Japan heads north 1937, impact on Europe

[Deleted member 1487]

There were many deficiencies outside armor doctrine in 1941. Direct current experience would push the Red Army towards up dating infantry, artillery, reconissance, & logistics doctrines. & not taking some of the wrong course taken 1939-41.

That's the thing, I think given the constraints of fighting in the Far East and casualty rates other than marginal changes to tactics the pressure is going to be toward dumbing down doctrine to make it workable with masses of hastily trained conscripts with limited education (a problem of the legacy of the Czarist era and the disruptions of WW1/the RCW/the problems of the early years of the USSR) and honing the existing concepts of Deep Battle doctrine, which means very costly mass assaults. That creates a negative feedback loop of then needing even more quickly trained conscripts with even less military skills to throw into the meat grinder. As per OTL 1941 and on that allows for some honing of operational doctrines, but largely makes tactics much worse and more costly, which is a really bad thing for trying to fight a grinding attritional battle in the Far East supplied over the TSRR while still trying to maintain a deterrent force in Europe. Even going full war economy still means fighting only on what Soviet industrial resources exist after the 2nd 5 year program (no foreign support for them) and abandoning the next ones (which IOTL were crucial to preparing for war with the Nazis) and trying to maintain the TSRR despite heavy wear and tear. As it was IOTL fighting the Germans it took the Soviets years and millions of losses to learn what actually worked against their opponents, not to mention L-L and a huge heap of foreign military support on other fronts, which the Soviets will not have here. Granted the Japanese aren't the threat the Germans were, but they are not push overs and were inflicting disproportionate losses on the Soviets IOTL despite being all in on China. No Chinese conflict and Japan has all it's resources to put into fighting the USSR, which cannot use it's full resources agains the Japanese.

 

[Borya]

Japan had 600,000 men mobilized in 1937 and 1,000,000 in 1939.

Meanwhile the USSR was in the middle of purging itself in 1937, IIRC.


Stalin won't be able to partake in the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.


Populations in 1939:
Japanese Empire: 101,471,000

Japan: 71,380,000
Korea: 24,326,000
Taiwan: 5,765,000​

Soviet Union: 168,524,000


Manchukuo at its peak provided 170,000 to 220,000 men to Japan, but they understandably weren't very enthused soldiers.
By 1940, Manchukuo had somewhere between 36 and 44 million people.

During the war, the USSR mobilized 12,500,000 men.
Japan mobilized 6,095,00 men.


Even if the Japanese capture the railway, cut the Soviets off in the east, and manage to march west and take everything up to Lake Baikal, what next? The Soviets have more men and more manufacturing capacity and an absolute willingness to throw wave after wave of bodies at the outnumbered Japanese.

Maybe the Japanese create a White Russian satellite state and offer Soviet defectors protection if the serve this state. That'd be one way to even the odds a tiny bit I suppose, although it hardly evens things.



Here's a big what if: What happens if the Japanese take over Kolmya and other gulags? Imagine the global horror upon the Japanese publicizing the horrors there.

Do not need to throw body’s at Japanese. Soviet Union had advantage in tanks bombers artillery. Even if Japan had better fighters Soviet have more. Only think Japan have is fleet. But give it time it be sunk buy VVS.

And gulag was in north not east. And gulag was not extermination camp but work camp. Japan prison camps was worse then Soviet.

 

[thaddeus]

if we arrive in 1939, and Soviet-Japanese war has been ongoing for year or more, assuming Poland has remained neutral, what is the German move?

really undecided on how this timeline might develop, with USSR-Japan ongoing conflict, their preferred goal to push Poland into war with Soviets too?

a Baltic conflict was mentioned in recent thread,guess it would possible for Germany to "reach around" Poland to strike at the USSR.

 

[Borya]

really undecided on how this timeline might develop, with USSR-Japan ongoing conflict, their preferred goal to push Poland into war with Soviets too?

a Baltic conflict was mentioned in recent thread,guess it would possible for Germany to "reach around" Poland to strike at the USSR.

They. Ishtar but front be much smaller.

 

[Borya]

Anybody want to write timeline?

 

[thaddeus]

really undecided on how this timeline might develop, with USSR-Japan ongoing conflict, their preferred goal to push Poland into war with Soviets too?

a Baltic conflict was mentioned in recent thread,guess it would possible for Germany to "reach around" Poland to strike at the USSR.

They. Ishtar but front be much smaller.

part of the OP was effects on any Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, under this scenario that would be a stunning betrayal of the Japanese (and their own expressed ideology)

with a war in the Far East, the Soviets might not want to eliminate Poland as a buffer state anyway? so the Germany desire would be moot, unless they invade solo.

 

[walmart]

unless they invade solo.

If Germany invades solo , Could they present the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact as a fait accompli to the Soviets?

 

[thaddeus]

part of the OP was effects on any Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, under this scenario that would be a stunning betrayal of the Japanese (and their own expressed ideology)

with a war in the Far East, the Soviets might not want to eliminate Poland as a buffer state anyway? so the Germany desire would be moot, unless they invade solo.

If Germany invades solo , Could they present the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact as a fait accompli to the Soviets?

completely lost on this scenario, if we are assuming ongoing war between USSR-Japan, it seems Germany would want Poland to break their back against the Soviets and vice versa?

maybe the default position would be since Poland has not acted in a year(?), they are not going to act and so Germany would try to gain the territory they want, irregardless of the Soviets, present them as you say with fait accompli?

Germany might invade the corridor Pomerania and Silesia, that would present Poland with fait accompli? as well as the Soviets (who could then have real fight to gain their desired "share" of Poland)

 

[Deleted member 1487]

completely lost on this scenario, if we are assuming ongoing war between USSR-Japan, it seems Germany would want Poland to break their back against the Soviets and vice versa?

maybe the default position would be since Poland has not acted in a year(?), they are not going to act and so Germany would try to gain the territory they want, irregardless of the Soviets, present them as you say with fait accompli?

Germany might invade the corridor Pomerania and Silesia, that would present Poland with fait accompli? as well as the Soviets (who could then have real fight to gain their desired "share" of Poland)

Perhaps ITTL instead of ordering war Hitler let's Goering work on the British to work the Poles over into giving up the Corridor and Danzig?

 

[thaddeus]

completely lost on this scenario, if we are assuming ongoing war between USSR-Japan, it seems Germany would want Poland to break their back against the Soviets and vice versa?

maybe the default position would be since Poland has not acted in a year(?), they are not going to act and so Germany would try to gain the territory they want, irregardless of the Soviets, present them as you say with fait accompli?

Germany might invade the corridor Pomerania and Silesia, that would present Poland with fait accompli? as well as the Soviets (who could then have real fight to gain their desired "share" of Poland)

Perhaps ITTL instead of ordering war Hitler let's Goering work on the British to work the Poles over into giving up the Corridor and Danzig?

while a wise course, wonder if the Soviet-Japanese war might not compel them to act faster? that Poland falls in line as a "large Slovakia" or occupied per OTL? (my assumption is an ongoing Far East conflict)

of course Germany might use Soviet distraction to enact a more favorable M-R Pact? leaving for another day some of the side agreements that caused so much heartburn? (Finland, the Baltics, etc.)

 

[Deleted member 1487]

while a wise course, wonder if the Soviet-Japanese war might not compel them to act faster? that Poland falls in line as a "large Slovakia" or occupied per OTL? (my assumption is an ongoing Far East conflict)

of course Germany might use Soviet distraction to enact a more favorable M-R Pact? leaving for another day some of the side agreements that caused so much heartburn? (Finland, the Baltics, etc.)

I doubt it, Poland had too many domestic problems to sort out and didn't necessarily want the USSR gone, nor Germany occupying their country even as an ostensible ally. They didn't want to become a Slovakia or Hungary and were too powerful to simply take that lying down. Germany wasn't in a position to move for some time, so nothing was coming before 1939 per OTL, though without the Soviets to worry about perhaps the Allies might have been more aggressive against them for breaking the Munich Agreement?

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Need to remember here nazi Germany courted both China and Japan into 1937, perhaps with greater attention to China. Absent a Sino/Japanese war Germany continues to provide training, and other assistance to the KNT government. Assistance to Japan might be increased as well.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Need to remember here nazi Germany courted both China and Japan into 1937, perhaps with greater attention to China. Absent a Sino/Japanese war Germany continues to provide training, and other assistance to the KNT government. Assistance to Japan might be increased as well.

They also get a lot back:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sino-...6–1941)#Germany_and_Chinese_industrialization

Kung met von Blomberg on the afternoon of June 13 and discussed the execution of 1936 HAPRO Agreement. Under this agreement, the German Ministry of War loaned China 100 million Reichsmarks to purchase German weapons and machines. In order to repay the loan, China provided Germany with tungsten and antimony.
........
The most important industrial project from Sino-German cooperation was the 1936 Three-Year Plan, which was administered by the Chinese government's National Resources Commission and the Hapro corporation. The purpose of this plan was to create an industrial powerhouse capable of resisting Japan in the short run, and to create a centre for future Chinese industrial development for the long run. It had several basic components such as the monopolisation of all operations pertaining to tungsten and antimony, the construction of the central steel and machine works in Hubei, Hunan, and Sichuan, and the development of power plants and chemical factories. Cost overrun for these projects was partly assuaged by the fact that the price of tungsten had more than doubled between 1932 and 1936.[23] Germany also extended RM 100 million line of credit to the KMT. The Three-Year Plan introduced a class of highly educated technocrats to run these state-owned projects. At the height of this programme, Sino-German exchange accounted for 17% of China's foreign trade and China was the third largest trading partner with Germany. The Three-Year Plan had many promises, but much of its intended benefits would be undermined by the start of the Second Sino-Japanese War.[24]

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

They also get a lot back:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sino-German_cooperation_(1926–1941)#Germany_and_Chinese_industrialization

If Germany continues this past 1937 Japan may not be able to get enough from its Soviet conquest, or from Germany to compensate for Chinese development. Best case for Japan is Germany ceasing support for China & a continuation of the Europeans continuing the Unequal Treaties. A revived KMY Japan, supported by Germany would eventually bring about the end of the Colonial Concessions & related economic drag. Then start thinking seriously about its 'lost territories' in Manchuko & Korea.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

If Germany continues this past 1937 Japan may not be able to get enough from its Soviet conquest, or from Germany to compensate for Chinese development. Best case for Japan is Germany ceasing support for China & a continuation of the Europeans continuing the Unequal Treaties. A revived KMY Japan, supported by Germany would eventually bring about the end of the Colonial Concessions & related economic drag. Then start thinking seriously about its 'lost territories' in Manchuko & Korea.

Tokyo had little interest in the conquest of China, they were dragged into it by the IJA forces on the ground. So I'd think from the perspective of leadership and the IJA on the ground Chinese development won't matter for some time especially relative to the threat of the USSR and only if they try to attack Manchukuo or Japanese interests in China. Considering China has a LONG way to go before being offensively capable or even willing given their internal political problems I doubt that it would be a serious issue for Japan to be concerned with.
Plus Japan meanwhile will of course continue using Manchuria as a drug hub to destabilize Chinese society and finances their imperial efforts (they were supplying 90% of the world's illicit opium products):
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manchukuo#Drug_trafficking

Plus for Germany they don't really care about Japan once they're stuck in a war with the USSR for a while, they've fulfilled their purpose in Hitler's wider strategic goals and China is just too lucrative to cut loose. I'm sure that on balance Japan would like to see Germany not help China, but it is just too much in Germany's interest to do so thanks to the Chinese market and as a potential bigger ally than Japan. Plus Japan and Germany weren't really allies until 1940 anyway.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Absent the OTL Sino/Japanese war & 'average' KMT management some time in the 1950s by my back of the envelope calculations. The KMT begins serious pressure to end Japanese control of Manchuko. The probable strategic sequence would be: 1. neutralize the residual Communist state. 2. End the European Concessions. 3. Prepare for a war with Japan. From 1938 thats a fifteen to twenty year effort, which seems possible lacking a major war & the disruption of the Communist revolution. Of course a increase in KMT corruption & mismanagement would drag that out, or lead to a unsuccessful war with Japan. Conversely some improvement in KMT management could make a successful 1955 confrontation with Japan probable.

Another variable is Japans war with the USSR. That might ultimately weaken Japan, or leave Japan on the losing side & seriously weaker.

Lots of ways this could go.

 

[alexmilman]

I don’t think the Soviet purges were reaching the Far Eastern military districts yet.

That’s correct: Blucher was arrested and executed on 1938 and Shtern (who was a main planner of Khalkin Gol Campaign) was arrested only in 1941. Blucher at that time was not a big loss: he was suffering from a chronic drunkedness and was not up to date as far as the modern methods of warfare (*) were involved but Shtern was quite competent.

(*) The problems were known for quite a while but Stalin was shrugging them off for as long as possible (“well, today he is drunk but tomorrow he’ll sober up: the old horse knows his route”, etc.) but his clear inability to conduct a modern war was demonstrated at Lake Khasan.

 

[thaddeus]

Poland had too many domestic problems to sort out and didn't necessarily want the USSR gone, nor Germany occupying their country even as an ostensible ally. They didn't want to become a Slovakia or Hungary and were too powerful to simply take that lying down. Germany wasn't in a position to move for some time, so nothing was coming before 1939 per OTL, though without the Soviets to worry about perhaps the Allies might have been more aggressive against them for breaking the Munich Agreement?

they still have option of working out some deal with the Soviets to invade Poland? or if the Soviets were cautious, due to ongoing Far East conflict, they might strike a deal to resume trading and Germany could seize the parts of Poland most critical to them?

Plus for Germany they don't really care about Japan once they're stuck in a war with the USSR for a while, they've fulfilled their purpose in Hitler's wider strategic goals and China is just too lucrative to cut loose. I'm sure that on balance Japan would like to see Germany not help China, but it is just too much in Germany's interest to do so thanks to the Chinese market and as a potential bigger ally than Japan. Plus Japan and Germany weren't really allies until 1940 anyway.

they thought at one point to mediate between Japan and China, with both joining Anti-Comintern? seems more likely under this scenario.

the KMT might actually consolidate their control over the country?

 

[YusaEmi]

Could Japan gain outer Manchuria and Sakhalin?

Yes.

 

[BobTheBarbarian]

@BobTheBarbarian thoughts?

Without the war in China the Japanese could deploy over a million men against the USSR; but if in 1941 they would have had difficulty operating in Transbaikalia, in 1937 it would have been nearly impossible. Accordingly, the IGHQ established the Great Khingan Range as the general western limit of advance. On the other side, the Soviet Army was a basket case with the purges.

Comparatively, the strength of the Red Army at the time was about 1,300,000, of which 370,000 men, 1,560 aircraft, 1,500 tanks, and 64-67 subs were located in the Far East (by Japanese estimates).
The Soviets judged the Japanese Army in February 1938 to have 1,200,000 men, 4,500 heavy guns, 1,800 tanks, and 2,000 aircraft. The Soviet troops in the Far East were generally the best they had, since the STAVKA regarded Japan as the most likely enemy before Hitler started causing trouble in Europe. However, it probably would have been difficult to maintain that quality over a protracted length of time as casualties, the diluting effects of mobilization, and Stalin's paranoia took their toll.

The Japanese War Plan for 1937 vis-a-vis the USSR was as follows (from JSOM vol. 1):

- D-30: Assemble striking forces at the Eastern Border of Primorye (Maritime Province)
- D to D+90 or 120: Destroy main body of Soviet Forces in Primorye, thereafter besieging Vladivostok with 3 divisions if it had not already fallen. Northern and Western fronts will fight delaying actions until main body of forces can regroup for pivots in this direction.
- Thereafter: Defeat the expected Soviet counteroffensives on the Northern and Western Fronts, especially around Qiqihar Plains, and begin an offensive toward the border. By the summer of 1938 a defensive perimeter running through Skovorodino and Hailar should be established, which will be held indefinitely.

The forces to be used were:
- D-Day: 21 divisions (15 against Primorye, 3 for holding actions in the north vs. Blagoveshchensk, 2 for holding actions in the west, and 1 in reserve)

For command of the air: 500 aircraft, of which 200 would initially be available in Manchuria​

- D+15: 30 divisions
- D+30: 34 divisions

Additionally, smaller units (brigades, separate regiments, etc. were to be mobilized under direct Army control). Armor would be gathered into "mixed mechanized brigades" for "making attacks and exploiting results following breakthroughs in the border." Apparently the Japanese command intended to use their infantry and artillery to break through the Soviet defenses, while tanks were to be held in reserve. The IJA expected that 22 to 23 divisions plus smaller units would be available for the "Second Phase" push to the Khingan Mountains. This was expected to be a tough fight, since by that time it was anticipated that the Soviets would have brought in elite reinforcements from European Russia. As far as I can tell there is no direct prediction of the forces the Soviets would be capable of bringing to bear, but subsequent studies concluded that based on the capacities of the Trans-Siberian Railway they could eventually gather and support 55 to 60 divisions.