Japanese victory in the pacific war - is it really ASB?

Eh...the 262 was a piece of garbage and the V-2 was completely and utterly useless. So being behind on those isn’t exactly something to cry about. If the choices are those or computers and atomic science choose the latter every time.

Well. . . I can't agree on the Me-262. It was . . . effective enough in combat.

Sure, the engines didn't last long; it was very vulnerable on takeoff and landing. And anyway, too few, too late, too little petrol.

But "garbage" is not really fair.
 
If Europe quiets down after a quick Axis victory rearmament could take a back seat to other concerns, especially once trade is normalized. The Axis would not (yet) be on our soil or at our doorstep.

Just where are you going with this line of thought, anyway?

Even if Halifax makes peace pronto, Barbarossa is still going to happen. The Japanese are still going to move into French Indochina. How is there anything that is going to roll back American rearmament (which is already codified in law)?
 
Isolation does not me disarmed and sticking your head in the sand, it means we tried this once this time you morons can kill yourselves without us.
And as Teddy said speak softly and carry a big stick. The best way to insure your isolation is to make it a sure bet that anyone dumb enough to try something gets trashed.
And if the US is left standing on its own as a major power with only various 2nd rate powers to support it the US with its wealth and its resources it will start a huge military build up.
You would also see a Manhattan Project at least as big as OTL.
And you could very well see the US training ever man under 30 in military training then placed into reserve until needed.

Of course you still have the problem that this is just not going to happen, but,,,
 
I just cant see 450 wining against a USN CV task force in mid 1945 even if they all get used, not that they will against a convoy supplying the Soviets and keeping well to the north as they would be saved to deal with an invasion. When USN can sail within gun range of the home islands and get away with it sneaking north should be easy?

The only approaches to Vladivostok are through the Kuriles-covered by Japanese aircraft and artillery positions-or through the previously mentioned straits. Up until the Soviet entry into the war, MILEPOST was conducted via Soviet flagged vessels, which Tokyo left alone as per the Neutrality Agreement between the USSR and the Japanese Empire.
 
Likewise, the Allies still were unable to close the Tsushima Strait and Korea Strait.

More like, "had more important tasks to accomplish than closing the Tsushima and Korea Straits."

Almost kind of a moot point what could get through Tsushima Strait when Japan had so few ships to try the voyage in the first place. The U.S. sank over half a million tons in July 1945 alone (almost half through air-dropped mines). And what it could get through could hardly be moved from Kyushu to Honshu, given the near-closure of the Shimonoseki Straits after July 1 (14 days of complete cessation of shipping, and on most remaining days only a single ship could move through). For a more specific example: traffic at the Kobe-Osaka ports in July plummeted from 320,000 tons to only 44,000 tons. [Source: Frederick M. Sallager, "Lessons from an Aerial Mining Campaign," RAND Corporation, April 1974.]
 
Dude, I'm also in the "Absent Lend-Lease Soviets lose camp", but it's not happening in '42 or '43. The food shortages, which were the most dire supply, would not have gotten catastrophic until 1944.

They would've been catastrophic no later then 1943, as that's when Food production reached it's lowest extent and Lend Lease compromised 50% of the RKKA's ration strength:
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The Bread of Affliction: The Food Supply in the USSR during World War II, by William Moskoff -

"The central fact behind the increased importance of the collective farm market was the drastic drop in food production, especially in 1942 and 1943, and the diminished proportion that went to the civilians. In 1943 overall agricultural production was only 38 percent of the 1940 level. In 1943, however, the Red Army began to recapture agricultural areas of the Ukraine, Belorussia, and the Caucasus and by the next year, 1944, agricultural output had risen to 54 percent of the 1940 level. Not surprisingly, the collapse of the food economy led to astonishing increases in prices. The most rapid rate [Emphasis by author] of increase in prices took place in 1942 and began to taper off in mid-1943."

The Soviet Economy and the Red Army, 1930-1945, by Walter Scott Dunn -

"By November of 1941, 47% of Soviet cropland was in German hands. The Germans had 38% of the grain farmland, 84% of the sugar land, 38% of the area devoted to beef and dairy cattle, and 60% of the land used to produce hogs. The Russians turned to the east and brought more land into cultivation. In the fall of 1941, the autumn and winter crops increased sharply in the eastern area. But despite all efforts, farm yields dropped from 95.5 million tons of grain in 1940 to 29.7 million tons in 1942. Production of cattle and horses dropped to less than half of prewar levels and hogs to one fifth. By 1942, meat and dairy production shrank to half the 1940 total and sugar to only 5%. Farm production in 1942 and 1943 dropped to 38% and 37% of 1940 totals."

Mark Harrison also considers Lend Lease vital to preventing a general collapse in the USSR, and Stalin did likewise agree at the time.
 
More like, "had more important tasks to accomplish than closing the Tsushima and Korea Straits."

Almost kind of a moot point what could get through Tsushima Strait when Japan had so few ships to try the voyage in the first place. The U.S. sank over half a million tons in July 1945 alone (almost half through air-dropped mines). And what it could get through could hardly be moved from Kyushu to Honshu, given the near-closure of the Shimonoseki Straits after July 1 (14 days of complete cessation of shipping, and on most remaining days only a single ship could move through). For a more specific example: traffic at the Kobe-Osaka ports in July plummeted from 320,000 tons to only 44,000 tons. [Source: Frederick M. Sallager, "Lessons from an Aerial Mining Campaign," RAND Corporation, April 1974.]

Leaving the connections between Mainland Asia and the Home Islands was of vital importance for Japan, who were able to transfer numerous divisions even into August this means. Closing this was critical if the blockade strategy was to work.
 
Dude, I'm also in the "Absent Lend-Lease Soviets lose camp", but it's not happening in '42 or '43. The food shortages, which were the most dire supply, would not have gotten catastrophic until 1944.

This is why I wish Obsessed Nuker were not on sabbatical; he always has the Soviet data on stuff like this so ready to hand.

The loss of lend-lease wouldn't make any noteworthy impact until the 1943 campaigning season at earliest. It likely draws a lot of the teeth of the Smolensk and Orsha Offensives, to be sure, and starvation would become a serious problem in some areas by the winter of 1943; but it's hard to see any Soviet collapse before 1944.
 
Leaving the connections between Mainland Asia and the Home Islands was of vital importance for Japan, who were able to transfer numerous divisions even into August this means. Closing this was critical if the blockade strategy was to work.

Sure, no question. But do we have a full list of exactly which divisions were transferred and on what dates? What TOE did they bring with them?

Almost all of my sources are boxed up; but my recollection is that nearly all of those movements were before June 1.
 
Well. . . I can't agree on the Me-262. It was . . . effective enough in combat.

Sure, the engines didn't last long; it was very vulnerable on takeoff and landing. And anyway, too few, too late, too little petrol.

But "garbage" is not really fair.

Twelve hours of flight time. I had homework assignments in college that took longer. It’s a totally fair assessment. If I built a robot that could solve a maze in two minutes broke and had to have the most advanced part relaxed after it did, every time, I would also call it garbage.
 
Twelve hours of flight time. I had homework assignments in college that took longer. It’s a totally fair assessment. If I built a robot that could solve a maze in two minutes broke and had to have the most advanced part relaxed after it did, every time, I would also call it garbage.

Like I said, the engines didn't last long. But that was more due to available materials than the design, which was...not terrific, but decent enough, for the time.
 
Like I said, the engines didn't last long. But that was more due to available materials than the design, which was...not terrific, but decent enough, for the time.

Available materials are a core part of a design. If proper ones can’t be used then either the design is adjusted to meet reality or it’s scrapped. Sometimes both. You can’t say well it would have been great but..., and then still expect it to be judged based on the theoretical standard.
 
Nonsense, worst comes to worst the Soviets give up Siberia and let the Japanese starve in the snow. Moscow is worth a dozen Siberias in 1942!

Of interest, I think its was a total of 18 divisions transferred from the Far East (4 divisions?), Eastern Siberia (Transbaykal?), and Central Siberia altogether. Japan's theoretical Hokushin-ron plan for an invasion of Russia prioritized (a) Vladivostok, (b) Land east of Lake Baikal/Eastern Mongolia, (c) Irkutsk/Western Mongolia, and (d) Krasnoyarsk before securing a line at either 70 degrees East or Ob River. Siberia and the Far East are still valuable, both for the Trans-Siberian Railway and for the resources they provide. Ulan-Ude was the easternmost city to receive relocated industry from western/European Russia, that's east of Irkustsk. There is already oil exploitation for northern Sakhalin Island in 1941, at one count before deeper oil deposits were discovered in 1977 the area was producing 60,000 barrels/day (DEI was producing about 7.5M tons per year and Japan sought 3.75M tons per year; Japanese planned expansion from early 1939's production of much less than that was put on hold due to the international situation).
 
Available materials are a core part of a design. If proper ones can’t be used then either the design is adjusted to meet reality or it’s scrapped. Sometimes both. You can’t say well it would have been great but..., and then still expect it to be judged based on the theoretical standard.

Exactly, the reason something fails isn't important just that it does.
 
Sure, no question. But do we have a full list of exactly which divisions were transferred and on what dates? What TOE did they bring with them?

Almost all of my sources are boxed up; but my recollection is that nearly all of those movements were before June 1.

I'll review D.M. Gianreco's work and get back to yah on that; I'm sorry I haven't had more sources handy! College be like that.
 
Sure, no question. But do we have a full list of exactly which divisions were transferred and on what dates? What TOE did they bring with them?

Almost all of my sources are boxed up; but my recollection is that nearly all of those movements were before June 1.

Transfers from Manchuria and Korea basically stopped after April 5, 1945, because the Soviet Union notified Japan that they would not renew their Neutrality Agreement from four years earlier. This led to a frantic 'scramble' to reinforce Manchuria through local mobilization of whatever remaining manpower was available plus the addition of understrength divisions from China. [Giangreco p. 22]

The last group of divisions transferred out of Manchuria consisted of the 11th, 25th, 57th, and 1st Armored divisions back to Japan in March and the 111th, 120th, and 121st divisions to Korea. These latter divisions were redeployed to counter a possible US invasion there, while in China four other divisions were withdrawn towards the coast as a similar precaution. [p. 21]
 
There were people who survived who were 500 feet from the epicenter of the explosion due to being in strong concrete buildings or basements. Given the bombings were to be a prelude to the Americans attacking, most soldiers would indeed be in fortifications while the mountainous terrain would confine the explosions.


The point is the bomb would be dropped before the invasion fleet arrived. They would have no idea when it would drop, or when the invasion would start. It would be a bolt from the blue. The Bomb would be detonated at an altitude of couple of thousand feet, so the blast would roll down the sides of the mountains. Obviously it would be a good thing to be on the other side of a mountain when an atom bomb goes off. Do you really think most Japanese solders would be living underground for months waiting for something? What happens if they drop a few bombs on troop concentrations in Southern Kyushu, where the Japanese are expecting an invasion, and then the Americans land somewhere else?

I've read the Americans planned to drop 2 new Fatman type Bombs on cities in late August, 3 Bombs for Kyushu, and 6 for Coronet, the capture of Tokyo. So for pride the Japanese People would have to endure 13 Atomic Bombs?
 
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They would've been catastrophic no later then 1943, as that's when Food production reached it's lowest extent and Lend Lease compromised 50% of the RKKA's ration strength:
M79dgrAD_o.png

MTrRlP8L_o.png


The Bread of Affliction: The Food Supply in the USSR during World War II, by William Moskoff -

"The central fact behind the increased importance of the collective farm market was the drastic drop in food production, especially in 1942 and 1943, and the diminished proportion that went to the civilians. In 1943 overall agricultural production was only 38 percent of the 1940 level. In 1943, however, the Red Army began to recapture agricultural areas of the Ukraine, Belorussia, and the Caucasus and by the next year, 1944, agricultural output had risen to 54 percent of the 1940 level. Not surprisingly, the collapse of the food economy led to astonishing increases in prices. The most rapid rate [Emphasis by author] of increase in prices took place in 1942 and began to taper off in mid-1943."

The Soviet Economy and the Red Army, 1930-1945, by Walter Scott Dunn -

"By November of 1941, 47% of Soviet cropland was in German hands. The Germans had 38% of the grain farmland, 84% of the sugar land, 38% of the area devoted to beef and dairy cattle, and 60% of the land used to produce hogs. The Russians turned to the east and brought more land into cultivation. In the fall of 1941, the autumn and winter crops increased sharply in the eastern area. But despite all efforts, farm yields dropped from 95.5 million tons of grain in 1940 to 29.7 million tons in 1942. Production of cattle and horses dropped to less than half of prewar levels and hogs to one fifth. By 1942, meat and dairy production shrank to half the 1940 total and sugar to only 5%. Farm production in 1942 and 1943 dropped to 38% and 37% of 1940 totals."

Mark Harrison also considers Lend Lease vital to preventing a general collapse in the USSR, and Stalin did likewise agree at the time.

What would make you think that the United States, and Canada wouldn't continue to provide Lendlease food, and other supplies to the Soviets, even if the UK had some type of armistice with Germany? The UK would be building up a 30 division army at home, a 20 division Indian army, and another 10 Empire divisions. The RN would continue to build a huge fleet of new, and upgraded ships. The RAF would build up a heavy bomber force of 3,000 aircraft, and at least and as many tactical aircraft.
 
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