Japanese victory in the pacific war - is it really ASB?

[M79]

The US response to the Fall of France was to order a 70% increase in Naval Strength, the House passed it 316 to 0. This was in addition to the buildup already initiated from the invasion of China and Anschluss which was a mere 20% increase in strength, as well as a smaller increase when WWII was declared. Similar increase occurred for the Armty at the same time

One really thinks that the US response to Britain or the USSR going down won't be to put this on roids? And in naval technology the US was in most regards decently ahead of the Axis, and wasn't that far behind in other fields if behind at all

The US not doing something like this is OOC, hence the lead paint comment

With all due respect, there is a difference between peacetime buildups during a period of active international conflict and those when an international situation is relatively stable. If Europe has fallen to the Germans and Japan has essentially taken SE Asia for itself without a USSR to deal with, yes the US may ne paying more attention but there is still a very strong isolationist wing which will not support rearmament or buildup if the US is not directly threatened. And eventually it will be one way or another.

German aerospace and naval technologies were often well ahead of the Allies, though that gap was closing by war's end in OTL. Look at the impact of the Messerschmitt P.1101, Type XXI submarine, V2 rocket, and Siemens T-52d/T-52e/T-43. Beyond that consider the Me 262, magnetophon recorders, Nipolit/glass mines, and fuel-air weaponry (Hexenkassel project under Mario Zippenmayr - the May 1945 commentary about it from German military leadership in US interrogations is disturbing).

 

[Athelstane]

The US not doing something like this is OOC, hence the lead paint comment

Yup.

 

[Spencersj345.346]

The US response to the Fall of France was to order a 70% increase in Naval Strength, the House passed it 316 to 0. This was in addition to the buildup already initiated from the invasion of China and Anschluss which was a mere 20% increase in strength, as well as a smaller increase when WWII was declared. Similar increase occurred for the Armty at the same time

One really thinks that the US response to Britain or the USSR going down won't be to put this on roids? And in naval technology the US was in most regards decently ahead of the Axis, and wasn't that far behind in other fields if behind at all

The US not doing something like this is OOC, hence the lead paint comment

Indeed the only places the USN was behind the Axis was in making reliable torpedoes and behind slightly in metallurgy/armor plate production methods as related to the Italians and Germans

 

[Athelstane]

With all due respect, there is a difference between peacetime buildups during a period of active international conflict and those when an international situation is relatively stable. If Europe has fallen to the Germans and Japan has essentially taken SE Asia for itself without a USSR to deal with, yes the US may ne paying more attention but there is still a very strong isolationist wing which will not support rearmament or buildup if the US is not directly threatened. And eventually it will be one way or another.

I would like to suggest that the isolationist impulse in the U.S. in the years leading up to the war *can* be overstated.

Again, just consider the votes of the major naval buildup bills in question.

Second Vinson Act of 1938

• Passed the House on March 21, 1938 (294–100)
• Passed the Senate on May 3, 1938 (56–28)

Two Ocean Navy Act of 1940

• Passed the House by unanimous consent June 22, 1940
• Passed the Senate by unanimous consent July 10, 1940

And the Two Ocean Navy Act, passed immediately in the wake of the Fall of France, was done with lightning speed.

Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 (first peace-time conscription act in American history)

• Reported by the joint conference committee on September 14, 1940;
• agreed to by the House on September 14, 1940 (233–124)
• and by the Senate on September 14, 1940 (47–25)

Congress may not have been keen on war at that point, but it sure as hell was alarmed at what was happening in Europe. And it was taking rapid action to rearm in response.

 

[Athelstane]

Indeed the only places the USN was behind the Axis was in making reliable torpedoes and behind slightly in metallurgy/armor plate production methods as related to the Italians and Germans

And rocketry.

Well - and jet aircraft.

Not that either were decisive in the war anyway.

 

[Athelstane]

The invasion of Oahu, December 1941. - Axis History Forum

forum.axishistory.com

As for forces on Hawaii on December 7th 1941...

https://www.usarpac.army.mil/history/dec7_printable.htm

Dear God not TINKERBELL again

YEAAAAAAAARGH

 

[CV(N)-6]

The invasion of Oahu, December 1941. - Axis History Forum

forum.axishistory.com

Ok, so let's say that somehow, through weakening other theaters and crippling their oil reserves, the IJN lands three infantry divisions on Oahu, supported by the Kido Butai for a few days. The Kido Butai can't stay forever, so air cover is lost, soon enough the nearest USN CV's, IIRC Lexington and Enterprise, will be raiding the army, the surviving BB's and CA's will bombard the beachhead, the army on Oahu(something like 40,000) will establish a defensive line, surviving aircraft will sortie, Saratoga will be near, Yorktown, Ranger, Wasp, and soon after Hornet, plus BB's will be traversing the Canal, and the troops will be cut off. The IJN can either waste even more fuel to help them, probably taking losses it can't replace and the USN can, or not be able to help, losing the army. Assuming somehow the IJN gets the landing force landed without detection or a contested landing, you've got to deal with an insanely long supply line, with a skilled opponent who can hurt you always lurking. The attrition to the IJN could actually shorten WW2 because more and more resources would be drawn from SE Asia, possibly giving ABDA a fighting chance, and the USN is fighting on home turf, against an enemy who has to steam a long way to the battlezone, whereas the USN has several islands still 100% American occupied that it can raid from. Think Guadalcanal with sides switched and the IJN has to go a looong way to get to where it needs to go. That is a recipe for disaster.

 

[RamscoopRaider]

With all due respect, there is a difference between peacetime buildups during a period of active international conflict and those when an international situation is relatively stable. If Europe has fallen to the Germans and Japan has essentially taken SE Asia for itself without a USSR to deal with, yes the US may ne paying more attention but there is still a very strong isolationist wing which will not support rearmament or buildup if the US is not directly threatened. And eventually it will be one way or another.

German aerospace and naval technologies were often well ahead of the Allies, though that gap was closing by war's end in OTL. Look at the impact of the Messerschmitt P.1101, Type XXI submarine, V2 rocket, and Siemens T-52d/T-52e/T-43. Beyond that consider the Me 262, magnetophon recorders, Nipolit/glass mines, and fuel-air weaponry (Hexenkassel project under Mario Zippenmayr - the May 1945 commentary about it from German military leadership in US interrogations is disturbing).

And you are aware that these things take time to build. IE the Two Ocean Navy Act of 1940 was scheduled to finish in 1946, a hypothetical 1942 act dealing with the fall of the USSR, would probably be finishing in '49 or '50. Again Two Ocean Navy Act passed with literally no oppostion, if there was a strong isolationist wing by that point in time somebody would have voted no in either the House or Senate

US had better naval architecture, actually reliable high pressure steam plants, a functional DP gun system, better fire control, functional carrier aviation, among other things. The only German Naval tech the US was really interested in was their Sonar, US evaluation of the Type XXI was a few good features but highly flawed as an actual design. Aerospace, the US had a lead in Turbosuperchargers and heavy bombers, not to mention actually had functional carrier planes, Germany had a lead in jets and rocket propulsion/ballistic missiles, Germans deployed command guided bombs first, US deployed radar and IR guided ones so really not that far ahead

 

[Johnrankins]

If the Japanese somehow are operating on a perfect, mistake free basis, that's a lot of departures from reality, and we mostly deal with single departure timelines here. But if you really imagine across the board mistake free (right decisions on sub use, ASW, being more careful with codes, etc., etc., etc.), it may make more difference than people have suggested. The logistics of attacking an enemy on the opposite side of the Pacific ocean are not trivial, so if the U.S. has to contend with Japanese batting 1.000, it may take a considerably longer time than OTL before the U.S. can successfully push forward, even with the massive U.S. advantage in production. But what ASB intervention is causing the Japanese to make no mistakes anywhere else and yet still screw up diplomacy completely? And if they also have mistake free diplomacy, they do not fight the U.S.

Mistake free long wars are ASB in and of itself. Everyone makes mistakes in war sooner or later!!!

 

[Johnrankins]

Japan doesn't have the industrial capacity to hit the US hard enough to do much more than Pearl Harbor OTL and even if they'd gotten two carriers that day it just means the Japanese are given an extra nine months or so before the newest carriers and battleships show up in numbers. The best Japan might be able to hope for in that case is a reverse-Midway after a (Pearl Harbor + two carriers nixed) and even then it's not likely to be enough.

One possibility apparently not often discussed is if Japan swaps the Southern route with the Northern one and attacks Russia in a combined offensive with Germany. Many of those Russian soldiers defending the gates of Moscow in December 1941 were Siberian transfers so if they finish off the USSR entirely and plan a massive joint attack with Germany circa 1950 (maybe after a SeaLion '44 without US involvement and Japanese help?) there's a different outcome. It is unlikely the US would standby to let that happen in blissful ignorance however.

Nonsense, worst comes to worst the Soviets give up Siberia and let the Japanese starve in the snow. Moscow is worth a dozen Siberias in 1942!

 

[M79]

Nonsense, worst comes to worst the Soviets give up Siberia and let the Japanese starve in the snow. Moscow is worth a dozen Siberias in 1942!

Wouldn't cutting off the supplies from the Trans-Siberian Railway alone have a significant impact at that point? I'm not sure how many supplies they were bringing in that way at that point...

 

[M79]

I would like to suggest that the isolationist impulse in the U.S. in the years leading up to the war *can* be overstated.

Again, just consider the votes of the major naval buildup bills in question.

Second Vinson Act of 1938

• Passed the House on March 21, 1938 (294–100)
• Passed the Senate on May 3, 1938 (56–28)

Two Ocean Navy Act of 1940

• Passed the House by unanimous consent June 22, 1940
• Passed the Senate by unanimous consent July 10, 1940

And the Two Ocean Navy Act, passed immediately in the wake of the Fall of France, was done with lightning speed.

Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 (first peace-time conscription act in American history)

• Reported by the joint conference committee on September 14, 1940;
• agreed to by the House on September 14, 1940 (233–124)
• and by the Senate on September 14, 1940 (47–25)

Congress may not have been keen on war at that point, but it sure as hell was alarmed at what was happening in Europe. And it was taking rapid action to rearm in response.

If Europe quiets down after a quick Axis victory rearmament could take a back seat to other concerns, especially once trade is normalized. The Axis would not (yet) be on our soil or at our doorstep.

 

[History Learner]

When USN battleships are firing on the home islands does that really apply?

By mid 1945 the USN should be able to simply force convoys under heavy escort and simply use them to absorb any remaining Japanese (air/sea) forces that could anyway later be used to attack an invasion.

Norway is an indicative example of this regard.

 

[Johnrankins]

Wouldn't cutting off the supplies from the Trans-Siberian Railway alone have a significant impact at that point? I'm not sure how many supplies they were bringing in that way at that point...

It might have some but the Soviets aren't going to risk Moscow for Siberia! I imagine the Iranian route would be expanded.

 

[wcv215]

And rocketry.

Well - and jet aircraft.

Not that either were decisive in the war anyway.

Eh...the 262 was a piece of garbage and the V-2 was completely and utterly useless. So being behind on those isn’t exactly something to cry about. If the choices are those or computers and atomic science choose the latter every time.

 

[History Learner]

The air burst at Hiroshima leveled almost every building within 1,000 yards of the blast, and killed, or seriously injured almost every person in the area. People a mile away were killed, or seriously hurt. Since the Japanese would have no notice of the bombing not every man would be laying down in a deep bunker, when it hit. Most of the men would be walking around, preforming normal military functions, training, patrolling, improving positions, bringing in supplies, playing sports. All but the deepest bunker would cave in from the over pressure. Your vision seems to be every man is living 24/7 in a stone tunnel, dug into a maintain side. That's not reality.

There were people who survived who were 500 feet from the epicenter of the explosion due to being in strong concrete buildings or basements. Given the bombings were to be a prelude to the Americans attacking, most soldiers would indeed be in fortifications while the mountainous terrain would confine the explosions.

 

[jsb]

Norway is an indicative example of this regard.

Why and at what point in time? By spring 1945 we are in a very different situation to June/July 1942 for example.....?

 

[History Learner]

Wouldn't cutting off the supplies from the Trans-Siberian Railway alone have a significant impact at that point? I'm not sure how many supplies they were bringing in that way at that point...

It'd outright collapse them in 1942 or 1943 at the latest.

 

[History Learner]

Why and at what point in time? By spring 1945 we are in a very different situation to June 1942 for example.....?

Yes, in August of 1945 the Japanese still had 450 aircraft in Hokkaido and Hokkaido was definitely beyond the range of Allied land based airpower. Likewise, the Allies still were unable to close the Tsushima Strait and Korea Strait.

 

[jsb]

Yes, in August of 1945 the Japanese still had 450 aircraft in Hokkaido and Hokkaido was definitely beyond the range of Allied land based airpower. Likewise, the Allies still were unable to close the Tsushima Strait and Korea Strait.

I just cant see 450 wining against a USN CV task force in mid 1945 even if they all get used, not that they will against a convoy supplying the Soviets and keeping well to the north as they would be saved to deal with an invasion. When USN can sail within gun range of the home islands and get away with it sneaking north should be easy?