Japan heads north 1937, impact on Europe

[Deleted member 1487]

they would lose Japanese tanks against Russian armour hmmm. well good luck with that. Remember what happened OTL when the 2 sides clashed

The Soviets lost a shit ton of men and equipment?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battles_of_Khalkhin_Gol

Casualties and losses
Manpower:
27,880[nb 2]
556[16]–990[2]
Equipment:
208 aircraft[17]
253 tanks destroyed[18]
133 armored cars destroyed
96 mortars and artillery
49 tractors and prime movers
652 trucks and other motor vehicles[15][16]
significant animal casualties[19]

Manpower:
16,343
2,895[nb 3]
Equipment:
160 aircraft[17]
29 tanks destroyed or crippled[5]
Many tankettes destroyed
72 artillery pieces (field guns only)[21]
2,330 horses killed, injured, or sick[14]
significant motor vehicle losses[22]

 

[Deleted member 94680]

If the Japanese assault is successful, or at least sustained, how does this affect the German invasion in ‘41? There’s no reason I can see to assume a Japanese-Soviet war would effect Nazi build up and aggression as OTL from ‘37-‘41?

IIRC, Stalin moved a lot of troops from the East to help defend Moscow? If they are involved in a land war with the Japanese, they aren’t available to be rushed West, surely?

 

[Deleted member 1487]

If the Japanese assault is successful, or at least sustained, how does this affect the German invasion in ‘41? There’s no reason I can see to assume a Japanese-Soviet war would effect Nazi build up and aggression as OTL from ‘37-‘41?

It could well impact the Molotov Ribbentrop pact from even happening, which opens up all sorts of butterflies; if there is no Soviet-Nazi commercial treaty blockaded Germany is going to be in for some difficulty even getting ready for Barbarossa.

IIRC, Stalin moved a lot of troops from the East to help defend Moscow? If they are involved in a land war with the Japanese, they aren’t available to be rushed West, surely?

Not many, most were newly raised formations. The big transfers happened months earlier and they were largely destroyed in the fighting up to and including Vyazma-Bryansk. I doubt that fighting with the Japanese starting in 1937 would continue into 1941; especially once the Germans invade Poland Stalin is going to be panicking and aiming to make peace ASAP, much like what drove the push to make Khalkin Gol decisive and then sign a non-aggression pact with Japan IOTL. Assuming Barbarossa happens anywhere close to like OTL despite the butterflies, then the losses and expenditures in the Far East is likely to be much more damaging to the USSR than the need to lock down forces there during Barbarossa.

 

[History Learner]

they would lose Japanese tanks against Russian armour hmmm. well good luck with that. Remember what happened OTL when the 2 sides clashed

The Japanese inflicted heavier losses in both men and tanks?

 

[jacobk]

If Japan and the Soviet Union make peace at somepoint. Could Japan swing South and attack China.

In this scenario Japan would launch an aggressive war against the USSR, win at great cost of men and material, and then immediately launch another aggressive war against another massive foe. While Imperial Japan's strategic planning was somewhat cavalier and over-optimistic, I think this is a bridge too far. I don't think a quick win is in the offing against the USSR, and in any event they're going to want to hold on to what they have.

To the extent the war with the USSR leaves any resources to spare, I'd assume Japan's China strategy would center around the idea that "the empire, long united, must divide." I can see them funneling money and expertise towards anybody who looks likely to set themselves up as a warlord and break off a chunk of China. The dream scenario would be for China to fall apart into warring states without Japan needing to send in any troops, or at least not many. Basically copying their role model and setting themselves up as perfidious Albion of the east.

If anything, one of the main benefits of a crazy aggressive war with the USSR is that it crowds them out from trying a crazy aggressive war against China.

 

[McPherson]

Say Japan invades the Soviet Union in 1937 instead of China.

How would this impact Europe

Would this impact the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact

What would be the impact on the Eastern front

Disrupts the power balance estimates and makes political calculations even more confused. Germany needs 1937 Russia at least to be quiescent for example.

Not sure why they would TBH. But let's say it happens. The Anti-Comintern pact is signed, so Germany is likely to be aiding Japan in some way, but isn't obligated to take direct action. Italy too, once it signs on, would also try and help someway, perhaps sending an expeditionary corps or some symbolic aid.

The USSR is actually in a bad way, as their 5 year plans are now tossed into disarray and their major military industrial expansion has yet to happen:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Five-year_plans_for_the_national_economy_of_the_Soviet_Union#Second_plan,_1933–1937

Hitler is probably delighted in one way, frustrated in another due to not being able to intervene. Perhaps he starts putting pressure on the Poles to sign on to the pact?
Poland and Japan actually had a surprising amount of cooperation in the interwar period, so there might be some aid from them too:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japan–Poland_relations

I'd think Europe as a whole would be happy to see the Soviets stuck in a Russo-Japanese War v2.0 and hope for a similar result. Depending on how long it lasts and how costly the USSR could be in a bad way come 1939-41 and not ready for a German invasion. I'd think they'd be even more eager IOTL to sign an alliance with someone after what was going on with Japan, not sure if it would be different than IOTL, especially given the Polish-Japanese silent alliance. Finland likely has a reprieve and the USSR might not be in a position to be as aggressive as they were from 1939-40 ITTL.

Given that the Soviets would not have nearly the OTL 1939 advantage in material and Japan wouldn't be tied down in China the Soviets would have a really bad time fighting the Japanese. Remember until Zhukov showed up with major reinforcements from European Russia in summer 1939 the Japanese were whipping the Soviets badly in the border conflicts:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Suiyuan_Offensive
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kanchazu_Island_incident
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Lake_Khasan

Even in victory thanks to lopsided numbers the Soviets still took substantially heavier losses in 1939 than the Japanese:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battles_of_Khalkhin_Gol#Aftermath

Plus there is the issue of Soviet supply via the TSRR:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/2752258?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents
Though by 1937 things were improving quite a bit sustaining a war over that sort of distance is going to be real tough, especially without US L-L, which IOTL took the pressure off of the TSRR to the tune of IIRC about 2 million tons of supplies.

Likely the fighting drags out and neither side and really defeat the other, but the Japanese gain some ground and it ends with both sides exhausted and not in a great position to fight anyone else for a while after. Of course the Japanese could then jump back in if/when Germany invades ITTL to claim the victory they'd be unable to achieve on their own.

Oil.

Even if it is not to scale the Soviets should be able to manage some bomber raids on Japan and sub attacks on shipping. How much will Japan divert to air and sea defense?

Nothing. the Japanese IJNAS can handle anything the VVS or VVF has with forces in place.

Actual operational & combat experience will count for something, tho fighting the Japanese of 1937-38 would not be the same as fighting the Wehrmacht of 1941. Purges aside the largest weakness of the Red Army in 1941 was the effect of expansion from a bit over 100 infantry divisions in September 1939 to over 300 in 1941. The training organization could not cope with such, and several fundamental changes in doctrine and mobilization plans complicated things. Even if a not a single officer were purged training standards could not have been kept up to a level that could cope with the Wehrmacht of 1941. A war with Japan might offset that with a earlier mobilization/expansion, starting 1937 vs late 1939. That could lead to better doctrine, a more coherent training program, and slower more organized expansion.

Maybe, but Russian infantry tactics would still be garbage. No NCO corps worth a damn and no9t enough "ensigns" and "warrants" talented enough in the drafted levies to make a difference by OJT.

There were many deficiencies outside armor doctrine in 1941. Direct current experience would push the Red Army towards up dating infantry, artillery, reconissance, & logistics doctrines. & not taking some of the wrong course taken 1939-41.

Artillery, though the IJA artillery park was technically deficient and their doctrine stuck in the Russo Japanese War in 1937. This is not the 1941 IJA, either.

Do not need to throw body’s at Japanese. Soviet Union had advantage in tanks bombers artillery. Even if Japan had better fighters Soviet have more. Only think Japan have is fleet. But give it time it be sunk buy VVS.

And gulag was in north not east. And gulag was not extermination camp but work camp. Japan prison camps was worse then Soviet.

Agree about Gulags and Japanese internment camps. Soviet tactical aviation is complete garbage. IJNAS is good. IJAAS is "primitive". This is 1937 not 1941.

Anybody want to write timeline?

No. The mess with the Pacific war is a nightmare enough.

Need to remember here nazi Germany courted both China and Japan into 1937, perhaps with greater attention to China. Absent a Sino/Japanese war Germany continues to provide training, and other assistance to the KNT government. Assistance to Japan might be increased as well.

Germany had to pick 1. Weimar bet on China. The Berlin maniac went with Japan. I do not see this changing.

Without the war in China the Japanese could deploy over a million men against the USSR; but if in 1941 they would have had difficulty operating in Transbaikalia, in 1937 it would have been nearly impossible. Accordingly, the IGHQ established the Great Khingan Range as the general western limit of advance. On the other side, the Soviet Army was a basket case with the purges.

Comparatively, the strength of the Red Army at the time was about 1,300,000, of which 370,000 men, 1,560 aircraft, 1,500 tanks, and 64-67 subs were located in the Far East (by Japanese estimates).

The Soviets judged the Japanese Army in February 1938 to have 1,200,000 men, 4,500 heavy guns, 1,800 tanks, and 2,000 aircraft. The Soviet troops in the Far East were generally the best they had, since the STAVKA regarded Japan as the most likely enemy before Hitler started causing trouble in Europe. However, it probably would have been difficult to maintain that quality over a protracted length of time as casualties, the diluting effects of mobilization, and Stalin's paranoia took their toll.

The Japanese War Plan for 1937 vis-a-vis the USSR was as follows (from JSOM vol. 1):

- D-30: Assemble striking forces at the Eastern Border of Primorye (Maritime Province)
- D to D+90 or 120: Destroy main body of Soviet Forces in Primorye, thereafter besieging Vladivostok with 3 divisions if it had not already fallen. Northern and Western fronts will fight delaying actions until main body of forces can regroup for pivots in this direction.
- Thereafter: Defeat the expected Soviet counteroffensives on the Northern and Western Fronts, especially around Qiqihar Plains, and begin an offensive toward the border. By the summer of 1938 a defensive perimeter running through Skovorodino and Hailar should be established, which will be held indefinitely.

The forces to be used were:
- D-Day: 21 divisions (15 against Primorye, 3 for holding actions in the north vs. Blagoveshchensk, 2 for holding actions in the west, and 1 in reserve)

For command of the air: 500 aircraft, of which 200 would initially be available in Manchuria​

- D+15: 30 divisions
- D+30: 34 divisions

Additionally, smaller units (brigades, separate regiments, etc. were to be mobilized under direct Army control). Armor would be gathered into "mixed mechanized brigades" for "making attacks and exploiting results following breakthroughs in the border." Apparently the Japanese command intended to use their infantry and artillery to break through the Soviet defenses, while tanks were to be held in reserve. The IJA expected that 22 to 23 divisions plus smaller units would be available for the "Second Phase" push to the Khingan Mountains. This was expected to be a tough fight, since by that time it was anticipated that the Soviets would have brought in elite reinforcements from European Russia. As far as I can tell there is no direct prediction of the forces the Soviets would be capable of bringing to bear, but subsequent studies concluded that based on the capacities of the Trans-Siberian Railway they could eventually gather and support 55 to 60 divisions.

OIL.

Single railroad. It high capacity double or triple track. Believe me it can move a lot of trains. Long heavy trains. In war time military trains get high prioryty.

Rolling stock and way stations (, locomotive machine shops, turn-tables, train sheds, and complete marshalling yards east of Lake Baikal were few and far between. that matters. Plus until the 1938 railroad reforms the soviet rail network was "incompetent".

It could easily be destroyed by long ranged bombers. Which would severely handicap the Soviets.

Nope. not enough bombers and not enough tonnage/sortie to be effective.

There's a been a number of figures on IJA forces available, but I imagine there would be a heavy amount of involvement from the IJN especially around Vladivostok. What kind of carrier and battleship resources would be available at the outbreak and what is the likelihood of them actually coordinating with the IJA?

4 flattops and 5-7 BBs with attendant cruisers and destroyers. Probably wreck the port. Has to be taken from overland though.

Problem whit that Japan did not have good bombers. And in Soviet Union railway worker would work extra shifts for war efort. Most out of patriotism some of of fear to be sent to gulag.

They had good enough.

The Japanese carrier force was not very developed at the time, but the surface fleet was very powerful. Look at what it was able to do on the Chinese coast during the initial invasion. For something as complex and significant as a war against Russia, there would surely be a great deal of joint planning ahead of time as there was before the invasion of southeast Asia (the rivalry was intense but not at the memetic levels it is sometimes portrayed as being).

It won't take the IJNAS to ramp up. About 9 months via RTL China War results.

The Red Army would have to gather its forces and supplies around Chita because Primorye is too vulnerable and would be quickly cut off. Also since 1935 the Japanese Navy had the G3M bomber which had a range of 4400 km, and from 1938 the Army had the Ki-21, which was considerably superior to the Tupolev SB.

That bomber had a practical tactical radius of 800 km.

Why you think we lose again. Once we kick Japan of continent. We need good navy to invade Japan and netrulizem for ever

The Russians had the 3rd strongest navy on Earth (Larger than the USN on paper.) and they "thought" they were good enough to trounce the IJN which was 1/4 their size. What happened? Move forward 30 years and look at a MUCH STRONGER and BETTER navy than Russia could ever hope to float. The USN had to pound the IJN down by sheer weight of numbers and was not able to really seal the deal until it was globally 4x and locally 1.5x the size and 6x the combat power of the IJN. Russia's chances at sea are zero.

The supply bottleneck for the Soviets is around Lake Baikal, at the railway tunnels. These cannot be destroyed via an air campaign by the bombers the Japanese have at this time. IF they can somehow move to take that area, they then have to hold it. Possible, but iffy. Attacking Vladivostok via the IJN is suicidal, the defenses are too formidable. They can degrade it, but it would have to be taken by land. Again, possible, but even more difficult. The IJA is going to have to defeat the Soviets Armies, while simultaneously holding the Lake Baikal area AND keeping any forces from heading south through Mongolia. How much Mongolia had been developed by the Soviets in the interwar era I don't know. That last option may not be viable anyhow.
The only way I can see this happening is if Japan mobilizes quickly and gets enough gear and boots on the ground in theater fast enough.

Oil.

How could the Soviet Union manage to build a big fleet between 1937 and 1942? Also, to my knowledge the Soviets made little effort to improve the Trans-Siberian Railway during the war years, with the exception of the abandoned BAM project. I do know that they attempted to increase the production of munitions in Komsomolsk beginning in 1940 and at Irkutsk and Ulan-Ude thereafter, but am not aware of any additional track being laid.

In any regard, most of my figures on the Trans-Siberian Railway were already from 1944 and 1945.

Agreed. But as ON will swoop in to point out, the Russians did manage to increase their rolling stock and locomotive parks by a whopping 30% from 1938-1945 and they did manage to upgrade to double track capability clear from Baikal to Vladivostok. (With a lot of American lend lease TECHNICAL help.)

Anyway, the Japanese IJA, for all their prowess and tactical proficiency, are just as railroad bound as the Russians. They are a peasant infantryman based army that does not have enough trucks or even railroad rolling stock for their garrison forces in Manchuria, much less for cross country jaunts across hostile terrain through which they would have to attack. One means steppe and DESERT. Their artillery and basic army equipment aside from the small mechanized forces they have is stuck in the Russo Japanese War era. They will modernize light infantry tactics greatly to become the second most dangerous infantry on Earth by 1941, but in 1937, they are still stuck on stupid.

 

[sarahz]

The Japanese inflicted heavier losses in both men and tanks?

The Japanese inflicted heavier losses in both men and tanks?

What happened did indeed see the Japanese inflict heavier losses than on paper they should have done. But what it also showed was the lack of ability to replace and resupply, unlike the Soviets, and despite at times sometimes poor Soviet responsiveness the Japanese being strategically defeated and the invading force largely destroyed.

 

[thaddeus]

Disrupts the power balance estimates and makes political calculations even more confused. Germany needs 1937 Russia at least to be quiescent for example.

it seems that it would ease an earlier German-Soviet trade deal? the Soviets would drop involvement in the Spanish Civil War (one obstacle), and the German military would be uniform in approval of resuming their clandestine cooperation? (against the backdrop of Hitler's brinkmanship)

Germany had to pick 1. Weimar bet on China. The Berlin maniac went with Japan. I do not see this changing.

they haven't seized Nanking and Shanghai under this scenario? might they try the "have your cake and eat it too" policy?

OIL.

any Japanese moves against the USSR might center around seizing the rest of Sakhalin? my understanding they thought they were being "cheated" over oil production? (maybe just Soviet disinterest?)

however a CIA report estimated oil production was quickly doubled post-war https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP83-00415R006800060003-7.pdf

there is also one of largest coal mines on Sakhalin they might want to pocket?

if they do that and shoot up Vladivostok they still might be able to negotiate an end to conflict? with primary Soviet interest towards Europe.

 

[McPherson]

it seems that it would ease an earlier German-Soviet trade deal? the Soviets would drop involvement in the Spanish Civil War (one obstacle), and the German military would be uniform in approval of resuming their clandestine cooperation? (against the backdrop of Hitler's brinkmanship)

The Berlin maniac and the Moscow madman are not buddies. Weimar/Soviet cooperation of the 1920s and early 1930s breaks down fairly quickly. The "Russian German" cooperation of 1939-1941 was a pure expediency "resources for truce" and east Europe partition deal that quickly broke down as both sides stupidly tried to double cross each other. IOW ideology poisons whatever geo-political common sense should have been at work between the 2 nations. Chances of war, extremely good, mutual extended cooperation? Steep log drop from unity to zero. Question of months or even weeks before war erupts. Stalin may not have planned aggression (He was an opportunist aggressor and something of a physical and moral coward.) but the Berlin maniac was going to attack inevitably.

they haven't seized Nanking and Shanghai under this scenario? might they try the "have your cake and eat it too" policy?

A great deal depends on the appeasement west. I include the mid 1930s US in this utter imbecility. It comes down to OIL. See further.

any Japanese moves against the USSR might center around seizing the rest of Sakhalin? my understanding they thought they were being "cheated" over oil production? (maybe just Soviet disinterest?)

Sakhalin (and Manchuria oil fields) has deep drilling problems. The Japanese and the Russians have to import the tech, and the people who have it *(the Americans) have no good reason to help either nation, because both nations are "unreliable" economic partners.

however a CIA report estimated oil production was quickly doubled post-war https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP83-00415R006800060003-7.pdf

CIA estimates of the 1950s era soviet economic production capacity are notoriously unreliable. However, I am still convinced the Russians developed deep drilling techniques and applied them, along with the slave labor to get those purported production levels out of the Sakhalin fields. Remember, Soviet Russia was EXACTLY the kind of criminal ideological regime, ruled by a psychotic mass murdering no-good rotten despicably evil man, that collectively as a government and as a madman sitting at the apex of power; cared nothing about human life, dignity, and rights as such totalitarian regimes topped by such maniacs are wont to do: whether fascist, communist, or whatever form of "state is supreme" ideology is asserted to maintain the madman's personality cult rule. As long as that bastard, Stalin, is in charge; incredible feats of soviet engineering at the costs of horrendous human suffering is the order of his insane, demented and psychotic day. Sakhalin appears to have been one of those notorious soviet era achievements.

there is also one of largest coal mines on Sakhalin they might want to pocket?

Probably and doable. Certainly more probable and possible from a military standpoint than any RTL China adventure or hypothetical ITTL "Siberian" war.

if they do that and shoot up Vladivostok they still might be able to negotiate an end to conflict? with primary Soviet interest towards Europe.

Depends. Tojo was a fool, but not in power yet. And Stalin is Stalin. He might indeed give up on Sakhalin and adjacent waters (for now) hoping like the chicane and coward he is, that others fighting Japan open up an opportunity for him to play aggressor and grab east Asian spoils (like he tried to do postwar and was thwarted, except for a few crummy islands that Russia could still have lost if they had screwed up during the Cold War.).

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

I will say that the outcome of a hypothetical war would be considerably different if hostilities broke out later, say, during 1939 (Khalkhin Gol). At that point the majority of Japanese forces were mired in China and the Red Army was much larger and better equipped than it was in 1937. Also, the effects of the purges were not as severe in the Far East as they were in the west, though losing Shtern would hurt a lot.

Ya its a major game changer. I've stuck to examining this in the context of no Sino Japanese war, & no significant PoD in Europe through 1940. That is the Polish war & campaign in the west fall out pretty much as OTL. Inserting other PoD causes evets to crawl off in a impossible number of directions. Theres several changes already in event that stir up the crazy factor.

Two would be: Continuation of German assistance to KMT China. At Japanese request nazi Germany withdrew its support 1937-38. It seems likely this would continue into at least 1938, but for how long? Would China become some sort of German ally, or would it move towards alignment with the US &/or a European power like Britain?

The other is how much 1-4 years of combat experience benefits the Red Army. My take is it means a lot in the fundamentals. Never mind the arguments that the sacred tenants of Blitzkrieg wont be worshiped. The problems of the the Finnish war & 1941 were largely from bad assumptions for the mobilization & use of reservist, and lack of attention to critical aspects of training. The 16 months from the end of the Finnish war to the German war led to some corrections, but it was not enough time to overcome the larger problems 2-3 years to asorb the lessons of a war in the Far East might result in a better thought out mobilization and training regime. Plus a focus on the basics of battle skills and staff work, vs the panicky pursuit of ill understood doctrine changes which occurred from late 1939 & were fueled by the collapse of France.

 

[Oldbill]

McPherson,
While oil is a great concern, IOTL it was only during WWII that the embargo took place, after Germany had occupied Europe, and after Japan had been at war with China for years. ITTL, neither of these events is taking place. The Dutch have no reason not to sell oil to the Japanese, so they will. I believe the US will also be willing to sell just about anything to the Japanese, they are after all fighting the Communists of the Soviet Union. I'd go so far as to say the attitude of the US is that they can simply kill each other off and we'd sell them whatever it takes to do so.

I agree with you on Sakhalin. Coal was extremely important to the Japanese at this time, they will take Sakhalin. I wonder if US firms would work with the Japanese to increase production, again, they are fighting the Soviets, this may be sufficient reason to keep the US Govt. from trying to keep the oil companies from aiding the Japanese with better tech.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

One thing i'm curious about would be the possibility of a formal Japanese strategic alliance with Poland -- perhaps the Poles, in fulfilment of their (or more accurately Japan's) interests, could engage in a sort of "phony war" in the west (military exercises and small skirmishes along the border) in order to keep Stalin paranoid about an attack from that front, causing valuable troops and resources to be pulled away from the east?
Even IOTL, Japan's attitude towards Polish spies and fugitives during WW2 was quite tolerant, angering their nominal ally Hitler.

The Poles and Japanese were friendly, but I'm skeptical the Poles would do much to provoke the USSR. Sharing of intelligence might be very opaque and might be kept below Soviet observation. I don't know how far Poland had been penetrated by Soviet intelligence. Or what success the poles had vs the Reds. They did admirably well vs the Germans. Did they have much to offer Japan?

 

[McPherson]

McPherson,
While oil is a great concern, IOTL it was only during WWII that the embargo took place, after Germany had occupied Europe, and after Japan had been at war with China for years. ITTL, neither of these events is taking place. The Dutch have no reason not to sell oil to the Japanese, so they will. I believe the US will also be willing to sell just about anything to the Japanese, they are after all fighting the Communists of the Soviet Union. I'd go so far as to say the attitude of the US is that they can simply kill each other off and we'd sell them whatever it takes to do so.

A great deal depends on the appeasement west. I include the mid 1930s US in this utter imbecility. It comes down to OIL. See further.

I agree with you on Sakhalin. Coal was extremely important to the Japanese at this time, they will take Sakhalin. I wonder if US firms would work with the Japanese to increase production, again, they are fighting the Soviets, this may be sufficient reason to keep the US Govt. from trying to keep the oil companies from aiding the Japanese with better tech.

Sakhalin (and Manchuria oil fields) has deep drilling problems. The Japanese and the Russians have to import the tech, and the people who have it *(the Americans) have no good reason to help either nation, because both nations are "unreliable" economic partners.

One sells them the rope to hang each other. That is a bit different from selling them the KNIFE to murder one's self. Roosevelt goofed on that one. The Americans should have provided goods and services but not the know-how to either nation, or actually ANY nation. Soviet tank factories and Japanese scrap steel processing plants killed way too many Americans. Same goes for Germany in a related matter. Industrial know how was that mistake. (How to make analog numeric control machine tools, and organize efficient factories was a STRATEGIC advantage the Americans threw away for little profit.). There is a LESSON LEARNED here that was not learned.

McP. ​

 

[History Learner]

What happened did indeed see the Japanese inflict heavier losses than on paper they should have done. But what it also showed was the lack of ability to replace and resupply, unlike the Soviets, and despite at times sometimes poor Soviet responsiveness the Japanese being strategically defeated and the invading force largely destroyed.

I'm sorry, but what? Lake Khasan saw a Japanese victory, while Nomohan was a single Japanese division against Soviet Corps-level formations; the Kwantung Army had prepared a multi-division relief force but held back in order to not escalate the situation. Despite that, equal losses were inflicted and the worst phase of the offensive for the Japanese still saw them achieve a 1 for 1 basis. Even in 1945 at the Battle of Mutachiang-the only major engagement of the Soviet Manchurian campaign-the Japanese inflicted equal losses and destroyed 300 to 400 Soviet tanks.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Now i want to make time to game this out....

 

[YusaEmi]

What happened did indeed see the Japanese inflict heavier losses than on paper they should have done. But what it also showed was the lack of ability to replace and resupply, unlike the Soviets, and despite at times sometimes poor Soviet responsiveness the Japanese being strategically defeated and the invading force largely destroyed.

I'm sorry but I don't see how Khalkin Gol can be considered a defeat for the Japanese when the results of the battle are all the hallmarks of a victory. If anything it only counts as a "defeat" for the Japanese due to their disinterest in escalating conflicts. There's no way you can attempt and rationalize it, the Soviets did badly in Khalkin Gol and it can barely be considered a pyrrhic victory on the sheer virtue of the fact the Japanese were uninterested in pushing further.

 

[Oldbill]

Something we have barely touched on is the TSR, the Trans Siberian Railway. While the main vulnerability for it lies at Lake Baikal, there is another, more readily reached, and that is at Khabarovsk. If the Japanese land on the coast and move inland (through very difficult terrain) they could attack Khabarovsk. Cutting the line there isolates Vladivostok. Alternatively the IJN (using light units and riverine craft, many of which they would have to build) could attack down the Amur to reach the city. Isolating Vladivostok would be very damaging to the Soviets.

 

[arctic warrior]

With war in Far East the Soviets will turn the tap on aiding the Spanish Republic; early Franco victory.
Austria may still get acquired by the Berlin Madman by March 1938 but how about the Czech Crisis? Without Soviet proposals of aiding the Czechs militarily the appeasement powers may cave in earlier. The Poles and Romanians won't even have to deny the Soviets march across their territory to aid the Czechs and the republic will fall apart.
The German demands on the Corridor may come earlier than March 1939 perhaps already during late 1938 making the British and French reluctant to prop up the Poles!
The Berlin Madman might not even need the Berlin-Moscow Pact ITTL.

 

[NoMommsen]

...
Sakhalin (and Manchuria oil fields) has deep drilling problems. The Japanese and the Russians have to import the tech, and the people who have it *(the Americans) have no good reason to help either nation, because both nations are "unreliable" economic partners.
...

This ... "tech" argument of deep drilling technology that only the US-boys have had ...
I've heard it already on some occasions.

What actually was this ominuos bit of "tech" exclusive to the US no one els seems to have been able to copy ?

Not the "Rotary"-drill-bit I hope, invented/patented already 1844 by a Brit named Robert Beart (and thereby possible to be 'reinvented' by everybodyelse).

 

[McPherson]

This ... "tech" argument of deep drilling technology that only the US-boys have had ...
I've heard it already on some occasions.

What actually was this ominous bit of "tech" exclusive to the US no one else seems to have been able to copy ?

Not the "Rotary"-drill-bit I hope, invented/patented already 1844 by a Brit named Robert Beart (and thereby possible to be 'reinvented' by everybodyelse).

Howard Hughes and his special drill bits.