Georgia Congressman. But the mayoral race in Atlanta was looking increasingly good for Andrew Young and John Lewis, a Black civil rights leader in Fowler’s district, was poised to gain a spot on the City Council. In recent days, Lewis had begun making mention of a potential primary challenge to Fowler if the Congressman did not deliver on key issues for the Democratic Party’s liberal base. Fowler had since indicated to the White House that he may be open to a hospital cost containment bill.

Fowler was an important vote, but he was not the most influential. One significant setback for the legislation was the elevation of Don Rostenkowski to the Ways and Means chairmanship. In 1979, Rostenkowski dealt the Carter administration a major blow when he sided with the American Hospital Association in putting forth the voluntary measures aimed at cost containment. The new Carter/Kennedy alliance would need to find a way around Rostenkowski’s influence if they were going to pass the cost containment bill.

As for the broader reform package, Kennedy and Eizenstat agreed on several areas of discussion for a future meeting between the president and Congressional leaders. They also set a date: May 19th. As fate would have it, neither Carter nor Kennedy would be in Washington that day.


May 13, 1981
St. Peter’s Square — Vatican City


Pope John Paul II rode through St. Peter’s Square in a customized Fiat which allowed him to shake hands and perform blessings as he traveled through a crowd. May 13th was no different as the Pope, donning all white, made his way through the Square, oblivious to the dangers that swirled around him.

Mehmet Ali Ağca and his partner Oral Çelik were waiting in the Square, ready to open fire on the Pope. They even carried a small explosive device with them, which they hoped would create enough chaos for them to flee the scene without arrest. They waited patiently for the Pope to get close to them.

When he came near enough, Ağca got off his first shot. It struck the Pope in his stomach and he began to lean forward in pain. Noticing the success of Ağca’s first shot, Çelik successfully got off a shot of his own, striking the Pope in the chest. The bullet struck the Pope’s heart and he collapsed immediately. He was dead.

Shrieks rang out through the Square as the assassins snuck through the crowd to make their escape. Camillo Cibin, the chief of the Vatican security, pursued them, but Çelik detonated the explosion. Eleven others died from the bomb, and the assassins were able to escape in the chaos, just as they had predicted.

The assassins then began their trek to the Bulgarian Embassy, about four kilometers away, where they hoped to find refuge from the global manhunt they predicted.

En route to the embassy, a nervous Çelik jeopardized their escape. A police officer, noticing the haste with which they were running away from the scene, confronted the men. Çelik shot the police officer twice, drawing attention to them. A group of bystanders who were rushing to the square to help after hearing the explosion heard the shots and saw the men sprinting away from the dead police officer. They chased after the assassins, forcing them into the street where a car struck Çelik, killing him instantly. Ağca avoided the car but soon found himself pushed to the ground from the group of bystanders who kept him there until police were able to put him under arrest.

News of the assassination and bombing spread quickly, and in Washington, Watson informed the president in the Oval Office. Carter was devastated at the display of such violence. He himself had already survived an assassination attempt. What is happening to the world? Carter thought to himself.

Eizenstat quickly noticed the politics of what was happening. “You need to call Senator Kennedy,” he said, “and deliver him the news yourself.” It was the kind of display of presidential humility that had been lacking from the Carter White House in the first term. Eizenstat saw an opportunity for the president to make a genuine gesture towards Kennedy, a devout Catholic who would be devastated by the news. Carter said he couldn’t be bothered, but Eizenstat pressed him, and the president gave in.

He placed a phone call to the Senator and delivered the news himself. Kennedy was immensely grateful for the personal call, and Carter asked Kennedy to join him at the funeral when the arrangements were prepared by the Vatican. Kennedy, touched by the invitation, thanked the president.


May 19, 1981
Air Force One — Over the Atlantic Ocean


On May 19, 1981, the world gathered for the funeral of Pope John Paul II. That night, Carter, Kennedy, and the rest of the entourage returned home to the United States aboard Air Force One. It had been a long day, and Carter was having trouble falling asleep, so he went outside his cabin and started to pace the plane. He saw Ted Kennedy slipping Rosary Beads into his pocket, and the president invited him back to his cabin for a conversation.

It began slowly enough. Awkward pleasantries about their families. Carter wasn’t sure how to ask about Kennedy’s — he was well aware of the divorce. Exhaustion weighed down on both men, even though neither could get to sleep, and it suppressed their inhibitions just enough for Carter to turn back and face Kennedy after staring out the window for a minute or so. He asked, “What was today like for you?”

“I’m sorry, Mr. President?”

“Well, I’m not a Catholic,” Carter reminded Kennedy. “I was just wondering what today — laying a Pope to rest. What did that feel like? To you?”

The question caught Kennedy off guard. Not in the way that Mudd’s had. Most people assumed Ted didn’t know the answer to that question. It wasn’t that. It was more that Kennedy had too much he wanted to say. Too many policies to pass. Too many ideas to turn into bills to sign into laws. He’d been overwhelmed. So, he’d just shut down.

But this question — Kennedy really hadn’t considered it before. What did it feel like? He thought about that for a moment. “I suppose it’s hard to put into words.” He bit his lip for a moment longer. “I appreciate the invitation. It was an honor, Mr. President.”

That wasn’t what Carter had meant. Damnit, where’s this man’s soul? The president looked out the window. At the stars. He thought of Romeo & Juliet — the part Bobby Kennedy quoted in his convention speech in ’64.

Without thinking, Carter let the words trickle out: “When he shall die take him and cut him out into stars and he shall make the face of heaven so fine that all the world will be in love with night and pay no worship to the garish sun.”

“Mister President?”

“I’m sorry,” he said, turning to Kennedy. He noticed a glimmer in the corner of Kennedy’s eye. Carter looked away. He had meant the Senator no disrespect.

“I think that’s why today was so hard for me. To see what senseless violence could do to my brothers, to my country, and now … to my faith.” Kennedy let the words hang between them. “I was so shaken…” His voice trailed off. The sentence was left hanging — never to be completed.

“Did you question your own faith?” It was a remarkably personal question, but Carter was at ease. He’d spent many Sundays teaching the Bible. Discussing faith. He did not think about how those classes had been amongst fellow Baptists. How the Catholics, carrying the guilt of centuries, did not discuss, in the same way, the Bible and its teachings. They relied on a different code — a different religion and a different type of faith.

Kennedy bristled at the question before tentatively answering, “I did.” His voice betrayed his hesitation, a feeling he carried not because he was ashamed to admit it, but because this was a new thought for him and a new conversation for them. Just days earlier, he and Carter had no desire to answer each other’s phone calls. “I think we all — there are those moments…” His voice trailed off again. He searched for what he wanted to say. He wasn’t done speaking, just thinking. Carter noticed and sat patiently, looking into the Senator’s trembling lips as he fought to find the words.

“When Bobby died, I remember my mother cried out, ‘But how could they have taken the father of ten children?’ And what she meant, though she couldn’t bring herself to say it aloud, was, ‘How could God?’” [3]

Carter nodded as Kennedy continued: “My mother, the most devout and the persistent believer I have ever known — even she…” He didn’t need to say more.

The silence sat between them, Carter looking over Kennedy’s shoulder, imagining the pain he had felt. The pain Rose must have felt. And then Kennedy interrupted him: “And you, Mr. President? Have you ever — what Kierkegaard called ‘fear and trembling’ — have you ever been there?”

“Certainly,” he said with ease. He was an Evangelical. These conversations happened all the time. With each increasing hesitation of Kennedy’s, Carter was slowly reminded he was discussing faith with a Catholic. “The Hostage Crisis challenged me in a way I’d never been challenged before. I prayed more then than at any point in my entire life. And they were answered, but it was agonizing.”

Almost instinctually Kennedy replied with a cliche: “I can’t imagine what that must have been like.”

But surely, Carter thought, he must have tried. Kennedy ran against him for the presidency. He wanted to sit in the Oval Office, the Situation Room. He wanted to handle situations like the Hostage Crisis — or, at least, he’d asked the American people to let him. No president wants to handle such situations. But here he was offering a platitude that surely must have been devoid of meaning because the alternative was that his entire campaign had been devoid of meaning. Carter pondered what it all meant. What did it all meant to him? Why did he run?

Of course, Kennedy had struggled with that own question himself when he ran. Helped by drink, he gazed out at the night sky as Air Force One hurdled back to familiar shores. The water. He thought of the water below them — of the force with which it swallowed him, her, the vehicle whole. It was shallow, but it had been deep enough. The water began to fill the car, and he forced his way out. He emerged gasping for air. Swallowing hard with each breath. Panting in search of more air, of more life.

He’d stumbled back to the motel where he was staying, leaving Mary Jo Kopechne for dead. The memory struck him like an icepick to the spine. A jolted chill sped through his shoulders, his spine, his elbows and fingers. He clenched his eyes shut to force out the memory, and Carter noticed, for the first time, that the Senator was struggling. He averted his gaze.

When he turned back, his eyes met Kennedy’s. The president feared that Kennedy might jolt upright and leave the conversation, but he didn’t. He stayed and asked Carter another question, “Do, uh — doyaevah wondah why us?”

Carter started to answer, but Kennedy continued on: “I’ve made — uh — made mistakes in my life, and sometimes I wondah, why this was all meant for me? What did I do to, uh, to diiiisuuuuuhhhvvv —” He stopped there.

Carter didn’t agree with the insinuation behind the question. “I’ve come to realize the idea that we are saved by the grace of God through faith in Jesus Christ corrects the belief that we must do something good in order to earn God’s grace and love.” He let it sit between them. After all, he was raising the ancient disconnect between the Catholics and the other Christians. It was a disagreement over that core tenet of Carter’s faith — the idea of faith and works. What was their relationship? “We do not need to live a perfect life, nor even a morally decent one, to be loved and accepted by our Creator.” [4] So said the Baptist.

The Catholic paused. It did not take much time for him to begin shaking his head.

“No, no,” he began. “We have to live a virtuous life —”

“You mistake me,” Carter interrupted. “Of course we should, but faith brings about good works, but doing good things does not result in faith. And if we fail to do good works, we are loved by God nonetheless. It does not mean we should ignore His teachings, it just means we are allowed to fall short of them.” [5]

Kneeling at the altar, rosary in hand. Sitting in the box, a screen between him and the preacher. Bless me father for I have sinned…

Allowed. To fall short. Of them. Allowed to fall short of them. Allowed to fall short. Allowed.


Carter’s words were as foreign to Kennedy as Hinduism or Islam may have been. He squeezed his eyes shut and rubbed his face once more. Bless me father for I have sinned… Bless me father for I have…

And as the president watched his one-time rival rub his face, as if to wash away the guilt, it occurred to him — like a bridge emerging from a blur into a haunting focus — why the man across from him had run for president. It swallowed Carter whole, like the icy water of the Atlantic.

“Ted, I think…” but Carter’s voice trailed off. Even he wasn’t sure what to say.

Kennedy thought about leaving. Shifted uncomfortably in the chair. But then Carter spoke, taking the attention, which seemed almost permanently fixed on the man before him, and bringing it back so he could breathe: “When I was on that table — I wasn’t prepared then. I am now.”

“To die?”

“I am. It surprises me even now, but — yes. I am.”

Kennedy thought about the plane coming down into the Massachusetts soil. He shuddered.

“I don’t know that I am,” he admitted. “There’s so much left to do…” Again, his voice trailed off. But Carter wanted to know what it was he meant to say.

“Finish your thought,” he urged, as if he were back at Bible study. CCD, as a young Teddy may have called it.

“Uhh, you know our mothahs… I think they have shaped, in real ways, both of us…” Kennedy wasn’t sure why he was speaking for Carter, but the president was simply nodding and so Kennedy continued. “Well, when our fathah was away at work…” He was failing to finish any of his sentences.

Carter didn’t interrupt.

“Luke 12:48: ‘And to whomsoever much is given, of him shall much be required…’ Jack and Bobby did so much…” His voice trailed off again, but Carter didn’t need to hear anything else to understand.

The president nodded in agreement, his chin resting in his folded hand. He rubbed his chin with his index finger as if in thought. It really is that simple for him.

“So, I suppose I feel we have a lot of work left to do,” Kennedy said, standing up and ending what may have been among the most awkward conversations of his life. But when he returned to his seat, he looked out the window, and thought about how grateful he was to have had it.


May 28, 1981
St. Peter’s Basilica — Vatican City


Tradition dictates that smoke shall be emitted to tell the people the results of a ballot of the College of Cardinals. Black smoke indicates that the College failed to elect a pope. White smoke indicates that the Lord’s word has been heard and that a new pope has been elected.

At the May 1981 Conclave, the Cardinals were a college divided. It had taken eight ballots to make Karol Wojtyła Pope John Paul II when they last gathered. In October of 1978, when the cardinals met for their second conclave that year, they were divided between the archbishop of Genoa, Giuseppe Siri, a conservative, and the archbishop of Florence, Giovanni Benelli, a liberal. Though Benelli came close to the Papacy, his inability to win over conservatives denied him the chance and Wojtyła emerged as a compromise candidate.

According to the Catholic doctrine, the Pope was really chosen by God. He won because God, working through His Cardinals, scrawled the chosen name on the paper. He is considered a direct successor of Saint Peter. One does not arrive at the Papacy through politicking. At least, that’s the Church’s official story. In reality, the continuous balloting is not all that dissimilar from the process Republican and Democratic delegates performed at their conventions for more than a century. There are no noisemakers at the Papal Conclave. No long-winded nominating speeches. No voice from the sewer. No balloon drops. But there is the pressure to arrive at a consensus choice, and just as how the Democratic Party — long divided between the conservative South and the liberal base — forced this compromise through the two-thirds rule, the election of a pope required a two-thirds majority in order to be named Pope. It meant that the liberal wing of the Church and the conservative wing of the Church had to compromise.

Given the recent rapidity of conclaves, the dynamics of the 1978 conclaves were still very much in play just a few years later. The 1981 conclave was just as fraught with tension as the others had been.

For two days, once the first day, four times the second, black smoke gushed from the small chimney. There was no Pope. Once again, Benelli found himself near the Papacy. On the fifth ballot, he was just four votes shy. Those final votes, however, are always the hardest to win.

The cardinals adjourned that evening and went to their rooms to pray. The black smoke bellowed as the waiting crowd sighed in disappointed. Many thousands got on their knees and prayed. Let there be a Pope tomorrow, they asked the Lord. Those cardinals inside the conclave who most ardently supported Benelli believed that would secure the Papacy on the sixth ballot the next morning.

Part of Benelli’s success on the initial ballots stemmed from the fact that conservatives were divided on who they would support. Some voted for Giuseppe Siri, as they did in the October 1978 conclave. Others felt they needed a new candidate and they began to rally their votes behind Bernardin Gantin, Cardinal Bishop of Palestrina, who would have become the first Black pope.

It became clear to the conservatives that a new compromise candidate was needed, or there would be a rush to Benelli on the next ballot. In the dark of the night, they whispered to one another. A name passed from one Cardinal’s lip to another’s ear. It was shrouded in secrecy. It had to be. Some heard the name of the new candidate. Others heard only, “Stay firm. Do not give in. A compromise can be reached.” There was no Haley Barbour on the floor to stir mischief. There was no Roger Stone to count heads and report back to Benelli. There was only the delicate, invisible hand of God.

The next morning, when the cardinals gathered once more, they were handed their ballots — simple sheets of paper folded in the middle. On the top, it read “Eligo in Summum Pontificem,” I elect as Supreme Pontiff. The cardinals then wrote the name of their choice on a blank line on the bottom half of the ballot.

When the counting began, Benelli looked confident, but his smile soon dissipated. He had been through this process before and new what to look out for. To hear a new name — at this stage — could spell an inevitable, if long, road to a new compromise candidate. He wished so dearly that they had not adjourned last night. If they had only been in the Basilica for another vote, he could have won it through exhaustion, he believed. But after only a few ballots he heard the new name. Sebastiano Baggio.

Ballots bore Baggio’s name in conclaves past. He was an influential leader among the Cardinals — the Prefect of the Congregation of Bishops since 1973. He had prepared lists of candidates for the episcopacy from all around the globe, and he was responsible for assessing the work and conduct of existing bishops. [6] In that sense, he had yielded significant power and had many friends within the Conclave. He had not seriously considered the Papacy his destiny, but with a deadlocked group of Cardinals, it was natural that they would turn to someone to whom they all owed something.

Baggio had also shared Pope John Paul II’s views on Latin America. In fact, he was in the midst of disagreements within the Church over the unitary policy proposed for the region. It had been Baggio who who recommended that the late Archbishop Romero be stripped of his duties.

The Sixth ballot showed once more just how confused the October 1981 Conclave was. A new candidate was emerging, but Benelli held the most votes.

Sixth ballot, 1981 Papal Conclave
Giovanni Benelli … 72
Sebastiano Baggio … 20
Giuseppe Siri … 18
Bernardin Gantin … 2
Joseph Ratzinger … 2

Black smoke. They voted again.

Seventh ballot, 1981 Papal Conclave
Giovanni Benelli … 72
Sebastiano Baggio … 40
Giuseppe Siri … 1
Joseph Ratzinger … 1

Black smoke.

The cardinals looked around. Not a single Benelli vote had moved. Baggio was coalescing the opposition, but could they ever come to a final agreement? Many of the Latin American cardinals would not give in to the idea of Baggio, who had betrayed Romero and characterized their region of the Church, unfairly, they believed, as sympathetic to Marxism. If Baggio was the new conservative candidate, that was fine, but he would not be a compromise candidate.

They voted again, but the eighth ballot matched the seventh. They would vote just one more time that evening. Electing a pope seemed impossible.

Franz König, the Archbishop of Vienna, had played a key role in electing John Paul II. He was widely aware of all the tensions within the current College. There was a general unease permeating the group. They had assembled for the third time in three years. It was not a habit they wanted to make. There was pressure for a young pope. But the ideological beliefs had prevailed. The liberals hoped that Benelli, the most electable of their lot, would last long enough to appoint more cardinals to ensure a majority in future conclaves — even if those conclaves came sooner.

König knew that while Baggio may have been ideologically acceptable, he was not globally acceptable. The Latin American representatives would never vote for him, and those who were more liberal would not compromise to support him at the expense of their Latin American colleagues. Once more, the task of selecting a Pope fell to König. He did not say a word. He merely wrote out a new name for the ninth ballot.

Ninth ballot, 1981 Papal Conclave
Giovanni Benelli … 72
Sebastiano Baggio … 41
Basil Hume … 1

Black smoke. And a new name.

Basil Hume went to sleep that evening wondering the same question that all of his colleagues were wondering. Who wrote him down? And, perhaps more pressingly, Could there be an English Pope? An Englishman as the Heir to Saint Peter? It could not be, many reasoned. They would gather the next morning — for the third day of voting — and the conservatives would break. They had to. Until they didn’t.

Tenth ballot, 1981 Papal Conclave
Giovanni Benelli … 60
Basil Hume … 43
Sebastiano Baggio … 11

Black smoke. Benelli knew, however, that the next ballot would not yield the same result. A tear formed in his eye, and he brushed it away quickly. His dream denied. His fate sealed.

Eleventh ballot, 1981 Papal Conclave
Basil Hume … 99
Giovanni Benelli … 15

Habeas Papam. The Cardinals broke into applause and the ballots were burned with the chemicals needed to emit the right color smoke.

The anxious crowd gathered in St. Peter’s Square — the very place where just weeks earlier John Paul II was shot dead — erupted into cheers. Many broke into tears as they finally saw it at last.

White smoke.


June 1, 1981
California State Capitol Building — Sacramento, CA


Jerry Brown’s stomach growled. The quixotic young Governor of California had skipped breakfast. He was in the midst of his most torturous budget negotiations to date, and he had only just made up his mind about his political future. Two years ago, he announced a long shot bid to challenge Jimmy Carter for the Democratic nomination. His campaign went nowhere. Now, he was facing a question of whether to run for a third term as governor or try his hand at a campaign for the Senate. Neither option looked promising.

The Los Angeles Times had just published a story they thought might be the beginning of their own Watergate scandal. Brown had been using a computer — still a novelty at the time — to make a complete list of political supporters and then convert the names into a usable mailing list for political purposes. And he was using taxpayer dollars to do it. So the story went. And suddenly the same Jerry Brown who railed against corruption, who eschewed gifts and established a Fair Political Practices Commission to keep corruption out of government, found himself under investigation from said Commission. [7]

There was a lot weighing on the 44-year-old’s mind. He was dating Linda Ronstadt. The state’s surplus was disappearing before his eyes. He had gotten a heads up about an upcoming report from the CDC about a new pneumonia affecting gay men, particularly in the San Francisco area. Whatever that meant. And, now, pacing his office before a scheduled news conference, he was beginning to regret the announcement he was about to make.

The polls were grim for Brown. The budget debates and the Times investigation into the mailing list had brought his approval ratings down to their lowest number. Republicans continued to paint his administration as weak on crime, and now they’d accuse him of mismanaging the surplus and taking a Nixonian approach to public office. Polls showed him facing a humiliating defeat against Lieutenant Governor Mike Curb.

The other option — a Senate bid — was no better. At least not on paper. Senator Hayakawa had no political base to speak of, and it looked increasingly likely that he’d lose the Republican primary, possibly to Barry Goldwater, Jr, a Congressman and son of the conservative stalwart who just lost his own Senate bid in Arizona back in November of 1980. There was a palpable energy to Goldwater’s campaign, and polls showed him winning comfortably against Brown. It looked like no matter what Brown did, he’d go down in defeat — and his career would be over.

He considered not running for either spot and just running for president again in 1984. He’d had the support of popular figures in the Democratic Party during his last campaign. Jane Fonda was on board. Tom Hayden and Jesse Jackson, too. But Brown knew that running for president three times in a row would diminish his credibility. He also knew he was unlikely to win. So, for Jerry Brown, the path to a political future was winnowing, but the promise of life outside of politics was growing more alluring.

He enjoyed the life that came with being a politician — dating well-known actresses, models, and singers — women like Linda. She’d been with him throughout the presidential campaign, and he thought if they could survive that — well, who knew. Maybe she’d become Mrs. Brown. He thought about that earnestly. And he also wondered if maybe this wasn’t all for him. Maybe they were right about Jerry Brown. Maybe he was too weird for all of it.

But he also knew that he was Pat Brown’s son. He had to do something with his life, and he’d always been drawn to the grandeur of the office and the promise of the ballot. Governor? Senator? What could he do? Where would his future take him? Brown pondered it all again as he waited for his news conference.

When it came time, he marched out in a brown suit — one LA Times reporter thought it was a bit … weird of him — and marched into the room as bulbs flashed and reporters shoved microphones in his direction. What’s Jerry Brown about to do?

“Uh, thank you all for coming today. I’ll be brief. I just want to make an announcement.

“In recent days, I know, there’s been some question — uh, some have asked me what I intend to do in 1982. They’ve asked if I’ll seek a third term as governor, or perhaps run for Senate. I have listened to my friends and my family when weighing what the next step — the right step — is for me.

“And so, I’ve decided that the name ‘Jerry Brown’ will not appear on the ballot in November 1982. Not for Governor. Not for Senator. I’ll be a private man, living a private life, after eight years as your governor.”

The bulbs flashed again, and Brown squinted as he looked forward into their glare.

“I want to thank the people of California for the trust they’ve put in me over the last — uh — throughout my time here. Thank you. And I’ll take your questions now.”

The room erupted in shouts: Governor, governor! Governor! Governor Brown! They whirred by him in a dizzying storm. They wanted to know if it was because of Linda. They wanted to know if he’d called his father. What was happening with the budget negotiations? What about the list of political supporters? Was he admitting wrongdoing?

Brown answered their questions for half an hour, a handkerchief blotting his ever-more-present forehead. Then, he told them it was enough. “I’ve got to go,” he said, and off he went — out of the room, down the hall, out the doors, and out of the Capitol Building. Off went Jerry Brown into the tranquility of a private life. It was only a matter of time now.

Within minutes of hearing the news, some 87 miles southwest, the Mayor of San Francisco started calling her rolodex. She had a campaign to put together.


June 8, 1981
The White House — Washington, DC


The president decided it was time to bring the Congressional leaders together, at the White House, to decide whether or not healthcare reform was an issue to which they were committed. Carter was unwilling to stake his political capital and the success of his second term on legislation that Congressional Democrats wanted even less than he did. If they were going to pass something, they had to do it together, and they had to be on the same page from the beginning.

He had sensed in Kennedy a deep and genuine desire to get the legislation passed. Carter knew from press reports that the issue was real for Kennedy given his son’s cancer. But he saw Kennedy’s deep anguish on the night they returned home from Pope John Paul II’s funeral on Air Force One. He saw the guilt Kennedy carried from the mistakes he’d made in his life. In Carter’s eyes, Kennedy’s entire presidential campaign had been an exercise in one of Catholicism’s most peculiar traditions: confession.

He also saw in Kennedy the deep fear that he would not measure up to the legacies of his brothers, and in that fear, Carter believed, was the hope for compromise. There was no guarantee that Fritz Mondale would occupy Carter’s office in 1985, and there was no guarantee that he would have the kinds of Congressional majorities that Carter had at present. If liberals wanted to put the country on the path to universal healthcare reform, their best hope was to come to an agreement with Jimmy Carter — and if Ted Kennedy wanted to secure his legacy and ensure that his name would be remembered alongside his brothers’ not as an embarrassment but as a continuation of the familial legacy, then he would need to come to the table with Jimmy Carter.

In fact, Carter believed he already had Kennedy close enough to his side that the bigger obstacle remained the Congressional opposition to his hospital containment bill. He was adamant that the containment bill pass before the larger implementation of HealthCare. Carter was unwilling to hand the American people a bill for rising healthcare costs, and he also believed that containing medical prices was essential to getting the larger issue of inflation under control. To win, he would need to turn Congress against the American Hospital Association and other lobbyists on K Street who typically reigned supreme.

Jordan skipped the meeting. He was not friends with Kennedy nor Byrd, Rostenkowski nor O’Neill, nor any of the others coming to the meeting. He was also unsure that the foray into healthcare was worth it. Instead, the president was joined by Watson, Eizenstat, and Wexler.

A host of Congressional leaders, Democrats all, joined Carter in the Oval Office to discuss the issue. Carter sat behind the Oval Office with the members sitting on a couch and various chairs in front of him. Behind them stood a host of Congressional staffers. White House staff sat on a couch behind the members, taking notes and occasionally turning around to join the discussion.

Kennedy started the meeting, thanking the president for calling them together. “I assure my colleagues that there is no more important work this session than that of healthcare reform.”

They went around the room, sharing how important they each thought the issue was, until President Carter decided it was time to start having a conversation instead of agreeing the conversation needed to be had. “We cannot move on this until we address the issue of hospital cost containment.”

Immediately, from the periphery, Dick Gephardt’s Chief of Staff chimed in. “Mr. President, let me say first of all, that we understand the importance of lowering the costs of healthcare for all Americans, but I want to be very clear that hospital cost inflation is on par with the rest of the economy. The votes are not there for a hospital-specific cost control measure. It failed rather significantly in the House.”

Carter forced a weak smile. “I was there,” he said to scattered laughter. “I also remember that not everyone in this room was on board with the proposal.” He tossed an icy glare in Gephardt’s direction.

“It is important that if we do this, we are on the same page. I am not interested in spending political capital and the American public’s time on an issue where the disagreements between us stand in the way of any real chance for progress. If you’re not with me, we don’t have to do all of this again.”

Kennedy looked down at his shoes. At first, he’d thought the president had maybe learned a lesson — that he had to involve Congress at the outset. But then, he realized that it was once again classic Carter: My way or the highway.

The conversation continued around the hospital cost containment bill with the staffers chiming in to add their sense of vote counts and technical language. It devolved into a heated argument between Eizenstat and the House Democratic staffers.

“Get out,” the president said, rising from his seat. “I want all of the staff out of here. If you’re not a member of Congress or the President or Vice President of the United States, leave the room.”

All of them, except for Eizenstat, moved towards the door.

“Stu, did you win a Congressional election I don’t know about?”

Eizenstat turned pale and moved towards the door.

About an hour later, he had long stopped pacing, and was instead leaning up against a desk and looking up at the ceiling. Eizenstat counted the cracks and grooves. He looked over at a bookshelf and read the titles and authors. He was halfway through the third shelf when he heard the door click open. And then he saw it.

He saw it in Kennedy’s nod. He saw it in Long’s pace. He saw it in the way Rostenkowski and Gephardt looked down at the floor and the way Wyche Fowler followed close behind Rostenkowski. Stu Eizenstat looked through the cracked door, and he saw it there, most of all, in Carter’s grin.

White smoke.

>>>>>>>

[1] As part of my research for the timeline, I scrolled through years and years of discussions on these boards. Every one of us have our own niche interests and knowledges, and so I was delighted to turn up a comment from now-banned member who talked about McCormack’s role in the fusion space. McCormack lost by a pretty healthy margin, so I don’t think he’d overcome that, but things still work out for him on this issue ITTL.

[2] IOTL, the legislation opened 95% of the state for oil and gas development, but buoyed by his reelection, Carter secures additional protections for state lands.

[3] This comes right from True Compass, 479.

[4] This comes from Faith, 99.

[5] The root of this comes from Faith, 99.

[6] Characterization of the role and the man comes from this obituary of him: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/obituary-cardinal-sebastiano-baggio-1499403.html

[7] Man of Tomorrow, 211.
Btw, super curious about this, did you consider other cardinals for the position or did you always have Hume as your pick?

I asked Yes the same question regarding papal selection for McGoverning, but I’m curious if you ever have any thought to the Brazilian Cardinal Aloísio Lorscheider (proponent of Liberation theology, passed away on December 23, 2007).

Doubly curious what the potential effects could be for Carter regarding the religious vote, Kennedy regarding the primary, and Catholics overall (especially on abortion) if you had a much more liberal papacy, with either Lorscheider coming out victorious in either of the ‘78 conclaves or in an alt scenario, a ‘76 conclave (which would be mere months after he was appointed cardinal IOTL).

(The alt ‘76 conclave would be if Giacomo Lercaro had been made Pope at either the ‘58 or ‘63 conclaves, or a ‘54 conclave if Pius XII had abdicated due to his stomach illness.)

What could a super liberal church (and its followers) look like when controlled the two most liberal papabile for half a century? (53 years)

Lercaro (late 1954-October 18, 1976) (22)
Lorscheider (October 28, ‘76-December 23, ‘07) (31)

(For context, Lorscheider would be the third longest reigning Pope, only 6 months behind Pius IX, while, Lercaro would place top 10. Depending on when “late 1954” is, he’s between #8-10, either behind Pius VII but ahead of Alexander III, or ahead of St. Leo I but behind St. Sylvester I.)

(For additional context, this would be a world where: Ted Kennedy’s 22 when Lercaro’s anointed, and a certain senator from Delaware’s 12 [so the two biggest American Catholic politicians of the late 20th and early 21st century are still in their youth when a radically liberal pope is in power]. On top of that, he’d be in charge for 6 years by the the time JFK’s elected, and 18 by the time Roe’s decided, while the following Pope, who’s an advocate for Liberation Theology would be in power for 3 (after Lercaro’s 22) by Ted’s primary, so that’s a whole generation of Catholics who’s Overton Window has been shifted to the left. Quite a bit of potential tbh.)

(There’s also the changes to Vatican II to consider, as well, and perhaps especially, the lack of Humanae vitae, as Lercaro most likely accepting the findings of the Pontifical Commission on Birth Control, which state that artificial birth control isn’t inherently evil. Which would certainly help with that flu coming out of San Fran that Jimmy’s been hearing about.)
 
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Deleted member 145219

I don’t know much about RFK but I was under the impression he was far more economically liberal than Carter. Social issues they seem similar
Yeah, from the way I’ve heard it, RFK in 1968 was campaigning on the first indicators of what we now know as neoliberalism. Of course, it wasn’t as destructive as the Reagan/GOP kind, but it presented a break with the then standard liberal economics.

There’s a reason that some people considere Nixon to be the last (small l) liberal President.
It's really complicated.
 
Btw, super curious about this, did you consider other cardinals for the position or did you always have Hume as your pick?

Most of your other notes here pre-date the J2 POD, but I wasn't really settled on an an alternative Pope until writing the chapter. Originally, I had considered Giovanni Colombo, assuming that with two popes dead in such quick succession, he would feel compelled to emerge as the compromise. Then, I planned for Sebastiano Baggio, but I didn't feel there was enough about his theology to go back to him if I wanted to. I settled on Hume because I felt he could represent a good compromise ideologically, even if regionally he was a dark horse.
 
15. Cartercare
CARTERCARE

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“Sometimes a party must sail against the wind.”
-Ted Kennedy​

September 1, 1981
Russell Senate Office Building — Washington, DC


The Senate Caucus Room was not the most usual location for a press conference, but this was one of enormous size and notoriety. Ted Kennedy walked into it through a blaze of camera flashes. He was followed by Robert Byrd, Russell Long, Alan Cranston, and Gaylord Nelson.

It was the room where his brothers Jack and Bobby declared their presidential campaigns. It was the home of William Fulbright’s hearings on Vietnam and Sam Ervin’s hearings on Watergate. The room pulsed with history, and this morning was no exception. The Democrats were here to announce a path forward on healthcare reform after a summer of hearings and internal deliberations.

Robert Byrd went to the podium first.

“For the last several months, the Senate Finance Committee and the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee have been convening hearings on the issue of reforming our current health insurance framework. Those hearings have been instructive, and I want to thank Chairman Long and Chairman Kennedy for their diligence and attention to such a crucial issue.

“President Carter and the Democratic Party are committed to using our Congressional majorities in this session to ensure that Americans can more affordably access healthcare, and that we provide for this in a way that is respectful of the present economic realities.

“We are here today to update the American people on the progress that we have made on healthcare reform and to provide the public with a sense of where we are now in terms of legislation and of our path forward. In two days, President Carter will address a joint session of the Congress and give his own summation of the issue.

“I will leave the details to Senators Long and Kennedy, but I want to say unequivocally that I thank them for the work they have done, and will continue to do, to get this legislation to a vote and — eventually — into law. Senator Long?”

Long now assumed the podium. “Mr. Leader, thank you for your words of appreciation. I am particularly proud of the work we have done in the Senate this past summer, and I want to echo the gratitude expressed to Senator Kennedy and extend it to Senators Nelson and Ribicoff who have been diligent in their commitment in the health area.

“Since mid-July, the Senate Finance Committee has been examining the issue of bringing better healthcare to the people, and we have focused our hearings on two main areas: containing the costs of healthcare and improving the quality, efficiency, and price of health insurance.

“I have met with the Democrats and with Senator Dole, and we have come to an understanding that the next step is for the Senate Finance Committee to proceed with marking up Senator Nelson’s hospital cost containment bill.

“President Carter has been very clear that the only way to realize a more total reform of the health insurance industry is to address the issue of hospital costs. He knows my views on this, and we are not in total agreement on everything, but given the importance of this issue, we are ready to move forward with Senator Nelson’s bill. We will continue to negotiate the details of that legislation, but I want to thank Senator Nelson for his work in putting forward a proposal upon which we can all voice our thoughts and make amendments.”

Senator Nelson nodded from behind Long.

Then came Kennedy’s turn to speak. With the cadence employed more for a speech than a press conference, Kennedy thanked his colleagues and launched into his remarks: “We have to pass this legislation. We have to pass this legislation because it is the right think for American families.

“I had a father who was touched by stroke and sick for seven years. We were able to get the very best in terms of healthcare because we were able to afford it. It would have bankrupted any average family in this nation — any family in Boston or Bilox, Atlanta or Akron, Cincinnati or Chicago.

“I had a son who was touched by cancer. It was an extraordinary expense, but I was able to afford it. It would have obliterated the savings of any average family. It would have mortgaged their savings, their children’s educational futures.

“For seven months, I lay in the hospital with a broken back able to access to the very best healthcare. I was able to receive all of this because of my wealth. It is wrong that all over this land there are families who have to choose between life-saving care and putting food on their tables or clothes on their back. We are the greatest nation in the world. The richest, most prosperous nation in the world. It is time we make this a reality for our people.

“I am thankful to President Carter who has shown a genuine commitment to bring this issue to the forefront during his second term, and I am pleased that we will be able to pass legislation that guarantees healthcare coverage for aaaaaall Americans.” [1]

The reporters launched into questions about process — hearings, timings, votes. The Senators alternated their remarks, pressing the House to bring-up the legislation, explaining that they were on board with the president’s plan to pass hospital cost containment legislation before universal coverage. Kennedy was emphatically on board — a cheerleader for the Carter plan, which did not mean universal coverage but instead set-up the framework for gradually expanding care.

“Senator Kennedy, just two years ago you launched a primary challenge campaign against President Carter because of this very issue. Why are you on board with him now?”

Kennedy tucked his glasses into his coat pocket and looked straight at the camera. “Because the time has come.”


September 3, 1981
Capitol Building — Washington, DC


Many presidents believed that they could turn the tides with a speech. Carter was never one of them — at least not until that Oval Office address in July of 1979, which had undeniably set him on course for the second term he now enjoyed. Carter did not believe that a speech to a joint-session of Congress would magically bring them all on board. He did not think that he could solidify public sentiment — or even Congressional sentiment — with his words. But he did believe that his speech was needed to set the tone and the path forward for the present debate. The members of Congress had done their part, and now he wanted to offer America the clarity of his convictions.

The Sergeant-at-Arms exclaimed his arrival, as the grinning Carter made his way to the Speaker’s rostrum. Fritz Mondale was beaming and gripped the president’s hand firmly. It was a proud moment for the Son of Minnesota. With a courteous nod, the Speaker acknowledged the president and grasped his hand before announcing him to the raucous Congress.

“Mister President, Mister Speaker, members of Congress, fellow Americans:

“I come here to talk to you tonight about one of the most important issues facing our nation at the present time. I am speaking, of course, of the current inflationary pressures that are halting our economic growth as a nation and proving burdensome to the average American family.

“There can be no mistaking one of the most profound causes of our current inflation, and that is the cost of healthcare in this country.

“Since 1950, the cost of health has risen 1,000 percent. Let me say that again: In the last three decades, the cost of health has risen 1,000 percent.

“Today, the average American I devoting one month’s worth of wages to cover health care costs — an entire month’s work simply to afford to be healthy.

“So, we need to do this because the costs are too high for the average American. And they are too high for our economy to sustain. If we can limit the increases in hospital charges as outline in the legislation before you today, we can save more than $5 billion for the government and consumers. Imagine what that will do for our national budget, and for restraining inflation.” [2]

Carter hoped, perhaps foolishly, that if he were able to convince Republicans that the cost containment bill was necessary for economic reasons, they would come on board. His words did not resonate with those in the room that night, but his framing of the issue as one of economic necessary did help change minds at home. It also gave the Democratic Party an effective message moving forward on the issue.

The president then launched into his own vision for expanding healthcare coverage to all Americans. He explained his idea for a new government program, which combined Medicare and Medicaid, into HealthCare. The new HealthCare would be set up to cover an expanded group of Americans and when certain benchmarks were met, it could be expanded to encompass everyone.

Some in the White House feared that bringing attention to universal coverage would cost Carter voters, potentially imperiling both bills, but Jordan and Eizenstat disagreed, believing that Carter had to show weary liberals that he was serious about national insurance so long as they could get his cost containment bill through. Eizenstat was particularly clear-eyed throughout the process, saying, “We are never going to get a Republican vote for this bill. We have to go it alone, and we have to keep the Party’s coalition together.”

The speech was just the beginning of Carter’s dramatic effort in the press to sell the bill as necessary for the economy and good for the average American. In the weeks ahead, the president refused to let up, knowing that his political capital (and his ability to pass future legislation) hung in the balance. He felt confident in victory, knowing that he had nearly united the Democratic Party behind him, but nearly uniting them was not quite the same as unification.


September 6, 1981
R Street — Washington, DC


Sunday, September 6, 1981, was the start of the 1981 NFL season. At 1:00pm, the Atlanta Falcons were playing the New Orleans Saints, and Caddell was having Jordan, Powell, and a whole slew of West Wingers over to the R Street Beach to watch the game. Before they watched the game, however, the senior staff had to engage in a Washington tradition: Meet the Press.

The Sunday shows reigned supreme for their coverage of the national debate, and with a busy week for healthcare reform, the senior staff turned to Bill Monroe and his program to see how the debate was playing. Bill Monroe turned to Bob Dole. And that meant trouble for the West Wing.

Dole was one of the Party’s best hatchet men. In 1976, as the running mate to Gerald Ford, he’d notoriously referred to World Wars I and II as “Democrat Wars” and blasted Mondale for the number of men who died during them.

Dole was quick to blast the Carter administration as inept and ineffective, but privately he was relieved to have an ally on the budget. Carter and Dole both agreed on the need to bring forth a balanced budget, and Dole was pleased with the Carter administration’s emphasis on responsible spending and taxation policy. As far as he was concerned, Carter’s approach was more measured and more conservative than anything Ronald Reagan had espoused on the campaign trail. And that’s why Bob Dole couldn’t wrap his head around the healthcare proposal.

“Bill, I’m frankly surprised to see this proposal from a president who has said he supports a balanced budget,” Dole said. “There is nothing in this bill that is fiscally responsible. It may seem like a good idea now, but Americans will be paying the bill for CarterCare long after he leaves office…” Cartercare. The word had slithered off of Dole’s tongue with such contempt.

Watching at the R Street Beach, Jordan couldn’t help but laugh. “CarterCare? That’s a new one, Bob!”

Caddell had the opposite reaction. This was bad. “We don’t want this bill named after us!”

“Why not? Better CarterCare than KennedyCare,” Powell said.

“If people look at this issue of supporting healthcare reform as an issue of supporting Jimmy Carter…” Caddell’s voice trailed off. He would need to run the numbers, put a poll in the field. But he didn’t have a good feeling.

Jordan waved him off. “The guy’s been elected president twice. The people like Jimmy Carter.”

“This’ll make the bill his legacy.”

“And to that I say again: Better ours than Ted’s!”

They turned their attention back to the television, where Dole was listing off all kinds of scary numbers about how America couldn’t afford CarterCare.

“Oh come on, Bill, you piece of shit! Hospital costs are the number one factor contributing to inflation right now. If we pass this, if we kill inflation, we can afford anything we want!” Jordan yelled. He wasn’t sure if he was remembering it exactly right. Is it the number one factor? But his general point was nonetheless correct, at least as far as he was concerned. If they passed the healthcare reform bill, it would go a long way in helping curb inflation, and that would only mean good things for the economy — and government revenue.

“The Democrat bill ignores a free market approach to reform,” Dole was saying, “and it comes at the problem by instituting mandates and price controls that are going to put our hospitals out of business and stifle our ability to pay for good doctors. It is short-sighted.”

Powell yawned.

“CarterCare is a bad deal for the American people.”

Jordan let the television have it again. “Who wrote that line for you, Bob? Huh?” He groaned.

“Should we go back to the office?” Powell asked.

“Nothing for me to do there,” Jordan said in a rare acknowledgement of his loosening grip on the West Wing. Powell excused himself to call Jack Watson and see if the White House wanted to put out some kind of a response.

“It’s all bullshit, Jody,” Jordan called after him. “They could’ve had Kennedy on the show, but instead they chose Dole. Total bullshit!”

Powell ignored him, and so Jordan turned to Caddell to continue his point. “The press hates us, Pat. They always have.”

“I know,” he grumbled. But he also couldn’t shake the feeling that the American people were about to start hating this bill.

• • •​

“Who knows what will come next?!” Jerry Falwell roared from the lectern, bringing his fist down to the wooden podium with a sanctimonious thud.

“We must be clear-eyed about what is coming next: abortion-on-demand —” There were gasps from the pews before him. Falwell interrupted himself and nodded. “Yes! Abortion-on-demand! And your child sick with cancer, your grandmother sick from a stroke, your wife the victim of a tragic accident — it will be the government that decides whether or not they get care, the government that decides what kind of care they get. The government will be deciding between life and death, it will usurp the role of God!”

More gasps came up from the congregation. This was Sunday in Jerry Falwell’s America.

With Reagan defeated, Falwell felt his grip on the Republican Party slipping, and so he injected himself directly into the healthcare debate.

“You need to tell Washington that we are watching them. We will not let them assume the powers of God for their own misinformed vanity projects! We will not let them become arbiters of life and death! Every Senator, every Congressman must respect the sanctity of human life, and the government has no business making decisions to the contrary!”

Falwell encouraged his congregants to go to a rally in Washington while the bill was being debated and protest against the bill’s passage. “I fear that if we do not take up this issue, we will watch as our nation continues the backsliding towards Sodom and Gomorrah.”


October 17, 1981
Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia — Philadelphia, PA


The reporters and their cameramen followed close behind the president. Grin on, Carter turned to face them as he walked into the hospital. “Please, keep your attention on the families,” he said, “this isn’t about me being here. If y’all had reported these stories sooner, I wouldn’t have to be.” The feigned humility. Some in the press corps rolled their eyes. Pastor Jimmy. They’d seen him many times before.

The president, dressed in khakis and a button down shirt without a tie, made his way through the hospital. He was greeted by nurses and doctors who showed him around to various patients. There was a child fresh out of surgery on a broken arm — expected to make a full recovery. Carter kneeled down to ask her about her friends at school and what she wanted to be when she grew up. Then, he turned his attention to the parents.

“Now, what’s a trip like this cost you?”

“Oh, I can’t even think about it, Mr. President,” the father said. “I don’t wanna, anyway.”

“Do y’all have insurance?”

“Yessir, Mr. President, we do. Through my job. But we have a high deductible, and this surgery was expensive.”

Carter shook his head. He clicked his tongue against the back of his front teeth and put his hands on his knees. “Mr. Walsh, I hear ya,” he started, raising his voice so that the reporters and their microphones could pick him up clearly. “We’ve got to do something about hospital costs. Did you know they’re one of the leading causes of our current inflation? I keep trying to get Congress to pass this bill of mine, but you know what the problem is, don’t you, Mr. Walsh? You’re a smart man.”

Mr. Walsh thought for a minute. “Oh, I don’t know. They’re all corrupt down there.”

Carter nodded. “That’s the problem. These doctors and these hospitals — they’ve got all these lobbyists down there, and they keep putting pressure on the House and Senate, telling them that they’ll go out of business if they can’t charge folks like you as much as they do.”

That got a bit of a laugh out of Mr. Walsh. “This place? Going out of business?”

Carter shrugged. It said everything. I don’t believe it either.

The president thanked the Walshes for their time and moved throughout the hospital. A boy being treated for leukemia. He had already surpassed his lifetime insurance cap, and he was just 14 years old. His parents had sold their house and moved into a two-bedroom apartment to pay for his care. Carter put his arm around the father, Rosalynn put her hand on the mother’s knee.

Jack Watson and Jerry Rafshoon stood off to the side and admired the president’s work. It had all been his idea.

In the White House a few weeks earlier, the senior staff sat huddled around the desk in the Oval Office and offered only grim news about the state of the hospital cost containment bill. Carter made it clear that he was not willing to pass universal coverage without first controlling the costs from providers — otherwise, he reasoned, the government would just be on the hook for it all. But the staff had been meeting with members on the Hill and coming up short.

Democrats feared what would happen during the Midterm Elections in ’82, and they didn’t want to be seen as too close to Carter when election time rolled around. Carter was beside himself at their logic. After all, passing healthcare reform had been their idea.

“I don’t understand. What do they plan on running on if they’ve been too scared to pass anything all session?” He tossed a pen onto the Resolute Desk and it slid to the edge and dropped off. “What are they doing?”

He had never understood the creatures of Washington.

“Mr. President, I think they’re worried about what these groups are going to do if they vote for the bill. The doctors. The hospitals. The insurance companies. There’s a lot of money out there that they don’t want to attract into their campaigns.”

Hadn’t they passed campaign finance reform to prevent all of this from happening?

With usual frustration, he stood from his chair and paced around the Oval. By now, his steps were a familiar pattern for the president and for his staff.

“We’ve got to show them how popular this bill is. If we do that, they won’t be worried about the outside spending on their campaigns,” Carter thought aloud.

Wexler agreed with him, and said she’d been running outreach with a number of organizations and advocacy groups. She was lining them up for meetings on the Hill. But Carter waved her off.

“Do you remember the summer we were at Camp David?”

“Mr. President, you just gave a speech, I don’t think —”

Carter shook his head. “I’m not talking about another speech. But you remember how I wrote that speech? How I went out into the towns around Camp David and met with everyday folks? Yeah, we called up governors and senators and businessmen, but those meetings with the people wrote that speech. That’s how I knew what to say.”

Jordan couldn’t help but crack a smile at Carter’s own revisionist history. It was true that Carter had gone out and had dinner and coffee with regular folks, but to suggest the speech wasn’t a near copy of Caddell’s asinine memo was too much for Jordan.

“That’s what we need to do,” his boss was still saying. “Let’s go talk to the people who are paying these costs. Let’s put them on television. Let’s show Congress what’s happening out there.”

And now they were there — at the children’s hospital in Philadelphia, watching Carter and his wife talk to sick kids and their parents about the costs of care. It was worth a thousand words — no, a thousand speeches. But privately, Watson held his doubts that Carter could get the bill through the House and Senate. There was a lot of work left to do back in Washington.


November 24, 1981
Capitol Building — Washington, DC


Jimmy Carter did not always learn the lessons he was supposed to. His entire first term could be used (and soon would be by historians) as a case study in the breakdown of relations between Congress and the chief executive. Some expected that the second term Carter won might mollify his penchant for quarreling with Congress. They overlooked the far more likely outcome: Winning a second term emboldened Carter, convinced him that he was right, and gave him the validation needed to continue his efforts to bend Congress to his will. The president lacked the relationships and political acumen necessary to make his vision a reality.

In the summer of 1981, the defeat of his dear friend Charlie Kirbo’s nomination dealt Carter another opportunity to learn a lesson or continue down a path of executive obstinance. He was angry at those in the Senate who had let his friend’s reputation wither while their own political standings solidified. As far as Carter was concerned, they were nothing but a motley crew of attention-seeking glad-handers. Carter, of course, was different. He was the anti-politician.

Nonetheless, Carter knew that the momentum was building for some kind of Congressional action around healthcare reform, and he was unwilling to support it if there wasn’t first a measure aimed at controlling hospital costs, and so the president determined he needed to work with his fellow Democrats in Congress and steer the cost containment bill towards passsage.

Carter convened regular meetings with individual lawmakers who were crucial to the bill’s success, such as Charlie Rangel from New York and Henry Waxman from California. Both had been among Carter’s proponents throughout the first term push. But Carter’s attention on select supporters meant one member of the House was being ignored — and he wasn’t happy about it.

Tip O’Neill never understood Jimmy Carter or his Georgian way of doing things. For that matter, Carter had never appreciated the Irish boss image of the Speaker of the House, but when it came to the House, Tip O’Neill was the boss, and he was tired of Carter consistently working around him. And word soon got back to the president through Charlie Rangel, who informed him that there was an obstacle on the road to hospital cost containment, and it rhymed with “hip.”

Carter, bored by the personalities of the Beltway, summoned O’Neill for dinner in the White House Residence in an effort to bring him around on the issue of hospital cost containment.

The dinner was stiff and uncomfortable, and there was no time nor desire to share the kinds of intimate and philosophical anecdotes that made up Carter’s Air Force One conversation with Kennedy. Instead, Carter cleared his throat and put his napkin on the table after the main course. It was time to talk business.

Jack Watson wasn’t in the room for the dinner, but he’d prepped Carter thoroughly for the meeting. “Be humble,” he pleaded.

Carter took it.

“Mr. Speaker, the reality is, we can’t get this passed without your full support. Nobody can count votes in the caucus like you can, and we’re running into opposition on all sides, mostly from the conservatives, of course, and from some of the new thinkers like Gephardt. I can’t figure a way around them, and I can’t get healthcare reform through without first passing the hospital cost containment bill.” Carter drew a breath, prepared to enter a winding soliloquy about inflation and the need to be fiscally responsible in passing national healthcare coverage. O’Neill didn’t need to hear any of it.

“Mr. President, I will find the votes.”

Carter cleared his throat again. He was almost too surprised to speak, but he shouldn’t have been. For Tip O’Neill, the act of governing had always been about making people’s lives better. That meant making sure the costs at the hospital weren’t too high after a visit, and while he didn’t completely agree with the president that the cost containment bill was a prerequisite for universal coverage, he knew that the president wasn’t budging. If they wanted to deliver healthcare coverage, they had to pass the containment bill. He just wanted the president to ask.

And so it was Tip O’Neill, not Jimmy Carter, who held meetings with individual members and sussed out their needs like only a true boss can. A Maryland congresswoman had been denied the opportunity to appoint young women in her district as House pages. It offended her a bit. No matter, she could have some slots the next time they came up. [3] For most members, there was something they could get outside of the bill’s text that would mean they’d vote for the bill. An earmark for a school in Ohio, some money for a train station in South Carolina — such was the art of deal-making in Washington. And that was how Tip O’Neill got to 209 votes. But he was still nine votes down.

There were a number of conservative Democrats unwilling to budge. They didn’t care for universal healthcare either, so that threat didn’t faze them. They were already senior enough and plenty of them were willing to start caucusing with the Republicans if O’Neill took away chairmanships. So, the Speaker had hit a stopping point. But he’d been here before. He figured he knew the way out.

He summoned the gangly Wyche Fowler, another Georgian, to his office. Wasn’t there any way that the conservatives could fall in line? Fowler, who had already agreed to support the bill himself, tried to get away with a mere shrug, but O’Neill didn’t let him leave the office so quickly. Isn’t there a way?

Until, finally, O’Neill got an answer he could work with. Just as he’d suspected, every member had their price. For the conservative Democrats, it meant a numerical change to the legislation. They needed to lower the fine hospitals would face if they violated the cost containment provisions. Then, maybe, those members who were so fond of the American Hospital Association and the American Medical Association (and their financial support), would come on board with the bill.

Carter was irate, fearing it would render the bill meaningless, but Tip O’Neill tried to explain an important lesson of the Beltway to the president: You couldn’t always get what you want. As Tip explained, he was now actively feuding with Ways and Means Chairman Dan Rostenkowski, who was doing the bidding of the AHA. Carter needed to come around, or they’d lose the vote. Rostenkowski was a Nay regardless of how the exact wording came out, but if Carter was willing to compromise, members would see that the president was listening to them, and they would feel more comfortable about having extracted a concession from the White House. They figured they could sell that to nervous lobbyists and constituents. But Carter had to make a move to help them.

In typical fashion, Carter demanded time to think it over, and he brought in all of his advisors who stood in unanimous agreement: Take the deal. But Carter didn’t agree.

“What’s the point of passing a worthless bill?” When no one answered, he assured his staff that he wasn’t asking a rhetorical question. He wanted an answer. And so Hamilton Jordan, fed up with the temper tantrum, decided to provide him with one.

“It’s not a worthless bill, Mr. President; it’s just not the bill you wanted. Sure, some of the bigger hospitals might decide a few years that it’s worth paying the fine. But they won’t every year — not when you get universal healthcare through. But you can’t do any of that if we don’t get this bill in now. You can always go in later and amend it in the next Congress or the one after. But you’ve got to make it law first, and you’ve got to build momentum on this issue, or we’re done next November, and you’ll be forced to sit in this office with no hope of passing anything.”

Carter conceded but provided his own counter offer. They could lower the fine, but they had to tie it to inflation. Fine, the conservative Democrats agreed.

And so Tip O’Neill had found 228 votes, and the U.S. House of Representatives voted to pass Jimmy Carter’s hospital cost containment bill.

The fight in the Senate would be even more grueling. The House effort had been aided, ironically, by the defeat of the legislation years earlier. Instead, Congress had passed revised legislation, championed by Gephardt, that pushed through a national study commission analyzing costs. With that commission’s report in hand, many Democrats felt they had what they needed to go back and vote for the president’s bill. In the Senate, however, Carter needed the votes to overcome a filibuster, and he didn’t have them, and so that’s why Senator Charles Grassley rose to the Senate floor in protest, and he stood there for eleven hours.

Grassley’s filibuster of the hospital cost-containment bill focused largely on the fact that legislation passed two years earlier had enabled states to set up their own cost-containment systems, but many of them had not yet had the opportunity to do so. Grassley thought that the Carter bill impeded the ability of states to be laboratories for innovation — to find a solution to the problem on their own. “I fear, Mr. President, that we are, in our impatience, neglecting what may become one of the best opportunities to draft a successful program. My state of Iowa has already begun the work of looking at what kind of a program we could create to address these issues. Why should the United States Senate intervene in Iowa’s ability to build the program that works best for that state?” It was an argument that Republicans used on many issues. State government over federal government. Even if the 1980 election had served as a rejection of Reagan’s shrink the federal government mantra, the ideology still coursed in the veins of Republicans in Washington.

By the time the Iowa Senator yielded the floor and allowed debate to continue, the Republican caucus had lined up to kill the bill through amendments. It was a tactic that Senator James Abourezk had used during the energy fight in Carter’s first term, and just like that fight, Senate Majority Leader Bob Byrd was ready. He called in Fritz Mondale to sit and preside, and together they once again dispatched with the long list of amendments prepared to stall the bill.

Just as he did during the energy debate, Byrd enforced a Senate rule that all dilatory motions or amendments and all amendments deemed not germane would be found out of order. Immediately, that complicated the Republican effort — they had hoped that they could introduce several amendments that were politically toxic to key Democratic senators, which would then force them to vote against the final bill. Byrd sidestepped them.

Over the span of half an hour, Byrd called hundreds of amendments put in by Republicans, and within seconds of Byrd calling them, Mondale brought his gavel down. Out of order. Out of order. It was a rare, though not unprecedented, maneuver, and it enraged the Republican minority. After Byrd had dispensed with the proposals, Howard Baker took to the floor and decried the lack of respect for the minority.

Baker’s tone was far from scolding. Instead, it was somber.

“This chamber is no stranger to conflict. Once, Representative Preston Brooks of South Carolina, who was born in Strom Thurmond's hometown of Edgefield, came into this Chamber and attacked Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts with a cane.

“It feels a bit today, at least to this Senator, that today’s actions — not employed for the first time by this tyrannic majority — underscore a weakening of that unspoken rule of this chamber: That we work together. This institution is said to be the world’s greatest deliberative body. I wonder, now, how that can be true. I cannot hide my concern this evening, but I can offer hope.

“I can offer a reminder about why it is that this place — where we have debated civil rights and the Panama Canal treaty; where differing visions on taxes, on environmental protection, on relations with the Soviet Union have been presented — why is that this place works.

“The answer is this: What makes the Senate work today is the same thing that made it work in the days of Clay, Webster and Calhoun, in whose temple we gather this evening.

“It isn't just the principled courage, creative compromise and persuasive eloquence that these men brought to the leadership of the Senate — important as these qualities were in restoring the political prestige and Constitutional importance of the Senate itself in the first half of the 19th century. By the way, it is interesting to me that at that time an alarming number of our predecessors in the office of the Senate found the House of Representatives more attractive and more promising and left the Senate to find their careers over there.

“It isn't simply an understanding of the unique role and rules of the Senate, important as that understanding is. It isn't even a devotion to the good of the country, which has inspired every Senator since 1789.

“What really makes the Senate work — as our heroes knew profoundly — is an understanding of human nature, an appreciation of the hearts as well as the minds, the frailties as well as the strengths, of one's colleagues and one's constituents.

“We have to know that at the end of a long debate, we can come together, shake hands, and love those on the other side. Yes, love. That is what Calhoun himself said of Clay. Yes, he said, ‘I don't like Henry Clay. He is a bad man, an imposter, a creator of wicked schemes. I wouldn't speak to him. But by God, I love him.’

“But what we have to keep in mind is that in those days, the debates were fair. Both sides felt that their viewpoints were respected. Combined, my side of the aisle represents millions of Americans. Their voices, their ideas, their amendments deserve to be heard in this body, even if we are not the majority. We deserve to be heard. We deserve a vote. The promise of this body — this institution — is that the rules are fair. They must be fair.

“I do not agree with this legislation, but it does not offend me. I am offended, however, by the manner in which the majority has conducted itself. I can promise only that if it is our party that holds the most seats come next November, the minority will not be treated the way we were this evening, for we must remember the lessons learned by our colleagues who were here for the bruising moments, the fraught moments, the time that Sumner was caned.

“It is at those times we have learned the hard way how important it is to work together, to see beyond the human frailties, the petty jealousies, even the occasionally craven motive, the fall from grace that every mortal experiences in life.” [4]

Years earlier, when they had used a similar strategy to preserve what remained of Carter’s energy bill, the president later expressed regret. He said to Byrd directly that he believed they had employed the “wrong tactic.” [5] But when the opportunity presented itself to save his hospital containment bill, which was the key to any healthcare reform, Carter did not flinch. He did not think twice. He knew what they had to do, and he told Byrd to do it once more, and he told Mondale to sit in that chair.

Mondale, sitting and listening to Baker that night, wondered at what cost they had just passed the hospital containment bill. Ted Kennedy, on the floor for the entirety of the debate, his arms crossed, his eyes fixed, did not share the same doubts. He, like Carter, knew that they had done what must be done. It was what the moment called. Sometimes a party must sail against the wind. And when, days later, he stood behind President Carter as the president fixed his signature on the bill, and when Carter turned around to shake Kennedy’s hand and give him one of the pens used, Ted Kennedy knew in his heart that the end had justified the means. America was sailing forward.

>>>>>>>>

[1] Based on Kennedy’s remarks here.
[2] States come from here with language inspiration from here.
[3] Based on an actual request of the Speaker around this time. Tip and the Gipper, 305.
[4] Baker’s speech is based heavily on his speech about the Senate as an institution, which you can read here.
[5] Stu Eizenstat, President Carter: The White House Years, 188.
 

Deleted member 145219

CARTERCARE

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“Sometimes a party must sail against the wind.”
-Ted Kennedy​

September 1, 1981
Russell Senate Office Building — Washington, DC


The Senate Caucus Room was not the most usual location for a press conference, but this was one of enormous size and notoriety. Ted Kennedy walked into it through a blaze of camera flashes. He was followed by Robert Byrd, Russell Long, Alan Cranston, and Gaylord Nelson.

It was the room where his brothers Jack and Bobby declared their presidential campaigns. It was the home of William Fulbright’s hearings on Vietnam and Sam Ervin’s hearings on Watergate. The room pulsed with history, and this morning was no exception. The Democrats were here to announce a path forward on healthcare reform after a summer of hearings and internal deliberations.

Robert Byrd went to the podium first.

“For the last several months, the Senate Finance Committee and the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee have been convening hearings on the issue of reforming our current health insurance framework. Those hearings have been instructive, and I want to thank Chairman Long and Chairman Kennedy for their diligence and attention to such a crucial issue.

“President Carter and the Democratic Party are committed to using our Congressional majorities in this session to ensure that Americans can more affordably access healthcare, and that we provide for this in a way that is respectful of the present economic realities.

“We are here today to update the American people on the progress that we have made on healthcare reform and to provide the public with a sense of where we are now in terms of legislation and of our path forward. In two days, President Carter will address a joint session of the Congress and give his own summation of the issue.

“I will leave the details to Senators Long and Kennedy, but I want to say unequivocally that I thank them for the work they have done, and will continue to do, to get this legislation to a vote and — eventually — into law. Senator Long?”

Long now assumed the podium. “Mr. Leader, thank you for your words of appreciation. I am particularly proud of the work we have done in the Senate this past summer, and I want to echo the gratitude expressed to Senator Kennedy and extend it to Senators Nelson and Ribicoff who have been diligent in their commitment in the health area.

“Since mid-July, the Senate Finance Committee has been examining the issue of bringing better healthcare to the people, and we have focused our hearings on two main areas: containing the costs of healthcare and improving the quality, efficiency, and price of health insurance.

“I have met with the Democrats and with Senator Dole, and we have come to an understanding that the next step is for the Senate Finance Committee to proceed with marking up Senator Nelson’s hospital cost containment bill.

“President Carter has been very clear that the only way to realize a more total reform of the health insurance industry is to address the issue of hospital costs. He knows my views on this, and we are not in total agreement on everything, but given the importance of this issue, we are ready to move forward with Senator Nelson’s bill. We will continue to negotiate the details of that legislation, but I want to thank Senator Nelson for his work in putting forward a proposal upon which we can all voice our thoughts and make amendments.”

Senator Nelson nodded from behind Long.

Then came Kennedy’s turn to speak. With the cadence employed more for a speech than a press conference, Kennedy thanked his colleagues and launched into his remarks: “We have to pass this legislation. We have to pass this legislation because it is the right think for American families.

“I had a father who was touched by stroke and sick for seven years. We were able to get the very best in terms of healthcare because we were able to afford it. It would have bankrupted any average family in this nation — any family in Boston or Bilox, Atlanta or Akron, Cincinnati or Chicago.

“I had a son who was touched by cancer. It was an extraordinary expense, but I was able to afford it. It would have obliterated the savings of any average family. It would have mortgaged their savings, their children’s educational futures.

“For seven months, I lay in the hospital with a broken back able to access to the very best healthcare. I was able to receive all of this because of my wealth. It is wrong that all over this land there are families who have to choose between life-saving care and putting food on their tables or clothes on their back. We are the greatest nation in the world. The richest, most prosperous nation in the world. It is time we make this a reality for our people.

“I am thankful to President Carter who has shown a genuine commitment to bring this issue to the forefront during his second term, and I am pleased that we will be able to pass legislation that guarantees healthcare coverage for aaaaaall Americans.” [1]

The reporters launched into questions about process — hearings, timings, votes. The Senators alternated their remarks, pressing the House to bring-up the legislation, explaining that they were on board with the president’s plan to pass hospital cost containment legislation before universal coverage. Kennedy was emphatically on board — a cheerleader for the Carter plan, which did not mean universal coverage but instead set-up the framework for gradually expanding care.

“Senator Kennedy, just two years ago you launched a primary challenge campaign against President Carter because of this very issue. Why are you on board with him now?”

Kennedy tucked his glasses into his coat pocket and looked straight at the camera. “Because the time has come.”


September 3, 1981
Capitol Building — Washington, DC


Many presidents believed that they could turn the tides with a speech. Carter was never one of them — at least not until that Oval Office address in July of 1979, which had undeniably set him on course for the second term he now enjoyed. Carter did not believe that a speech to a joint-session of Congress would magically bring them all on board. He did not think that he could solidify public sentiment — or even Congressional sentiment — with his words. But he did believe that his speech was needed to set the tone and the path forward for the present debate. The members of Congress had done their part, and now he wanted to offer America the clarity of his convictions.

The Sergeant-at-Arms exclaimed his arrival, as the grinning Carter made his way to the Speaker’s rostrum. Fritz Mondale was beaming and gripped the president’s hand firmly. It was a proud moment for the Son of Minnesota. With a courteous nod, the Speaker acknowledged the president and grasped his hand before announcing him to the raucous Congress.

“Mister President, Mister Speaker, members of Congress, fellow Americans:

“I come here to talk to you tonight about one of the most important issues facing our nation at the present time. I am speaking, of course, of the current inflationary pressures that are halting our economic growth as a nation and proving burdensome to the average American family.

“There can be no mistaking one of the most profound causes of our current inflation, and that is the cost of healthcare in this country.

“Since 1950, the cost of health has risen 1,000 percent. Let me say that again: In the last three decades, the cost of health has risen 1,000 percent.

“Today, the average American I devoting one month’s worth of wages to cover health care costs — an entire month’s work simply to afford to be healthy.

“So, we need to do this because the costs are too high for the average American. And they are too high for our economy to sustain. If we can limit the increases in hospital charges as outline in the legislation before you today, we can save more than $5 billion for the government and consumers. Imagine what that will do for our national budget, and for restraining inflation.” [2]

Carter hoped, perhaps foolishly, that if he were able to convince Republicans that the cost containment bill was necessary for economic reasons, they would come on board. His words did not resonate with those in the room that night, but his framing of the issue as one of economic necessary did help change minds at home. It also gave the Democratic Party an effective message moving forward on the issue.

The president then launched into his own vision for expanding healthcare coverage to all Americans. He explained his idea for a new government program, which combined Medicare and Medicaid, into HealthCare. The new HealthCare would be set up to cover an expanded group of Americans and when certain benchmarks were met, it could be expanded to encompass everyone.

Some in the White House feared that bringing attention to universal coverage would cost Carter voters, potentially imperiling both bills, but Jordan and Eizenstat disagreed, believing that Carter had to show weary liberals that he was serious about national insurance so long as they could get his cost containment bill through. Eizenstat was particularly clear-eyed throughout the process, saying, “We are never going to get a Republican vote for this bill. We have to go it alone, and we have to keep the Party’s coalition together.”

The speech was just the beginning of Carter’s dramatic effort in the press to sell the bill as necessary for the economy and good for the average American. In the weeks ahead, the president refused to let up, knowing that his political capital (and his ability to pass future legislation) hung in the balance. He felt confident in victory, knowing that he had nearly united the Democratic Party behind him, but nearly uniting them was not quite the same as unification.


September 6, 1981
R Street — Washington, DC


Sunday, September 6, 1981, was the start of the 1981 NFL season. At 1:00pm, the Atlanta Falcons were playing the New Orleans Saints, and Caddell was having Jordan, Powell, and a whole slew of West Wingers over to the R Street Beach to watch the game. Before they watched the game, however, the senior staff had to engage in a Washington tradition: Meet the Press.

The Sunday shows reigned supreme for their coverage of the national debate, and with a busy week for healthcare reform, the senior staff turned to Bill Monroe and his program to see how the debate was playing. Bill Monroe turned to Bob Dole. And that meant trouble for the West Wing.

Dole was one of the Party’s best hatchet men. In 1976, as the running mate to Gerald Ford, he’d notoriously referred to World Wars I and II as “Democrat Wars” and blasted Mondale for the number of men who died during them.

Dole was quick to blast the Carter administration as inept and ineffective, but privately he was relieved to have an ally on the budget. Carter and Dole both agreed on the need to bring forth a balanced budget, and Dole was pleased with the Carter administration’s emphasis on responsible spending and taxation policy. As far as he was concerned, Carter’s approach was more measured and more conservative than anything Ronald Reagan had espoused on the campaign trail. And that’s why Bob Dole couldn’t wrap his head around the healthcare proposal.

“Bill, I’m frankly surprised to see this proposal from a president who has said he supports a balanced budget,” Dole said. “There is nothing in this bill that is fiscally responsible. It may seem like a good idea now, but Americans will be paying the bill for CarterCare long after he leaves office…” Cartercare. The word had slithered off of Dole’s tongue with such contempt.

Watching at the R Street Beach, Jordan couldn’t help but laugh. “CarterCare? That’s a new one, Bob!”

Caddell had the opposite reaction. This was bad. “We don’t want this bill named after us!”

“Why not? Better CarterCare than KennedyCare,” Powell said.

“If people look at this issue of supporting healthcare reform as an issue of supporting Jimmy Carter…” Caddell’s voice trailed off. He would need to run the numbers, put a poll in the field. But he didn’t have a good feeling.

Jordan waved him off. “The guy’s been elected president twice. The people like Jimmy Carter.”

“This’ll make the bill his legacy.”

“And to that I say again: Better ours than Ted’s!”

They turned their attention back to the television, where Dole was listing off all kinds of scary numbers about how America couldn’t afford CarterCare.

“Oh come on, Bill, you piece of shit! Hospital costs are the number one factor contributing to inflation right now. If we pass this, if we kill inflation, we can afford anything we want!” Jordan yelled. He wasn’t sure if he was remembering it exactly right. Is it the number one factor? But his general point was nonetheless correct, at least as far as he was concerned. If they passed the healthcare reform bill, it would go a long way in helping curb inflation, and that would only mean good things for the economy — and government revenue.

“The Democrat bill ignores a free market approach to reform,” Dole was saying, “and it comes at the problem by instituting mandates and price controls that are going to put our hospitals out of business and stifle our ability to pay for good doctors. It is short-sighted.”

Powell yawned.

“CarterCare is a bad deal for the American people.”

Jordan let the television have it again. “Who wrote that line for you, Bob? Huh?” He groaned.

“Should we go back to the office?” Powell asked.

“Nothing for me to do there,” Jordan said in a rare acknowledgement of his loosening grip on the West Wing. Powell excused himself to call Jack Watson and see if the White House wanted to put out some kind of a response.

“It’s all bullshit, Jody,” Jordan called after him. “They could’ve had Kennedy on the show, but instead they chose Dole. Total bullshit!”

Powell ignored him, and so Jordan turned to Caddell to continue his point. “The press hates us, Pat. They always have.”

“I know,” he grumbled. But he also couldn’t shake the feeling that the American people were about to start hating this bill.

• • •​

“Who knows what will come next?!” Jerry Falwell roared from the lectern, bringing his fist down to the wooden podium with a sanctimonious thud.

“We must be clear-eyed about what is coming next: abortion-on-demand —” There were gasps from the pews before him. Falwell interrupted himself and nodded. “Yes! Abortion-on-demand! And your child sick with cancer, your grandmother sick from a stroke, your wife the victim of a tragic accident — it will be the government that decides whether or not they get care, the government that decides what kind of care they get. The government will be deciding between life and death, it will usurp the role of God!”

More gasps came up from the congregation. This was Sunday in Jerry Falwell’s America.

With Reagan defeated, Falwell felt his grip on the Republican Party slipping, and so he injected himself directly into the healthcare debate.

“You need to tell Washington that we are watching them. We will not let them assume the powers of God for their own misinformed vanity projects! We will not let them become arbiters of life and death! Every Senator, every Congressman must respect the sanctity of human life, and the government has no business making decisions to the contrary!”

Falwell encouraged his congregants to go to a rally in Washington while the bill was being debated and protest against the bill’s passage. “I fear that if we do not take up this issue, we will watch as our nation continues the backsliding towards Sodom and Gomorrah.”


October 17, 1981
Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia — Philadelphia, PA


The reporters and their cameramen followed close behind the president. Grin on, Carter turned to face them as he walked into the hospital. “Please, keep your attention on the families,” he said, “this isn’t about me being here. If y’all had reported these stories sooner, I wouldn’t have to be.” The feigned humility. Some in the press corps rolled their eyes. Pastor Jimmy. They’d seen him many times before.

The president, dressed in khakis and a button down shirt without a tie, made his way through the hospital. He was greeted by nurses and doctors who showed him around to various patients. There was a child fresh out of surgery on a broken arm — expected to make a full recovery. Carter kneeled down to ask her about her friends at school and what she wanted to be when she grew up. Then, he turned his attention to the parents.

“Now, what’s a trip like this cost you?”

“Oh, I can’t even think about it, Mr. President,” the father said. “I don’t wanna, anyway.”

“Do y’all have insurance?”

“Yessir, Mr. President, we do. Through my job. But we have a high deductible, and this surgery was expensive.”

Carter shook his head. He clicked his tongue against the back of his front teeth and put his hands on his knees. “Mr. Walsh, I hear ya,” he started, raising his voice so that the reporters and their microphones could pick him up clearly. “We’ve got to do something about hospital costs. Did you know they’re one of the leading causes of our current inflation? I keep trying to get Congress to pass this bill of mine, but you know what the problem is, don’t you, Mr. Walsh? You’re a smart man.”

Mr. Walsh thought for a minute. “Oh, I don’t know. They’re all corrupt down there.”

Carter nodded. “That’s the problem. These doctors and these hospitals — they’ve got all these lobbyists down there, and they keep putting pressure on the House and Senate, telling them that they’ll go out of business if they can’t charge folks like you as much as they do.”

That got a bit of a laugh out of Mr. Walsh. “This place? Going out of business?”

Carter shrugged. It said everything. I don’t believe it either.

The president thanked the Walshes for their time and moved throughout the hospital. A boy being treated for leukemia. He had already surpassed his lifetime insurance cap, and he was just 14 years old. His parents had sold their house and moved into a two-bedroom apartment to pay for his care. Carter put his arm around the father, Rosalynn put her hand on the mother’s knee.

Jack Watson and Jerry Rafshoon stood off to the side and admired the president’s work. It had all been his idea.

In the White House a few weeks earlier, the senior staff sat huddled around the desk in the Oval Office and offered only grim news about the state of the hospital cost containment bill. Carter made it clear that he was not willing to pass universal coverage without first controlling the costs from providers — otherwise, he reasoned, the government would just be on the hook for it all. But the staff had been meeting with members on the Hill and coming up short.

Democrats feared what would happen during the Midterm Elections in ’82, and they didn’t want to be seen as too close to Carter when election time rolled around. Carter was beside himself at their logic. After all, passing healthcare reform had been their idea.

“I don’t understand. What do they plan on running on if they’ve been too scared to pass anything all session?” He tossed a pen onto the Resolute Desk and it slid to the edge and dropped off. “What are they doing?”

He had never understood the creatures of Washington.

“Mr. President, I think they’re worried about what these groups are going to do if they vote for the bill. The doctors. The hospitals. The insurance companies. There’s a lot of money out there that they don’t want to attract into their campaigns.”

Hadn’t they passed campaign finance reform to prevent all of this from happening?

With usual frustration, he stood from his chair and paced around the Oval. By now, his steps were a familiar pattern for the president and for his staff.

“We’ve got to show them how popular this bill is. If we do that, they won’t be worried about the outside spending on their campaigns,” Carter thought aloud.

Wexler agreed with him, and said she’d been running outreach with a number of organizations and advocacy groups. She was lining them up for meetings on the Hill. But Carter waved her off.

“Do you remember the summer we were at Camp David?”

“Mr. President, you just gave a speech, I don’t think —”

Carter shook his head. “I’m not talking about another speech. But you remember how I wrote that speech? How I went out into the towns around Camp David and met with everyday folks? Yeah, we called up governors and senators and businessmen, but those meetings with the people wrote that speech. That’s how I knew what to say.”

Jordan couldn’t help but crack a smile at Carter’s own revisionist history. It was true that Carter had gone out and had dinner and coffee with regular folks, but to suggest the speech wasn’t a near copy of Caddell’s asinine memo was too much for Jordan.

“That’s what we need to do,” his boss was still saying. “Let’s go talk to the people who are paying these costs. Let’s put them on television. Let’s show Congress what’s happening out there.”

And now they were there — at the children’s hospital in Philadelphia, watching Carter and his wife talk to sick kids and their parents about the costs of care. It was worth a thousand words — no, a thousand speeches. But privately, Watson held his doubts that Carter could get the bill through the House and Senate. There was a lot of work left to do back in Washington.


November 24, 1981
Capitol Building — Washington, DC


Jimmy Carter did not always learn the lessons he was supposed to. His entire first term could be used (and soon would be by historians) as a case study in the breakdown of relations between Congress and the chief executive. Some expected that the second term Carter won might mollify his penchant for quarreling with Congress. They overlooked the far more likely outcome: Winning a second term emboldened Carter, convinced him that he was right, and gave him the validation needed to continue his efforts to bend Congress to his will. The president lacked the relationships and political acumen necessary to make his vision a reality.

In the summer of 1981, the defeat of his dear friend Charlie Kirbo’s nomination dealt Carter another opportunity to learn a lesson or continue down a path of executive obstinance. He was angry at those in the Senate who had let his friend’s reputation wither while their own political standings solidified. As far as Carter was concerned, they were nothing but a motley crew of attention-seeking glad-handers. Carter, of course, was different. He was the anti-politician.

Nonetheless, Carter knew that the momentum was building for some kind of Congressional action around healthcare reform, and he was unwilling to support it if there wasn’t first a measure aimed at controlling hospital costs, and so the president determined he needed to work with his fellow Democrats in Congress and steer the cost containment bill towards passsage.

Carter convened regular meetings with individual lawmakers who were crucial to the bill’s success, such as Charlie Rangel from New York and Henry Waxman from California. Both had been among Carter’s proponents throughout the first term push. But Carter’s attention on select supporters meant one member of the House was being ignored — and he wasn’t happy about it.

Tip O’Neill never understood Jimmy Carter or his Georgian way of doing things. For that matter, Carter had never appreciated the Irish boss image of the Speaker of the House, but when it came to the House, Tip O’Neill was the boss, and he was tired of Carter consistently working around him. And word soon got back to the president through Charlie Rangel, who informed him that there was an obstacle on the road to hospital cost containment, and it rhymed with “hip.”

Carter, bored by the personalities of the Beltway, summoned O’Neill for dinner in the White House Residence in an effort to bring him around on the issue of hospital cost containment.

The dinner was stiff and uncomfortable, and there was no time nor desire to share the kinds of intimate and philosophical anecdotes that made up Carter’s Air Force One conversation with Kennedy. Instead, Carter cleared his throat and put his napkin on the table after the main course. It was time to talk business.

Jack Watson wasn’t in the room for the dinner, but he’d prepped Carter thoroughly for the meeting. “Be humble,” he pleaded.

Carter took it.

“Mr. Speaker, the reality is, we can’t get this passed without your full support. Nobody can count votes in the caucus like you can, and we’re running into opposition on all sides, mostly from the conservatives, of course, and from some of the new thinkers like Gephardt. I can’t figure a way around them, and I can’t get healthcare reform through without first passing the hospital cost containment bill.” Carter drew a breath, prepared to enter a winding soliloquy about inflation and the need to be fiscally responsible in passing national healthcare coverage. O’Neill didn’t need to hear any of it.

“Mr. President, I will find the votes.”

Carter cleared his throat again. He was almost too surprised to speak, but he shouldn’t have been. For Tip O’Neill, the act of governing had always been about making people’s lives better. That meant making sure the costs at the hospital weren’t too high after a visit, and while he didn’t completely agree with the president that the cost containment bill was a prerequisite for universal coverage, he knew that the president wasn’t budging. If they wanted to deliver healthcare coverage, they had to pass the containment bill. He just wanted the president to ask.

And so it was Tip O’Neill, not Jimmy Carter, who held meetings with individual members and sussed out their needs like only a true boss can. A Maryland congresswoman had been denied the opportunity to appoint young women in her district as House pages. It offended her a bit. No matter, she could have some slots the next time they came up. [3] For most members, there was something they could get outside of the bill’s text that would mean they’d vote for the bill. An earmark for a school in Ohio, some money for a train station in South Carolina — such was the art of deal-making in Washington. And that was how Tip O’Neill got to 209 votes. But he was still nine votes down.

There were a number of conservative Democrats unwilling to budge. They didn’t care for universal healthcare either, so that threat didn’t faze them. They were already senior enough and plenty of them were willing to start caucusing with the Republicans if O’Neill took away chairmanships. So, the Speaker had hit a stopping point. But he’d been here before. He figured he knew the way out.

He summoned the gangly Wyche Fowler, another Georgian, to his office. Wasn’t there any way that the conservatives could fall in line? Fowler, who had already agreed to support the bill himself, tried to get away with a mere shrug, but O’Neill didn’t let him leave the office so quickly. Isn’t there a way?

Until, finally, O’Neill got an answer he could work with. Just as he’d suspected, every member had their price. For the conservative Democrats, it meant a numerical change to the legislation. They needed to lower the fine hospitals would face if they violated the cost containment provisions. Then, maybe, those members who were so fond of the American Hospital Association and the American Medical Association (and their financial support), would come on board with the bill.

Carter was irate, fearing it would render the bill meaningless, but Tip O’Neill tried to explain an important lesson of the Beltway to the president: You couldn’t always get what you want. As Tip explained, he was now actively feuding with Ways and Means Chairman Dan Rostenkowski, who was doing the bidding of the AHA. Carter needed to come around, or they’d lose the vote. Rostenkowski was a Nay regardless of how the exact wording came out, but if Carter was willing to compromise, members would see that the president was listening to them, and they would feel more comfortable about having extracted a concession from the White House. They figured they could sell that to nervous lobbyists and constituents. But Carter had to make a move to help them.

In typical fashion, Carter demanded time to think it over, and he brought in all of his advisors who stood in unanimous agreement: Take the deal. But Carter didn’t agree.

“What’s the point of passing a worthless bill?” When no one answered, he assured his staff that he wasn’t asking a rhetorical question. He wanted an answer. And so Hamilton Jordan, fed up with the temper tantrum, decided to provide him with one.

“It’s not a worthless bill, Mr. President; it’s just not the bill you wanted. Sure, some of the bigger hospitals might decide a few years that it’s worth paying the fine. But they won’t every year — not when you get universal healthcare through. But you can’t do any of that if we don’t get this bill in now. You can always go in later and amend it in the next Congress or the one after. But you’ve got to make it law first, and you’ve got to build momentum on this issue, or we’re done next November, and you’ll be forced to sit in this office with no hope of passing anything.”

Carter conceded but provided his own counter offer. They could lower the fine, but they had to tie it to inflation. Fine, the conservative Democrats agreed.

And so Tip O’Neill had found 228 votes, and the U.S. House of Representatives voted to pass Jimmy Carter’s hospital cost containment bill.

The fight in the Senate would be even more grueling. The House effort had been aided, ironically, by the defeat of the legislation years earlier. Instead, Congress had passed revised legislation, championed by Gephardt, that pushed through a national study commission analyzing costs. With that commission’s report in hand, many Democrats felt they had what they needed to go back and vote for the president’s bill. In the Senate, however, Carter needed the votes to overcome a filibuster, and he didn’t have them, and so that’s why Senator Charles Grassley rose to the Senate floor in protest, and he stood there for eleven hours.

Grassley’s filibuster of the hospital cost-containment bill focused largely on the fact that legislation passed two years earlier had enabled states to set up their own cost-containment systems, but many of them had not yet had the opportunity to do so. Grassley thought that the Carter bill impeded the ability of states to be laboratories for innovation — to find a solution to the problem on their own. “I fear, Mr. President, that we are, in our impatience, neglecting what may become one of the best opportunities to draft a successful program. My state of Iowa has already begun the work of looking at what kind of a program we could create to address these issues. Why should the United States Senate intervene in Iowa’s ability to build the program that works best for that state?” It was an argument that Republicans used on many issues. State government over federal government. Even if the 1980 election had served as a rejection of Reagan’s shrink the federal government mantra, the ideology still coursed in the veins of Republicans in Washington.

By the time the Iowa Senator yielded the floor and allowed debate to continue, the Republican caucus had lined up to kill the bill through amendments. It was a tactic that Senator James Abourezk had used during the energy fight in Carter’s first term, and just like that fight, Senate Majority Leader Bob Byrd was ready. He called in Fritz Mondale to sit and preside, and together they once again dispatched with the long list of amendments prepared to stall the bill.

Just as he did during the energy debate, Byrd enforced a Senate rule that all dilatory motions or amendments and all amendments deemed not germane would be found out of order. Immediately, that complicated the Republican effort — they had hoped that they could introduce several amendments that were politically toxic to key Democratic senators, which would then force them to vote against the final bill. Byrd sidestepped them.

Over the span of half an hour, Byrd called hundreds of amendments put in by Republicans, and within seconds of Byrd calling them, Mondale brought his gavel down. Out of order. Out of order. It was a rare, though not unprecedented, maneuver, and it enraged the Republican minority. After Byrd had dispensed with the proposals, Howard Baker took to the floor and decried the lack of respect for the minority.

Baker’s tone was far from scolding. Instead, it was somber.

“This chamber is no stranger to conflict. Once, Representative Preston Brooks of South Carolina, who was born in Strom Thurmond's hometown of Edgefield, came into this Chamber and attacked Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts with a cane.

“It feels a bit today, at least to this Senator, that today’s actions — not employed for the first time by this tyrannic majority — underscore a weakening of that unspoken rule of this chamber: That we work together. This institution is said to be the world’s greatest deliberative body. I wonder, now, how that can be true. I cannot hide my concern this evening, but I can offer hope.

“I can offer a reminder about why it is that this place — where we have debated civil rights and the Panama Canal treaty; where differing visions on taxes, on environmental protection, on relations with the Soviet Union have been presented — why is that this place works.

“The answer is this: What makes the Senate work today is the same thing that made it work in the days of Clay, Webster and Calhoun, in whose temple we gather this evening.

“It isn't just the principled courage, creative compromise and persuasive eloquence that these men brought to the leadership of the Senate — important as these qualities were in restoring the political prestige and Constitutional importance of the Senate itself in the first half of the 19th century. By the way, it is interesting to me that at that time an alarming number of our predecessors in the office of the Senate found the House of Representatives more attractive and more promising and left the Senate to find their careers over there.

“It isn't simply an understanding of the unique role and rules of the Senate, important as that understanding is. It isn't even a devotion to the good of the country, which has inspired every Senator since 1789.

“What really makes the Senate work — as our heroes knew profoundly — is an understanding of human nature, an appreciation of the hearts as well as the minds, the frailties as well as the strengths, of one's colleagues and one's constituents.

“We have to know that at the end of a long debate, we can come together, shake hands, and love those on the other side. Yes, love. That is what Calhoun himself said of Clay. Yes, he said, ‘I don't like Henry Clay. He is a bad man, an imposter, a creator of wicked schemes. I wouldn't speak to him. But by God, I love him.’

“But what we have to keep in mind is that in those days, the debates were fair. Both sides felt that their viewpoints were respected. Combined, my side of the aisle represents millions of Americans. Their voices, their ideas, their amendments deserve to be heard in this body, even if we are not the majority. We deserve to be heard. We deserve a vote. The promise of this body — this institution — is that the rules are fair. They must be fair.

“I do not agree with this legislation, but it does not offend me. I am offended, however, by the manner in which the majority has conducted itself. I can promise only that if it is our party that holds the most seats come next November, the minority will not be treated the way we were this evening, for we must remember the lessons learned by our colleagues who were here for the bruising moments, the fraught moments, the time that Sumner was caned.

“It is at those times we have learned the hard way how important it is to work together, to see beyond the human frailties, the petty jealousies, even the occasionally craven motive, the fall from grace that every mortal experiences in life.” [4]

Years earlier, when they had used a similar strategy to preserve what remained of Carter’s energy bill, the president later expressed regret. He said to Byrd directly that he believed they had employed the “wrong tactic.” [5] But when the opportunity presented itself to save his hospital containment bill, which was the key to any healthcare reform, Carter did not flinch. He did not think twice. He knew what they had to do, and he told Byrd to do it once more, and he told Mondale to sit in that chair.

Mondale, sitting and listening to Baker that night, wondered at what cost they had just passed the hospital containment bill. Ted Kennedy, on the floor for the entirety of the debate, his arms crossed, his eyes fixed, did not share the same doubts. He, like Carter, knew that they had done what must be done. It was what the moment called. Sometimes a party must sail against the wind. And when, days later, he stood behind President Carter as the president fixed his signature on the bill, and when Carter turned around to shake Kennedy’s hand and give him one of the pens used, Ted Kennedy knew in his heart that the end had justified the means. America was sailing forward.

>>>>>>>>

[1] Based on Kennedy’s remarks here.
[2] States come from here with language inspiration from here.
[3] Based on an actual request of the Speaker around this time. Tip and the Gipper, 305.
[4] Baker’s speech is based heavily on his speech about the Senate as an institution, which you can read here.
[5] Stu Eizenstat, President Carter: The White House Years, 188.
Looking forward to reading in depth. So Cost Containment has passed, but Health Care has not been taken up yet, correct? Bakers remarks reminds me of the aftermath of the Bloody Eight House Election in 1984. I always understood Majority Rule, as the Majority Rules, but the Minority had Rights. But the Majority gets their way and the Minority doesn’t get to obstruct. In theory. Practice on the other hand…. Post 1992…..
 
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Great update! Can’t say I find Baker’s argument compelling—shooting down intentional obstructionism is hardly the same thing as beating someone from the opposite party half to death. I suppose it reflects the focus on decorum and procedures in this era.
 
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